LawCare Nigeria

Nigeria Legal Information & Law Reports

National Industrial Court

MR. RICHARD OGUGU -vs- BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED & ANOR

admin 0

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE YENAGOA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT YENAGOA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE BASHAR .A. ALKALI

DATE: FEBRUARY 13, 2018                             SUIT NO: NICN/YEN/69/2017

BETWEEN:

  1. RICHARD OGUGU

AND

  1. BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED
  2. EBIKABOWEI C. DORGU

REPRESENTATION

Mr. N.A Wanogho Esq appearing with J.O Wanogho Esq. and Amba Prosper Esq for the Claimant.

Mr. Gibson Esowa Esq for the Defendant.

 

JUDGEMENT

The Claimant instituted this action by an Originating Summons dated and filed the 27th day of October, 2017. The Originating Summons is supported by a 21 Paragraphs Affidavit sworn to by the Claimant. Also attached to the Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons are four (4) Exhibits, namely Exhibit A, B, C  and D.

CLAIMANTS’ CASE

The brief fact of this case as contained in the Affidavit in Support of this Originating Summons (paragraphs 2-20), The Claimant is an employee of the 1st Defendant. That the Claimant via an employment letter dated 2nd April, 2012 (Exhibit A) was employed as the “Executive Director-Business Development of the 1st Defendant.  And the 1st Defendant (Bayelsa Oil Company Limited) is a Limited Liability Company incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 as evidenced in Exhibit B, while the 2nd Defendant is the Managing Director of the 1st Defendant as at the time of the institution of this action. And that the 1st Defendant has a “Personnel Policy” which guides the activities of the 1st Defendant in relation to its employees and/or how the 1st Defendant conduct its human relation matters with its employees as contained in Exhibit C.

Also, that as a fact, Paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy provides that an employee of the 1st Defendant may be suspended from duty with or without pay for a period not exceeding two (2) weeks and the employee will receive a written notice stating the reasons for the suspension period and the effective date of the suspension. Also that Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, provides that an employee whose conduct is under investigation may be suspended from duty for the length of investigation. However, after thirty (30) days of suspension, if the investigation is not completed, then the employee shall be paid half of his basic salary till completion of investigation.  But, precisely on the 17th day of October, 2017, the 1st Defendant through the 2nd Defendant served the Claimant with a suspension letter (Exhibit D) where the Claimant was suspended indefinitely without pay which is contrary to Paragraph 59 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy, As an employee can only be suspended with or without pay for a period not exceeding two weeks. And that since by the contents of Exhibit D (Suspension letter) the 1st Defendant is not investigating the Claimant’s conduct as such Paragraph 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy can not be the basis for his indefinite suspension. And that even by the provisions of Paragraph 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy, where an employee of the 1st Defendant is suspended from duty pending investigation, the employee shall be entitled to be paid half of his salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after thirty (30) days from the date of suspension of such employee.  That the purported letter of suspension issued to the Claimant by the 1st Defendant through the 2nd Defendant, do not state that the Claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after thirty (30) days from the date of suspension, and as such his purported indefinite suspension can not be based on the provisions of Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy. By suspending the Claimant indefinitely without pay by the 1st Defendant though the 2nd Defendant is a breach of Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy.

SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT

The Claimant being dissatisfied with the action of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, brings this summons for the determination of the following questions:

  1. Whether or not by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant can suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and/or for an indefinite period of time?

 

  1. If issue 1is answered in the negative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay, by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void, illegal and of no effect whatsoever, in that same contravenes paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy?
  2. Whether or not by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY. It is only an employee of the 1st defendant whose conduct is under investigation that can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation?
  3. If issue 3 is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal, of no effect whatsoever and not based on the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the claimant is under investigation?
  4. Whether or not by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, where an employee of the 1st defendant is suspended from duty pending investigation, the employee shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension of such employee?
  5. If Issue 5 is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal, not based on the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of suspension do not state that the claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension?

The Claimant further sought for the following reliefs:

  1. A DECLARATION that by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant cannot suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and/or for an indefinite period of time.

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal and of no effect whatsoever, in that same contravenes PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY.

 

 

  1. A DECLARATION that by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, it is only an employee of the 1st defendant, whose conduct is under investigation that can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation.

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal, of no effect whatsoever and not based on the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the claimant is under investigation.

 

 

  1. A DECLARATION that by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, where an employee of the 1st defendant is suspended from duty pending investigation, the employee shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension of such employee.

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal, not based on the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of suspension do not state that the claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension.
  2. A MANDATORY ORDER OF COURT setting aside the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, in that same is in breach of PARAGRAPH 59 & 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY.
  3. AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the defendants from further suspending or dismissing the claimant from his employment or job with the 1st defendant, based on the subject matter of this suit.
  4. AN ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT awarding the sum of N20, 000, 000. 00(Twenty Million) naira only, in favour of the claimant and against the 1st & 2nd defendant, as exemplary and punitive damages for the wrongful or illegal indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay.
  5. ANY FURTHER ORDER or other orders the Honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this application.

In his Written Address the Claimant formulated Six (6) Issues for Determination as follows:

  1. Whether or not by the provisions of Paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, the first defendant acting through the 2nd defendant can suspend an employee from duty without pay indefinitely and or for an indefinite period of time?

 

 

  1. If No. 1 is answered in the negative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void; illegal and of no effect whatsoever, in that same contravenes Paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy?

 

 

  1. Whether or not by the provision of Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, It is only an employee of the 1st Defendant, whose conduct is under investigation that can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation?

 

  1. If Issue No. 4 is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void, of no effect whatsoever and not based on the provisions of Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the claimant is under investigation.

 

 

  1. Whether or not by the provisions of Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, where an employee of the 1st Defendant is suspended from duty pending investigation, the employee should be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after (30) thirty days from the date of suspension of such employee?

 

  1. If Issue No. 6 is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal, not based on the provision of Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, in that the said purported letter of suspension do not state that the claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after thirty days (30) days from the date of suspension?

 

On the First Issue, on whether or not by the provisions of Paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, the 1st Defendant through the 2nd  Defendant can suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and or for an indefinite period of time, the Claimant submitted that by the provisions of Paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd  Defendant, can not suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and/or for an indefinite period of time. That a body and/or organizations that have rules, policy, document and / or constitution regulating its activities or relationship is bound to the provisions of the said rules, policy, documents and / or constitution, and nothing can be done by that body and / or organization in contravention of the said rules, policy, document and / or constitution.

That from the content of ‘Exhibit A’ (.i.e the letter of employment through which the Claimant was employed as the ‘Executive Director –  Business Development’ of the 1st Defendant) and ‘Exhibit C’ (.i.e the 1st Defendant’s ‘Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’), which both exhibits are annexed to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, it is crystal clear that the 1st Defendant have a ‘Personnel Policy’ which guides the activities of the 1st Defendant in relation to its employees and / or how the 1st Defendant conducts its human relation matters with its employees.

Whereas Clause 1.3 of the Introductory Part of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. ‘Exhibit C’) expressly provides that the said policy ‘has been formulated to guide all employees and to enable them understand the company’s responsibilities towards its employees and the company’s expectation from its employees (vice versa)’, the letter of employment through which the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant (.i.e ‘Exhibit A’) further provides that the Claimant shall be entitled to ‘other entitlements as contained in the existing personnel policy’.

PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY provides as follows:

‘As the discretion of the company, an employee may be suspended from duty with or without pay for a period not exceeding two weeks. The employee will receive a written notice stating the reason for the suspension period and the effective date.’

Claimant/Applicant submitted that from the totality of the provisions of PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, can only suspend an employee from duty without pay, for a period not exceeding two weeks, and reasons for the suspension period must be clearly stated.

That a careful perusal of Exhibit D’ (.i.e. the letter of suspension through which the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant suspended the claimant) will show that the claimant was suspended indefinitely without pay and / or no suspension period was given in the said letter of suspension.

The OXFORD ADVANCE LEARNER’S DICTIONARY (NEW 8TH EDITION) @ PAGE 762, defines the word “indefinite” to mean ‘lasting for a period of time that has no fixed end’.

The Claimant respectfully submitted that a suspension made under PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, is not meant to last indefinitely or for a period of time that has no fixed end. Rather, a suspension made under PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY is meant to specify the period of the suspension and such period must not exceed two weeks, humbly urge this court to so hold.

It is also the submission of the claimant that the wordings of PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY are clear and unambiguous, thus urge this court to hold that the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant cannot suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and / or for an indefinite period of time. On this submission, rely on the case of UNITY BANK PLC VS OLATUNJI (2015) 5 N.W.L.R. (PART 1452) Page 203 RATIO 9 at Page 213.

That the operative word used in PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY with respect to the length of time for which an employee of the 1st Defendant can be suspended is ‘for a period of two weeks’ submitted that ‘not’ connote compulsoriness or duty which must be complied to by the 1st Defendant.

On what should aid this court in interpreting the provisions of PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY claimant respectfully submit that by examining the said provision, this Honourable Court can by employing adequate guidance from the provision, arrive at a correct decision. In performing this task, the Judge ought to be persuaded by the immortal words of the indefatigable Lord Denning, MR, when faced with the onerous task of interpreting a provision in the rent Act, 1920 in SEAFORD COURT ESTATES LTD VS ASHER (1949) 2 KB 481 and he held that:

‘He (The Judge) must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of parliament, and must do this not only for language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and on the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the intention of the legislature…. Put into homely metaphor, it is this: a judge should ask himself the question: if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases’.

That from the totality of the above, claimant urged that this Honourable court should resolve the issue 1 in favour the Claimant and against the Defendant, by holding that by the provision of PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, cannot suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and / or for an indefinite period of time.

On Issue Two, The Claimant submitted that if Issue 1 is answered in the negative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay, by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal and of no effect whatsoever, in that same contravenes PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY.

In arguing Issue 2, Claimant adopt the arguments contained in Issue 1 above and further submitted that if this Honourable Court resolve Issue 1 in favour of the claimant and/or answer Issue 1 in the negative, then it is humbly submitted that the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay, by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal and of no effect whatsoever, in that same contravenes PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY.

That from the content of the letter of suspension through which the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant suspended the claimant (i.e Exhibit D), it is aptly clear that the claimant was suspended indefinitely.

Based on the legal arguments canvassed with respect to Issue 1 above, Claimant submit that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay, by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant is null and void, illegal and of no effect whatsoever, in that PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY provides that the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, cannot suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and/or for an indefinite period of time.

A communal reading of PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY shows that the 1st defendant can only suspend its employee (i.e the Claimant) for a period not exceeding two weeks and reasons for the suspension period must be clearly stated. And humbly urged that Issue 2 be resolved in favour of the Claimants and against the Defendants, by holding that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay, by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void, illegal and of no effect whatsoever, in that same contravenes PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY.

On the Third Issue, that is whether or not the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, it is only an employee of the 1st Defendant, whose conduct is under investigation that can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation?

In arguing Issue 3, Claimant adopt all the legal arguments contained in Issue 1 above and further submitted that by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, it is only an employee of the 1st Defendant, whose conduct is under investigation that can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation.

PARAGARAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY provides as follows:

‘An employee whose conduct is under investigation may be suspended from duty for the length of investigation. However, after 30 days of suspension, if the investigation is not completed, then the employee is paid half of his/her basic salaries till the completion of investigation’.

That from the content of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, it is submitted that before the 1st defendant can suspend an employee from duty for the length of an investigation, such employee’s conduct must first be under investigation. Thus, it is submitted that without an employee’s conduct being under investigation, such an employee cannot be suspended by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant. Submitted that the wordings of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY are expressly clear and unambiguous and humbly urge this Honourable Court to give them their ordinary meaning. Rely on the case of UNITY BANK PLC VS OLATUNJI (SUPRA)  RATIO 9 AT PAGE 213 and urged that Issue 3 be resolved in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendants, by holding that by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, it is only an employee of the 1st Defendant, whose conduct is under investigation that can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation. Urged this court to grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant on the face of his Originating Summons.

On the Fourth Issue, The Claimant submitted that if Issue 3 is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal, of no effect whatsoever and not based on the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the claimant is under investigation?

In arguing Issue 4, the Claimant adopt legal arguments contained in Issue 1 & 3 above, And further submitted that if this Honourable Court resolve Issue 3 in favour of the Claimant and/or answer Issue 3  in the affirmative, then it is humbly submitted that the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void, illegal, of no effect whatsoever and not based on the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the Claimant is under investigation. That a careful perusal of the content of the letter of suspension through which the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant suspended the claimant (i.e Exhibit D), aptly shows that the Claimant was not suspended because his conduct was under investigation. In fact, a communal reading of the content of the purported letter of suspension (.i.e Exhibit D) will show clearly that the 1st & 2nd Defendant had already concluded investigation and/or come to a conclusion, hence the suspension of the Claimant. This being the case, it is respectfully submitted that PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY is most inapplicable in the suspension of the Claimant, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the Claimant is under investigation. Flowing from the legal argument contained in paragraphs 8.3 of this Written Address, submitted that the only applicable portion of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy is PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, which stipulates that an employee of the 1st Defendant cannot be suspended for more than two weeks. Urged that Issue 4 be resolved in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendants, by holding that the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void, illegal, of no effect whatsoever and not based on the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the Claimant is under investigation.

On the fifth issue, The Claimant submitted that whether or not by the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, where an employee of the 1st Defendant is suspended from duty pending investigation, the employee shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension of such employee?

In arguing issue 5, claimant adopt the legal arguments contained in Issue 1, 3 & 4 above, and further submitted that by the provisions of PARAGRAPHS 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, where an employee of the 1st defendant is suspended from duty pending investigation, the employee shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension of such employee. Urge this court to so hold.

 

PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY provides as follows:

 

‘An employee whose conduct is under investigation may be suspended from duty for the length of investigation. However, after 30 days of suspension, if the investigation is not completed, then the employee is paid half of his/her basic salaries till the completion of investigation.’

 

That from the content of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMIED PERSONNEL POLICY, it can be deduced that where the 1st defendant suspend an employee from duty for the length of an investigation and after 30 days of suspension, if the investigation is not completed, then the employee is paid half of his/her basic salaries till the completion of investigation. The wordings of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY are expressly clear and unambiguous and we humbly urge this Honourable Court to give them their ordinary meaning. On this position of the law, Rely on the case of UNITY BANK PPLC VS OLATUNJI (SUPRA) @ RATIO 9 AT PAGE 213 and urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the claimant.

On the sixth issue, The claimant contended that if issue 6 is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the purported indefinite suspension of the claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd defendant, is null and void, illegal, not based the provisions of PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of suspension do not state that the Claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty)days from the date of suspension?

In arguing Issue 6 (six), Claimant adopt the legal arguments contained in issue 1, 3 & 5 above, and further  submitted that if this Honourable Court resolve Issue 6 in favour of the Claimant and/or answer Issue 6 in the affirmative, then it is humbly submitted that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void, illegal, not based the provisions of PARAGRAPH OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of suspension do not state that the Claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension. That a careful perusal of the content of the letter of suspension through which the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd defendant suspended the claimant (i.e ‘Exhibit D’), aptly shows that the said letter of suspension do not state that the claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension. In fact, a communal reading of the content of the purported letter of suspension (i.e Exhibit D) will show clearly that the claimant was suspended indefinitely without pay. This being the case, it is respectfully submitted that PARAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY is most inapplicable in the suspension of the claimant, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30(thirty) days from the date of suspension. Flowing from the legal argument contained in Paragraphs 10.3 of this Written Address, Claimant submitted that the only applicable portion of the 1st Defendant’s ‘PERSONNEL POLICY’ is PARAGRAPH 59 OF THE BAYELSA OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, which stipulates that employee of the 1st Defendant cannot be suspended for more than two weeks.

And humbly urge that Issue 6 be resolved in favour of Claimant and against the Defendants, by holding that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void, illegal, not based on the provision of PARAGRAGRAPH 62 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, in that the said purported letter of suspension do not state that the Claimant shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 (thirty) days from the date of suspension. Urge this court to do so.

The Claimant urges this court to grant all the reliefs sought by the claimant on the face of his originating summons.

 

THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT

The Defendants filed their Memorandum of Appearance dated and filed 13th November, 2017, also alongside filed a Motion on Notice for Extension of time within which to file and serve 19 paragraphs counter affidavit together with a Written Address dated 24th November, 2017 and filed on the 27th November, 2017 (which same was moved and granted on the 11th December, 2017). Also filed along with the said Defendant’s counter affidavit dated 27th November, 2017 and filed on the same date, are four (4) Exhibits (Exhibits A, B, C and D), and a Written Address.

The Defendants in their counter affidavit which was deposed to by the 2nd Defendant denied the depositions as contained in the supporting affidavit, and further denied all the claims of the claimant. The Defendants admitted that the claimant was, vide a letter dated 17th October, 2017, placed on an indefinite suspension without pay by the 1st Defendant through the 2nd Defendant. And being aggrieved by the said suspension, The Claimant filed this suit on the 27th October, 2017 vide an originating summons challenging the legality of the said indefinite suspension on the face of Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy. In response, the Defendants filed a 19 Paragraph Counter Affidavit and Four (4) Exhibits (Exhibits A – D)

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS

The Defendants formulated three issues that arise for the determination in the circumstance of this case as follows:

  1. Whether this suit is competent and whether the Claimant has a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants.
  2. Whether the suspension of the Claimant is in line with the Personnel Policy of the 1st Defendant.
  • Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this case.

ON ISSUE ONE, ON WHETHER THIS SUIT IS COMPETENT AND WHETHER THE CLAIMANT HAS REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.

The Defendants submit that the Claimant’s suit is premature, incompetent and that the Claimant has no reasonable cause of action against the Defendants.

That the Claimant does not have a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants in the pursuit of the reliefs which is sought before this Court and hence this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action.

The term reasonable cause of action is a term which has ascribed definite meaning as a result of judicial attempts at unearthing its meaning and scope. In the case of EGBE VS ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 47) 1, the erudite Oputa JSC held thus:

“Now let us look at the meaning of cause of action. It is admittedly an expression that defies precise definition. But it can safely be defined as the fact or facts which establish or give rise to the right of action-it is the factual situation which give a person a right to judicial relief. A cause of action is to be distinguished from a right of action. A right of action is the right to enforce presently a cause of action. In other words a cause of action is the operative fact or facts (the factual situation) which give rise to the right of action which itself is a remedial right”.

Also cited the case of HANSEATIC INT’L LTD VS USANG (2002) 13 N.W.L.R (Pt. 784) 376 at 408.

The gravamen of the case of the Claimant is that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the Defendants contravenes Paragraph 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Company Policy (Exhibit D).

Paragraph 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant Company Policy (Exhibit D) are hereby reiterated ease of reference. Paragraph 59 states as follows:

“At the discretion of the company, an employee maybe suspended from duty with or without pay for a period not exceeding two weeks. The employee will receive a written notice stating the reason for the suspension period and effective date”

Paragraph 62 states as follows:

“An employee whose conduct is under investigation maybe be suspended from duty with or without pay for the length of the investigation. However after 30 days of the suspension, if the investigation is not completed, then the employee is paid half of his salary/her basic salary till the completion of the investigation”.

That the point that can be gleaned from Paragraph 59 of EXHIBIT D as stated above are:

  1. The company can as its discretion suspend an employee.

 

  1. The suspension maybe with or without pay.

 

 

  • The suspension period shall not exceed two weeks.

 

  1. The suspension shall be by a written notice stating the reasons for the suspension period.

Further submit that from the above points, it is crystal clear that the Claimant’s right under Paragraph 59 of EXHIBIT D has not been breached. This is because the Claimant’s suspension has only lasted for ten (10) days before he filed this action. The Claimant’s suspension letter (EXHIBIT B) shows that he was suspended on the 17th of October, 2017 while the suit was filed on the 27th October, 2017. Refers to Paragraph 10 of Defendants’ Counter-Affidavit. It is therefore obvious that the suspension of the Claimant has not exceeded two weeks before he rushed to the court to file this action. The Claimant’s right or protection under Paragraph 59 above cannot be said to be breached until the suspension exceeds two weeks.

Therefore the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant rightly exercised its discretion to suspend the Claimant without pay. Unfortunately, the Claimant did not wait for two weeks to elapse in other to ascertain whether his suspension will be lifted or not. Besides, Paragraph 59 of EXHIBIT D, the clear obligation on the part of the 1st Defendant is to ensure that the suspension is by written notice stating the reason and effective date of the suspension: and this was strictly complied with by the Defendants.

Further submit that by Paragraph 62 of EXHIBIT D an employee suspended on account of being investigated shall be entitled to half of his basic salary till completion of investigation if the investigation is not completed after 30 days. Obviously, the suspension of the Claimant has reached 30 days before he rushed to court. It is therefore also submitted that the Claimant’s right under Paragraph 62 of EXHIBIT D has not been breached.

The Defendants further submitted that the Claimant’s case is pre-mature and that the Claimant does not have a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants in the pursuit of the reliefs which is sought before this court and hence this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action.

Therefore urge the Honourable Court to dismiss this suit for want of jurisdiction.

On Issue Two, whether the suspension of the Claimant is in line with the Personnel Policy of the 1st Defendant, the Defendants contended that the suspension of the Claimant as contained per EXHIBIT B is in line with the Personnel Policy of the 1st Defendant (EXHIBIT D). The suspension of the Claimant did not in any way offend paragraph 59, 62 or any other provision of the Exhibit D.

For the argument that the Defendants’ suspension of the Claimant did not offend Paragraph 59 of EXHIBIT D before the commencement of this suit, Defendants rely on their arguments in Paragraphs 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 of their written address.

Also that the Defendants’ suspension of the Claimant was issued in full compliance with Paragraph 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy (EXIHIBIT D). Paragraph 62 of EXHIBIT D is an exception to Paragraph 59 because it makes provision for a circumstance under which an employee can be placed on indefinite suspension beyond two weeks.

Sir, EXHIBIT B shows that the Claimant was suspended based on allegations of serious misconduct (Refer this court to Paragraph 6 of the Defendant’s Counter-Affidavit).

Also, the Defendants’ Counter-Affidavit is clear on the fact that upon the suspension of the Claimant, the 2nd Defendant, vide an Internal Memo dated 18th of October, 2017, constituted a committee to within thirty (30) days, investigate the allegations of serious misconduct against the Claimant and come up with recommendations. It is also contained in the Counter-Affidavit that the said committee commenced investigation into the allegation of serious misconduct against the Claimant and the committee in course of performing their assignment, had started gathering information, records and documents for analysis so that they can invite the Claimant for his defense. Also, the Committee was mandated to invite the Claimant for his defense, not later than seventeen (17) days after the constitution of the Committee. It is also clear from the Counter-Affidavit that the Claimant filed this suit on the 27th of October 2017 before he could be invited by the Committee to state his defense, as this suit was filed just nine (9) days after the constitution of the committee. (Refer this Court to Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Defendants’ Counter-Affidavit and EXHIBIT C annexed therein).

Therefore Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Defendants’ Counter-Affidavit and EXHIBIT C shows that the Claimant’s conduct is under investigation in line with Paragraph 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy (EXHIBIT D). Unfortunately, the Claimant rushed to the court just nine (9) days after the constitution of the committee before he could be invited by the Committee to state his defense. The Claimant’s suspension and investigation had not lasted up to 30 days before he filed this suit. As such, the issue of paying the Claimant half of his basic salary does not arise.

That the position of the law is very clear that speculation or conjecture has no place in our courts. Neither the parties nor the court is permitted or entitled to speculate anything. A court will interfere to set any speculation aside. Refer this court to: IBN LTD VS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 417) P. 1 AT 36, RATIO 10.

Accordingly, urge this court to discountenance the argument of Claimant’s Counsel in Paragraph 8.3 and 8.4 of his written address as same amount to speculation.

The Claimant’s filing of this suit just ten (10) days after his suspension is premature and a calculated pre-emption of the Internal Mechanism of the 1st Defendant.

On the third issue, on whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this case? The Defendants submit that the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought in this case because his suspension is in line with the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy (EXHIBIT D). Rely on arguments in Issue Two above.

Further submit that Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s Affidavit in support of Originating Summons contravene Section 115 (2) of Evidence Act 2011 in that the said paragraphs contains legal arguments and conclusions. And happily, Order41 Rule 11 of the National Industrial Court Rules (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017 states that the provisions of Section 107 to 120 of Evidence Act which set out the provisions governing Affidavit shall be applicable under the Rules of this court.

It is the law that Affidavit evidence must not contain prayers, legal arguments and conclusions and where they do, they offend the provisions Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. And in the event that such situation exists, as in this case, the paragraphs containing the offensive depositions must be struck out. I also rely on the case of: F.B.I.R VS INTERGATED DATA SERVICE LTD (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 490) P. 788 AT 794 RATIO 7; OLAIFA VS CHAIRMAN, IBADAN NORTH EAST LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 455) P. 1724 AT 1728 RATIO 8.

Accordingly, urge this Honourable court to strike out paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s Affidavit in support of Originating Summons as they are in contravention of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. Further submits that once the aforesaid offensive paragraphs of the Claimant’s Affidavits are struck out, there is nothing left in the claimant’s affidavit to sustain the reliefs sought in this case. Therefore submit that the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought in this case.

The Defendants further submitted that the relief in paragraph 8 of reliefs sought as contained in the face of the Claimant’s Originating Summons is not grantable in law. The relief amounts to inviting this Honourable Court to take over the running and management of the 1st Defendant. The same relief states as follows:

“An order of injunction restraining the Defendants from further suspending and dismissing the Claimant from his employment or job with the 1st Defendant, based on the subject matter of this suit”.

The law remains that in a mere master/servant relationship, being a contract not clothed with statutory flavour, as in this case, the master has unfettered right and liberty to terminate his servant’s employment or dismiss his servant from employment at any time and for any reason and for no reason at all, provided that the terms of contract of service between them are compiled with. This is because a willing servant cannot be imposed on an unwilling master. Rely on the cases of: DUDUSOLA VS N.G. CO. LTD (2013) 10 N.W.L.R (PT. 1363) P. 423, AT 438, PARAS D-G; FAKAUDE VS O.A.U.T.H (1993) 5 NWLR (PT. 291) 47.

Therefore granting the relief sought by Claimant amount to fettering the right of the 1st Defendant under the law to hire and fire which will mean foisting a willing servant on an unwilling master against the age long position of the law. That the 1st Defendant reserves the unfettered right to suspend, terminate the employment or dismiss the Claimant at any time provided such action is in line with EXHIBIT D. Therefore, this suit cannot be a ploy to circumscribe the right of the 1st Defendant which is cognizable under the law.

It is trite law that where a particular relief sought by a party is vague, unmanageable, or unspecific, the Court will refuse to grant such a relief. Rely on A-G OGUN STATE VS A-G FEDERATION (2002) 18 N.W.L.R (PT 798) P. 232 AT 246, RATIO 7. Also, in the case of EMMANUEL VS DOHERTY (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 445) P. 1634 AT 1646 PARAGRAPHS G-H. The court held that every relief sought in the court must be clear, precise and quantifiable, it must be devoid of speculation. It was equally held that the trial court erred by granting reliefs sought by the Defendants which was bound to create speculations. Accordingly, we submit that the above cited relief is not grantable in law same being vague, ambiguous, imprecise and bound to create speculation and we therefore urge the court to disregard same.

Furthermore, the Defendants submit that the Claimant is not entitled to the N20, 000, 000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) claimed in paragraph 9 of reliefs sought, against the Defendants as exemplary and punitive damages for alleged wrongful indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay.

When a suspension is adjudged to be wrongful, the employee is only entitled to his wage or salary for the period of wrongful suspension. This is because, suspension is not dismissal; when an employee is suspended, his contract of employment remains subsisting and unbroken. I rely on the case of: ADEKUNLE VS WESTERN REGION FINANCE CORPORATION (1963) WNLR 5; OYELUDE VS CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1977) NCLR 368.

Assuming but not conceding that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant is wrongful, we humbly submit that he is only entitled to his salary or wages for the period of suspension. The Claimant intends to take advantage of alleged and unproved wrongful suspension to harvest a windfall that is not applicable to this case. Accordingly submit that the Claimant is not entitled to the N20, 000, 000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) claimed in Paragraph 9 of reliefs sought, against the Defendants as exemplary and punitive damages as same is frivolous, unmeritorious, gold-digging and inapplicable.

Finally, the Defendant urge this court to dismiss the Claimant’s case as same is incompetent, premature, speculative and unmeritorious.

 

THE CLAIMANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW

The Claimant further filed a reply on points of law in response to the Defendants’ Written Address. It is dated 8th December, 2017 and filed on the same date. It is also being accompanied with a 14 Paragraphs further affidavit in response to the Defendants’ counter affidavit. The further affidavit is dated 8th December, 2017 and filed on the same date.

In reply on the points of law, the Claimant further formulated five (5) issues for determination as follows:

  1. Whether the claimant has a reasonable cause of action and/or the Claimant’s suit is premature or incompetent?
  2. Whether the suspension of the Claimant is in line with the Personnel Policy of the 1st Defendant?
  • Whether paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons offends or contravenes the provisions of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011?
  1. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit?
  2. Whether paragraphs 17 (a-f) of the Defendants’ Counter Affidavit amounts to legal argument and as such contravenes the provisions of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, and as such ought to be struck out?

On the first issue on whether the Claimant has a reasonable cause of action and/or the Claimant’s suit is premature or incompetent? The Claimant submitted that in paragraph 3.0 – 3.12 of the Defendants’ Written Address. The Defendant’s Counsel erroneously submitted that the Claimant has no reasonable cause of action and/or that the Claimant suit is premature and incompetent. The reasons for the said submission of the Defendant Counsel are in two folds they are: (1) That by paragraphs 59 & 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy. The defendant has the discretion to suspend the Claimant indefinitely and that the Claimant’s right has not been breached; and (ii) That by Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy. The Claimant ought to have waited for two (2) weeks or thirty (30) days to elapse on being suspended before instituting this suit, hence the Claimant’s suit is premature or incompetent.

That the Defendants have admitted vide their Counter-Affidavit and Written Address that the Claimant was suspended indefinitely, and the claimant being aggrieved to such indefinite suspension do not comply with his terms of employment as contained in Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. The 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy) which said 1st Defendant Personnel Policy regulates the terms and conditions of the Claimant’s employment, raise a reasonable cause of action.

Further submitted that Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy), do not provide that an employee of the 1st Defendant must wait for two weeks or thirty (30) days to elapse on been suspended before instituting a suit against the Defendant, hence the Claimant’s suit is not premature or incompetent. For clarity sake, the said paragraphs 59 and 62 of The ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy) only provides the duration of suspension and/or procedure for the suspension of the 1st Defendant’s employee and the Claimant vide this suit is contending that the said duration of suspension and/or procedure for the suspension as contained in Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy) was not complied with when he was indefinitely suspended.

That by the provisions of PARAGRAPHS 59 AND 62 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY’, the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant cannot suspend an employee from duty without pay, indefinitely and/or for indefinite period of time. From the provisions of Paragraphs 59 of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ the  1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant can only suspend an employee without pay, for a period not exceeding two weeks and not indefinitely.

That in the case of AIG-IMOUKHUEDE VS UBAH (2015) 8 N.W.L.R (PART 1462) PAGE 399 @ PARAGRAPH C @ PAGE 435 cause of action was defined as ‘simply a factual situation the existence of which entitled one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person’. It is also respectfully submitted that the claimant’s contention in this suit that his suspension contravenes paragraphs 59 and 62 of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy) raises a reasonable cause of action in that once this Honourable Court holds that the said suspension do not comply with Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy), then this Honourable court is bound to set aside the indefinite suspension.

Further submitted that in determining whether the Claimant suit discloses reasonable cause of action, ‘the court must limit itself to the Claimant’s claims and not resort whatsoever must be made to the Defendants’ defence’. Rely on the case of BELOXXI & CO. LTD VS SOUTHTRUST BANK (2012) 2 N.W.L.R (PART 1285) PAGE 605 @ PARAGRAPHS E-F @ PAGE 616. Thus respectfully urge the Honourable court t discountenance any defense raised by the defendants in determining whether the claimant’s suit discloses a reasonable cause of action.

But assuming but not conceding that the Honourable court holds that the claimant’s suit  do not disclose a reasonable cause of action, it is respectfully submitted that this Honourable court is empowered to grant the claimant’s declarative relief whether or not the claimant has a reasonable cause of action. Rely on the case of IKINE VS EDJERODE (2001) 18 N.W.L.R (PART 745) PAGE 446 @ RATIO 22 @ PAGE 460 – 461.

Finally, urge this Honourable Court to hold that the Claimant has a reasonable cause of action and / or that the Claimant suit is not premature or incompetent.

On the Second Issue of whether the suspension of the Claimant is in line with the personnel policy of the 1st Defendant, the Claimant contended that in Paragraph 4.0 – 4.8 of the Defendants’ Written Address, the Defendant Counsel erroneously submitted that the Claimant indefinite suspension is in line with the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy (.i.e. the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy).

Further submitted that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay contravenes Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the ‘Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy’ (.i.e. the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy), which said 1st Defendant Personnel Policy regulates the terms and conditions of the Claimant’s employment.

That a suspension made under PARAGRAPHS 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, is not meant to last indefinitely or for a period of time that has no fixed end. Rather a suspension made under PARAGRAPHS 59 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY is meant to specify the period of suspension and such period must not exceed two weeks.

Submitted that by the provision of PARAGRAPHS 62 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY, it is only an employee of 1st defendant, whose conduct is under investigation can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation. The said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of Claimant is under investigation.

A careful perusal of the content of the letter of suspension through which the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant suspended the Claimant, aptly shows that the Claimant was not suspended because his conduct was under investigation. In fact, a communal reading of content of the purported letter of suspension show that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have already concluded investigation and / or come to a conclusion, hence the suspension of the Claimant. This being the case, respectfully submitted that PARAGRAPHS 62 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY is most inapplicable in the suspension of the Claimant, in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the Claimant is under investigation.

Further submitted that the said memo annexed to the Defendants’ Counter-Affidavit as ‘EXHIBIT C’ was made by the Defendants for sole purpose of this case and / or no committee was ever constituted by the Defendant to investigate Claimant. The Defendant did not at anytime grant the Claimant fair hearing or inform the Claimant that he was been investigated for any misconduct. The said memo annexed to the Defendants Counter-Affidavit as ‘EXHIBIT C’ was also not served on the Claimant and / or the Claimant was not copied. In fact Claimant never got any knowledge of the said memo until Defendants’ Counter Affidavit was served on him.

That courts of law do not read extraneous words into document, and as such, urge this Honourable court to give the provisions of PARAGRAPHS 59 & 62 OF THE BAYELSA STATE OIL COMPANY LIMITED PERSONNEL POLICY their ordinary meaning. On this position of the law, rely on the case of AIGORO VS COMM., LANDS, KWARA STATE (2012) 11 N.W.L.R (PART 1310) PAGE 111 @ PARAGRAPHS C- E @ PAGE 129. Also affirming this position of the law, the Court of Appeal in the case of DANTATA JNR. VS MOHAMMED (2012) 14 N.W.L.R (1319) PAGE 122 @ PARAGRAPHS E – G @ PAGE 160, held as follows: ‘The question of interpretation of documents is a matter of law. The words used in the document must be given effect and no word must be added or subtracted or ignored’.

Finally urge this Honourable Court to that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay, contravenes Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy (.i.e. the 1st Defendants Personnel Policy), which said 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy regulates the terms and conditions of the Claimant’s employment.

On the Third Issue of whether Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons offends or contravenes the provision of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011? The Claimant submitted that, in Paragraph 5.1 – 5.3 of the Defendants’ Written Address, the Defendants’ Counsel erroneously submitted that Paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons offends or contravenes the provisions of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011.

Submitted that Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons do not offend or contravene the provision of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, as same only contain Statement of Facts and not arguments or submissions as alleged by the Respondent/Applicant’s Counsel.

All through the length and breadth of Paragraph 5.1 – 5.3 of the Defendants’ Written Address, the Defendants’ Counsel did not show how the depositions contained in the said Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons constitutes an argument. Thus, urge this Honourable Court to discountenance the arguments contained in Paragraphs 5.1 – 5.3 of the Defendants’ Written Address, as same is misconceived in the law.

In furtherance to the above submission, further submit that the depositions contained in Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, explicitly set forth the facts and circumstances forming the grounds of deponent belief and place, and circumstance of the information of facts contained therein, in line with Section 115 (1), (2), (3) & (4) of the Evidence Act, Cap E14 L.F.N 2011. Thus same does not contravene and/or violates the provisions of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. Urge this court to so hold.

On the Fourth Issue on whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought of this case, the Claimant submitted that in Paragraph 5.4 – 5.9 of the Defendants’ Written Address, the Defendants’ Counsel erroneously submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to the grant of relief 8 contained on the face of the Originating Summons and that the Claimant is also not entitled to the grant of the punitive and exemplary monetary damage claimed in the relief 9 contained on the face of the Originating Summons.

Submitted that the court of law has the discretion to grant punitive and exemplary damages once it holds that a party has suffered a wrong. In the same vein, this Honourable Court has the inherent power to restrain the Defendant from further suspending and dismissing the Claimant from his employment or job with the 1st Defendant, based on the subject matter of this suit, in that same will be tantamount to witch hunting. On this Honourable Court inherent power to grant reliefs 8 & 9 contained on the face of the Originating Summons, respectfully rely on SECTION 6 (6) (A) OF 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (AS AMENDED), SECTION 16 (3) & 19 OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT.

That in the case of BFI GROUP CORPORATION VS BUREAU OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (2012) 18 N.W.L.R (PART 1332) PAGE 209 @ 241, the Supreme Court, per Fabiyi JSC, stated pointedly that: ‘Liberally ubi jus ibi remedium means where there is a wrong, there is a remedy. It is that the rule of primitive law was the revers. Where there is a remedy there is a right. The Court is enjoined to provide a remedy where a right is established…. The injury suffered by the appellant was not too remote. Same stares both parties in the face and must be readdressed by the court. The appellant should not be made to go empty handed without a remedy’. Urged this court to hold that the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit including reliefs 8 and 9.

On the Fifth Issue of whether the Paragraphs 17 (a – f) of the Defendants’ Counter Affidavit amounts to legal argument and contravenes the provisions of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, and as such, ought to be struck out? The Claimant respectfully submitted that the content of Paragraph 17 (a – f) of the Defendants’ Counter Affidavit amounts to legal argument and contravenes the provisions of Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, and as such, ought to be struck out.

Finally the Claimant urged this Court to discountenance all the submissions of the Defendant and grant all the reliefs sought.

COURT’S DECISION

I have read and understood all the processes filed by the learned Counsel for both the Claimant and the Defendants in this suit. I have equally analysed all the averments contained in both the Supporting and Opposing Affidavits, the Exhibits and the Written Addresses. It is apparent that all the parties agreed that there exist an employer and employee relationship between the parties (which is still subsisting). But where the parties differ is whether the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant is in line with Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy (which are EXHIBIT C and D). Having said all these I narrow the issues for the just determination of this case down to the following:

  1. Whether this suit is competent and whether the Claimant has disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the Defendant.

 

  1. Whether the suspension of the Claimant is in line with the Personnel P olicy of the 1st

 

 

  1. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this case.

On the First Issue on whether this suit is competent and whether the Claimant has a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants, a cause of action in law means: (a) a cause of complaint; (b) a civil right or obligation for the determination by a court of law; (c) a dispute in respect of which a court of law is entitled to invoke Judicial Powers to determine; (d) consequent damages;(e) every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the Judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to be proved; (f) all those things necessary to give a right of action whether they are to be done by the plaintiff or a third person; (g) it is factual situation which enables one person to obtain a remedy from another in the court in respect of an injury. See A.G FEDERATION VS ABUBAKAR (2007) 10 N.W.L.R (Pt 1041) 1 S.C, NWOKEBI VS EGBE (2005) 9 N.W.L.R (PT 930) 293, A.G FEDERATION VS ANPP (2003) 12 SCNJ 67; (2004) F.W.L.R (PT 190) 1458 SC.

Furthermore, a cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. It is the fact or combination of facts, which gives rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements, viz, the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, and the consequent damage. Also a cause of action is the factual situation which a plaintiff relies upon to support his claim, recognized by the law as giving rise to a substantive right capable of being claimed or enforced against the defendant. The factual situation must, however, constitute the essential ingredients of an enforceable right as claimed. And in order to determine whether or not a suit discloses a cause of action, and the relief sought, the courts are required to examine the averments in the pleadings and see if they disclose any cause of action. See AGBANELO VS UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (2000) 4 SC (Pt.1) 233; ODUNTAN Vs. AKIBU (2000) 7 SC (PT II) 106; MOBIL OIL PLC VS. D.E.N.R LTD. (2004) 1 NWLR (PT. 853) 142. Having said all these, the gravamen of the case of the claimant against the defendants is that the claimant was suspended indefinitely by the 1st Defendant through the 2nd Defendant in contravention of Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Company Policy. Counsel to the Defendants in the Written Address made heavy weather to the fact that the claimant ought to have wait until after the expiration of two weeks before he instituted this action, And that since the suspension only lasted for 10 days before he instituted this action, Then the action is premature and as such the claimant do not have reasonable cause of action against the defendants in the pursuit of the reliefs which he sought before this court. And hence this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and even urged this court to dismiss this suit for want of jurisdiction.

I wish to submit that both the claimant and the defendants had admitted that the claimant was suspended indefinitely and also Exhibit B and D clearly attest to this fact. And the claimant felt that the defendants failed to comply with Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy (1st Defendant Personnel Policy) which said 1st Defendant Personnel Policy regulates the terms and conditions of the claimant’s employment; And its trite that in considering or determining whether claimant suit discloses reasonable cause of action, the court must only limit itself to the claimant’s claim and not to resort on whatsoever is the defendants’ defence. See MOBIL OIL PLC VS. D.E.N.R LTD (SUPRA), And AGBANELO VS UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (supra).

Furthermore, I painstakingly perused and analysed the wordings as contained in Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy, And I did not see where its provided or stated that an employee of the 1st Defendant (like the Claimant) must wait for two weeks to elapse upon been suspended before instituting a suit against the 1st Defendant. The said Paragraph 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy only provides the duration of suspension and/or procedure for the suspension of the 1st Defendant’s employee, and the Claimant vide this suit is contending that his suspension was not complied with when he was indefinitely suspended. And also this court is empowered to grant declaratory reliefs to an aggrieved party like the reliefs which are sought by the Claimant in this suit. And from the affidavit in support of this originating summons one can see that the cause of action with respect to this suit aroused on the 17th day of October, 2017 when the claimant was served with the suspension letter (Exhibit D) indicating that he was suspended indefinitely. And the Claimant having felt aggrieved by the act of the Defendants for not complying with the provisions of Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policy, he can institute an action against the Defendants the cause of action having aroused. See ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ADAMAWA STATE VS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2015) ALL FWLR (PT. 797) 597 at 640. In view of the foregoing facts enumerated ab-initio, I felt that the claimant’s suit has disclosed a reasonable cause of action, And also that the suit is not premature or incompetent. And I so hold. I resolved the first issue in favour of the Claimant.

On the Second Issue of whether the suspension of the Claimant is in line with the Personnel Policy of the 1st Defendant, while the Defendants in their Written Address in Paragraphs 4.0-4.8 submitted that the Claimant indefinite suspension is in line with the Bayelsa Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy. And on the other hand the Claimant maintained that his indefinite suspension without pay contravenes Paragraph 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy which regulates the terms and conditions of the Claimant’s employment. Let me for the ease of reference reiterate the said Paragraph 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant’s Company Personnel Policy.  Paragraph 59 states as follows:

“At the discretion of the company, an employee may be suspended from duty with or without pay for a period not exceeding two weeks. The employee will receive a written notice stating the reasons for the suspension period and the effective date”.

Paragraph 62 states as follows:

“An employee whose conduct is under investigation may be suspended from duty for the length of investigation. However, after 30 days of suspension, if the investigation is not completed, then the employee is paid half of his/her basic salaries till the completion of investigation”.

The points that can be gleaned from Paragraph 59 of the 1st Defendant Company Personnel Policy are as follows:

  1. The company can at its discretion suspend an employee.

 

  1. The suspension may be with or without pay.

 

 

  1. The suspension period shall not exceed two weeks.

 

  1. The suspension shall be by a written notice stating the reasons for the suspension period.

 

From the above, while its not in dispute that the 1st Defendant can suspend an employee at its discretion which may be with or without pay, But the suspension period shall not exceed two weeks under Paragraph 59. By Exhibit B and D (from 2nd to 4th paragraphs of the said Exhibits), which was signed by the 2nd Defendant one can see that the reasons for the suspension are clearly spelt out. And Paragraph 5 of the same Exhibit stated as follows:

“…Consequently, you are hereby suspended indefinitely. Your suspension takes effective this Tuesday 17th October, 2017 and without salary…”

From the above one can see that while Paragraph 59 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy only allows the suspension of an employee for a period not exceeding two weeks, But by the letter of suspension (Exhibit B & D), The Claimant was suspended indefinitely.

Let me state here that Paragraph 59 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy deals with the suspension procedure, while Paragraph 62 deals with suspension from duty. That is to say Paragraph 62 can only come to play if the conduct of an employee is under investigation. In this case the claimant was only suspended and no machinery of investigation was set on motion at the time when the Claimant instituted this action. The Claimant was indefinitely suspended on the 17th October, 2017 and this suit was filed on his behalf on the 27th October, 2017 challenging the flaws as contained in the suspension letter. The Defendants made heavy weather on the fact that the Claimant should have wait for the two weeks or thirty days to expire before instituting this action, An idea which this court did not support the cause of action having accrued. Also there is nothing in the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy which precludes the claimant from instituting any action before the expiration of the suspension period.  The Defendants in their Counter Affidavit (Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9) and Exhibit C contended that a committee was constituted to investigate the allegations of serious misconduct against the claimant on the 18th October, 2017; a fact which the Claimant denied in Paragraphs 8 and 9 of his Further Affidavit, which I aligned myself with the submission of the Claimant since he was not notified. And the Defendants never avered to same, That they indeed notified the Claimant. In other word the Claimant was never copied.

It is of legal importance to note that the purported letter of indefinite suspension without pay issued to the Claimant does not in any way stipulates that the Claimant’s conduct is under investigation, and as such Paragraph 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel policy can not be the basis of the Claimant indefinite suspension. And it also runs contrary to Paragraph 59 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy.

In AKINYANJU VS. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (2005) 7 NWLR (PT. 923) 87, the court defines suspension to mean to defer, lay aside or hold in abeyance, it also means to halt half way but not to bring to an end. A master can suspend his servant when necessary, since suspension of an employee is not an unusual procedure taken in order to facilitate an investigation, but such suspension must be in line with the terms of contract or employment. See SHELL PET. DEV. CO. VS. LAWSON JACK (1998) 4 NWLR (PT. 545) 249. AND AYEWA VS. UNIVERSITY OF JOS (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 659) 142. Also in UDEMAH VS. NIG. COAL CORP. (1991) 3 NWLR (PT.180) 477. The Court of Appeal held that the employer has the right to suspend an employee for the purpose of investigation or disciplinary action. However, the employer must comply with any existing regulation or policy governing such action. And the governing regulation or policy in this case with regards to suspension of the Claimant is the Provisions of Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy, which any action regarding the suspension of any employee in the 1st Defendant’s company must be complied with. Furthermore, a person or an aggrieved employee unlawfully suspended from work (like in this case) has the right and can seek redress in the court and claim his full salary. In other words, an aggrieved employee has the right to approach the court if he/she thinks his suspension is unnecessary, unreasonable, invalid and unlawful. In suggesting that the Claimant can not challenge his suspension until the determination or expiration of two weeks or 30 days as presupposes in paragraph 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy (as in the instant case), the Defendant is engaging in an overgeneralization of the law. See MRS. ABDULRAHMAN YETUNDE MARIAM Vs. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN TEACHING HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD & ANOR (2013) 35 NLLR (PT. 103) 40 NIC; ACB  LTD. VS UFONDU (1997) 10 NWLR (PT. 523) 169 C.A.

There is no gainsaying that an employer has the right to discipline an erring staff (and suspension is such disciplinary measure). See UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR VS. ESIAGA (1999) 4 NWLR (PT. 502) 719 at 739-740; THE SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD VS LAWSON-JACK (1998) 4 NWLR (PT. 545) at 249; in the interest of the organization or institution, although it may be otherwise if the contract of employment either expressly or impliedly rules out recourse to discipline by the employer. See NEPA VS. OLAGUNJU (2005) 3 NWLR (PT. 913) at 602. Indeed, as held in SHELL PET. DEV. CO. (NIG.) LTD. VS. OMU (1998) 9 NWLR (PT. 567) at 672, It is disruption of an ordinary employer’s business to fetter him with an injunction not to discipline his servant. Here, the employer has the right to suspend an employee when necessary, with or without pay or at half pay. See the English case of MARSHALL VS MIDLAND ELECTRIC (1945) 1 ALLER 653.

Having said all these; As I have earlier said its not in doubt that the 1st Defendant can suspend the Claimant either with or without pay as contained in Paragraph 59 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy, But such suspension shall not exceed two weeks. Therefore, the suspension of the Claimant indefinitely as contained in Exhibits D and B can not stand. And suspension under Paragraph 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy can only come to play when the conduct of an employee is under investigation, in that situation the suspension can last for the period or length of investigation. However, after 30 days of suspension, if the investigation is not completed, then the employee is paid half of his/her basic salaries till the completion of investigation. And since the Defendants failed, neglected or refused to notify the Claimant that his conduct is under investigation, Then he can not be suspended pursuant to the Provisions of Paragraph 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy.

Based on the reason I enumerated ab-initio I resolved the second issue in favour of the Claimant and hold that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay is not in line with the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy same being in breach of Paragraph 59 and 62 of the 1st Defendant Personnel Policy as such I declare same null and void and of no effect whatsoever, And consequently same is here by set aside.

On the Third Issue on whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this case; by the combined effect of Section 16, 19 (b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, this court is empowered to grant injunction and other declaratory reliefs or orders either conditionally or unconditionally in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient so to do. But granting or otherwise of such orders or reliefs depends on the circumstances of each case.

From the Originating Summons filed by the Claimant specifically the relief 8 (eight) which states as follows:

“An order of injunction restraining the Defendants from further suspending or dismissing the Claimant from his employment or job with the 1st Defendant, based on the subject matter of this suit”.

It’s trite that in mere master/servant relationship, being a contract not clothed with statutory flavour, as in this case, the master has an unfettered right and liberty to terminate his servant’s employment or dismiss his servant from employment at any time and for any reason provided that the terms of contract of service between them are complied with. This is because a willing servant can not be imposed on an unwilling master. See CHUKWU VS NITEL (1996) 2 NWLR (PT. 430) 290. AND FAKAUDE VS. O.A.U.T.H (1993) 5 NWLR (PT. 291) 47. Thus, for this court to make an order of injunction to restrain the Defendants from further suspending and dismissing the Claimant from his employment based on the subject matter of this suit is far overreaching. It will amount to fettering the right of the 1st Defendant under the law to hire and fire which will mean foisting a willing servant or an unwilling master against the age long position of the law.  And a Declaratory Order is not made in a contract of employment unless the facts and circumstances of the case warrant the making of such an order. See A.C.B PLC VS NWODIKA (1996) 4 NWLR (PT. 443) 470. And N.S.I.T.F.M.B. VS ADEBIYI (1999) 13 NWLR (PT. 633) 16. 

Furthermore, on relief 9 as contained in the Originating Summon for an order of this court awarding the sum of N20, 000, 000. 00 (Twenty Million Naira) in favour of the Claimant and against the 1st and 2nd Defendants as exemplary and punitive damages for the wrongful or illegal indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay, it is worthy to note that exemplary damages are usually awarded whenever a Defendant’s conduct sufficiently discloses malice, fraud, cruelty or insolence, which I felt the Claimant has not proved any one of those. See ELIOHANI (NIG) LTD VS MBADIWE (1986) NWLR (PT. 14) 47 S.C.; ODOGU VS A.G FEDERATION (1996) 6 NWLR (PT. 456) 508 SC, ALLIED BANK (NIG) LTD VS AKUBUEZE (1997) 6 NWLR (PT. 509) 374 SC.

And its trite where a suspension is adjudged to be wrongful, the employee is only entitled to his wages or salary for the period of wrongful suspension. This is because, suspension is not dismissal; when an employee is suspended, his contract of employment remains subsisting and unbroken. See NRC VS UMERA (2006) 17 NWLR (PT. 1008) Pg. 265.

Having said all these its my ordent belief that the claimant is not entitled to reliefs 8 and 9; and as such same is hereby refused. I resolve this issue in favour of the Defendant and hold that the Claimant is not entitled to reliefs 8 and 9 as contained in the Originating Summons, And same is hereby dismissed.

On the issue of whether Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons and also Paragraphs 17 (a-f) of the Defendants’ Counter Affidavit amounts to legal arguments and conclusions as such contrary to Section 115 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, A cursory look on the both averments attest to the facts that the averments do not offend any provision of the Evidence Act 2011.  And I so hold.

Before I draw the curtain on this Judgment and for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as contained in this Judgment;

  1. I declare that by the provisions of Paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant can not suspend an employee from duty without pay indefinitely and/or for an indefinite period of time.

 

  1. I declare that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever, in that same contravenes Paragraph 59 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy.

 

 

  1. I declare that by the provisions of Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, it is only an employee of the 1st Defendant, whose conduct is under investigation that can be suspended from duty for the length of the investigation.

 

  1. I declare that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, is null and void and of no effect whatsoever and not based on the provision of paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy in that the said purported letter of indefinite suspension do not state that the conduct of the Claimant is under investigation.

 

 

  1. I declare that by the provision of Paragraph 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy, where an employee of the 1st Defendant is suspended from duty pending investigation, the employee shall be entitled to be paid half of his basic salary till the completion of the investigation, if the investigation is not completed after 30 days from the date of suspension of such employee.

 

  1. I hereby set aside the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay by the 1st Defendant acting through the 2nd Defendant, in that same is in breach of Paragraphs 59 and 62 of the Bayelsa State Oil Company Limited Personnel Policy.

 

 

Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

 

 

 

HON. JUSTICE BASHAR .A. ALKALI

                                                             PRESIDING JUDGE

                                                                         Signed

admin

Website:

Related Story