Mr. Leo Adetayo Adelakun -VS- The Bayelsa State Government & 2 ORS

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE YENAGOA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT YENAGOA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

 

DATE:  MONDAY 24TH FEBRUARY, 2020                                         Suit No: NICN/YEN/41/2019

 

BETWEEN:

 

Mr. Leo Adetayo Adelakun

(The Registrar, International Institute of Tourism and

Hospitality/Bayelsa Institute of Tourism, Catering and                           Claimant

Hotel Management Yenagoa, Bayelsa State).

 

AND

 

  1. Bayelsa State Government
  2. Attorney General, and Commissioner For Justice                 Defendants
  3. Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism,

Catering and Hotel Management

 

REPRESENTATION

Mr. M.A. Abidolu Esq with E.J. Eweke Esq and K.H. Ikuli Esq for the Claimant.

Mr. Diepreye O. Omubo Esq (Assistant Director) Ministry of Justice, Bayelsa State for the Defendants.

 

JUDGMENT

The Claimant initiated the process of this action by way of Originating Summons dated the 22nd day of August, 2019 and filed on the same date. The reliefs sought against the Defendants are as follows:

(a)  A DECLARATION that by the combined effect of Part 11, Section 7 (i) & (2) (b) provision of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law 2012, the 1st Defendant acting through the office of the Head of the Civil Service cannot unilaterally terminate or transfer the appointment of the Claimant from the 3rd Defendant before the expiration of the statutory tenure of the office.

 

(b)  A DECLARATION that the purported termination of appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant before expiration of his tenure of office is null/void, illegal and or of no effect whatsoever.

 

 

(c)   A MANDATORY ORDER of court setting aside the purported termination of appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant before expiration of his tenure of office is null/void, illegal and or of no effect whatsoever and the same is in breach of Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012.

 

(d)  AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from suspending or transferring or dismissing the Claimant from his employment or job with the 3rdDefendant, based on the subject matter of this suit.

 

(e)  AN ORDER of this Honourable court awarding the sum of N10, 000, 000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only in favour of the Claimant and against the 1st and 2ndDefendants respectively, as exemplary and punitive damages for the wrongful or illegal termination of the Claimant before the expiration of his tenure as the Registrar of the 3rdDefendant.

 

AND FURTHER ORDER OR ORDERS that the Honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstance of this application.

 

The Originating Summons was supported by an eighteen paragraphs affidavit deposed to by Mr. Leo Adetayo Adelakun, the claimant. Attached to the affidavit are eight annexures marked as “Exhibit AD1, AD2, AD3, AD4, AD5, AD6, AD7 and AD8” respectively. Also attached to the Originating Summons is a written address.

 

 

The Defendants entered a Conditional Appearance on the 10th day of September, 2019 before filing its Counter Affidavit dated the 13th day of September, 2019.

 

 

CLAIMANT’S CASE IN BRIEF

The brief facts of the case as contained in the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons is that the Claimant is an employee of the 3rd Defendant through a letter of employment by the Bayelsa State Government in the year 1998 with its confirmation dated the 26th day of January, 2000. Claimant avers that by the letter dated the 12th day of September, 2015 his appointment as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant was confirmed by one Prof. Prince Ayibaye Efere, the former Rector of the 3rd Defendant. The 3rd Defendant is an Institute established by Law governing its operation and cited as “Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 and Federal Polytechnic Act 2013 while the 2nd Defendant is the Chief Law Officer of the 1stDefendant pursuant to the law establishing the 1st Defendant to oversee, supervise and be administratively in charge of the International Institute of Tourism and Hospitality Yenagoa under the 3rdDefendant.

 

Claimant further avers that he is aware that the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 provides that an employee of the 1st Defendant including the Claimant can only be removed by the Executive Governor of the state for misconduct or gross misconduct, which he has never been investigated or queried about for any misconduct. Claimant avers that his tenure as a Registrar of the 3rd Defendant still subsists and the 1stDefendant through the office of the Executive Governor is empowered to renew at the expiration for another period of four years, and not the office of the Head of Service. That on the 20th day of August, 2019 he received a letter from the office of the Head of Service terminating his appointment as Registrar of the 3rdDefendant and the Rector of the 3rdDefendant one Mr. Timi Johnson instructed the security to deny him and other staff of his office access to the office.

 

Claimant also avers that the Head of Service has neither invited him nor questioned his competence before the purported letter of termination. If there was any allegation of misconduct against him by the regulations governing the 3rd Defendant, the purported termination against him would be the effect of any investigation. The 1st Defendant through the office of the Head of Service did not follow the requirements or procedures before terminating his tenure as the Registrar of the 3rdDefendant. Hence this suit.

 

 

SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT

 

The claimant seeks the determination of this Honourable court on the following questions:

 

  1. Whether or not by the combined effect of Part 11 section 7 (i) & (2) (b) provision of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law 2012, the 1st Defendant acting through the office of the Head of Civil Service can unilaterally terminate or transfer the appointment of the Claimant from the 3rdDefendant before the expiration of the statutory tenure of the office.

 

  1. If issue herein raised above (i) is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the purported termination of appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rdDefendant before expiration of his tenure of office is null/void, illegal and or of no effect whatsoever.

 

On issue one, learned counsel submit that by the provision of Part 2, Sections 7 (i) & (2) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 of the 3rdDefendant, the 1stDefendant either unilaterally or acting through any other agency can only terminate appointment of Claimant as a result of commission of certain or investigated offences therein referred to in the above cited law as gross misconduct. Learned counsel contends that it is trite law that a body that has rules, policy, document and constitution regulating its activities is bound by the provisions of the said rules. The 1stDefendant has the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 as the law that guides the activities of the 3rd Defendant. Learned counsel argued that the termination of an employee by an agency not saddled with the responsibility in that regards amounts to ultra vires which the court would not allow to stand. The wrongful termination of appointment amount to denial of rights of the employee given to him under the law. Cited BAMISILE VRS NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & ORS (2013) ALL FWLR PT 678 @ P. 911, PARAS F – G. Learned  counsel referred this Honourable court to section 6 (1) of the Federal Polytechnic Act. Learned counsel submit that by the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 the 1stDefendant can only terminate the Claimant if there is a misconduct but Exhibit AD7 being the purported Letterof Terminationdated the 20th day of August, 2019, did not state any of the misconduct on the part of the Claimant neither did Exhibit AD – 8 show that the Claimant was under any investigation. Learned counsel argued that the provisions of section 6 (1) and (2) of the Federal Polytechnic Act are clear and unambiguous and urged this Honouarable court to hold that the 1stDefendant cannot terminate the Claimant from duty before the expiration of his tenure. Cited  UNITY BANK PLC VRS OLATUNJI (2015) 5 NWLR PT. 1452 @ P. 203 ESP @ P 213 R. 9.

 

On issue two, learned counsel adopted his legal arguments contained in issue one above and further submit that a careful perusal of the letter of Termination which the 1st Defendant by the office of the Head of Service (Exhibit AD 8) shows that the Claimant was not under any investigation. Learned counsel submit that the purported termination of the Claimant unilaterally or acting through the 1st Defendant is null, void, illegal and of no effect as it contravenes the provisions of Part II, Section 7 (1) of Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 of the 3rd Defendant. Learned counsel urged this Honourable court to hold that by the provisions of Part II Section 7 (1) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 the tenure of the Claimant still subsist.

 

In conclusion, learned counsel urged this Honourable court to grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant on the face of the originating summons.

 

 

 

THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS

 

The Defendants filed their Memorandum of Appearance dated the 10th day of September, 2019 alongside filed a twenty paragraphs counter affidavit together with its annexures (Exhibits MOJ 1 and MOJ 2) and a written address.The Defendants in their counter affidavit which was deposed by one Tonbra Yerikema, the Head of Audit in the International Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Elebele Yenagoa, Bayelsa State averred that the Claimant was employed by the Bayelsa State Government through the State Civil Service Commission in 1998. The procedure for Claimant’s appointment as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant is in conflict with the Institute’s Law, even as the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar predates the transfer of his service to the 3rd Defendant. The Defendant denies any relationship between the 3rd Defendant and the Federal Polytechnic Act, 2013. TheDefendants averred that the 3rdDefendant’sworkings and conditions of service is regulated by its law and the Public Service Rules and the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 governs some of the 3rd Defendants’ activities which applies only to employees and staff of the 3rd Defendant and does not apply generally to the employees and staff of the 1st Defendant. The Executive Governor of the state is empowered under the said law to remove from office only the Chairman and members of the Governing Board of the 3rd Defendant who have committed acts of misconduct or otherwise but does not apply to every employee of the 3rd Defendant such as the Claimant.

 

The Defendants averred that it was due to the improper appointment of the Claimant as Registrar that the Executive Governor of Bayelsa State removed the Claimant from office which he exercised his powers judiciously by directing the Head of Service to effect the transfer of the Claimant (who is a public servant in another ministry). There is no allegation against the Claimant and the Defendants have nothing against the Claimant. The Defendant averred that the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar before his transfer to the 3rdDefendant is unlawful and illegal and his termination of appointment as Acting Registrar and subsequent transfer was done in accordance with Law and Public Service Rules.

 

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS.

 

In the written address learned counsel on behalf of the defendant formulated three issues for determination as follows:

 

  1. Whether the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rdDefendant was done in accordance with the law to wit: The Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 and hence valid ab initio.

 

  1. Whether from the circumstances of his engagement as staff of the 3rdDefendant, the 1stDefendant acting through the office of the Head of Service can properly relieve the Claimant of his duty as “Registrar” and effect his transfer to another Ministry or Department of Government.

 

  1. Whether the Federal Polytechnic Act is applicable to this case.

 

On issue one, whether the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rdDefendant was done in accordance with the law to wit: the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 and hence valid ab initio. Learned counsel submit that the Claimant’s employment is one clothed with a statutory flavour. Learned counsel argued that for an employment to enjoy the status of statutory flavour, the manner of employment and termination must be specifically provided for in the statute creating the employment. See FMC IDO EKITI VRS OLAJIDE (2011) 11 NWLR (PT. 1258) @ 256. Learned counsel argued that the question to be answered is whether the Claimant’s employment as Registrar was made in accordance with procedure laid down in the Bayelsa State Institute for Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012?.  Learned counsel answered in the negative and submit that there was noncompliance with the provision of the law relating to the appointment of the Registrar of the 3rdDefendant’s Institute. He relied on section 15 of the law. The Registrar shall be appointed by the governing Board of the Institute. A closer look at Exhibit AB3 annexed to the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons shows that the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar was made by the former Rector one Prof. Prince Ayibaye Efere without recourse to anyone after the Claimant had been in an acting capacity for over six months. Where did the former Rector derive the powers to appoint the Claimant as substantive Registrar? Learned counsel submits that any act done ultra vires is void ab initio. The Rector acted beyond his power, the law does not empower the Rector to appoint a Registrar, therefore the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar cannot stand. See MACFOY VRS UAC LIMITED (1962) AC 153. Learned counsel submits that the former Rector act of appointing the Claimant as Registrar without any Board is bad and void in law.

 

On the second issue whether from the circumstances of his engagement as staff of the 3rdDefendant, the 1stDefendant acting through the office of the Head of Service can properly relieve the Claimant of his duty as “Registrar” and effect his transfer to another Ministry or Department of Government”. Learned counsel submit that from the Claimant’s deposition in paragraph 3 of the affidavit in support of his originating summons Claimant was appointed the Registrar of the 3rdDefendant vide a letter dated September 12th 2015 after he had acted in that capacity for six months and was only released by the Civil Service Commission to the Institute vide a letter dated 12th July 2016 in response to letters of request of release dated 16th September, 2015 and 21st December, 2015 all dates being subsequent to the Letter of Appointment this by implication means that between 2015 when Claimant was said to have worked in the office of the 3rdDefendant’s Institute and 12th July, 2016 when Civil Service Commission formally approved his transfer of service, Claimant was not part of the 3rdDefendant. It cannot be said that the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar could have based on the transfer of his services which came later in 2016. The appointment as “Registrar” cannot predate the transfer. Learned counsel submit that it is trite law that speak for themselves. He relied on the cases of NIDB VRS OLALOMI INDUSTRIES LIMITED (2002) 5 NWLR PART 761 PAGE 532 @ RATIO 7, NEPA VRS ELFANDI, (1986) 3 NWLR PART 32 @ PAGE 884. Learned counsel argued that assuming without conceding that the appointment is proper and regular section 15(3) of The Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law vests the power to appoint the Registrar of the Institute on the Governing Board the power to remove the Registrar, who by virtue of his office is a member of the Governing Board, resides with Governor. By section 7 (2) (b) of the law that he can be removed from office by the Executive Governor of the state for reasons of gross misconduct and section 32 of the Law defines gross misconduct to mean a grave violation or breach of the provisions of the law.

 

Learned counsel further contend that the powers of the Governor to remove an erring member of the Board is not subject to the direction or opinion of any other person and the Governor may act or delegate to another person the duty to act on his behalf. See OMIETE MICHAEL KALANGO VRS THE GOVERNOR OF BAYELSA STATE OF NIGERIA & 2 ORS (2009) 7 NWLR (PT. 1139) 17 SCLearned counsel argued that the Claimant was not dismissed from service, he was merely relieved of his appointment as Registrar of the International Institute of Tourism and Hospitality and directed to resume work at the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs where he originally belonged and this did not in any way constitute a breach of employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants. The Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management is an Institute established and funded by the Government and being part of the Public Service, transfer of staff was made from one ministry to another. It was based on this that the Claimant transferred staff from the Institute to other ministries. See Exhibit MOJ1 in the counter affidavit by Section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the Public Service of a state is defined as “the service of the state in any capacity in respect of the Government of the State and includes service as:

 

(f)    “staff of any educational institution established or financed principally by a Government of a state”.

 

Learned counsel submit that the “Registrar” being a staff transferred by the Government to the Institute which is part of Public Service of a state can be transferred back to any Ministry upon the directive of the Governor of the state. The termination of the Claimant’s appointment as “Registrar” and transfer to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs was proper, lawful and not done in contravention of any law and urged this Honourable court to resolve issue 2 in favour of the Defendants.

 

On issue three, whether the Federal Polytechnic Act Is applicable to this case, learned counsel submit that the Claimant made reference and relied on the provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act and argued that the Claimant was entitled to hold office as Registrar for a period of five years and until the expiration of the period he cannot be removed from office but this argument is not sustainable as the Federal Polytechnic Act is a federal enactment establishing Federal Institutions that does not directly applyto states but limited to Federal Polytechnics. Learned counsel contend that by section 31 of the Federal Polytechnic Act, Polytechnic was defined to mean the respective Polytechnics set up under section 1 of the Act” and not any other institute. The polytechnics referred to in the First Schedule of the Act the 3rdDefendant on record is not one of the polytechnics. It is trite law that the express mention of one thing means the exclusion of all others and urged the court to give the Act the strict interpretation it so contemplates. There is no nexus between the Claimant’s appointments with the Federal Polytechnic Act relied on by the Claimant.

 

In conclusion learned counsel urged this Honourable court to dismiss the claims of the Claimant with punitive cost for being lacking in merit.

 

 

 

CLAIMANT’S FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT

 

The Claimants filed a further and better affidavit dated the 2nd day of October, 2019 and filed on the same date. The affidavit is supported by a written address. In the written address learned counsel formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:

 

Whether the Claimant by his position as the Registrar of the 3rd Defendant is not protected by the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 as an employee or staff”.

 

In arguing the sole issue for determination, learned counsel submits that the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 is the only authority that regulates the scope of operation of the 3rdDefendant. It is trite law that a contract of employment enjoys statutory flavour where its conditions are governed by provisions of statute or regulations derived from the statute. See sections 5 (1) (2), 6, 7,13 (2) (f) and 15 of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 and the case of BOARD OF MANAGEMENT FMC MAKURDI VRS ABUKUME (2016) 10 NWLR PT (1521) @ P. 536. Learned counsel contend that the 1st and 2nd Defendant acting through the office of the Head of Service lack the required powers to terminate the appointment of the Claimant without due process as stipulated in the laws establishing the 3rd Defendant except by the Board as empowered in section 6. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF CUSTOMS VRS GUSAU (2017) ALL FWLR PT. (911) @ RATIOS 4, 10 and 11.

 

Learned counsel submit that the Defendant was wrong to say his appointment was void ab initio as his appointment was proper, legal and lawful. See ExhibitsAD3 and AD4, the Claimant who was permanently released to the 3rdDefendant had at that material time, been clothed with the statutory flavour by his appointment as Registrar so being the Registrar of the 3rd Defendant shall be regulated by the provisions of the aforesaid Law, 2012 establishing the 3rd Defendant and not otherwise. Learned counsel submit that it is the principal of law, that document which regulates the relationship between the employer and employee is the service agreement or the contract of service and not a collective agreement. Learned counsel further submit that a collective agreement (Civil Service Rules) referred to by the Defendants is not binding on an individual employee and the employer unless such a collective agreement is incorporated into the contract of service or adopted as part of the contract or condition of service and the Defendants have failed to established this before this Honourable court. There is no part of the Bayelsa State Law, 2012 that incorporatedthe Civil Service Rules of Bayelsa State that could have empowered the office of Head of Service to exercise such an arbitrary power. See A.C.B (NIG) LTD VRS NWODIKA (1996) 4 NWLR PT 493 @ P. 470.

 

Learned Counsel submit that assuming without conceding that the Executive Governor had wanted to exercise his authority by terminating the appointment of the Claimant, he would have done it in vacuum without recourse to the Law establishing the 3rd Defendant. Hence, the power so exercised was ultra vires of the office of the Head of Service. Learned counsel contend that by Exhibit AD 8 in the Supporting Affidavit, the Head of Service terminated the appointment of the Claimant without following due process, usurping the powers of functions of the Board as contained in Section 6 of the Laws 2012 establishing the 3rd Defendant. It is trite law that the effect of a party terminating a contract of service governed by regulations or statutory instrument is that such arbitrary or unilateral termination is invalid and ineffectual. See COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMSVRS GUSAU (SUPRA) ESP @ P 455, PARA G or at PAGES 435 – 436 RATIO 4.

 

In conclusion, learned counsel urged this Honourable court to discountenance the submission of the Respondent and their Counter Affidavit that the Claimant is only on transfer and not the termination of his employment, by granting the relief sought by the Claimant.

 

 

THE 1ST TO 3RD DEFENDANTS’ FURTHER AND BETTER COUNTER AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT BETTER AND FURTHER AFFIDAVIT.

 

The 1st to 3rd Defendants filed an eleven Further and Better Counter Affidavit in opposition to Claimant’s Better and Further Affidavit dated the 11th day of October, 2019 and filed on the same date. The affidavit is supported by a written address. In the written address, learned counsel to the Defendant did not formulate any issue for determination but instead responded on the issue for determination by the Claimant in his Further and Better Affidavit. Learned counsel contend that granted that the condition of the Claimant’s employment is governed by the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar was done in gross violation of the same law from which he is seeking protection. See Section 15 (3) of the said law where it was clearly stated that the Registrar shall be appointed by Governing Board of the Institute. The word “shall” used by the above provisions indicates that it is mandatory that only the Governing Board can appoint the Registrar. Learned counsel submit that where a statute prescribed the mode or manner of doing an act, then non-compliance is fatal to the action and renders it a nullity. See Madukolu vrs Nkemdilim (1962) 2 ALL NLR 581 @ 592. The appointment of the Registrar by the former Rector, one Prof. Prince Ayibaye Efere without recourse to the Governing Board was void ab initio. See Macfoy vrs UAC Limited (1962) AC 153.

 

Learned counsel submit that in response to the fact that it is only where a collective agreement is incorporated into a Contract of Service that it can apply to the services of the Claimant with the 3rd Defendant. The 3rdDefendant is part of the Public Service of Bayelsa State and as provided in Section 318 (d) (f) of the 1999 Constitution in definition of the Public Service of a state. The Public Service is also guided by the Civil Service Rules which is resorted to when needed. The Governor being the Head of the Public Service of the State authorized the transfer of the Claimant who is not the Registrar but was transferred by the same method to the 3rdDefendant.Learned counsel submit that by virtue of section 7 (2) (b) of the Bayelsa State Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 the Executive Governor has powers to remove the Registrar who is a member of the Board from the office for reasons of gross misconduct or non performance. Gross misconduct is defined under Section 32 of the Law to mean grave violation or breach of the provisions of the law. Learned counsel contendthat the Executive Governor properly terminated the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar because of manifest contravention of the Law in the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar. Learned counsel argued that the cases of Comptroller General of Customs vrs Gusau (2017) ALL FWLR (PT. 911) and Board of Management FMC Makurdi vrs Abakume (2016) 10 NWLR (PT. 1521) is not applicable to this situation.

 

In conclusion, learned counsel urged this Honourable court to dismiss the claims of the Claimant with punitive cost for being lacking in merit.

 

 

 

MOTION ON NOTICE FILED BY THE 1ST, 2ND, & 3RD DEFENDANTS’/COUNTER CLAIMANTS’ COUNTER CLAIM TO CLAIMANT’S ORIGINATING SUMMONS

 

By a Motion on Notice dated the 6th day of November, 2019 and filed on the same date, the Defendant sought for and was granted leave by this court an extension of time to file and serve her Counter Claim to the Claimant’s Originating Summons dated the 6th day of November, 2019 and filed on the same date. The Counter Claimants adopted their counter claim on the 4th day of December, 2019 and withdrew Prayer C of their Counter Claim which was struck out. The Counter Claimants are praying for the following reliefs:

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rdDefendant by the Rector of the 3rdDefendant without recourse to the Governing Board is contrary to the provisions of Section 15 (3) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 and therefore unlawful, null and void.

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar and his transfer to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs by the Governor of Bayelsa State through the Head of Service of Bayelsa State is proper, regular and lawful and not done in contravention of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012.

 

 

  1. AN ORDER of this Honourable court directing the Claimant to refund to the Bayelsa State Government, the salaries and allowances he earned in excess of his normal Grade Level 14 salaries when his appointment as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant was unlawful, illegal and void.

 

  1. AN ORDER of the Honourable court awarding the sum of N5, 000, 000. 00 (Five Million Naira) only in favour of the Defendants/Counter Claimants and against the Claimant as punitive cost for the litigation.

 

AND FOR SUCH FURTHER ORDER(S) as this Honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.

 

The counter claim is supported by a written address. In the written address learned counsel formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:

 

Whether by virtue of the provisions of sections 15 (1) & (3), 5 (2) and 7 (2) (b) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law 2012 the Governor of Bayelsa State acting through the office of the Head of Service can validly terminate the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar and transfer him to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs.

 

In arguing the sole issue for determination learned counsel submit that the appointment of the Claimant as the Registrar of the 3rd Defendant was done in utmost bad faith on the ground that the appointment contravened the trite provisions of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012. Learned counsel referred this Honourable court to Section 15 (1) (3), Section 5 (2), Section 7 (2) (b) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012. Learned counsel submits that in the above stated provisions the word “shall” was used in the mandatory realm the wordings of the provisions were clear and unambiguous. Learned counsel contends that the word “shall” as used in the sections denotes without doubt, the mandatory nature of the word. He relied on the case of NUNGHE & ANOR VRS SWA & ORS (2012) LPELR – 7929 (CA) RATIO 1. The Supreme Court has in plethora of cases emphasized on the needs for the courts to interpret words in a statute or document based on their ordinary meaning. Learned counsel placed reliance on the case of FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC & ORS VRS ALHAJI SALMANU MAIWADA & ORS (2012) LPELR.

 

Learned counsel contend that the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar was not done in accordance with the Law and as far as the appointment contravene the law, the Governor of Bayelsa State has the statutory mandate to remove an improper person appointed to the officeof a Registrar. The termination was lawful and consistent with the enabling law and urged this Honourable court to so hold.

 

In conclusion, learned counsel urged this Honourable court to grant all the reliefs sought by the counter claimants.

 

 

CLAIMANT’S/RESPONDENT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS IN OPPOSITION TO THE COUNTER CLAIM OF THE DEFENDANTS COUNTER CLAIMANTS FILED ON THE 6TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2019.

 

In opposition of the counter claim filed by the Defendants, the Claimant filed a written address dated the 14th day of November, 2019 and filed on the same date. Learned counsel in his written address answered the sole issue for determination raised by the Defendants/Counter Claimants in the negative and relied on the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and the Further and Better Affidavit together with the Written Address therein. The Claimant challenges the propriety, validity and competence of the counter claim filed.

 

Learned counsel submit that by Order 3, Rules 17 (1) (2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 as applicable to this Honourable court Originating Summons is appropriate where the reliefs sought are not disputable, otherwise the action shall be commenced by Writ of Summons where pleadings are filed. The reliefs sought by the Respondent/Counter Claimants more especially relief (c) is hostile, therefore disputable. It is the principle of law that the procedure for commencing an action by Originating Summons is not meant to be resorted to in a hostile action between the parties and in which the parties concerned need to know before handing the issue which they are called upon to contend with from the pleadings. See JOHNSON VRS MOBILE PRODUCING  (NIG) UNLIMITED (2010) ALL FWLR PT 531 @ 1337 ESP @ P. 1341, R. 3 OR P 1361 PARAS A – C.

 

Learned counsel further submit that the respondents/counter claimants is an attempt to justify the termination of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rdDefendant by the Executive Governor through the office of the Head of Service misconceived the interpretation of the provisions of the laws establishing the 3rdDefendant. Learned counsel argued that the question to be answered are was the Claimant’s appointment as a Registrar of the 3rd Defendant terminated as a result of misconduct or non performance? Was the Claimant under any investigation? Learned counsel argued that the Claimant has not been alleged to have committed any offence or misconduct that could warrant either suspension, transfer or termination of the appointment of the Claimant. It is trite law that where a statute maintains specific things, those things not mentioned are not intended to be included while interpreting a statute or provision of the law. See MKPA VRS MKPA (2010) 14 NWLR (PT. 1214) @ P. 612.

 

Learned counsel urged this Honourable court to discountenance this counter claim for its incompetence and lacks merit.

 

 

COURT’S DECISION

The Claimant by an Originating Summons dated 22nd August, 2019 and filed on same date commenced this action against the Defendants and claims the reliefs as contained in the said Originating Summons.

In challenging the Claimant’s Originating Summons filed on the 22nd August, 2019, the Defendants have filed a 20 paragraph counter affidavit. The brief facts of the case as summarized from the Claimant’s affidavit is that the Claimant alleges that he is an employee of the 3rd Defendant as the Registrar of the Institute. That vide a letter dated the 12th day of September, 2015, his appointment as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant was confirmed by Prof. Prince Ayibaye Efere, a former Rector of the 3rd Defendant. It is also the Claimant’s case, that while his tenure as Registrar was still subsisting, the 1st Defendant through the office of the Head of Service, by a letter dated 20th August, 2019 terminated his appointments as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant. That the termination of his appointment as Registrar by the 1st Defendant through the office of the Head of Service was done without recourse to due procedure or requirements of law. That being aggrieved by the actions of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, he brought this action against them and seeks the reliefs contained in the Originating Summons from this Honourable court.

The Defendants in opposition to those allegations have filed a 20 paragraph Counter Affidavit and contend that the suit be dismissed for lacking in merit.

I have carefully and thoughtfully read through all the processes filed by the learned counsel for and on behalf of the parties in this suit. I have judiciously evaluated all the exhibits together with the averments contained in both the Supporting and Opposing affidavit including the Further and Better Affidavits filed. Having done all these, in other to effectively and effectually determine this suit I merged both issues formulated by parties as follows:

  1. Whether or not by the combined effect of section 7 (1) and (2) (b), 15 (3) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 the appointment of the Claimant was done in accordance with the provision of the law.

 

  1. If issue (a) herein raised above is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the 1st Defendant acting through the office of the Head of Service can properly relieve the Claimant of his duty and transfer him to another Ministry or Department of Government of Bayelsa State.

 

  1. Whether the Federal Polytechnic Act is applicable in this case.

On issue one, whether or not by the combined effect of section 7 (1) and (2) (b), 15 (3) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 the appointment of the Claimant was done in accordance with the provision of the law. In stating his case and reinforcing the arguments in support of his claim, Claimant made copious reference to the provisions of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 as the statute that regulates the relationship between the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant. He argues that this law guides the activities of the 3rd Defendant in relation to the Claimant’s employment and other staff of the Institute as well as how the 3rd Defendant conducts her activities with its employees. He specifically referred to section 7 (1) and (2) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 Law and contends that his tenure as Registrar is still subsisting and thus he cannot be removed before the expiration of the tenure of his office as Registrar. Invariably Claimant is tying the nature of his employment with one clothed with statutory flavour.

On what amounts to an employment with statutory flavour, the court held in the case of FMC, Ido Ekiti vrs Olajide (2011) 11 NWLR (pt. 1258) at 256 that for an employment to enjoy the status of statutory flavour, the manner of employment and termination must be specifically provided for in the statute creating the employment. In matters of such appointment, the procedure laid down in the applicable statute or regulations made thereunder must be religiously followed as any breach would render the exercise null and void.

Now, the pertinent question is whether the Claimant’s employment as Registrar was made in accordance with procedure laid down in the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012? Section 15 of the law makes provision for the office of the Registrar and provides as follows:

15 (1) “There shall be a Registrar who shall be the Chief Administrative Officer to the institute and shall serve as Secretary to the Management Committee”

15 (3) “The Registrar shall be appointed by the Governing Board of the Institute (The Board) and shall possess a good degree from a recognized University with at least 10 years experience.”

The commanding word in the above provision is ‘SHALL’, which makes it mandatory that only the Board of the Institute has the power to appoint the Registrar of the Institute. That power is not delegated to any other person or persons. A closer look at Exhibit AB3 annexed to the Claimant’s Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons, this Honourable court will discover that the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the Institute was made by the former Rector, one Prof. Prince Ayibaye Efere solely by a letter dated 12th September, 2015 without recourse to anyone after the Claimant had been in an acting capacity as Registrar for over six months. One is prompted to ask the following questions: who appointed the Claimant as Acting Registrar? When was he appointed an Acting Registrar? And from where did the former Rector derive the powers to appoint the Claimant as substantive Registrar? Can it be said that the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar was a fresh one or it was linked to his earlier employment into the State Civil Service? The Claimant has not been able to prove these before the court.

It is trite that any act done ultra vires is void ab initio. The Rector acted beyond his power specified in Section 10 of the aforesaid law. The law does not empower the Rector to appoint a Registrar. Thus, the letter dated 12th September, 2015 appointing the Claimant as Registrar is void as it was not done in a compliance with the manner specifically provided for in the law. The appointment of the Claimant as Registrar cannot stand. One cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. See the case of Macfoy vrs UAC Limited (1962) AC 153 where the court held that if an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. In that case, Lord Denning said “…….if an act is void, then it is in law a nullity it is automatically null and void without much ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the Court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad.” The former Rector’s act of appointing the Claimant as Registrar without any Board is bad and void in law. I so hold.

It is settled principle of law that when a Statute or Rules directs that a certain procedure be followed before a person can be appointed or his appointment be terminated, such a procedure must be strictly followed otherwise the court will declare void any act done not in accordance with the prescribed procedure. See Longe vrs First Bank Plc (2000) 6 NWLR (pt. 1189) pg 3; Adeniyi vrs Governing Council Yaba College of Technology (1993) 6 NWLR (pt. 300) 426.

There is nothing before this court to show that the appointment of the Claimant was ractified by the Board assuming if there was no Board at the time when the Claimant was appointed as the Registrar of the 3rd Defendant. And its trite that one of the cardinal rules of interpretation of statutes is that where the provision of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the duty of the court is to simply interpret the clear provision by giving the plain wordings their ordinary interpretation without more. It is not the function of a court of law to bend backwards to sympathize with a party in a case in the interpretation of a statute merely for the reason that the language of the law seems harsh or is likely to cause hardship. See Abacha vrs FRN (2014) 6 NWLR (pt. 1402) pg 43; Kraus Thompson Org. Ltd vrs N.I.P.S.S. (2004) 17 NWLR (pt. 901) 44. Therefore, I resolved the first issue in favour of the Defendants.

On issue two if issue (a) herein raised above is answered in the affirmative, whether or not the 1st Defendant acting through the office of the Head of Service can properly relieve the Claimant of his duty and transfer him to another Ministry or Department of Government of Bayelsa State. It is the case of the Claimant that he began his career as a Civil Servant in the Bayelsa State Ministry of Information and Culture as an Information Officer II on Salary Grade Level 08 Step 2 in 1998. He was later deployed to the Bayelsa State Council for Arts and Culture where his appointment was confirmed in June 15th 1999.

While he was still in the service of the Bayelsa State Civil Service, Claimant applied formally for transfer of service to the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management. From the Claimant’s deposition in paragraph 3 of the Affidavit in Support of his Originating Summons and by Exhibit AD3 attached to the said affidavit, Claimant was appointed as the Registrar of the 3rd Defendant vide a letter dated September 12th 2015 after he had acted in that capacity for over six months. Curiously, the Claimant was only released by the Civil Service Commission to the Institute vide a letter dated 12th July, 2016 in response to letters of request of release dated 16th September, 2015 and 21st December, 2015 respectively. The implication is that between 2015 when Claimant was said to have worked in the office of the 3rd Defendant’s Institute and 12th July, 2016 when Civil Service Commission formally approved his transfer of service which I felt its an irregularity, It cannot therefore be said that the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar could have been based on the transfer of his services which came later in 2016. Thus, the appointment as “Registrar” cannot predate the transfer. See NIDB vrs Olalomi Industries Limited (2002) 5 NWLR part 761 page 532 at ratio 7.

In the case of Nepa vrs El-Fandi (1986) 3 NWLR part 32 at page 884. The court held that documents themselves are the best form of evidence. The Claimant has exhibited documents before this court. These documents best describe the irregularities surrounding the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar. Therefore the appointment is improper. And I so hold.

Assuming without conceding that the appointment is proper and regular, the Governor of Bayelsa State has the powers to terminate the appointment of the Registrar. While section 15(3) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law vests the power to appoint the Registrar of the Institute on the Governing Board, the power to remove the Registrar, who by virtue of his office is a member of the Governing Board, resides with Governor. Section 7 (2) (b) of the law provides that the office of the Chairman or any member of the Board shall become vacant if: ‘He was removed from office by the Executive Governor of the State for reasons of gross misconduct or non-performance.’ The law under section 32 defines gross misconduct to mean a grave violation or breach of the provisions of the law.

The procedure adopted for the appointment of the Claimant was defective and a grave violation of the provisions of the law. On this ground, the Governor can exercise his powers under section 7 (2) (b) of the law to remove Claimant from office. Further, the powers of the Governor to remove an erring member of the Board is not subject to the direction or opinion of any other person or authority as the section makes no provision for that.

In the exercise of the Governor’s power to remove a member of the Board under the law, the Governor may act or delegate to another person the duty to act on his behalf. This is because it is not the normal function of a Governor to convey to Public Servants the termination or other disciplinary action against them. This is the normal function of the Civil Service Commission and Heads of the different Parastatals. See the case of Omiete Michael Kalango vrs the Governor of Bayelsa State of Nigeria & 2 Ors (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 17 SC. Therefore, in the instant case, it is proper that the instrument terminating the appointment of the Claimant was issued by the office of the Head of Service of Bayelsa State acting on the directives of the Governor.

It is also pertinent to place on record that by the said letter of termination issued on behalf of the Governor by the office of the Head of Service, the Claimant was not dismissed from service, he was merely relieved of his appointment as “Registrar” of the International Institute of Tourism and Hospitality and directed to resume work at the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs where he originally belonged. This act of redeployment of the Claimant to the mainstream of the Bayelsa State Civil Service after his disengagement from the Institute of Tourism and Hospitality as “Registrar” did not in any way constitute a breach of employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants.  Moreover, the Act did not state the mode through which the Governor shall convey the removal. Civil service is part of the executive arm of the state. It is worthy of note that the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management is an Institute established by Government with the sole purpose of carrying out vocational training. It is part of the public service, transfer of staff was made from the other ministries to it and transfer are usually made from it to other ministries. It is based on this that the Claimant himself transferred staff from the Institute to other Ministries as per Exhibit MOJ 1 in the Counter Affidavit.

Section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, the Public Service of a State is defined as “….the service of the state in any capacity in respect of the Government of the State and includes service as:

(f)    “staff of any educational institutional established or financed principally by a Government of a State;”

Therefore, the “Registrar” being a staff transferred by the Government to the Institute; which is part of the Public Service of a State can be transferred back to any Ministry upon the directive of the Governor of the State. In so far there is no any law which prohibits same. Therefore, its my ardent belief that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment as “Registrar” and his transfer to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs was proper, regular, lawful and not done in contravention of any law. I so hold. I resolved issue two in favour of the Defendants.

On the third issue whether the Federal Polytechnic Act is applicable to this case. The Claimant in his written address equally made reference to the provisions of the Federal Polytechnic Act and relied on same to argue that the Claimant is entitled to hold office as Registrar for a period of five years, and until the expiration of the period he cannot be removed. This argument, with all due respect, is not sustainable. The Federal Polytechnic Act is a federal enactment establishing Federal Institutions that does not apply directly to States. Its application is therefore limited to Federal Polytechnics and does not extend to the Bayelsa State International Institute of Tourism and Hospitality.

Section 31 of the Federal Polytechnics Act defines “Polytechnic” to mean the respective polytechnics set-up under section 1 of the Act” and not any other Institute. Specifically, the First Schedule to the Act clearly outline the Polytechnics referred to in section 1 of the Act and the 3rd Defendant on record is not one of the Polytechnics referred to in the First Schedule of the Act. Thus, the act does not contemplate any relationship with the 3rd Defendant. It is a well-established principle of law that the express mention one thing means the exclusion of all others. The name of the 3rd Defendant is not listed in the First Schedule of the Act. Therefore, not applicable in this case.

Assuming without conceding that the appointment of the Claimant as the Registrar of the 3rd Defendant was regular, by the provisions of section 7 (1) of the law the tenure is for four years, which is renewable for reappointment for another term of four years. And not five years as the Claimant contended, which thereafter the Claimant can be transferred back to any Agency, Department or Ministry. Counsel to the Claimant also submitted that there exist a Consent Judgment entered by this court on the same subject matter. I wish to reiterate here that the said consent judgment in Suit No. NICN/YEN/19/2019 only dealt with the issue of suspension of the Claimant and nothing more as such cannot operate as a res judicata.

In all, I resolved all the issues formulated in favour of the Defendants, the case of the Claimant fails and same is hereby dismissed.

THE COUNTER CLAIM

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Counterclaimants filed a Counter Claim to Claimant’s Originating Summons where the Counter Claimants formulated a lone issue for determination as follows:

Whether by virtue of the provisions of sections 15 (1) and (3), 5 (2) and 7(2) (b) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012, the Governor of Bayelsa State acting through the office of the Head of Service can validly terminate the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar and transfer him to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs.

And consequent upon this question for determination the Counter-Claimants prays to this court to grant the following reliefs:

  1. A DECLARATION that the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant by the Rector of the 3rd Defendant without recourse to the Governing Board is contrary to the provisions of section 15 (3) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 and therefore unlawful, null and void.

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar and his transfer to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs by the Governor of Bayelsa State through the Head of Service of Bayelsa State is proper, regular and lawful  and not done in contravention of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012.

 

  1. AN ORDER of this Honourable court directing the Claimant to refund to the Bayelsa State Government, the salaries and allowances he earned in excess of his normal Grade Level 14 salary when his appointment as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant was unlawful, null and void.

 

  1. AN ORDER of the Honourable court awarding the sum of N5, 000, 000. 00 (Five Million Naira) only in favour of the Defendants/Counter Claimants and against the Claimant as punitive cost for litigation.

Its a settled law that a counter claim is an independent action, separate and distinct from the original action. See Agbaosi vrs Imevbore (2014) 1 NWLR (pt. 1389) 556; Dada vrs Williams (2013) 2 NWLR (pt. 1338) pg 260.

Counsel to the Claimant/Defendant to Counter Claim contended that by the provisions of Order 3 Rules 17 (1) and (2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 Originating Summons is appropriate only where the reliefs or claims sought are not disputable. He said relief (c) is hostile, therefore disputable. While I agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel to the Defendant to Counter Claim that Originating Summons can be used to commence actions which usually involved questions or interpretation of the law or documents and not disputed facts as decided in Johnson vrs Mobil Producing (Nig) Unlimited (Supra), and having analyzed the reliefs sought in this counter claim by the Counter Claimants, one can see that its only relief (c) that cannot be commenced by a way of Originating Summons, this is because the Counter Claimants need to call evidence so as to prove the assertion contained therein. But its on record that the Defendants/Counter Claimants did apply for the striking out of relief (c) as contained in their Counter Claim which this court had earlier granted same.

Now coming back to the counter claim proper, the relevant provisions of the law establishing the 3rd Defendant/Counter Claimant and the office of the Claimant/Defendant to Counter Claim are as follows:

Section 15 (1) (3) provides thus:

Subsection (1)     There shall be a Registrar who shall be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Institute and shall serve as Secretary to the Management Committee;

Subsection (3)     The Registrar shall be appointed by the Governing Board of the Institute and shall possess a good degree from a recognized University with at least 10 years experience.

Section 5 (2) provide as follows:

The Board shall consist of the following members all of whom shall be appointed by the Governor, (except the Registrar, who is appointed by the Board).

Section 7 (2) (b) clearly provides thus:

The office of the Chairman or any member of the Board shall become vacant if; he was removed from the office by the Executive Governor of the State for reasons of gross misconduct or non performance.

From the provisions above specifically section 15 (3) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Hotel Management Law, 2012 (which state the mode upon which the Registrar of the Institute is to be appointed) was not followed. Its on record that the Claimant was never appointed by the Board as specifically provided by the law. The Claimant was appointed by the former Rector of the Institute. And there is nothing to show that at any other time the Board ratified such appointment.

Its a settled principle of law that when a statute or rules directs on how a certain procedure be conducted, such a procedure provided by the statute must be strictly followed otherwise the court will declare void any act done not in accordance with the said prescribed procedure. See Longe vrs First Bank Plc (Supra); Adeniyi vrs Governing Council, Yaba College of Technology (supra). And the use of the word “Shall” in the statute connotes the mandatory nature of the provision and the lack of an option or discretion in the matter. See ColKhaliel vrs Alhaji Aliero (1994) 4 NWLR (pt. 597) 139; Ajao Adadi Adams vrs Babatunde Umar & Ors (2008) LPELR – 3591 (CA) per Sankey JCA.  Also, it is a settled primary principle of interpretation of statutes that where the wordings of the law or statute are clear and unambiguous, the ordinary meaning of the word should be ascribed to it. See Abacha vrs FRN (supra).

Therefore, proper procedure having not been complied with in appointing the Claimant as the Registrar of the 3rd Defendant thus making his appointment void, the Governor can remove the Claimant. And since the provision of section 7 (2) (b) of the law is silent on the mode to be adopted in removing the Claimant, the Governor can use any other medium in doing so. Therefore, the Governor having acted through the office of the Head of Service and terminated the appointment of the Claimant, same is valid. And there is no law which precludes the 1st Defendant from transferring the services of the Claimant to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw National Affairs. I so hold. Therefore, I resolved the lone issue for determination in favour of the Defendants/Counter Claimants.

In summary the counter claim succeeds in part and I hold as follows:

  1. I declare that the appointment of the Claimant as Registrar of the 3rd Defendant by the Rector of the 3rd Defendant without recourse to the Governing Board is contrary to the provisions of section 15 (3) of the Bayelsa State Institute of Tourism, Catering and Management Law, 2012 and therefore void.

 

  1. I declare that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment as Registrar and his transfer to the Ministry of Culture and Ijaw Nation Affairs by the Governor of Bayelsa State acting through the office of the Head of Service of Bayelsa State is proper, regular and lawful and not done in contraventions of the law.

 

  1. Relief (c) is hereby struck out.

 

 

  1. I declined to award any cost.

Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

 

__________________________________________

HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

PRESIDING JUDGE

YENAGOA DIVISION

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA