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LUCKY MASI & 4 ORS -VS- NIGERIA CUSTOM SERVICE BORAD

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP:

HON. JUSTICE AUWAL IBRAHIM, PhD

 

DATE: 5th February, 2018                        SUIT NO NICN/PH/67/2014

 

BETWEEN:

 

  1. LUCKY MASI
  2. CHINEDU MASI
  3. AUGUSTINE MASI
  4. ESTHER MASI
  5. MABEL MASI=============CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS

(Suing as beneficiaries and representative the estate of late VIOLET N MASI (Mrs.)

 

AND

 

NIGERIA CUSTOM SERVICE BORAD====Defendant/Applicant

 

REPRESENTATION:

George Ogara Esq. appeared with Q.O. Epiah Esq. for the Claimants/Respondents.

Samaila Abba Zurmi Esq. appeared for the Defendant/Applicant.

 

RULING/JUDGMENT

 

On the 12th day of March, 2014, the Claimants approached this Honourable Court with a Complaint dated same date. Endorsed on the Complaint and the Statement of Facts are the following reliefs sought against the Defendant:

 

  1. Wherefore the Claimants claim against the Defendant the following reliefs:

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the defendant employment in November, 2004 is unlawful.
  2. The sum of N10, 118, 585. 07 being the salaries due to VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the defendant between November, 1996 to November, 2004.
  3. The sum of N3, 755, 351.16 being the gratuities due to VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the Defendant.
  4. The sum of N13, 070, 798. 29 being the pension due to VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the Defendant.
  5. The sum of N16, 638, 291. 95 being salaries due to MRS VIOLET N. MASI (Customs Service No. 33249) from the defendant from December 2004 to 15th March, 2014.
  6. The sum of N150, 000, 000. 00 being damages/compensation to the Claimants for the death of VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) caused by the Defendant’s failure, refusal and neglect to provide adequate medical care for the said VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) and/or seizure of the salary of VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) between November 1996 and November, 2004 which prevented her from obtaining adequate medical care.

 

The Complaint was accompanied with a Statement of Facts, list of witnesses, statements on oath of witnesses, list and copies of documents to be relied upon at trial. After being served with the processes of the Claimants, the Defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 9th April, 2014 on the same date. The said notice of preliminary objection has the following reliefs:

 

  1. That the Claimant (sic) action against the Defendants (sic) is statute barred.
  2. That the Claimant (sic) lack – STANDY (sic).

 

The grounds upon which the objection is raised are:

 

(a)  The action of the Claimants’ against the Defendant is statute barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, Cap P41, Laws of the Federation, 2004 (LFN, 2004).

(b) That by virtue of Section 6(1) of the Board of Customs and Excise (Amendment) Act, 77 of 1993.

(c)  That the Claimants’ lack locus standi to institute the action without letter of Administration of the Estate of the Late Mrs Masi Violet.

 

In support of the Notice of preliminary objection is an affidavit of 7 paragraphs deposed to by one Amadi H.C., a Superintendent of Customs in the Office of the Defendant attached to legal seat, Area 1 Command, Port Harcourt. There is also a written address in support.

 

Upon being served with the said Notice of Preliminary Objection, the learned Claimants’ counsel filed an (counter) affidavit in opposition to the preliminary objection of 20 paragraphs deposed to by one Augustine Masi, the 3rd Claimant in this suit. The said counter-affidavit is accompanied with a written address in opposition to the preliminary objection.

 

The Defendant did file a reply on points of law.

 

In his written address in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection, learned Defendant’s counsel formulated and argued the following issues for the Court’s determination:

 

  1. Whether the action of the Claimant against the Defendant is not statute barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004?
  2. And Section 6(1) of the Board of Customs and Excise (Amendment) Act No. 77 of 1993?

 

Arguing the 1st Issue, learned counsel submitted that the Claimants’ action is statute barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004. He reproduced the said Section as follows:

 

  1. Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any Act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or law of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, law, duty or authority, the following shall have effect.

(a) The action, prosecution or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the action, neglect or default companied of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing there of.

Learned counsel continued that in case of IBRAHIM VS J.S.C (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1, Ratio 4, the Supreme Court held, per IGUH J.S.C. at page 32 Paras. D-F

It can therefore be said that Section 2 (a) Public Officers Protection Act, CAP 379 (1990) give full protection or cover to all public officers or persons engaged in the execution of public duties who at all material times acted within the confines of their Public Duty.

The definition of “any person” in the Public Officers (Protection) Law – (Same with Act) cannot be read as meaning any person in any limited sense, that is to say, as referring only to natural persons or human beings. It admits and includes artificial persons such as a corporation sole, company, or any body or persons corporate or unincorporated, relying on Ibrahim’s case, supra, at page 36 paras. B-C.

That in the case of Bassey vs Minister of Defence (2000) ALL FWLR PT 343, 1799 at 1805 – 1806 paras. G-B it was held to the effect that S. 2 (a) Public Officers Protection Act, Cap 41 LFN, 2004, 379 LFN 1990 does not contest, prevent or deny right of a citizen of Nigeria from going to court in Nigeria. It merely restricts the period within which a public officer acting within his official function may be sued for any perceived wrong from the action of the Public Officer. The period within which such as action may be commenced is three months from the day the cause of action accrues. The Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P.41 LFN, 2004 is therefore not inconsistent, or against the provisions made in the constitution.

Learned counsel further submitted that where an action is Statute barred, a plaintiff who might have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of limitation laid down by limitation Law for instituting such an action has elapsed. An action commenced after the expiration of the period within which an action must be brought as stipulated in the statute of limitation in question prescribes a period within which an action must be brought, legal proceeding cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of prescribed period, relying on N.P.A Vs LOTUS PLASTICS LTD & ANOR. (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 297), page 1023 at page 1045 paragraphs B-F.

That, applying the above principles of Law and Case Law precedent to the Defendant/Applicant, the Defendant/Applicant is a Public Officer and consequently protected by S. 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act. He submitted that the Claimant’s alleged cause of action occurred on 2004 and it shows clearly that he commenced this suit against the defendant outside the three months statutory period within which to sue the defendant. The Defendant/Applicant was sued ten 10 years after the alleged offence was committed. This clearly shows that this suit was filed outside the three (3) months statutory period within which to sue the Defendants.

Furthermore, that Section 6(1) of the Board of Customs and Excise (Amendment) Act 77 of 1993 provides that:-

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in other law, no action shall be instituted against the Board in respect of any act, neglect or default done or omitted to be done by any officer, servant or agent of the Board with regard to the regulations made pursuant to section 8(1)(b) of this Act unless it is commenced within three months next after the act or negligence complained of or in the case of a continuing damage or injury, within three months next after ceasing thereof.

Section 8(1)(b) of the Board of Customs and Excise Act 45, 1992 provides as follows:

“Subject to the provision of this Act, the Board may, with the approval of the Minister make regulations relating generally to the conditions of service, including the power to fix salaries and allowances of staff of the Board and of the department and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing such regulation may provide for:

(c)      The appointment promotion and disciplinary control, including dismissal of staff of the Board and of the Department, appeals by such staff against his dismissal or other disciplinary measure, and until such regulations are made, any instrument relating to the conditions of service of the civil service of the Federation shall with such modification as necessary be applicable to the staff of the Board and of the department.

Learned counsel submitted that the defendant demised the Claimant in compliance with the provisions of Section 8 (1)(b) of the Board of Customs and Excise Act, No. 45, 1992. On his part, counsel contended, the Claimant has failed to observe the provision of the above statute by bringing his suit out of time. To allow him to bring this action 10 years after the lapse of time will amount to enlarging the time within which he could bring the action, and this is beyond the powers of this Honourable Court. It is the constitutional duty of the court to interpret the law and not to make or amend the law. It is only the legislature who enacted the law that can amend it to accommodate the extension of time within which the Plaintiff can sue. Where there is no such extension of time, the action carried out will be invalid. He referred to Araka V. Ejeagwu (2001) FWLR (Pt. 36) Ratio 9.

Consequently, upon the foregoing, it is the submission of the Defendants/Applicants that this court can grant this application and dismiss this suit against Defendants.  The action of the Plaintiff was caught by S.2(a) Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41 LFN 2004.

Also that this Honourable Court should grant the relief sought in the Notice of Preliminary Objection, for the reasons contained in the said Notice and their address herein and strike out and or dismiss this suit with substantial Cost.

 

On his own part, learned Claimants’ counsel formulated and argued the following lone issue for the court’s determination, namely, whether the Claimant’s/Respondents’ suit is statute barred?

 

Arguing same learned Claimants’ counsel stated that the ground upon which the application of the defendant is brought is Section 6(1) of the Nigeria Customs Service Board Act, Cap N100, LFN, 2004, and he reproduced same. He then went on to state that under the said section a complaint can be made in two different times as: viz:

 

(a)  Action commenced within three months next after the act complained.

(b) Action commenced in respect of continuing injury or damage within three months next after the continuing injury or damage has ceased.

 

That in determining whether the Claimants/Respondents claim is statute barred, it is the claims that are to be looked at. In the instant case, the claims are contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 of the Complaint as follows:

 

  1. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the defendant employment in November, 2004 is unlawful.
  2. The sum of N10, 118, 585. 07 being the salaries due to VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the defendant between November, 1996 to November, 2004.
  3. The sum of N3, 755, 351.16 being the gratuities due to VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the Defendant.
  4. The sum of N13, 070, 798. 29 being the pension due to VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) from the Defendant.
  5. The sum of N16, 638, 291. 95 being salaries due to MRS VIOLET N. MASI (Customs Service No. 33249) from the defendant from December 2004 to 15th March, 2014.
  6. The sum of N150, 000, 000. 00 being damages/compensation to the Claimants for the death of VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) (Customs Service No. 33249) caused by the Defendant’s failure, refusal and neglect to provide adequate medical care for the said VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) and/or seizure of the salary of VIOLET N. MASI (MRS) between November 1996 and November, 2004 which prevented her from obtaining adequate medical care.

 

Learned counsel then classified the reliefs sought into three, viz:

 

  1. Declaratory nature of relief (1) in the Writ of Summons.
  2. Reliefs 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the Complaint are unpaid salaries and entitlements which are outstanding till date.
  3. Relief 6 is damages arising from the failure to pay the salaries and entitlements in reliefs 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the Writ of Summons (accessory claim).

 

That the question that readily comes to mind is when did the cause of action in this suit arise? Learned counsel then stated that to answer this question we must find out what a cause of action is. That a cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. It contains facts or combination of facts which give rise to sue and in general consists of two elements:-

 

  1. The wrongful act of the Defendant which gives the Claimant cause of complaint, and
  2. The consequent damage.

 

On the declaratory nature of relief No. 1 in the Writ of Summons, learned counsel stated that Declaratory reliefs are binding adjudication of the rights of the parties to the suit. That in Dr Michael Ayo Daniyan & Ors vs Elekena Oba Iyagun & Ors (2002) FWLR (Pt. 120) p. 1805 at page 1835, paras, C-D, Oduyemi, JCA, also described declaratory reliefs thus:

 

It is a remedy for the determination of a justiciable controversy where the Plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights. It is a binding adjudication of the rights and status of litigants even though no consequential relief is granted. See Black’s Law Dictionary 5th Edition at page 368.

 

Learned counsel submitted further that the power of the court to make declarations at any time cannot be circumscribed by statute of limitation referring to Ewarami vs African Continental Bank Limited (1978) 4 S.C. 72 at 78, lines 5-10, where Irikife JSC held thus:-

In Hanson vs Radcliffe V.D.C. 507, Lord Stevendale M.R. had this to say on declaratory Judgment:-

The power of the Court to make declaration, where it is a question of defining the rights of the parties is almost unlimited.

 

Learned counsel then submitted that this Honourable Court has the inherent power to continue to adjudicate, determine and define the rights of the two parties that appear before it. And that this power can be exercised by the court even where there is no cause of action. He referred to Chief Ohwovwiogor Ikine & Ors vs Chief Olor Edjorode (2002) FWLR (Pt. 92) p. 1775 at p. 1814, para. F, where Onu JSC held that:-

Indeed a declaratory relief or declaration can be made even where there is no cause of action.

 

Counsel continued that a declaratory relief will be granted even when the relief has been rendered unnecessary by the lapse of time, referring to Alhaji Braimoh Simidu Bisimillahi vs Yagba-East Local Government & 2Ors (2003) FWLR (Pt. 141) p. 1923 at 1966-1967, paras. G-H. He stated further that reliefs 37(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Statement of Claim are in line with the principles enunciated in Bismillah’s case, above.

 

He continued that the power of the court to make a binding declaration is a discretionary one to be exercised pursuant to Section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. He then submitted that Section 6(1) of the Nigeria Customs Service Board Act, supra, cannot limit or circumscribe the powers of the court to adjudicate, determine and define the right of parties as conferred by the Constitution. He referred to Jeph C. Njikonye Esq. vs MTN Nig Communications Ltd (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 413) p. 1343 at 1368-1369, paras G-A. and then submitted that the invocation of Section 6(1) of the Nigeria Customs Board Act by the Defendant to restrict, impede or curtail the Claimants’ right to seeking and obtaining declaratory relief which can be granted under the inherent powers of this Court under Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution should be disregarded by this Honourable Court. He then urged the court to hold that relief 1 in the Complaint is not statute barred being claim for adjudication and definition of the right of the parties to the Suit.

 

On reliefs 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the Complaint, learned counsel submitted that they are pecuniary arising from unpaid salaries, pensions and gratuities. That unpaid pecuniary reliefs become payable upon demand and the failure of the Defendant/applicant to pay the salaries, pensions and gratuities of V.N. Masi (Mrs) has continued to cause injury to the beneficiaries of the Estate of late V.N. Masi (Mrs) up till date. That the said injury is continuous which falls within the second limb of Section 6 (1) of the Nigeria Customs Board Act.

 

Learned counsel continued that the right of a person in the public service of the Federation to receive pension, gratuity, salary or any other benefit is protected by Section 173(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, which provides thus:-

 

173-(1)        Subject to the provision of this Constitution, the right of a person in the Public Service of the Federation to receive pension or gratuity shall be regulated by law.

 

      (2)         Any benefit to which a person is entitled in accordance with or under such law as is referred to in Subsection (1) of this Section shall not be withheld or altered to his disadvantage except to such extent as is permissible under any law, including the Code of Conduct.

 

He the stated that reliefs 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the Complaint seek to recover benefits provided under the Constitution. Thus, the Claimants/Respondents seek the explanation of the legality and validity of the defendant in withholding the benefits of late V.N. Masi (Mrs) under the Constitution. Therefore, the powers of the Court to hear and determine issues with respect to the legality, extent, nature and validity of the actions of the Defendant under the Constitution cannot be statute barred. That Section 173(1) and (2) of the Constitution has provided for the payment of salaries, pensions, gratuities and other benefits to a person in the public service of the Federation and has also prohibited the withholding of same. Thus if Section 6(1) of the Nigeria Customs Service Board Act purports to limit the time to exercise the rights of such a person to these entitlements, such Act, stands void. He urged the court to so hold relying on a number judicial decisions to wit: Niger Development Co. Ltd vs Adamawa State Water Board & 3 Ors (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 422) p. 1052; Fasakin Foods Nig Ltd vs Martins Babatunde Shosanya (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 320) p. 1059 and Emmanuel Anzaku vs The Executive Governor Nassarawa State & Ors (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 303) p. 308 at 346. All these authorities are to support the submission of counsel that where the provision of a statute that is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, such provision should be declared null and void.

 

On relief 6 of the Complaint, learned counsel stated that Damages is an accessory legal remedy used by the court to protect a principal right which has been established. It is submitted that a remedy which is a legal accessory to a principal right cannot be statute barred where the principal right is not statute barred. He referred to the case of Okafor & Ors vs A-G Anambra State & Ors (2001) FWLR (Pt. 58) p. 1127 at 1151 paras. C-D. He submitted that where the court finds that the Constitutional right to pension, gratuity, salaries and other benefits were illegally withheld from V.N. Masi (Mrs) this Court has powers to award damages against the defendant for the violation of such Constitutional right.

 

Learned counsel for the Claimants/Respondents urged the court to discountenance the second relief of the Defendant/applicant in the Notice of Preliminary Objection on the ground that it is not known to law. He then added that the Defendant/Applicant is bound by the prayers in its Notice of Preliminary Objection. He cited a number of judicial decisions including Hydroworks Ltd vs Rimi Local Government (2002) FWLR (Pt. 110) p. 1906 at para. C.

 

The learned Claimants/Respondents’ counsel filed additional authorities dated 13th November, 2014 but filed on 10th November, 2017.

 

Thereafter, precisely on 20th November, 2017 the learned Defendant/Applicant’s counsel filed a reply on points of law on issues raised by the claimants’ counsel in opposition to the preliminary objection of the defendant/applicant.

 

I have carefully considered the processes filed, the arguments and submissions of the parties on the application of the Defendant as contained in its Notice of Preliminary Objection. The issue for determination is whether or not this suit of the Claimants is statute barred? The facts briefly put are that the Claimants claim to be suing on behalf of the Estate of Mrs V.N. Masi, a deceased officer of the Defendant. The Claimants are claiming the reliefs as set out at the beginning of this Ruling to which the Defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection. The basis of the objection is that the suit is statute barred. The limitation law relied upon by the Defendant is Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004 as well as Section 6(1) of the Nigeria Customs Service Board Act. Both statutes are similarly worded and have set the time limit of three (3) months within which the Claimants’ should have come to court from the time of the accrual of the cause of action.

 

In determining the issue at hand the starting point is that the Court is bound to confine itself to the originating processes of the Claimants in this suit. The court will then look at the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the Claimants filed their suit in court. If the Claimants have filed the suit outside the time allowed by the Statute of limitation, then the suit must be declared statute barred. See Hassan vs Aliyu (2010) LPELR-1357 (SC) per Adekeye JSC, p. 81 paras D-F where His Lordship held as follows:

 

In order to determine the period, consideration must be given to the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by limitation law then the action is statute barred.

See also Attorney-General of Rivers State vs Attorney-General of Bayelsa State & Anor (2012) LPELR-9336 (SC).

 

In the instant case, the cause of action is said by the Claimants to be the dismissal of the said deceased V.N. Masi (Mrs) from her job sometime in November 2004. See paragraph 26 of the Statement of Facts. It is important to point out here that the main claim of the Claimants is that the dismissal of Mrs V.N. Masi by the Defendant was wrongful and all the other reliefs are predicated on the success of this main claim. Then the Claimants filed this suit on 12th March 2014. This is clearly outside the three months stipulated by both Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004 (POPA, 2004), and Section 6(1) of the NCSB Act.

 

However, the learned Claimants’ counsel has submitted that the 1st relief of the Claimants which is declaratory is not subject to statute bar. He further submitted that reliefs 2, 3, 4 and 5 are for the salaries, pension and gratuity of the V.N. Masi (Mrs) which are also not subject to statute of limitation.

 

On the defence set up by the Claimants, the thrust of the defence is the proviso to the said limitation laws which provides that in the event of a continuing damage suffered by a Claimant, the limitation law will not apply until after three months from the ceasing of the continuing damage. The point of continuing damage has been fully explained by the decisions of the superior courts. The meaning of continuing damage or injury is that the act complained of is repeated at intervals so that the said damage or injury is revived as soon as it is repeated. This makes the damage or injury a continuing one. Thus it is not the continuing damage or injury in itself once the act is committed but rather it is the continuity of the act that causes the damage or injury that make the injury continuing damage or injury. See INEC vs Ogbadigbo Local Government & Ors(2015) LPELR-24838 (SC); and University of Ilorin vs Mr Jolayemi Ademola Ayodeji (2014) LPELR-23821 (CA). The Claimants in this case have stated that the deceased, Mrs V.N. Masi was dismissed from service for an alleged failure to report to work; and that she even subsequently wrote to the defendant for a reconsideration of the decision to dismiss her from service. The act of dismissal was a single act of damage/injury caused the deceased with the repercussions of loss of salaries and other benefits. Thus it cannot be said that the act of dismissal of the deceased by the Defendant was repeated monthly or any time at all for it to qualify as a continuing damage or injury. Therefore it is my humble view which I so find and hold that the defence of continuing damage or injury set up by the claimants does not avail them in this case.

 

Following this holding of the Honourable Court it is important to point out that the Claimants’ are claiming for and on behalf of the estate of the said deceased Mrs V.N. Masi but then the deceased herself did not institute the action herself before her demise. She thus did not even challenge the dismissal by the Defendant as being wrongful during her lifetime. If she had challenged the dismissal and within time, it would have been a different matter since limitation of time would not be a bar against such an action. The peculiarity of this suit is that the court is now being asked to determine the legality or otherwise of the dismissal of the deceased by the defendant, declare same as being unlawful and make the consequential orders that would result into the payment of alleged salaries and entitlements. This determination can only be done by the court where the suit was filed within time as stipulated by the limitation law. The effect of the limitation law is to remove the right of enforcement and the right to judicial relief and leaves the Claimant with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce if such an action is statute barred. See CBN vs Uchenna Godswill Denneh (2005) LPELR-11349 (CA).

 

Furthermore, learned Claimants’ counsel has argued that declaratory reliefs are never statute barred. The truth here is that the Claim in this suit is not about declaratory reliefs alone. There are, tied to the declaratory relief, claims for salaries, benefits and damages. Therefore the argument cannot avail the claimants. In the same vein, the argument of the Claimants that claim for salaries and other entitlements are not subject to statute bar, placing reliance on section 173 (1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the decision of this Honourable Court in Okiki vs Nigeria Customs Service (Unreported) Suit No. NICN/LA/246/2014 delivered on 22/9/2015 which relied on CBN vs Amao (2010) 5-7 MJSC at 5-6, is not tenable. This is because the Claimants in this suit are not even claiming for pension and gratuity but rather they are claiming for every entitlement of the deceased where the alleged dismissal of the deceased employee, Mrs V.N. Masi, was found to be wrongful. This distinguishes this suit from the authorities cited and relied upon by learned claimants’ counsel.

 

In the circumstance and for all the reasons given, I uphold the preliminary objection of the Defendant to this suit as I hold that the suit is statute barred for having been brought outside the three months period provided in Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, LFN, 2004 and also Section 6(1) Nigeria Customs Service Board Act, No. 45 of 1992. The suit is hereby struck out. I make no order as to costs.

 

Ruling/Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

 

Hon. Justice Auwal Ibrahim, PhD

Presiding Judge

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