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National Industrial Court

KabiruAbubakar Mustapha & 244 Others -VS- NITDA

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

ON THURSDAY 5TH DAY OF JULY 2018

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE  S. OLUYINKA ADENIYI

 

SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/05/2017

BETWEEN:

  1. KABIRU ABUBAKAR MUSTAPHA…………………………CLAIMANTS
  2. ABDULFATAH ABDULKAREEM
  3. ABDULHAMID BELLODAHIRU
  4. ABDULKAREEM BABAGIDA A.
  5. ABDULKAREEM SANI OMOLO
  6. ABDULKARIM ALIYU
  7. ABDULMALIK MAILAFIA
  8. ABDULMALIK MUKAILA
  9. ABDULRASHEED MUSTAPHA
  10. ABIOYE JIMOH A.
  11. ABU ANDREW
  12. ABUBAKAR ABDULLAHI
  13. ABUBAKAR ALI
  14. ABU DAVID OGBADU
  15. AFOLAKE AJALA
  16. AGAYIN A. OKUTA
  17. AGBAJE ADEWALE IFEDAPO
  18. AGBO PRECIOUS
  19. AGHO LINDA
  20. AHMED MUSTAPHA MUHAMMAD
  21. AHMED ABDULLAHI SURE
  22. AISHA MOHAMMED I.
  23. AJANA ANGELA IFEOMA
  24. AJIE IFEOMA C.
  25. AKINSOLA TEMILOLA
  26. AKPANUSONG UDUAK
  27. ALABI MARYAM OMOWUNMI
  28. ALAWE BOLAWALE VICTOR
  29. ALI ABUBAKAR MUHAMMED
  30. ALI GARBA SAIDU
  31. ALICE I. EDWARD
  32. AMOBI HENRY O.
  33. ANAHALU BENJAMIN C.
  34. ANENE OGOCHUKWU MAUREEN
  35. ANIDIOBI O. THEO
  36. ANN CURTIS E.
  37. ANOWU CLESTUS EZIM
  38. ANURIKA CHIBUZOR EKEZIE
  39. ASOGWA MARK
  40. ASUQUO FRANCISCA E.
  41. ATAINYANG PETER EDUNO
  42. AUSTINE O. ONUWUSIKA
  43. BABA GANA LAWAN
  44. BABATUNDE OLOWU ANDREW
  45. BUKURA KALI
  46. BALKISABDUL – JELIL
  47. BASHIR BALA
  48. BASIRAT MOGAJI
  49. BATHIYA NATHAN
  50. BILI KELANI
  51. BONIFACE OCHUGUDU CLEMENT
  52. CHAGWA FIYANYI LUKA
  53. CHIKA EMENIKE
  54. CHIOMA MARY NWOKOLO
  55. CHUKWUMA IKEGWUANI
  56. DANGANA JESSICA SAMUEL
  57. DANLADI SUNDAY BARDE
  58. DAVID ELEOJO HAPPINESS
  59. DAVID HARLING
  60. DAVID SAMUEL FUNGI
  61. DORCAS ANDOKA ALU
  62. DUNIYA MERCY
  63. EBOHON MICA OSEZUA
  64. EBUTA JOY MANYO
  65. EFIENEMOKWU NICOLE O.
  66. EGENE BRIDGET A.
  67. EJEMEAYO IZZI
  68. EJIGA ROSELINE
  69. EKUKINAM MFONOBONG UDUAK
  70. EMEKA ONYEBUCH E.
  71. EMMANUEL MATHIAS PETER
  72. EMMANUEL OSANG
  73. ENECHUKWU IFEAKANDU U
  74. ENIOLA OLUWATOSIN MONISOLA
  75. EUNICE MBAUYE YISA
  76. EYO ENEM JOSEPH
  77. FADILA USMAN ABDULLAHI
  78. FAROUK ALIYU
  79. FEESE UDOO SYLVIA
  80. FRANCIS OKAFOR C.
  81. HUSSAINA BABA INNA
  82. IBRAHIM A. AKANBI
  83. IBRAHIM ABDULLAHI BEBEJI
  84. IBRAHIM ABUSAFIYAN
  85. IBRAHIM LAWAL ISHAQ
  86. IBRAHIM MOHAMMED
  87. IBRAHIM NAOMI
  88. IDAMINABO ENE C.
  89. IDELI CHUKWUEBUKA O.
  90. IGBONNUGO IBEZIAKOR A.
  91. IJEOMA ONUBOGU
  92. IKEJIOFOR CLESTINE O.
  93. ILIYA BITRUS
  94. IREKPITAN TOLUWALASE O.
  95. ISA BABA TORO
  96. ISIMI ABIMBOLA
  97. ISMAIL OYINLOLA
  98. IWUNO TOCHUCKWU ROSE-ANN
  99. JESSICAIDUN
  100. JOHN NKEMDINIM NWACHUKU
  101. JOHNMARK JOSHUA
  102. JONATHAN M. COMFORT
  103. JULIS OCHAYI
  104. ABBAS BABAGANA
  105. KABIRU USMAN
  106. KADIRI ODUFA STELLA
  107. KASARI MATAKI ASTIRA
  108. KATCHANG JAMES OWEH
  109. KATCHY CHINUA
  110. KUVE JOHN
  111. LAMIDO TIJANI
  112. LAWANSON HELEN EBIERE D.
  113. LINUS WILSON BULAMA
  114. MAHAMMED KACHALA
  115. MAIMAGANI DANIEL D.M
  116. MAISHAIRA ADAMU
  117. MAMACHIKA JOSHUA
  118. MAROELOUISE EZEH
  119. MARY MANGA TURAKI
  120. MATKWAP M. KANGTUN
  121. MEDINAT ADEGOKE
  122. MOHAMMED GADAUJI
  123. MOHAMMED TAHIR ABUBAKAR
  124. MOHAMMED ZAKARIYA
  125. MOJUME EZIUZOR
  126. MUKARAK AHMED SHEHU
  127. MUHAMMAD KABIR KASSIM
  128. MUHAMMED SHITU
  129. MUKTAR USMAN
  130. MUTRALA NUHU
  131. MUSA DISABLED
  132. MUSTAPHA AHMED ABRAHIM
  133. MUSTAPHA DAUDA ILIYA
  134. MUSTAPHA MOHAMMED
  135. MUSTAPHA ZARAGOZA
  136. NABILA ABUBAKAR
  137. NAFISA YUNUSA
  138. NANDI LOGAN LEMARK
  139. NANNIM AUDU FADILA
  140. NCHEKWUBE NWARU C.
  141. NGAJI TIMOTHY ENYA
  142. NKPABO DANIEL INAKU
  143. NNAEMEKA NWODO
  144. NNAMANI CHIKA
  145. NWAKA MIRACULOUS
  146. NWANE JUDE
  147. NWORISA FORTUNE C.
  148. OBASI JUDITH C.
  149. OBALIMWE UTUM EDUSON
  150. OBETTA CHINEYRE DORIS
  151. OBIANUJU NNEKA
  152. OBIEKEZIE HELEN
  153. OBIERIKE DANIEL I.
  154. OBONO IWARA OFEM
  155. ODENIGBO ADAWZE B.
  156. ODETAYO OLUWATOMI
  157. ODEY LEHIOWO D.
  158. ODUNAYO AYOYEMI A.
  159. OFFIONGGAGOM JARIGBE
  160. OGBAKA ODAMA GABRIEL
  161. OGUCHE EYIOJO MERCY
  162. OGUNSEYI OLOWATOSIN O.
  163. OGUZI JOHNSON
  164. OJAR THERESA ADIGO
  165. OJEVWE ODELE LINDA
  166. OJIM KELECHI OKENWA
  167. OKAFOR GERALD C.
  168. OKAFOR UZOAMAKA B.
  169. OKAKU MECY ODEY
  170. OKECHUKWU CHARLES
  171. OKEKE ROESLINE NKECHI
  172. OKEKE TOBIAS CHUKWU
  173. OKEM SUNDAY AKAN
  174. OKOLI CHINELO J.
  175. OKOLI JOHNSON A.
  176. OKOLI THERESA OMANG
  177. OKOLI PLACIDUS
  178. OKOLO MAJOR O.
  179. OKON INI ASUQUO
  180. OLADEJO RASHEED
  181. OLADUNJOYE OBAFEMI J.
  182. OLAYINKA OLUWATOYIN O.
  183. OLOM ODEY MOSES
  184. OLOTU SANDRA A.
  185. OLUCHUKWU OKAFOR CHIKA
  186. OLUWADAMILOLA OGUNSOLA
  187. OMAEFI EMMANUEL E.
  188. OMANG RACHEAL IYEMYI
  189. OMOKHOMION AIKHENE
  190. OMOREWU CYRIL OYINKURO
  191. OMOTOSHO NURUDEEN ADIODUN
  192. ONODUGO H. TOBECHUKWU
  193. ONOMO KINGSLEY C.
  194. ONUORAH ANDREW NNAEMEKA
  195. ONYWNWHO FIDELIS
  196. ONYEWU ELIZABETH T.
  197. OYEBANJI DOYIN DAMILOLA
  198. OZOENE MERCY E.
  199. OZOMAH EMMANUEL
  200. PATRICK VINCENT
  201. PIUS KEKONG
  202. RUAMAU SHITTU
  203. RUFINA OTUMUDIA
  204. SABO M. ZAMFARA
  205. SADAM BELLO
  206. SAMAILA ADO
  207. SAMUEL ADEYEMI O.
  208. SAMUEL SALIFU
  209. SANGO GIDEON DAMISHI
  210. SANNI OLALEKAN
  211. SANUSI ABDUL
  212. SARAH JOSEPH D.
  213. SHARAFDEEN ONIJO
  214. SHEU ALIYU
  215. SHITTU OLAMIDE O.
  216. SILAS KUFRE EMMANUEL
  217. SODANGI KASIM
  218. SOUZEY UCHENNA EMMANUEL
  219. STELLA IFEPKOLUGO
  220. STEPHANIE OGA-UHIA
  221. SULEIMAN MOHAMMED BELLO
  222. SULEIMAN TANIMU ABUBAKAR
  223. TAHIR MUSA TAHIR
  224. TAIWO IYABODE IKIKADE O.
  225. THOMPSON E.O
  226. TOLUWALASE IDIGIE
  227. UBARU SAMUEL
  228. UCHENDU CHIBUEZE
  229. UDECHUKWU VERA CHINELO
  230. UDOH HOPE IFEOMA
  231. UDUAK EFFIONG O.
  232. UGOH IRENE U.
  233. UMAR AHMED
  234. UMAR MUHAMMAD USMAN
  235. USHE JAMES ESHIDENANG
  236. VIANANA TARILA C.
  237. VICTOR IRIPENATABUCHI E.
  238. VINCENT OBINWOGU
  239. VINCENT PATRICK A.
  240. YAKUBU SAIDU
  241. ZAHARADEEN MUHAMAD I.
  242. ZANNA SANNI DAR JAMAL
  243. ZIYADDEN MANAMA
  244. ZULAIHA ABDULAHI

AND

 

NATIONAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (NITDA)………………….………………………………………..DEFENDANT

J U D G E M E N T

 

The Claimants were recruited as members of staff of the Defendant, an agency under the Federal Ministry of Communication Technology.

The Claimants’ case as gathered from their claim before the Court is that, they were offered provisional appointment by the Defendant in November 2015. Having accepted the said offer of appointment, the Claimants concluded all the documentation required as members of staff of the Defendant. While waiting for their postings, the Claimants alleged that they saw an advertisement in the Daily Trust Newspaper of 4th November, 2016 informing the general public of the cancellation of the recruitment exercise of the Defendant which they were involved. The Claimants contend that, having accepted the offer of employment, it is unlawful for the Defendant to cancel or terminate their employment by the said advert in the Daily Trust Newspaper. Being aggrieved by the Defendant’s purported cancellation of the recruitment exercise, the Claimant commenced the present action vide a Complaint and Statement of Facts filed on 9th January, 2017 whereby they claimed against the Defendant the reliefs set out as follows:

  1.      AN ORDER of this Honourable Court declaring the publication of the Defendant in the Daily Trust Newspaper of Friday 4th November, 2016 cancelling the Claimants’ recruitment after offer and acceptance has taken place is unknown to law, illegal, null and void and of no effect.
  2.  AN ORDER of this Honourable Court declaring that all the Claimants recruited in the service of the Defendant in November 2015 are entitled to all the rights, privileges, emoluments, salaries and all prerequisites (sic) of office arising from or pertaining to the staff conditions of service of the Defendant.
  3.  AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay all salaries and entitlements accruing from the employment of the Claimants from November 2015 till the day of judgement as arrears withheld by the Defendant.
  4.  AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay general damages of N500,000,000 (Five Hundred Million Naira only)for the malicious publication, psychological damage arising from it and the pains and continued suffering of their loved ones and families, while the Defendant inflicted this unwholesome act of impunity on the Claimants.

The Defendant joined issues with the Claimants in its Further Amended Statement of Defence and other accompanying processes filed on the 23rd February, 2018 by which it contended that the recruitment exercise was cancelled on the ground that the entire recruitment process that culminated to the employment of the Claimants was not conducted in compliance with the rules for recruitment in the Public Service.

The Claimants’ Reply to the Statement of Defence was filed on 8th of February, 2017.

At the plenary trial, one Kabiru Abubakar Mustapha testified as CW1 for the Claimants. He adopted the two Statements on Oath that he deposed to as his evidence-in-chief. He also tendered thirteen (13) documents in evidence to further support the case of the Claimants. He was duly cross examined by the Defendant’s learned counsel.

For the Defendant, one Mr. Ayodeji Eniola, testified as DW1. He claimed to be the Acting Head of Human Resources and Administration Department of the Defendant. He adopted his Statement on Oath as evidence-in-chief and was equally cross examined. He tendered twelve (12) documents in evidence in support of the defence.

At the conclusion of the plenary trial, parties filed and exchanged their written final address in the manner prescribed by the Rules of this Court.

In the final address filed on behalf of the Defendant on 20th March 2018, its learned counsel, Ibrahim M. Attahir Esq., formulated five issues as having risen for determination in this suit, namely:

  1. Whether or not the power of employment vested in the Board of the Defendant by the NITDA Act, 2007 can be exercised by any other person or authority?
  2. Whether or not this Honourable Court can determine the case of the 245 Claimants on the basis of only few letters of offer of provisional appointment and few letters of acceptance dumped on the Court?
  3. Whether or not the few Claimants that tendered their letters of offer and acceptance have established a binding and enforceable contract of employment between them and the Defendant?
  4. Whether or not the non-joinder of the Honourable Minister of Communication, the Federal Character Commission, etc is fatal to the Claimants’ action?
  5. Whether or not the recruitment exercise is tainted with illegality?

For the Claimants, their final address was filed on 26th March, 2018 in which their learned counsel, Mr.Akenuwa W.O Esq. distilled three issues as having arisen for the determination in this suit, viz:

  1. Whether or not the employment of the Claimants’ by the Defendant can be cancelled by mere Newspaper publication in Daily Trust of 4th November 2016, the appointment of the Claimants being of statutory flavour.
  2. Whether or not the Claimants having accepted the offer of Employment, completed other documentations and resumed work but not assigned duties by the Defendant are entitled to salaries, allowances and other privileges contained in the staff conditions of service of the Defendant since November 2015 to date.
  3. Whether or not in the circumstance of this case, the Claimants are entitled to damages for the publication of 4th November 2016, for its failure to show cause for the publication in its defence.

The learned counsel for the Defendant filed Reply on Points of Law to Claimants’ written address on 29/03/2018. I shall make reference to this as I consider needful in the course of this Judgement.

Even though the issues formulated by learned counsel on both sides, when considered together have adequately captured the field of dispute in this suit; however, for better appreciation, I have elected to reframe the issues as follows:

  1. Whether or not there was a valid and enforceable contract of employment between the parties in this suit; and if so, whether or not the Defendant performed its obligation there under?
  2. Whether or not the Claimants are entitled to their claims?

Suffice to further state that I had carefully considered and taken the benefit of the totality of the arguments canvassed by the respective learned counsel in their written and oral final submission to which I shall endeavor to make specific reference as I deem necessary in the course of this judgement.

Before considering the merit of the case, I need to resolve some preliminary issues as raised by learned counsel on both sides. Even at that, I need to point out a thing or two.

The learned counsel for the Defendant had made heavy weather on the issue of the admissibility of Exhibits C11 and C12 in his written address. The objection to the admissibility of the said documents by CW1 had been raised during the plenary trial. The Court in its ruling on 23/01/2018 on the objection merely marked the documents as C11 and C12 respectively and ordered the Claimants’ counsel to effect the certification of the said documents. At the Court’s sitting of 15/03/2018, learned counsel for the Claimants’ informed the Court that the he had duly complied with the order of the Court by certifying the document with same properly authenticated and dated with the receipt number stated for its certification. The marked documents were thus admitted as Exhibits C11 and C12 respectively. The argument of the learned Defendant’s counsel that the Defendant had not been served with the certified documents is baseless. I am not aware of any law or rules of court that the documents admitted as exhibits by the Court must be served on the opposing party. Learned Defendant’s counsel‘s argument on this issue is frivolous and same is hereby discountenanced.

The learned Defendant’s counsel had also raised objection on the admissibility of the letter of acceptance of Ngaji Timothy Enya and Sanusi Abdul on the ground that the list of document filed by the Claimants merely stated the document itemized as number 3 as “Letter of acceptance of offer” and as such the only letter of acceptance admissible in this case is that of CW1 and no more. With due respects to learned counsel for the Defendant, this argument is misconceived. The CW1 had stated in paragraph 4 of his Witness Statement on Oath, “the letter of acceptance of offer of appointment by the Claimants”. The letters of acceptance sought to be tendered is that of Ngaji Timothy Enya, the 142nd Claimant and Sanusi Abdul the 212th Claimant. Having pleaded the letter of acceptance of offer of appointment by the Claimants and having admitted the letter of acceptance of CW1, the Court rejects the argument of the learned Defendant’s counsel and hold that the letter of acceptance of Ngaji Timothy Enya and Sanusi Abdul is admissible in evidence as Exhibits C14 and C14A respectively.

Again, the learned counsel for the Defendant urged the Court to discountenance the Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence filed by the Claimants on 08/02/2017. Learned counsel’s had argued that the Claimants’ Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence is not proper before the Court as same was filed nine months before the Statement of Defence was deemed filed and served on the Claimants and that the Claimants have not regularized its filing.

As rightly submitted, on 15/11/2017, the Honourable Court granted leave to the Defendant to enlarge the time within which to file its Statement of Defence and same was deemed as properly filed and served on the Claimants. However, the Claimants’ Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence was filed on 08/02/2017. I agree with the submission of the learned Defendant’s counsel that the Claimants’ Reply to the Statement of Defence is not properly filed before the Court and since the Claimants have not regularized its filing as prescribed by the Rules of this Court, same is hereby discountenanced.

The learned Claimants’ counsel had raised the issue of contradiction in the testimony of the sole witness of the Defendant. The alleged contradiction is on the issue of whether the witness’s department implemented the approval in Exhibit D1 and on the issue of whether the witness was the head of the Human Resources department. On alleged contradictions in the evidence of DW1, the law is settled that it is only those contradictions that are material and result in a miscarriage of justice that would warrant a rejection of the evidence. See Nsirim Vs Nsirim (2002) 2 SCNJ 46; Ezamba Vs Ibeneme & Anor (2004) 7 SCNJ 136; Nwokoro & Ors Vs Onuma & Ors (1999) 9 SCNJ 63; Ikemson Vs The State (1989) 3 NWLR (110) 455 @ 474

In the instant case, I agree with the submission of the learned Defendant’s counsel that the contradictions is immaterial and as such the learned Claimants’ counsel’s submission on this issue is discountenanced.

I shall proceed to take both issues upon which this action is to be decided together.

For starters, it is pertinent to remark that the case put forward by the Claimant is substantially documentary in nature. In that circumstance, the focus of the Court is directed principally at the documents tendered by parties as the yardstick to access the oral evidence adduced by the witnesses on either side of the divide. This course is in consonance with the established legal proposition that documentary evidence, being the best evidence, is the yardstick or hanger by which to access the veracity or credibility of oral testimony and that extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to contradict it, add or vary the provisions contained in a document. See Section 128(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 on the issue. See also Skye Bank PLC Vs Akinpelu (2010) 9 NWLR Pt 1198 Pg 179 (SC); Ndubueze Vs Bawa 2018 LPELR 43874

The case of the Claimants is that based on the letters of offer provisional appointment, they forwarded their letters of acceptance and reported for documentation as directed in their letters of offer. CW1 tendered the letters of provisional appointment, the 2015 list of successful Applicants as authenticated by the Federal Character Commission, the letters of acceptance and the NITDA Employee Handbook and Conditions of Service as Exhibits C1, C13,C13a, C13b, C12, C2, C14, C14A and C9 respectively.

CW1 further testified that they were issued staff identification numbers after the documentation and assumed duty. CW1 also testified that the Federal Character Commission issued a Certificate of Compliance to the Defendant for Claimants’ employment. He tendered in evidence the Certificate of Compliance dated 30th December, 2015 as Exhibit C11.

The CW1 further testified that while waiting for their posting, they saw an advertisement by the Defendant in the Daily Trust Newspaper of 4th November, 2016, stating that the recruitment exercise in which they were involved had been cancelled. He tendered in evidence as Exhibit C4, the certified true copy of the said newspaper publication.

The CW1 further testified that as a result of the publication, they caused their solicitors to write a letter to the Defendant to contest the cancellation of their recruitment and further demand the withdrawal of the said publication. The said letter dated 7th November, 2016 written by Wilfred Akenuwa of Fred Akenuwa & Co. to the Defendant was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C5. In response to Exhibit C5, the Defendant’s Head, Legal Services and Board Matters wrote a letter dated 16th November, 2016 to the Claimants’ solicitor to which the Defendant denied liability. The said Defendant’s reply was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C6.

The CW1 further testified that in response to Exhibit C6, their solicitors wrote a letter dated 18th November, 2016 to the Defendant. The said reply was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C7.  It is alleged in the said Exhibit C7 that by a letter annexed to the exhibit, it was the Defendant that sought for the withdrawal of Certificate of Compliance after the contract of employment had been established by the parties. The said annexure to Exhibit C7 was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C3; it is a letter dated 3rd August, 2016 written by the Defendant to the Executive Chairman, Federal Character Commission requesting for the withdrawal of the Certificate of Compliance. CW1 testified that their solicitor served a Notice of Intention to file a suit against the Defendant. The said notice was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C8. A copy of the NITDA Act 2007 was also tendered as Exhibit C10.

In concluding his evidence-in chief, CW1 prayed the Court to grant the Claimants’ claims as the nonpayment of their salary is inflicting undue punishment on them.

Under cross examination by the Ibrahim Attair Esq. of counsel for the Defendant, the CW1 testified that the Claimants had their induction in batches after they had concluded the documentation for their employment as laid down in the conditions of service handbook – Exhibit C9. He also testified that they had not been paid any salaries by the Defendant because they had not been posted to their duties.

The defence offered by the Defendant through its sole witness, the DW1, is that by the establishing statute of the Defendant as an agency under the Federal Ministry of Communication Technology, the approval of its Board or in the absence of the Board, the approval of the Honourable Minister of Communication Technology is required for the employment of its senior staff to be valid.

DW1 further testified that prior to the recruitment exercise, the Federal Government had dissolved all boards of its agencies and commissions including the Defendant and that there was no Minister in the Ministry of Communication Technology.

DW1 also testified that by a letter dated 6th November, 2015, its former Director sought the approval of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry to engage more skilled staff and that the approval was granted with the caveat that due process should be observed. He tendered the said letter seeking for approval in evidence as Exhibit D1.

DW1 further testified that it was after the letters of offer of provisional appointment were issued to the Claimants that the said Permanent Secretary requested by a letter dated 15th December, 2015 for the Ministry to observe the recruitment exercise scheduled for 17th December, 2015. DW1 tendered in evidence the letter of request as Exhibit D2. Based on this request, the Ministry replied the Defendant through a letter dated 16th December, 2015 that the recruitment exercise should be put hold pending further consultations with the Ministry. The reply by the Ministry is tendered in evidence by DW1 as Exhibit D3.

DW1 further testified that subsequently, the Ministry issued circular requesting for additional information arising from ministerial briefing and directed that no new contracts or appointments be made until formal authorization is sought and obtained from the Honourable Minister. The circular dated 21st December, 2015 is tendered in evidence by DW1 as Exhibit D5.

DW1 further testified that the Defendant had requested for waiver of advertisement from the Federal Character Commission and this request was granted by a letter dated 14th December, 2015 by which it directed that the list of the shortlist of candidates to be invited for interview be forwarded. The DW1 tendered in evidence the request for waiver as Exhibit D4.

In his further testimony, DW1 tendered in evidence Exhibit D6, a letter dated 30th December, 2015 written by the Federal Character Commission to the Defendant, granting the Defendant’s request for a Certificate of Compliance. DW1 further testified that Exhibit D6 was the authority for the Defendant to issue letters of appointment but that same was cancelled by a letter dated 8th August, 2016 when it was discovered that letters of appointment had been issued before Exhibit D6 was granted. DW1 tendered in evidence as Exhibit D7 the letter cancelling the Certificate of Compliance (Exhibit D6).

DW1 also testified that the purported employment of the Claimants was marred with irregularities as the recruitment exercise was neither observed nor supervised by the Ministry; and that the decision of its Director General to embark on a recruitment exercise in spite of the directive of the Minister is ultra vires which caused a query, a letter of request for recruitment and contract details, suspension and disengagement to be issued on the said Director General who carried out the said recruitment exercise. DW1 tendered in evidence the letter of query dated 6th January, 2016, letter of recruitment and contract details dated 13th January, 2016, letter of suspension dated 20th January, 2016 and letter of disengagement dated 12th February, 2017 written by the Minister to the Director General of the Defendant as Exhibit D8, Exhibit D9, Exhibit D10 and Exhibit D12 respectively. DW1 also tendered in evidence as Exhibit D11 the letter of appointment of one Mr. Vincent Olatunji Olasende as the new sit-in Director General of the Defendant.

Under cross examination by W.O Akenuwa Esq, of counsel for the Claimants, the DW1 further testified that the Claimants’ letters of appointment were issued after it had obtained the approval of the Minister as requested in Exhibit D1.

DW1 also testified that it was the responsibility of the Defendant to obtain the approval of both the Federal Character Commission and the approval of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry to engage the Claimants. DW1 further confirmed that the certificate of compliance issued for the purported employment of the Claimants was not valid because the certificate was withdrawn or cancelled when the Federal Character Commission realized the irregularities in the recruitment exercise. The DW1 testified that it was the Federal Character Commission that discovered that the Claimants’ letters of appointment were issued before the Certificate of Compliance was approved and that the Claimants were not interviewed. In closing his evidence, DW1 urged the Court to dismiss the Claimants’ case.

On the basis of the evidence adduced on the record as highlighted in the foregoing, parties seem to be ad idem on the fact that the Defendant engaged 245 successful applicants as listed in Exhibit C12. Parties also agree that the Defendant is a body set up by statute that is, the National Information Technology Development Agency Act 2007 (NITDA Act) and the Public Service Rules.

However, the bone of contention is the conduct of the appointment and the termination of the Claimants as senior members of staff of the Defendant. The Claimants insisted they were validly employed by the Defendant having being issued letters of offer of provisional appointment and having accepted the said offer and had concluded all documentation required as members of staff. Contrariwise, the Defendant asserted that the Claimants were not validly appointed in accordance with the express provisions of the statute regulating the Defendant and the Public service because the Claimants’ appointment was shrouded with irregularities; hence, the cancellation of the appointment.

Now, on the Claimants claim for declaratory reliefs, the learned Defendant’s counsel had argued that the Claimants have the onus to place before the Court the terms and conditions of the contract of employment and that a party claiming declaratory relief has a burden to proof it. In further support of this argument learned Defendant counsel cited the provisions of Section 131 -136 of the Evidence Act and the cases of University of Ilorin Vs Adesina (2009) All FWLR Pt 487 Pg 56 at 128 and INEC Vs Atuma (2013) 11 NWLR Pt. 1366 Pg 500

On the part of the Claimants, it is the argument of the learned counsel that they had discharged the burden of proving that a contract of employment exits through the letters of offer of employment and the letters of acceptance.

The Claimants’ cause of action as stated in the Statement of Facts, is on contract of employment and the termination of employment. By the provisions of Order 3 Rule 9 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, (the NIC Rules) it is absolutely essential for Claimants to plead the fact that there exists a contract of employment between both parties in their Statement of Facts.

Furthermore, it has been firmly established that when an employee complains that his employment was wrongfully or unlawfully terminated, he has the onus: (a) to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and (b) to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. See Okomu Oil Palm Co V Iserhienrhien (2001) 5 NSCQR 802; Alhaji Mohammed Bala Audu Vs Petroleum Equalization Fund (Management) Board & Anor 2010 LPELR 3824. This principle of law is in tandem with the provisions of Order 3 Rule 13 of the NIC Rules which listed the documents to accompany the Complaint in cases where a Claimant is challenging the termination of appointment. This includes inter-alia, the letter of appointment (if any) and all other documents the Claimant wishes to rely upon at the trial of the suit. It further states that the accompanying documents shall be exhibited along with the Statement on Oath as bundle of exhibits in support of Claimant’s claim before the Court.

The Claimants in challenging the termination of their appointment by the Defendant, averred In Paragraph 1 of the Statement of Facts, as follows:

The Claimants are staff of National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) recruited in November 2015. List of successful candidates as authenticated by the Federal Character Commission is pleaded along with letters of offer of employment by National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) as well as letter of acceptance of offer of appointment by the Claimants. Claimants also plead letter reference FCC/055/S.43/VOL.11/180 dated 30th December, 2015 from the Federal Character Commission to National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA). (Underlining mine)

This averment was reproduced in Paragraph 4 of the Witness Statement on Oath deposed by Kabiru Abubakar Mustapha, the CW1.

CW1 further stated in paragraph 2 of his Witness Statement on Oath that he has the consent and authority of the other 244 Claimants in this suit to swear to the Affidavit and to give evidence on their behalf. This was reiterated under cross examination by the learned Defendant’s counsel. In support of his assertion, DW1 tendered in evidence the letters of offer of provisional appointment for the 1st, 142nd, 162nd and 212th Claimants as Exhibits C1, C13, C13A and C13B, whilst the letters of acceptance of 1st, 142nd and 212th Claimants were tendered in evidence as Exhibits C2, C14 and C14A respectively. The letter of acceptance of the 162nd Claimant was not tendered in evidence.

The learned counsel for the Defendant had in his written address made the point that the Claimants’ have different contracts of employment with the Defendant. Citing the case of C. C. B. Nig Plc Vs Rose (1998) 4 NWLR PT 545 Pg 37 learned Claimants’ counsel submitted that the Claimants’ action is not in representative capacity as provided in Order 13 Rule 1 of the NICN Rules, 2017.

In my view, the learned Defendant’s counsel has aptly captured the essence of the case and claims of the Claimants when he submitted to the effect that they have different contracts of employment with the Defendant. The Statement of Facts undoubtedly shows this to be the case. The situation in this case is that the two hundred and forty five Claimants who severally and jointly instituted the instant action and who with various letters  of appointment employed by the Defendant as different officers of different grades or categories, are by their claims severally and jointly, challenging the termination of their respective appointments and claiming other reliefs which they consider as flowing from the unlawful termination of their appointment including general damages.

I have pondered on the submissions of the learned Defendant’s counsel in relation to non-representative capacity of the instant action. What I understand the submissions to amount to against the backdrop of the case set up in the Statement of Facts, is that the Claimants cannot jointly bring the instant action without tendering in evidence the personal individual letters of appointment and their letters of acceptance to their claim. In other words, that the Claimants ought to have instituted separate actions based on each Defendant’s contract of employment/appointment. And that it is only upon the consolidation of the said separate actions/claims that the Claimants actions can properly be tried together.

I am in no doubt that the learned counsel for the Defendant is eminently right, when his submissions are appreciated in this vein. In this regard, consider the case of Bossa & Ors Vs Julius Berger Plc (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 290) 1503 at 1518 as bringing out most graphically why persons should sue on the basis of their respective contracts of employment. In the case under reference, Abba Aji, JCA; at page 1518 said:

“In the realm of master and servant relationship, although ten or more persons are given employment the same day under the same conditions of service, the contract of employment is personal or domestic to each of the persons. In the event of breach, the persons do not have a collective right to sue or be represented in the suit.”

See also Bemil Nig Ltd Vs Marcus Emeribe & Ors (2009) LPELR 8732.

In the instant case, the Claimants had pleaded in their Statement of Facts that there were all issued letters of offer of provisional appointment and that they had all accepted the offer by their letters of acceptance but tendered in evidence only four (4) of the letters and three letters of acceptance namely, Kabiru Abubakar M., Ndaji Timothy and Sanusi Abdul.

It is trite that an averment in pleadings is not and does not tantamount to evidence and must therefore be established by satisfactory evidence unless the same is expressly admitted.  See Ajuwon Vs Akanni 1993 12 SCNJ 32.

Furthermore, it is elementary law that rules of Court are meant to be obeyed. They serve as beacon lights to the parties to a dispute illuminating the path leading to justice. Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to ensure compliance by litigants with rules of Court and to sanction breaches. Ojonye Vs Onu 2018 LPELR 44212 Owners of MV “Arabella” Vs NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR Pt. 1097 182

It is required by the NIC Rules that individual letters of provisional offer of appointment and the letters of acceptance of all the Claimants be tendered in evidence as proof of the contract of service being the bedrock of the case.

The whole essence of the need to plead, tender and prove the letter of employment, in an action of this nature is to enable the Court determine the terms and conditions of service or rights and obligations of the parties under the contract of service.

Amodu Vs Amode (1990) 5 NWLR Pt 150 Pg 356 at 370; Katto Vs Central Bank of Nigeria (1999) 6 NWLR Pt 607 390 at 405

Generally, the letter of employment must be resorted to in considering the rights and obligations of the parties. Exhibit C12 – the list of successful applicants tendered in evidence by the Claimants is just as it is described; it is a list that contains the names, state of origin, course of study, qualification and designation of the 245 applicants. This list cannot be substituted as proof of contract of employment between the parties as it does not contain the terms of employment of the parties.

It is trite that where the Claimant fails to plead and prove the fact of his employment in a contract of service, he will not be entitled to the declaration that his appointment subsists. Morohunfola Vs Kwara State College of Technology (1990) 4 NWLR Pt 145 Pg 506 @ 519

Applying the above principles, it is therefore clear without doubt that only three of the Claimants earlier listed have established a contract of employment with the Defendant. Failure of the other 242 Claimants to establish that a contract of employment exits between them and the Defendant is fatal to their case.

It is on this basis that I find and hold that action of the remaining 241 Claimants is incompetent.

The grouse of the Claimants is that having accepted the offer for provisional appointment and having completed the documentation as members of staff of the Defendant, they are entitled to salary and that the purported cancellation of the appointment by newspaper advertisement by the Defendant is illegal.

On its own part, the Defendant had contended that the power to authorize the employment of its principal officers and senior staff is vested in the Board of the Defendant and not in other person or authority. In paragraphs 7, 8, 26, 27, 28 and 36 of its Amended Statement of Defence, the Defendant averred that the Claimants’ appointment is invalid because the inconclusive recruitment exercise of the Claimants violated extant provisions and guidelines of employment in public service. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the Defendant cited Section 7 (c) of the NITDA Act 2007 which provides that the Board shall have no power to appoint, promote, terminate, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over principal officers and senior staff of the Agency. The learned Defendant counsel further cited the provision of Rule 020205 (f) of the Public Service Rule which states that no officer shall be appointed into the Federal Public Service without authorization for appointment from the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation and supervisory Boards in case of Parastatals.

As earlier noted, it is never in dispute that the Defendant is governed by its establishing laws being a creation of statute and that the laws regulating the appointment and the termination of the contract between the Claimants and the Defendant must be strictly complied with.

In its defence, DW1 had tendered series of document to prove that the Claimants’ employment did not comply with the guidelines of appointment in the Public Services Rules and hence the process is illegal and was cancelled.

I have carefully considered all the documents tendered in evidence by the contending parties in the instant case. My findings from the exhibits is that the Defendant initiated the process of appointment by requesting for the approval of the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Communication Technology to employ more skilled staff by Exhibit D1 dated 6th November, 2015. Exhibit D4 is a letter dated 14th December, 2015 written by the Federal Character Commission granting the Defendant’s request for waiver of advertisement. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Exhibit D4 gave further directives to the Defendant following the grant of the waiver of advertisement. The directives are re-produced hereunder:

3.”However, you are required to forward the shortlist of candidates to be invited for interview to this Office indicating among other things their State of Origin, Local Government Area, Sex, Posts and Qualification and also invite the Commission to observe the recruitment exercise.

4.”In addition, at the end of the exercise, you are to formally apply for and obtain a Certificate of Compliance from the Commission before issuing letters of appointment to the successful candidates. Please note that the waiver is valid for only three (3) months for you to conclude the exercise.” (Emphasis mine)

Having obtained the approval of the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Communication Technology to engage more skilled staff and the Defendant again wrote Exhibit D2, dated 15th December, 2015 to the Minister, wherein it requested for the presence of the Director of Human Resources to observe the recruitment scheduled for 17th December, 2015. By Exhibit D3 dated 16th December, 2015, the Minister, directed that the recruitment exercise be put on hold pending further consultations with the Ministry. However, the Federal Character Commission by a letter dated 30th December, 2015, issued Exhibit D6, the Certificate of Compliance and it made reference to the Defendant’s letter dated 21st December, 2015 by which the Defendant requested for the Certificate of Compliance. By implication, the Defendant did not comply with the directive of the Minister to put the recruitment exercise on hold but requested for Exhibit D6 which was the authority to issue appointment letters to two hundred and forty five successful candidates as contained in the list. By paragraph 4 (iii) of the exhibit, the letters of appointment were to be issued to the successful candidates within three months from the date of issuance of the Certificate.

The review of these documents reveals that the Defendant clearly flaunted the directives of the Minister and the Federal Character Commission. The Claimants’ letters of offer of provisional appointment were issued on 9th November, 2015, that is, before the interview for candidates was scheduled in Exhibit D2 and before the waiver for advertisement in Exhibit D4 and the certificate of Compliance Exhibit D6 were issued by the Federal Character Commission.

I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the Defendant that where an Act prescribes a particular method of exercising a statutory power, any other method of exercising such power is excluded. Okon Johnson & Ors Vs Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited & Ors 2009 LPELR 8280; William & Ors Vs Ascon Oil Co. Ltd & Ors 2018 LPELR 44107.

Section 7 (c) of the NITDA expressly stated the way and manner a principal officers and senior staff will be appointed. The word “shall” used in section 7(c) is mandatory in nature. There is no evidence on record that the said section had been amended to include the procedure adopted by the Permanent Secretary of the Defendant in the recruitment of the Claimants. It is clear that any step short of the ones prescribed by the NITDA Act will be null and void.

The Claimants’ counsel had however submitted with regard to the

validity of the appointment and the claim for salaries and entitlements of the Claimants, that under cross examination, the DW1 had admitted that the Defendant had issued the letters of offer of provisional appointment as the final product of recruitment exercise and that he also testified that it is the duty of the employer to provide work and to pay salary to the employees. In support of his submission, the learned Claimants’ counsel cited the provision of Section 17 (1) of the Labour Act.

My understanding of the learned Claimants’ counsel’s submission is that having issued the letters of provisional appointment, the Defendant is estopped by conduct from cancelling the recruitment exercise. This is based on the principle of estoppel by conduct.

The Apex Court elucidated on this principle in the case of Chukwuma Vs Ifeloye (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 118) 204 at 237 – 238 as follows:

“Where a person or one by words and or deed or conduct made to another a clear and unequivocal representation of fact either with knowledge of its false hood or with the intention that it should be acted upon, or has conducted himself that another would, as a reasonable man with his full faculties, intended to be acted upon, and that other person in fact acted upon the representation whereby his position was thereby altered to his detriment an estoppel arises against that person who made it and he will not be allowed to say that the representation is not what he presented it to be. This is known as estoppel by conduct or estoppel in pais.”

In other words, where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence of certain state of things and induces him to act on the belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from asserting against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.

See Raji Vs Obafemi Awolowo University 2014 LPELR 22088; Nsirim Vs Nsirim (2002) 3 NWLR Pt 755 697; Ude Vs Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR Pt 583 Pg 509; Ude Vs Osuji (1990) 5 NWLR Pt 151 488; Ige Vs Amakiri (1976) 11 SC 1;

On the strength of the evidence on record by the Defendant’s own showing that the Claimants’ letters of appointment were issued upon the approval in Exhibit D1 and based on the authorities earlier cited, I find and hold that the principle of estoppel by conduct is clearly applicable in the instant case.

The starting point for the determination of whether or not the three Claimants posited (supra) have established a contract of employment with the Defendant and whether they are entitled to the reliefs sought turns on a correct interpretation of the letters of offer of provisional appointment of tendered in evidence by the CW1 as Exhibits C1, C13 and C13B respectively. The exhibits dated 9th November, 2015 and was signed by one Ekawu Rose (Mrs.), the Acting Director Human Relations and Administration on behalf of the Director General of the Defendant.

Paragraph 1 of these exhibits, referred to the curriculum vitae submitted for employment and it conveyed “the approval of the Agency’s Management” to offer the provisional appointment. The position or designation and the cadre of the Claimants were also stated in this paragraph. They were stated in Exhibits C1, C13 and C13B respectively as Higher Executive Officer I on CONITSAS 8, Scientific Officer II on CONITSAS 7 Step 02 and Principal Executive Officer I on CONITSAS 10 Step 5.

Paragraph 2 thereof further stated, “You will be considered for regular employment as at when due”.

The letters of acceptance of the three Claimants were also admitted in evidence as C2, C14A and C14B respectively.

As earlier stated, the Claimants’ contract of employment is governed by Exhibits C1, C13 and C13B – their letters of appointment, the Act which established the Defendant and the Public Service Rules.

The terms of the contract of employment by the parties is hinged on the interpretation of paragraph 2 of the letter of provisional appointment which stated that “You will be considered for regular employment as at when due”.

It is therefore pertinent to interpret the words, “regular employment as at when due”. A regular employment as the word denotes is an employment for a definite and more or less extended period of time. By the title “offer of provisional appointment,” in Exhibits C1, C13 and C13B it would seem that such documents does not specifically have to mention the word probation to be able to deduce that the Claimants were on probation and that their employment would be confirmed as at when due.

Furthermore, Rule 020204 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, stipulates that all first appointments to the pensionable establishments other than a trainee post will be on probation.

Now, the 7th Edition of the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary at page 1156 says inter alia that the word ‘probation’ means (2) a time of training and testing when you start a new job to see if you are suitable for the work: a period of probation.”
Similarly, the 8th Edition of the Black’s Law Dictionary at page 564 says of ‘probationary employee’ – A recently hired employee whose ability and performance are being evaluated during a trial period of employment”.  In other words, any period of testing, evaluation or trial period of employment is grammatically a probation period in the employment. See also Dr. Ajewunmi Bili Raji Vs Obafemi Awolowo University 2014 LPELR 2088.

On the basis of the letters of appointment, the Act which established the Defendant and the Public Service Rules, the Court finds and holds that the Defendant employed the three Claimants on probationary employment.

Now, it is stated in Exhibit C9 that all new staff are subject to a probationary period of 1 year and the appointment will be confirmed on satisfactory completion of the 12 month period. By Rule 020303 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, to be eligible for confirmation, an officer is required to complete his probationary period to the satisfaction of the authority empowered to appoint him. Rule 020303 further provides that probationary appointment may be terminated, extended or confirmed. In other words, the Defendant may terminate a probationary appointment before such appointment is confirmed.

As posited supra, the Claimants were on probationary employment from 9th November 2015 up until 8th August 2016 when the appointment was terminated.

It has been held in a plethora of cases that where the contract of employment provides that the appointment is subject to a probationary period of a certain length of time, the employer reserves the right and discretion to determine the employment before the expiry of that period. See Ihezukwu Vs University of Jos (1990) 4 NWLR Pt 146 Pg 598 @ 612; Lake Chad Research Institute Vs Mallam Kolo Mohammed (2004) LPELR 5796

The Court therefore finds and holds that the employer in this case, namely the Defendant was entitled and rightly exercised this right when it determined and communicated to the Claimants through the newspaper advert that the appointment had been cancelled or terminated, on the ground that the recruitment exercise was illegal.

Now, if I may ask, what happens to Claimants’ salaries from November 2015 to August 2016 when the appointment was terminated? The Defendant did not controvert the fact that the Claimants were never paid salary. Salary is a consideration coming from an employer to an employee for work or services rendered. The key word here is work done and the evidence adduced is that the Claimants were waiting for their posting when the appointment was terminated and that they were never paid salary. The implication of this is that since they never were paid salary, the Claimants do not have any document to prove the remuneration they are entitled to.

The law is trite that, parties to a written contract are bound by the terms contained in the document(s) which constituted the contract. Once the terms have been ascertained, the Courts must enforce and give them the necessary effect. See Baba Vs N.C.A.T.C (1991) 5 NWIR Pt 192 Pg 388, Ladipo Vs Chevron (Nig.) Ltd (2005) NWLR (pt. 907) Pg 277.

Furthermore, it is the law that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated he has the onus, first, to place before the court the terms of the contract of employment and, second, to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. It is not in principle for the employer who is a defendant to an action brought by the employee to prove any of these.

This principle has been laid down in many cases including specifically Amodu Vs Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356, where Agbaje JSC (as he then was) observed at page 370 that:

“…it appears clear to me that since it is the plaintiffs’ case that his dismissal by the defendant is not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of service between them it is for the plaintiff to plead and prove the conditions of service regulating the contract of service in question.”

This principle was followed in Iwuchukwu Vs Nwizu (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 379 at 412; Akinfe & Ors Vs United Bank for Africa & Ors 2007 LPELR 8317

The Claimants’ reliefs are stated in Paragraph 16 of the Statement of Facts. I am afraid to state that the said paragraph of the Statement of Facts stating the reliefs being sought by the Claimants is very shallow and porous. Worse still, none of the Exhibits tendered in evidence stated the salary, allowances and benefits that members of staff of the Defendant in the same cadre as the Claimants are entitled to and there is no document stating the computation to determine the amount to be awarded.

It has been established in a plethora of cases, the need for special damages to be strictly pleaded, particularized and established by credible evidence. The salary, allowances, entitlements and benefits of each of the three Claimants being items of special damages must be adequately particularized in the pleading and also be proved by cogent and credible evidence at the trial. The term “strict proof” consists of evidence of particular losses which are exactly known or accurately measured before the trial. Strict proof simply implies that a Claimant who has the advantage of being able to base his claim upon a precise calculation must give the Defendant access to the facts which make such calculation possible.

The Claimants have failed to discharge the burden to entitle them to their claim for salaries and other entitlements. Therefore, I find and hold that Claimants are not entitled to legs (2) and (3) of their Claim.

The Claimants are also claiming the sum of N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) as general damages for the malicious publication, psychological damage arising from it and the pains and continued suffering of their loved ones and families.

The Claimants’ claim for award of general damages for termination of appointment of their probationary appointment is strange.  This is because what is computed for a successful party in such circumstance cannot be general damages, but proven special damages, which actually is the salaries and other entitlements of the Plaintiff during the period of the purported termination or dismissal, or what would have accrued to him had the dismissal or termination complied with the due process envisaged in the Condition of service, that is, the entitlement payable to the Claimant in lieu of notice (where re-instatement cannot be ordered). See New Nigeria Newspaper Vs Felix Atoyebi (2013) LPELR 21489; Adeniran Vs NEPA (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.786) 30 at 48; SPDC Ltd Vs Olarenwaju (2008) 12 SC (Pt.111) 27

Since I had held that the Claimants’ are not entitled to their claim for salaries and other entitlements, I hereby find and hold that the Claimants are also not entitled to leg (4) of the claim for general damages.

This case brings to focus the need for legal practitioners to be very careful in handling clients’ cases right from the drafting of the claims to the actual conduct of the proceedings in the courts.

In the instant case, though learned counsel for the Claimants pleaded some facts that could ground a cause of action arising from termination of employment sufficient facts were not made in the Statement of Facts for all the 245 Claimants and the evidence adduced with regards to the three Claimants who had established a contract of employment was also insufficient.

This is not a case where the sins of counsel are not to be visited on the party; it is simply a case of not awarding to a party what he never asked for, it is also a case of not allowing counsel to hide under the principle of not visiting the sins of counsel on the party to shy away from his professional responsibilities to his client in the conduct of his case. The standard of legal practice in this country is very high and it is advised that counsel either retain it at that high level or raise it higher, they are definitely not to lower it under any guise.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis therefore, this case is lacking in merit. The Claimants’ case fails in its entirety and is hereby accordingly dismissed.

Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.

  1. OLUYINKA ADENIYI

(Presiding Judge)

05/07/2018

 

Legal representation:

W.O.Akenuwa Esq.for Claimants

Ibrahim M. Attair Esq. with Messers Francis Adejoh and

Alhassan Ibrahim for Defendant

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