IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT KADUNA
ON TUESDAY 9TH DAY OF JULY 2019
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE S. O. ADENIYI
SUIT NO: NICN/KD/03/2019
BETWEEN:
- IBRAHIM AMINU
- IBRAHIM TANIMU
- ERIC ELIAS BILIYOR…….CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS
AND
NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION………………….DEFENDANT/APPLICANT
R U L I N G/JUDGEMENT
The Claimants were employees of the Defendants before they voluntarily retired. They alleged that the Defendant has not paid their transport/relocation allowance in spite of their repeated demands. The Claimants further alleged that they are entitled to the payment of the said allowance.
- They commenced the present action by aComplaintfiled in this Court on the 14/01/2019 whereby they claimed against the Defendant as follows:
- A Declaration that by virtue of Section 44.1.4 of the Defendant’s Corporate Policy and Procedure Guide, the Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid Transportation/Relocation Allowances.
- An Order directing the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiffs the total sum of Eight Million, Two Hundred and Ninety One Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifty – Six (sic) Naira, Sixty – Eight Kobo (N8,291,559.68) being money payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs as their respective Transportation/Relocation allowances as retirees from the services of the Defendant.
- Interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of Judgment until payment.
- The Plaintiffs also claim the cost of bringing this action.
The Defendant’s Statement of Defence, filed on 02/05/2019 was deemed as properly filed by the Court on 08/05/2019.
The Defendant also filed the instant Preliminary Objection on 19/03/2019, seeking an order of this Honourable Court to dismiss the Claimants’ suit for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground principally, that the action is statute-barred.
- In opposing the application, the Claimants filed aWritten Addresson 02/04/2019, to which the Defendant filed a Further and Better Affidavit and Reply on Points of Law on 02/05/2019.
I had proceeded to carefully consider this application, the totality of the facts deposed in the affidavits filed by the Defendant and the entirety of the written and oral submissions canvassed by the respective learned counsel for both parties, to which I shall make reference as I consider needful in the course of this Ruling.
- The case of the Claimants, as disclosed in theStatement of Factsis clear. They voluntarily retired from the employment of the Defendant. The Defendant had paid their respective terminal benefits and they are currently receiving pension under the Pension Scheme but they alleged that the Defendant had failed to pay their transport/relocation allowance. The Claimants further contended that they are entitled to enjoy full benefits accruable to them having served the Defendant meritoriously.
Being aggrieved by the refusal of the Defendant to pay the allowance, the Claimants commenced the present action and sought reliefs endorsed on the Complaint.
- The Defendant’s learned counsel had hinged his arguments in support of the instant application principally on the ground thatSection 12 (1) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act (NNPC Act), caught up with the suit, in that the Claimants commenced the suit after the time permitted for filing an action against the Defendant had lapsed.
The Defendant’s learned counsel further argued that in the present case, the wrong the Claimants alleged to have been done against them by the Defendant, as captured in their Statement of Facts, related to the purported Transport/Relocation Allowance, which they urged the Court to direct the Defendant to pay as retirees from the services of the Defendant.
Learned counsel further argued that, as disclosed in the Statement of Facts, the Claimants’ cause of action first arose in 2015/2016, when they were paid their retirement benefits or entitlements. The Defendant’s learned counsel further contended that since 2015/2016 to 14/01/2019 when the present suit was instituted was over twelve (12) months; the suit is statute-barred, having been instituted outside the twelve (12) months allowed by the NNPC Act, from the date of the accrual of the cause of action.
Learned counsel submitted that once a stipulated time for bringing an action has elapsed, the right of action becomes extinguished by effluxion of time and in that instance case, the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the suit is liable to be dismissed. He cited the authorities of A.G. Adamawa State & 15 Ors Vs A.G. Federation [2014] 4-6 SC 127; Egbe Vs Adefarasin (No. 2) [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1; United Bank for Africa Vs Abimbolu & Co [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 419) 371; Ajayi Vs Military Administrator of Ondo State [1997] 5 NWLR (Pt 504) 237
Learned Defendant’s counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the Claimants’ action is statute-barred and to dismiss same.
- In his arguments, the Claimants’ learned counsel posited that the cause of action accrued in 2018 when the Defendant officially communicated its refusal to grant the Claimants’ request for payment of their transportation/relocation allowances.
Learned counsel relied on the Court of Appeal authority of Samuel Ugbeche Vs NNPC [2016] LPELR 42033 which decided that, the provisions of Section 12(1) of NNPC Act cannot apply to bar the Claimants from instituting this action on the ground that same is statute barred.
Learned counsel further cited Section 173 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and argued that the provisions of Section 12 (1) of the NNPC Act is inapplicable to the instant case as the Section is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 173 (1) and (2) of the Constitution (supra). He urged the Court to hold that the preliminary objection lacks merit and to dismiss same.
- Permit me at this point to make comments on the issue canvassed by the learned Claimants’ counsel that the preliminary objection is premature.The learned Counsel for the Claimants’ argument is that the Defendant/Applicant ought to have filed a Statement of Defence to plead particular facts which occurred on the dates leading to the accrual of the Claimants’ cause of action before bringing this application and that the preliminary objection cannot stand without a Statement of Defence. Relying on the case of Jimoh Adekoya Odubeko Vs Victor Oladipo Fowler & Anor [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt 308) 637, learned Claimants’ counsel posited that the Defendant/Applicant having failed to file Statement of Defence, the preliminary objection is fundamentally flawed and liable to be struck out and he so urged the Court.
- In his Reply on Points of Law, the learned counsel for the Defendant contended that the issue of jurisdiction is substantive and proceeds to the foundation or exercise of the case itself. It is his submission that this application is a substantive application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain any aspect of the Claimants’ case as constituted. In support of his proposition, learned Defendant’s counsel cited inter – alia the cases ofUnited Bank for Africa Plc Vs Mode Nigeria Ltd[2002] All FWLR (Pt 112) 17; NDIC Vs CBN & Anor [2002] All FWLR (Pt 99) 1021 and urged the Court to discountenance the submission of learned Claimants’ counsel.
- Now, it has been held in a plethora of judicial authorities that the importance of jurisdiction is the very reason why it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, be it at the trial, on appeal to the Court of Appeal or even at the Apex Court. It must also be noted that the Court can suo motu raise issue of jurisdiction. Once it is apparent to any party that the Court may not have jurisdiction, it can be raised even viva voce. It is in the interest of justice to do so. SeePopoola Elabanjo & Anor Vs Chief (Mrs.) Ganiat Dawodu[2006] 15 NWLR (Pt 1001) 76; A.G. Federation Vs A.G. Anambra State [2017] LPELR 43491
- It is therefore not necessary to file a Statement of Defence before issue of jurisdiction can be raised as argued by the learned counsel for the Claimants. The case ofJimoh Adekoya Odubeko Vs Victor Oladipo Fowler & Anor (supra)relied upon by Claimants’ counsel, is not applicable to the facts of this case and furthermore the case was quoted out of context. I observe that the learned Claimants’ counsel in his written address omitted some words of Onu, JSC (as he then was) at Page 660. I do not know if this was inadvertent or deliberate.
In any case, I am of the firm view that the Objection filed by the Defendant was rightly done even as it had not filed its Statement of Defence as at the time the Objection was filed. I so hold.
I shall now proceed to resolve the issue in this application.
- The simple and narrow question to be determined in the instant case is whether the provision ofSection 12 (1)of NNPC Act is applicable to the facts of the instant case; and if so, whether, in the circumstances, the action is statute-barred and liable to be dismissed.
It would seem that from the submissions made by learned Defendant’s counsel, that the issue of a Court’s jurisdiction is the bed rock of a case. It is now settled that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to the question of the competence of the Court adjudicating. It is an exhibition of wisdom to have the issue of jurisdiction or competence determined before embarking on the hearing and determination of the substantive matter. Musaconi Ltd Vs Aspinall [2013] LPELR 2074; NDIC Vs CBN [2002] LPELR (supra), B.A. Shitta – Bay Vs A.G. of Federation & Anor [1998] LPELR 3055 (SC); Salisu & Anor Vs Mobolaji & Ors [2013] LPELR 22019 (SC)
- It must be underscored that theessence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute. Where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Therefore a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings are not commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the limitation law had lapsed. An action which is not brought within the prescribed period offends the provisions of the law and thus could not give rise to a cause of action.
- The yardsticks to determine whether an action is statute-barred are:
- The date when the cause of action accrued.
- The date of commencement of the suit as indicated in the Complaint.
- Period of time prescribed to bringing an action to be ascertained from the statute in question.
The general position of the law is that time begins to run for the purposes of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues. See Ajayi Vs Adebiyi [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 137; Sulgrave Holdings Inc. Vs FGN [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309.
Suffice it to quickly affirm the trite position of law as learned counsel for the Defendant had rightly submitted that in the determination of the subject-matter or cause of action, in a suit; it is the originating process of the Claimant that determines the jurisdiction. See Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors Vs Dopamu & Ors (2008) 7 NWLR Pt 1085 1 at 23; Oladipo Vs NCSB (2009) 12 NWLR Pt. 1156 @ 563; NURTW & Anor Vs RTEAN (2012) LPELR 7840
- Going further, the settled position is that when a Defendant raises a defence that the Claimant’s action is statute barred and the defence is sustained by the trial Court, the proper order for the trial Court to make is an order of dismissal of the Claimant’s action and not merely striking it out. This proposition was succinctly reasoned byAniagolu, JSC(of blessed memory) when he posited in Lasisi Vs A. G. Oyo State [1982] 4 SC 56, as follows:
“….What is there to try when the statute has provided that the period allowed for bringing an action in which those facts which have been in issue has expired? Absolutely nothing.”
See also Egbe Vs. Adefarasin (supra) 1; Eboigbe Vs. NNPC [1994] 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 647.
It is therefore settled that once an action is challenged on the grounds of limitation of time to commence the same, as in the instant case, and it is established, this bars the Claimant’s remedy and extinguishes his right of action; and then the Court will be compelled to wash off its hands from the case and decline jurisdiction to entertain the same.
- Now,Section 12 (1) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, upon which the Defendant’s learned counsel hinged his arguments provides as follows:
Section 12(1):
“Notwithstanding anything in any other enactment, no suit against the Corporation, a member of the Board or any employee of the Corporation for any act done in pursuance or execution of any enactment or law, or any public duties or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of such enactment or law, duties or authority, shall lie or be instituted in any Court unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof”.
In dealing with the instant case, the fundamental question to answer is: When did the cause of action accrue? Or may be a collateral question to be answered first is: what is meant by cause of action?
It is trite that a cause of action arises the moment a wrong is done to the Claimant by the Defendant and for the purpose of limitation of time for actions, time begins to run from the moment the cause of action has arisen, that is when the facts that are material to be proved to entitle the Claimant to success have happened. See AG Bayelsa State Vs AG Rivers State [2006] 12 SC 134; Agbonika & Anor Vs University Of Abuja [2014] All FWLR (Pt 715) 335 at 340; NNPC Vs Emelike [2018] LPELR 44180
- The relevant facts of the instant case are contained in Statement of Facts, particularlyParagraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 13thereof, where the Claimants averred as follows:-
- The Plaintiffs were retired employees of the Defendants and are all resident in Kaduna within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.
- The first Plaintiff states that he was employed by the Defendant and assumed duty as Account Clerk with Staff ID No. 72434 on the 1st day of July 1983. He rose through the ranks and retired voluntarily effective the 12th day of April 2015. The first plaintiff shall found and rely on his letter of retirement at the trial if this suit.
- The second Plaintiff states that he was employed by the Defendant as Trainee Operator with Staff ID No. 72383 on the 4th day of March, 1983. He rose through the ranks and retired voluntarily effective the 15th day of April 2015. The second Plaintiff shall found and rely on his letter of offer of appointment as well as his letter of retirement at the trial of this suit.
- The third Plaintiff states that he was employed by the Defendant as Trainee Operator with Staff ID No. 72356 on the 4th day of March, 1983. He rose through the ranks and retired voluntarily effective the 1st day of July, 2016. The third Plaintiff shall found and rely on his letter of offer of appointment as well as his letter of retirement at the trial of this suit.
- The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendant had paid them their respective terminal benefits and they are currently drawing pensions under the Pension Scheme but they have not been paid their Transport/Relocation allowances despite repeated demands. The Plaintiffs shall found and rely on their Solicitor’s letter of demand dated the 14th day of November, 2018 as well as the Defendant’s reply dated the 20th day of December, 2018. The Defendant is hereby notified to produce the original.
- A careful reading of the Complaint, the Statement of Facts and the reliefs claimed, will lead to the inevitable conclusion, that this suit was instituted by the Claimants to get the Court to direct the Defendant to pay the sum claimed “being money payable by the Defendant to the Claimants as their respective Transport/Relocation allowances as retirees from the services of the Defendant”. This is clearly seen by the reliefs sought.
It is not in dispute that the Claimants voluntarily retired their services from the Defendant. It is also not in dispute that the Defendant accepted their notice of voluntary retirement via the Defendant’s letters dated 02/02/2015 and 13/05/2015 respectively.
By paragraph 5 of the Defendant’s letters of acceptance of the Claimants’ voluntary retirement, the Claimants were advised to conclude and forward evidence of their clearances within a month of the receipt of the letter of acceptance to enable the Defendant process their final entitlements.
In paragraph 13 of their Statement of Facts, the Claimants admitted the Defendant had paid them their respective retirement benefits and they are currently drawing pension under the Pension Scheme.
- The Claimants’ contention, however, is that the Defendant failed to pay their Transport/Relocation allowance and that the cause of action crystallized on 14/11/2018 when their solicitors made a formal demand for the payment of the said allowance.
I take liberty to reproduce the relevant portion of the said letter of demand dated 14/11/2018 written by H.O. Suleiman Esq., of Mas’ud Alabelewe & Co to the Defendant.
“The extant NNPC Corporate Policy and Procedure Guide (CPPG) entitle our clients to a relocation allowance upon retirement. Our clients have repeatedly demanded for their relocation allowance and till date no amount was paid to them.” (Underlining for emphasis)
From the facts as gleaned above, it is obvious that the Claimants had been demanding for their relocation allowance upon retirement. I am of the firm view that the cause of action in the instant suit accrued in 2015 and 2016 when the Defendant accepted their voluntary retirements and according to the acceptance letter, when they were paid their retirement benefits by the Defendant, a month after the Defendant’s letter of acceptance. I so hold.
- Relying on the case ofSamuel Ugbeche Vs NNPC[2016] LPELR 42033, learned Claimants’ counsel further argued that the claims of the Claimants being one relating to terminal benefits, the provisions of Section 12 (1) of the NNPC Act is inapplicable as same is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 173 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
I think the learned counsel for the Claimants’ got it all wrong. Section 173 (1) of the Constitution (supra) applies to pension rights and not Transport/Relocation Allowance as in the instant case. Without further ado, I am of the view that the case of Samuel Ugbeche Vs NNPC (supra) does not apply in the circumstance of this case. I so hold.
- Now the pertinent question that follows is, whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain the reliefs of the Claimants? In my view, the answer is in the negative.
Arising from the foregoing therefore, I cannot help but agree entirely with learned Defendant’s counsel on the fact that Section 12(1) of the NNPC Act (supra) ought to avail the Defendant as the Claimants’ cause of action is statute barred having been instituted on 14/01/2018, several months after the statutory twelve (12) months provided by the NNPC Act. And I so hold.
- One of the principles of the statutes of limitation is that a person who sleeps on his right should not be assisted by the Courts in an action for recovery of his property. A person who is aware of his rights but allows them to go stale should not be allowed to revive the said stale action to the detriment of an adversary. It is similar to the equitable principle that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent and it prevents a party from acting unconscionably SeeNwadiaro V Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd(1995) NWLR Pt 150 322; Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd V Amadi (2010) 13 NWLR Pt 1210 32.
The philosophy behind the Limitation Laws was stated by Tobi, JCA (as he then was) in Merchantile Bank (Nig) Ltd V Feteco (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt 540) 143 at 156-157 thus:
“A statute of limitation is designed to stop or avoid situations where a plaintiff can commence an action anytime he feels like doing so, even when human memory would have normally faded and therefore failed. Putting it in another language, by the statute of limitation, a plaintiff has not the freedom of the air to sleep or slumber and wake up at his own time to commence an action against a defendant. The different statutes of limitation which are essentially founded on the principles of equity and fair play will not avail such a sleeping or slumbering plaintiff….”
- In the final analysis, my decision is that the filing of the Complaint over twelve months after the act complained of clearly offends Section 12 (1) of the NNPC Act.I find in the result that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The same shall be and is accordingly dismissed.
I make no order as to costs.
SINMISOLA O. ADENIYI
(Presiding Judge)
09/07/2019
Legal representation:
Mas’ud Alabelewe Esq. for Claiman
Josiah J. Ojenya Esq. for Defendants



