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National Industrial Court

Dr. Sunday Olusola Peters -VS- Federal University of Agriculture

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT IBADAN

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE F. I. KOLA-OLALERE

 

Date: December 13, 2017

 

Suit No: NICN/AB/09/2013

 

Between:

 

Dr. Sunday Olusola Peters

—————-             Claimant/judgment creditor

 

And

 

  1. Federal University of Agriculture Abeokuta
  2. The Governing Council, Federal University

Agriculture, Abeokuta

  1. Registrar, Federal University of Agriculture,

Abeokuta

 

————– Defendants/judgment creditors

 

Representation:

Dr. Yemi Oke for claimant/judgment creditor/ respondent. With him is Joy Ajulor (Miss).

Peter I. Ogah for the Defendants /judgment creditors/ applicants; with A.O. Less (Mrs.)

 

POST – JUDGMENT RULING

On May 19, 2015 this Court gave judgment on this case, which was 50/50 win to the parties. In order to avoid any doubt, the summary of the judgment states thus:

On the whole, I hereby declare and hold as follows:

  1.  I declare that the claimant’s right to dignity of his person as guaranteed by section 34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) was not threatened by the defendants by insisting that the claimant serves the University for 2years as agreed in the Bond.
  2. I declare that the claimant validly withdrew his service with the 1st defendant on November 13, 2012 when the 3rd defendant received the letter of withdrawal on behalf of the defendants. To that extent, the defendants’ letter of January 29, 2013 refusing the withdrawal is hereby declared invalid. Thus, the claimant is entitled to his terminal benefits less his indebtedness to the 1st defendant.
  3. In line with Rule 020804 (a) (ii) of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2006 the 1st defendant is entitled to a refund of the claimant’s 2years’ salary in lieu of his service, which was his own obligation under the Bond Agreement. This judgment sum (the claimant’s salaries for two years) is to be deducted from the claimant’s terminal benefits.

Judgment is entered accordingly and I make no order as to cost; signed by my humble self.

 

In other words, the Court held inter alia that the claimant was entitled to resign voluntarily and that the defendants were not allowed to refuse his voluntary resignation. The court went further to hold that the claimant is entitled to his terminal benefits. For the defendants, the Court held that they are entitled to counterclaim from the claimant, his two years’ salaries having failed to honour his bond with the University by his refusal to come back to serve the University for two years after his 4years study leave without pay as agreed by both parties. The two parties filed post-judgment applications before the Court. In this ruling, therefore; parties will be referred to by their original status in this suit to avoid confusion, even though the Court had given judgment on the substantive case.

 

On October 8, 2015 counsel to the defendants filed a post-judgment motion on notice brought pursuant to Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. This application was found to be defectively signed; it was withdrawn and struck out on February 28, 2017. See page 273 of the Court’s record. On October 22, 2015 counsel to the claimant filed an application for contempt proceedings pursuant to Order 29, Rule 1(2) (b) and Rule 2 (1) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 against five officers of the 1st defendant including the 3rd defendant for their failure to comply with the judgment of this Court. (See pages 297 to 333 of the record). Again at pages 524 to 542 of the Court’s record, the defendants filed a notice of preliminary objection against the claimant’s motion on notice for the committal of five officers of the 1st defendant on November 10, 2015 praying for an Order, dismissing and or quashing the application for committal proceedings (Forms 48 and 49) as instituted herein for being incompetent thereby robbing the Court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate on the motion as presently constituted. (See page 524 of the Court’s record). Parties are yet to move their applications for committal and for notice of preliminary objection.

 

THE DEFENDANTS’ APPLICATION

The defendants’ 1st application of October 8, 2015 brought pursuant to Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007; which was defective, was re-filed on May 19, 2016 praying for the following orders:

  1.  An Order inserting the words “if applicable” after terminal benefits such that the last two legs of the declaration of court in its judgment of 19th May 2015 will read as follows:

“On the whole I hereby declare and hold as follows:

(2)  I declare that the claimant validly withdrew his service with the 1st defendant on November 13, 2012 when the 3rd defendant received the letter of withdrawal on behalf of the defendants.  To that extent, the defendants’ letter of January, 29, 2013 refusing the withdrawal is hereby declared invalid.  Thus the claimant is entitled to his terminal benefit “if applicable”, less his indebtedness to the 1st defendant.

(3)  In line with Rule 020804 (a) (ii) of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2006 the 1st defendant is entitled to a refund of the claimant’ 2years salary in lieu of his service, which was his own obligation under the bond agreement.  This judgment sum (the claimant’s salaries for two years) is to be deducted from the claimant’s terminal benefits “if applicable”.

ALTERNATIVELY

  1. An Order  clarifying the meaning of the words “terminal benefit”  as pertaining to the Federal Public Service Rules and the Pensions Act, since terminal benefits in the Public Service are only calculated and paid by the Pensions Commission upon application by individual employee through his/her Pension Fund Administrator.

See pages 273 to 290 of the Court’s record.

DEFENDANTS’ WRITTEN ARGUMENTS

In support of the defendants’ application is a 16 paragraphed affidavit deposed to by Yemisi. Daramola (Mrs.) and a written address were also filed in support same date. Their counsel framed an issue for determination of the Court in the address as:

Whether in the circumstances of this case, the Honourable Court has the power and ought not to grant this application.

 

Arguing this issue, counsel submitted that by the provision of Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 the Court is allowed to rectify or amend such accidental slip or error in its ruling or judgment, citing Osigwe v. B.P.E. [2007] 32 WRN 138 at 149; Berliet (Nig.) Ltd v. Kachalla [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 478; [1985] 12 SCNJ 147; Asiyanbi v. Adeniji [1967] 1 all NLR 82; Min. of Lagos affairs, Mines and Power v. Akin-Olugbade [1974] 9 NSCC 489; [1974] 11 S.C 11; [1974] 1 All NLR (Pt.2) 226 and Hydroworks Ltd. v. Rimi Local Govt. [2002] 1 NWLR (Pt. 749) 564. Counsel went on that if the words, “if applicable” is added after the words “terminal benefits” in the 2nd and 3rd orders made by the Court in the said judgment, it will do justice to this case by bringing out the real intendment of the Court and avoid a situation wherein the intendment of the Court will be twisted to create an absurdity; akin to enforcing the doing of an illegality.

 

Referring to paragraphs 9 – 14 of the affidavit in support of this application, counsel submitted that under the Public Service Rules, only retiring public servants are entitled or qualified for terminal benefits, and that the Respondent will have to apply for same if he is qualified. That the Respondent in the instant application did not retire but voluntarily withdrew his services from the Applicant’s University. He concluded that the relief sought from the Court in the instant application is within its inherent powers to so grant, and rightly so in the circumstances wherein the accidental slip so identified has been properly brought to the notice of the Court. He urged the Court to grant the application.

 

CLAIMANT’S ARGUMENT IN OPPOSING THE DEFENDANTS’ APPLICATION

In opposition to this application, counsel to the claimant filed a 33 paragraphed counter affidavit deposed to by one Joy Ajulor, with 7 exhibits and a written address wherein counsel formulated 3 issues for the Court’s determination this way:

  1. Whether or not the clear judgment of this Honourable Court delivered on 19th May 2015 admits of any clerical mistake or error as provided under Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007.
  2. Whether or not this Honourable Court can re-open the Suit No: NICN/AB/09/2013 to clarify the clear meaning of terminal benefit where this Honourable Court has become functus officio.
  3. Whether or not the Defendants/Applicants by their conduct have failed to comply with the judgment of the Honourable Court delivered on the 19th May 2015.

 

Arguing the first issue, counsel submitted that the error or mistake anticipated under the Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 is limited to only clerical error and not any other type of error and may even be corrected without notice to the other party, citing Olurotimi v. Ige [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 257; Aregbesola v. Oyinlola [2011] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1253) page 458 at 563-564. He went on that the Defendants/Applicants have sought to invoke the doctrine of ‘slip rule’ ostensibly on the ground that Court omitted the word “if applicable” to cause the Court to implicitly re-write its clear judgment in a way to show that the Claimant/Respondent may not be able to claim his entitlement despite having worked for the Defendants for eleven years (11 years) and forced to resign by the recalcitrant posture of the Defendants/Applicants’ Vice-Chancellor concerning the Claimant’s/Respondent’s willingness to extend his study leave which was eventually denied him by the Vice-Chancellor of the Defendants’/Applicants’ University. To counsel, the omission of the word “if applicable” in the context of the circumstance of this case cannot be considered a clerical error or mistake within the anticipation of the provisions of Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 and as such the prayer sought by the Defendants/Applicants should be discountenanced.

 

Arguing issue two of whether this Honourable Court can re-open the suit after judgment when it has become functus officio, counsel submitted that granting the prayers will re-open the matter that it has become functus officio of and that this Court can no longer do that under the doctrine of the ‘slip rule’ as it is a tacit appeal to this Court to review its decision in favour of the defendants/Judgment creditor despite the Court having become functus officio. He urged the Court to so hold.

 

Arguing issue three of whether the Defendants have not failed to comply with the judgment of this Court delivered on the 19th May 2015 by their conduct, counsel submitted that the Defendants/Applicants have shown by their conducts that they are in contempt of this Court, four months after the delivery of the judgment of this Court, as they are yet to pay the entitlement of the Claimant/Respondent to him. He continued that the Defendants’/Applicants’ Motion on Notice dated 13.05.2016 is misconceived, as same is predicated on an act which is not contemplated under Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007; citing Alhaji Ahmed & Co (Nig.) Ltd v. African International Bank Ltd [2001] 10 NWLR (Pt.721) page 391 at page 403 paras E-F and Oyefolu v. Durosinmi [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 738) page 1 at page 13 para D-F. Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the application of the defendants.

 

CLAIMANT’S APPLICATION

Furthermore, on the January 23, 2017 counsel to the claimant filed an application at pages 663 to 742 of the record, praying for the following orders:

  1. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay the sum of N22, 809, 701.14 being the total entitlements of the Claimant after deducting the sum of N2,325,948.00 being two years basic salary in line with the Judgment of this Court delivered on 19th of May 2015.
  2. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay the sum of N22, 809, 701.14 in compliance with the Judgment of this Court delivered on 19th of May 2015.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE:

  1. An Order of this Honourable Court setting down for hearing the Motion on Notice for Committal to prison for disobedience of the Judgment of Court dated 19th of May 2015.

 

The application is supported by a 17 paragraphed affidavit deposed to by one Joy Ajulor and attached with it is 9 exhibits together with a written address. Counsel formulated an issue for determination in the address as:

Whether the Claimant/Applicant is entitled to the prayers as sought in this Application.

 

Arguing the said issue, counsel submitted that this application is being brought under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, the Court having entered judgment in respect of this case since May 19, 2015 as the claimant is entitled to reap the benefit of the judgment in form of terminal benefit from the institution he had served meritoriously for 11 years. Counsel referred to N.I.I.T. Zaria v. Dange [2008] 9 (Pt.1091) 127 at 147-148, paras. H-B (CA) (The Law Report is NOT cited); Nigeria Social Insurance Trust  Fund v. Iyen & Ors [2014] LPELR-22238 (CA); FRN v. Ibori & Ors [2014] LPELR-23214 (CA); COP v. Agholor [2014] LPELR-23212 (CA) and Paragraphs 5 to 12 of the affidavit in support of this motion. Counsel urged the Court to grant their application.

 

DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO THE CLAIMANT’S APPLICATION

In opposing this application, counsel to the defendants filed an 11 paragraphed counter affidavit deposed to by Ahmed Aboaba. It is also supported by a written address wherein counsel formulated the issue for determination as:

Whether the Honourable Court having made a final pronouncement in this suit on 19th of May, 2015 still possess the requisite jurisdiction to adduce further evidence to hear and grant the instant application.

 

Arguing the said issue, counsel submitted that this Court has made a final pronouncement in its judgment of May 19, 2015. Therefore, it is functus officio in granting reliefs of this nature in this suit, because the reliefs sought are not within the contemplation of post- judgment applications envisaged in the Rules of the Court, referring to Smith v. Soroyehun [2013] 37 WRN 133 at 163 (lines 45-20). Counsel went on that where a Court makes a final pronouncement on an issue brought before it as in the instant case, it becomes deprived of the requisite jurisdiction to make any further decision(s) in that suit. Exceptions, however, exist in cases of making clerical corrections for accidental slips as provided for in the Rules of the Court.  The only option available to the Applicant to obtain the reliefs sought herein is to appeal against the said decision or seek additional reliefs from the appellate Court, citing Senator Chris Adghje v. Hon. Nkechi J. N. Nwaogu [2008] LPELR – 3626 (CA); Sken Consult v. Ukey [1981] 1 SC; NDIC v. SBN Plc. [2003] 1 NWLR (Pt. 801) 221 – 430 at 324 and Okoye v. Nigeria Construction & Cp. Ltd [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 501 at 538. Counsel continued that this application is unknown to law and same does not fall within the exceptions to the general rule for post-judgment applications allowed either by decided authorities or by the Rules of the Court. He urged the Court to so hold.

 

ADDITIONAL WRITTEN ADDRESSES OF COUNSEL AS DIRECTED BY THE COURT.

On September 13, 2017 the Court directed counsel to the parties to further address it on three (3) issues, which came up during the preparation of the Ruling. The issues are:

  1. The nature of the substantive judgment of the Court delivered on May 19, 2015 on this case and to illustrate whether the judgment was executory or declaratory. They are to further elucidate on the enforceable order(s) in the said judgment.
  2. Considering the provisions of Section 254 (C) (1) (j) (iii) of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN (As Amended), can this Court interpret its judgment delivered on May 19, 2015 to comply with the provisions of the Pensions Act as canvassed by the defendants, even though the Act was not considered in the judgment?
  3. Can the Court add another phrase to the judgment to further convey its intention in the judgment under the ‘slip rule’ or under the Rules of the Court?

 

THE DEFENDANTS’ FURTHER WRITTEN ARGUMENTS

On the first issue of the nature of the Court’s judgment as directed by the Court, counsel to the defendant maintained that the judgment of the Court delivered on May 19, 2015 is a declaratory judgment and does not contain any executory order or orders.

 

On issue two of whether the Court can interpret the judgment to comply with the Pension Act, counsel answered this in the affirmative having mentioned “terminal benefits” in the judgment because that phrase is derived only from the Pensions Act, even though the Act itself was not specifically mentioned in the said judgment. He went on to argue that the Court can take judicial notice of all laws, citing Section 122 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

 

On issue three of adding a phrase to the judgment under the slip rule, counsel submitted that the Court has the power to add another phrase to its judgment to properly convey its intention both under the Slip Rule and its Rules, as well as under the NIC Act, citing section 7 (1) (c) (v) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006; Order 19 Rules 18 and 19 (1) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. He also referred to the cases of Osigwe v. B.P.E [2007] 32 WRN 138 at 149 and COP v. Okoli [1966] NNLR 1.

 

THE CLAIMANT’S FURTHER WRITTEN ADDRESS

On the first issue as directed by the Court, counsel to the claimant submitted that Orders 1 and 2 of the Judgment of this Court are declaratory while Order 3 is executory, citing Enekwe v. I.M.B. Ltd [2006] LPELR-1140; Alims Nig. Ltd v UBA Plc. [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 348) 971 at 981 Para G (CA) and Doma v Ogiri [1997] 1 NWLR (Pt. 481) 322 p. @ 344 paras B–D.

 

On issue two of interpreting the judgment to comply with the Pension Reform Act, counsel submitted that the Court can consider the Pensions Act in order to give effect to its judgment to make it executory, citing Section 254(C) 1 (j) (iii) of 1999 Constitution of the FRN (As Amended). He went on that by Section 9(1) (a) of the Pension Reform Act, 2004 the contribution of any Employer and Employee is a minimum of 7.5% and 7.5% of the monthly emolument of the Employee respectively into the Retirement Savings Account of the employee, while under Section 4 of the Pension Reform Act, 2014 the contribution of any Employee is 8% and 10% by the Employer. In his view, it is necessary that this Court should put the entitlements of the Claimant’s pension contribution into consideration as part of his terminal benefits.

Arguing issue three of adding phrase to the judgment under the ‘slip rule’, counsel submitted that the intention of the Court in the judgment is clear and as such there is no need for the invocation of the slip rule. What is required is to ascertain the entitlement due to the Claimant and to deduct the money due to the Defendant as per the bond, citing Aregbesola v. Oyinlola [2011] 9 NWLR Part 1253 page 458 at 563-564; Order 19 rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 and the case of Olurotimi v. Ige [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 257. Counsel went on that assuming without conceding that slip rule is applicable, it is to the extent that there was an omission by the Court in pronouncing on the reliefs specifically claimed by the Claimant as to allowances and interests in his statement of facts. To him, this omission can be corrected pursuant to the slip rule as provided under Order 19 rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007to pronounce on the said allowances and interests; the Court having inadvertently omitted to pronounce on a relief before it, may now remedy the ‘slip’ by amending its judgment to show the true intention of the Court and to further amplifying its executory essence. This means the terminal benefits of the Claimant as computed and deduction of 2years’ salary in lieu of his service to the Defendants and paying-over to the Claimant his terminal benefits/entitlement net of deductions can be ordered by the Court.

 

COURT’S DECISION

I have gone through the post judgment applications of both parties and from this I am of the considered view that the followings are issues to resolve on them:

  1. Whether or not the Court can insert the phrase ‘if applicable’ to its judgment as applied for by the defendants or to interpret the judgment in line with the Provision of Section 254 (C) (1) (j) (iii) of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN (As Amended) to comply with the provisions of the Pensions Act as canvassed by the defendants, even though the Act was not considered in the judgment?
  2. Whether or not the Court can order the defendants to pay to the claimant, the sum of N22, 809, 701.14 as his total entitlements after deducting the sum of N2,325,948.00; being his two years basic salary from his terminal benefits.
  3. Is the judgment of this Court delivered on May 19, 2015 in respect of this case executory or declaratory in nature?

 

 

CAN THE COURT INSERT “IF APPLICABLE” TO IT JUDGMENT?

Counsel to the claimant answered this question in the negative; to him, the Court had given its judgment and so, it has become funtus officio. On the other hand counsel to the defendants answered this question in affirmative, reasoning that this can be covered by the ‘slip rule’ and the Rules of this Court.

 

‘Slip Rule’ principle is concerned with how far a trial Judge should go in reviewing his own judgment. The power of amendment or correction of its records inherent in the jurisdiction of the court is very wide but it can only be exercised when the justice of the case demands it and when there is no miscarriage of justice on the other side. But matters relating to the facts or the law in the judgment itself cannot be a matter of review by the trial court with a view to correcting it; as the remedy open to an aggrieved party in the latter senerio is to appeal. See Gani v. UBA [2000] LPELR-10836 (CA); [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt.689) 116.

 

In the case of Olurotimi v. Ige [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt.311) 257 at 274, the Supreme Court, per Ogundare, J.S.C. held thus on the ‘slip rule’ principle:

The power of a Judge to amend his judgment is limited only to where there is a clerical mistake in the judgment or order, or an error arising from accidental slip or omission. And the inherent power of court to vary its own orders relates only to where it is necessary to carry out its own meaning and to make its meaning plain…The error or omission must be an error in expressing the manifest intention of the court. In the instant case, two judgments were given. The law cannot allow this kind of situation where the latter judgment was entered after an ex-parte application, where only one party was heard.

 

The amendment or correction amounts to a complete review of the judgment in the instant case. A Judge having pronounced the earlier judgment as he has purported to have done becomes functus officio.

 

Again, in the Supreme Court’s case of Nwana v. FCDA [2007] LPELP-2101 (SC): [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 59: [2007] 4 S.C. (Pt.11) 1 at page 16 paragraphs C – D, per Chukwuma – Eneh JSC held that “a slip under the banner of ‘slip Rule’ connotes accidental slip or omission as clerical mistakes in a judgment or Order capable of being amended even at times without notice to the other party”. See also Nwankudu v. Ibeto [2010] LPELP – 4391 (C.A) on the principle.

 

Furthermore, Order 26 rule 10 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 provides that “A Judge may at any time correct any grammatical or typographical mistakes in the Judge’s Judgments, Rulings or Orders or any accidental slip or omissions contained therein.” See also Order 19 Rule 19 of the repealed NIC Rules, 2007 on the same provision.

 

From the averments in paragraphs 4 to 15 of the affidavit in support of the motion, the defendants are seeking for the interpretation of the word ‘terminal benefit’ and the insertion of the word “if applicable” to the judgment. In my considered view, this application is not seeking for the correction of the grammatical, typographical mistakes or accidental slip or omission as envisaged in Order 19 Rule 19 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 and Order 26 rule 10 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. Adding this phrase as prayed for by the defendants will completely change the content of the said judgment and it will amount to re-writing the judgment. Such reliefs are not within the contemplation of post- judgment applications that this Court can handle. This Court has made a final pronouncement in its judgment of May 19, 2015.

 

In the same vein, this Court cannot consider the provision of the Pension Reforms Act or any other one in interpreting the judgment in question, by virtue of the provision of Section 254 (C) (1) (j) (iii) of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN (As Amended) after the judgment has been entered; contrary to the erroneous prayer of the defendants.

 

Therefore, I hold that this Court is functus officio of this matter. I further hold that the defendants’ application including their alternative prayer lack merit, they are hereby refused and dismissed.

 

CAN COURT ORDER PAYMENT OF N22, 809, 701.14 TO THE CLAIMANT?

It is worthy of note that there is no part of the judgment in question where the court ordered the defendants to pay to the claimant, the sum of N22,809,701.14 being his total entitlements after deducting the sum of N2,325,948.00 being his two years basic salary from his terminal benefits. It is, therefore, wrong of the claimant’s counsel to make an application for such claim from the judgment in question to this Court. This is misleading and a deliberate attempt by the claimant’s counsel to fabricate a claim that the Court did not grant and to manipulate the Court to enforce same. This is very unfortunate in my firm view.

 

Besides, the said judgment does not contain any specific order in terms of figures which may be enforced by the parties. For instance, the actual salary of the claimant was not before the Court neither was the manner in which terminal benefits of the employees of the University (1st defendant) are calculated made available to the Court at the hearing of the substantive suit.  Consequently, I find and hold that there is no figure before the Court, as the exact amount of the judgment sum to enforce by execution by either of the parties; either as the claimant’s two years’ salary or as the terminal benefits of the claimant.

In the circumstance, the claimant’s prayer for an order of the Court directing the defendants to pay to him, the sum of N22, 809, 701.14 being the total entitlements and the alternative prayer for an Order of Court setting down for hearing his Motion on Notice for Committal of the defendants/some officers of the 1st defendant University to prison for disobedience of the said Judgment of Court are baseless and they are accordingly dismissed.

 

THE NATURE OF THE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF MAY 19, 2015

For emphasis and not minding repeating the summary of the substantive judgment in question, the Court held this way:

  1.  I declare that the claimant’s right to dignity of his person as guaranteed by section 34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) was not threatened by the defendants by insisting that the claimant serves the University for 2years as agreed in the Bond.
  2. I declare that the claimant validly withdrew his service with the 1st defendant on November 13, 2012 when the 3rd defendant received the letter of withdrawal on behalf of the defendants. To that extent, the defendants’ letter of January 29, 2013 refusing the withdrawal is hereby declared invalid. Thus, the claimant is entitled to his terminal benefits less his indebtedness to the 1st defendant.
  3. In line with Rule 020804 (a) (ii) of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2006 the 1st defendant is entitled to a refund of the claimant’s 2years’ salary in lieu of his service, which was his own obligation under the Bond Agreement. This judgment sum (the claimant’s salaries for two years) is to be deducted from the claimant’s terminal benefits.

 

It suffices to say that the judgment of the Court delivered on May 19, 2015 is a declaratory judgment as same merely proclaims or declares the existence of legal rights of the parties. This declaratory judgment can only be a ground for subsequent proceedings in another suit between the parties and I so hold. See the cases of Olabomi & Anor v. Oyewinle & Ors [2013] LPELR-20969(SC); Celtel Nigeria BV v. Econet Wireless Ltd & Ors [2014] LPELR-22430(CA) and Okoya v. Santilli [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 172. In the alternative, parties are entitled to appeal and cross appeal on the said judgment to the Court of Appeal who can direct this Court to re – consider some issues on the said judgment if their appeals succeed.

 

On the whole, the two applications lack merit and they are accordingly dismissed.

 

Ruling is entered accordingly and I make no order as to cost.

 

 

Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere

Presiding Judge

 

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