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National Industrial Court

Dr Cecilia Arinye -VS- The University of Lagos

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LAGOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD

 

DATE: FEBRUARY 16, 2018

SUIT NO. NICN/LA/305/2017

 

BETWEEN

Dr Cecilia Arinye                                                    –                                                           Claimant

 

AND

The University of Lagos                                         –                                                         Defendant

 

REPRESENTATION

  1. Emeribe, for the claimant.

Prof. Taiwo Osipitan SAN, with Adetola Ogunlewe, for the defendant.

 

JUDGMENT

  1. The claimant is a confirmed staff of the defendant having been employed as Director of Sports vide a letter of employment dated 28th April 2009. Her story is that she had introduced reforms at the Sports Centre, which did not go down well with some elements in the University, particularly one Mr Afisu Sanya (a serial petitioner) who felt he should have been given the position of Director of Sports. That the said Mr Sanya wrote series of petitions against her, some of which were investigated and found to be baseless. However, that Mr Sanya ganged up with others including the Bursar ‘to write series of petitions “Financial Reports” of 13th October, 2016, 2nd November, 2016 and the 28th day of November, 2016’ against her, which led to the Vice Chancellor setting up an Administrative Panel in 2017 to investigate the issues raised in the said report. That she was invited by the panel, which she honoured. That she later received a letter from the Registrar purportedly suspending her with immediate effect and an Acting Director of Sports was then appointed without her being told the purpose of the sitting or why she is being investigated. The claimant believes she is being hunted because of her reforms at the Sports Centre; and that the Governing Council of the defendant had made up its mind to dismiss her. She wrote series of letters to the Pro-Chancellor and the President of the Alumni of the University on her issue, but that nothin has been done, hence the filing of the instant suit.

 

  1. By an originating summons dated and filed on 23rd June 2017, and brought pursuant to Order 3 Rules 1 and 17 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, the claimant is paying for the determination of the following questions:
  • Whether the investigation of the activities at the University of Lagos Sports Centre constitutes misconduct as prescribed under section 17 (now section 18) of the University of Lagos Act, CAP U9, Laws of the Federation 2004 and section 16 of University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016 to warrant the constitution of an Administrative Panel by the d
  • Whether the procedure adopted in suspending the claimant by “Management” is in conformity with the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, section 17 (now section 18) of the University of Lagos Act, Cap U9, Laws of the Federation 2004 and section 16 of University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016.
  • Whether the suspension of the claimant by the “Management” of the University of Lagos does not contradict the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, section 17 (now section 18) of the University of Lagos Act, CAP U9, Laws of the Federation 2004 and section 16 of University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016.

 

  1. The claimant accordingly prayed for the following reliefs:
  • A declaration that the Administrative Panel constituted by the “Management” of the University of Lagos to investigate the claimant is illegal, null and void.
  • An order nullifying the setting up of the administrative panel of the University of Lagos to investigate the claimant.
  • A declaration that the procedure adopted in suspending the claimant by the “Management” of the University of Lagos is not in conformity with the provisions of section 17 (now section 18) of the University of Lagos Act, Cap U9, Laws of the Federation 2004 and section 16 of University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016.
  • An order of this Honourable Court, setting aside all the findings and recommendations of the Administrative Panel set up by the defendant to investigate the claimant.
  • A declaration that the “Management” of the University of Lagos, does not have powers to suspend a senior staff of the University as contained in section 17 (now section 18) of the University of Lagos Act, Cap U9, Laws of the Federation 2004 and section 16 of University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016.
  • An order of this Honourable Court, setting aside the suspension letter to the claimant dated the 6th of June, 2017.
  • An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, its servants, agents, privies or any person acting on its behalf from taking any further steps in dismissing the claimant or even contemplating of suspending the claimant.

 

  1. In support of the originating summons is an affidavit with exhibits and a written address. In reaction, the defendant filed on 18th September 2017 a counter-affidavit with exhibits and w written address. To this, the claimant filed on 19th January 2018 a reply affidavit with exhibits and reply on points of law.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT

  1. The claimant submitted the three questions she posed in the originating summons as the issues for determination. On question (1) i.e. whether the investigation of the activities at the University of Lagos Sports Centre constitutes misconduct to warrant the constitution of an Administrative Panel by the defendant, the claimant referred to section 16 of the University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016, which provides for the discipline of members of staff of the University and states as follows:
  2. Discipline of all Senior Staff shall be in accordance with Section 17 of the University of Lagos Act, 1967 (as amended).
  3. Whenever, in the opinion of a Head of Department/Unit, misconduct which is of such a nature that can interfere with the smooth operation of the University has been established against an employee, the Head of Department/Unit concerned may recommend to the Vice-Chancellor through the Dean/Registrar that the employee be suspended for a specific period.

(a) Whenever, in the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor, a prima facie case of misconduct has been made against an employee and it is necessary to investigate the matter further with a view to determining the guilt or the appropriate disciplinary action, the employee may be suspended pending the determination of his/her case. Thereafter, the matter shall be referred to appropriate Committees.

(b) When an employee has been suspended, he/she shall thereupon be forbidden to carry on his duties and to visit his place of work without the express permission of the Vice-Chancellor. He may also be called upon to hand over Staff Identity card, uniform, Account Books Records, and any other property of the University in his charge to such other employee as the Head of Department/Unit may determine.

(c) The Registrar shall convey notice of suspension to the employee concerned in writing.

(d) Suspension shall be with pay for the period while investigation is being conducted on the alleged misconduct of the employee but it shall be without pay where he has been found guilty of the allegation or where the suspension has become punitive as approved by council.

 

  1. To the claimant, section 16 of the Regulations Governing Service in the University of Lagos refers to section 17 of the University of Lagos Act. That a cursory look at section 17 of the University of Lagos Act shows that the said section actually provides for the removal of Pro-Chancellor, Chairman of court of governors and certain members of council of court of governors. That the claimant in this suit does not fall among the persons listed in section 17 of the Act; as such, that so one may be constrained to assume that the section which is most appropriate in this case is section 18 of the Act which provides for removal of academic and administrative officers and staff. Section 18(1) of the University of Lagos Act, Cap U9, LFN 2004 provides as follows:

(1) If it appears to Council that there are reasons for believing that the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, the Provost of a college or any other person employed as a member of the academic or administrative staff of the University or a college should be removed from office or employment on the ground of misconduct or inability to perform the functions of his office or employment, the Council shall –

(a) give notice of those reasons to the person in question;

(b) make arrangements –

(i) for a joint committee of the Council and the Senate to investigate the matter, where it relates to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, the Provost of a college, or the Registrar, and to report on it to the Council; or

(ii) for a committee of the Senate to investigate the matter, where it relates to any other member of staff of the University, and to report on it to the Senate and to the Council; and

(c) make arrangements for the person in question or his representative to be afforded an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by the investigating committee with respect to the matter,

and if the Council, after considering the report of the investigative committee, is satisfied that the person in question should be removed as aforesaid, the Council may so remove him by an instrument in writing signed on the Directions of the Council.

 

  1. To the claimant, this provision is clear and unambiguous; as such the poser is: what amounts to a misconduct to warrant the setting up of an Administrative Panel to conduct investigation? That the University of Lagos Act did not define what amounts to misconduct of such a nature as to warrant the setting up of an Administrative Panel. However, that the Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Edition) at pages 1013 – 1014 defines misconduct to mean “a dereliction of duty; unlawful or improper behavior”. ‘Official misconduct’ was then defined as “A public officer’s corrupt violation of assigned duties by malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance”. That the Vice-Chancellor of the defendant set up an Administrative Panel to review “the activities in the Sports Centre”. That this is conspicuously stated in Exhibit L (letter dated 15th June 2017) which was an invitation to the claimant to appear before the Administrative Panel. The claimant went on that the Conditions Governing Service defines “misconduct” as follows:

Misconduct means any act, conduct or behavior in or outside the University which is prejudicial to the good name of the University and or of discipline and proper administration of the business of the University, and without prejudice to the generality of this definition includes membership of secret cults, instigating unrest or disorderly assembly, financial embarrassment, stealing, forgery, extortion or illegal collection of money from students, sexual exploitation of students, admission and examination malpractice, any act of moral turpitude, drunkenness, including taking of hard drugs in the course of duty, false claims against the University or any of its constituent part, insubordination, divided loyalty, negligence, falsification and suppression of records and conviction for a criminal offence other than traffic or boating offences, absence without leave from duty for two consecutive or more nights without satisfactory reason, disobedience of any order issued by any legally constituted authority of the University unjustified failure to answer questions satisfactorily in any investigations before any person or body designated by the University or any of its constituent bodies for the purpose of investigating any matter provided for in or arising out of these Regulations.

 

  1. The claimant then submitted that by the above provision of the law, it is only when an act of misconduct is of such a nature that can affect the smooth running of the University that an Administrative Panel can be set up to investigate such. That going by the definition of misconduct, it is manifestly clear no such acts of corrupt violation of duties has been established against the claimant. Furthermore, that activities in the “Sports Centre” is too vague and ambiguous and with all intents and purposes cannot be said to be of such a nature that will affect the smooth running of the operations of the University. Therefore, that the defendant has failed to establish any acts of misconduct against the claimant. That investigation of the activities at the University of Lagos Sports Centre does not constitute misconduct as prescribed under section 17 of the University of Lagos Act Cap U9 LFN 2004 and section 16 of the Regulations Governing Service in the University of Lagos to warrant the constitution of an Administrative Panel by the defendant, urging the Court to so hold, and referring to Essien v. University of Calabar [1990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 140) 605 at 617 – 618, which enjoined that the University staff be given notice of his infarctions so that he can make representation to Council showing cause why he should not be terminated. That the failure to disclose the nature of the acts amounting to misconduct on the face of the invitation letter given to the claimant violates her right to fair hearing. In other words, if there is failure to disclose on the letter of invitation for the claimant to appear before the Investigative Panel, the claimant is entitled to be put on notice as to what she would be confronted with so that she will prepare adequately for her defence and not for her to be ambushed only upon getting to the sitting of the Panel. That this no doubt offends the provision of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, citing Garba & ors v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NSCC (Pt. 1) 245 at 249. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that the setting up of the panel, together with failure of the defendant to disclose the purpose of the claimant appearing before the panel, is null and void and of no effect.

 

  1. The claimant took questions (2) and (3) together. To the claimant, the concepts of ‘fair trial’ and ‘fair hearing’ are interchangeable. That the true test of fair hearing is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial whether from his observation, justice has been done in the case. Such a bystander would be guided by two universally recognized principles. First, were the two sides to the case heard so as to fulfill the principle of audi alterem partem? Secondly, was the judge personally interested in the issue before him, thus violating the principle of nemo judex in causa sua? That the right to fair hearing is a constitutional right enshrined in section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, which cannot be waived or statutorily taken away, citing Ezechukwu v. Onwoka [2006] 2 NWLR (Pt. 963) 151, NACB Ltd v. Obadiah [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt. 863) 326 and Awoniyi v. Registered Trustees of Rosicrucian Order, AMORC (Nigerian) [2000] 6 SC (Pt. I) 103. That the right to fair hearing or fair trial is guaranteed by the section 36 of the 1999 Constitution. It, therefore, implies that both sides to a dispute brought before a court of law must be seen to be given reasonable opportunity to present their respective cases; it is, therefore, fundamental that each side is entitled to know what case is being made against it and be given an opportunity to reply thereto with no surprises allowed to be sprung by either side on the other. That by a letter dated 6th June 2017 (Exhibit K), the defendant purportedly suspended the claimant as the Director of Sports with immediate effect. That the claimant was immediately denied access to her office and deprive of taking any documents or materials that may be vital and useful to her case. That in the said Exhibit K, the defendant held inter alia that “the new panel found you culpable of mismanagement of the Sport Centre”. That after “finding the Claimant culpable” and suspending the claimant with immediate effect, the panel on 15th June 2017 by a letter invited the claimant to its sitting on 20th June 2017 by 10.30am. That if the new panel found the claimant culpable of mismanagement of the Sport Centre, then of what purpose is the sitting of the new panel. That the claimant was denied access to her office which means if she intends to use any document from her office in her defence then she would not be able to do so. Furthermore, that the letter inviting the claimant did not inform her of the nature of the allegation against her, contrary to Garba & ors v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NSCC (Pt. I) 245 at 249 and Egwu v. Uniport [1995] 8 NWLR (Pt. 414) 419 at 440 – 441.

 

  1. To the claimant, in a judicial or quasi-judicial body, a hearing in order to be fair must include the right person be affected (i) to be present all through the proceedings and hear all the evidence against him; (ii) to cross-examine or otherwise contradict all witnesses that testify against him; (iii) to have read before him all the documents tendered in evidence at the hearing; (iv) to have disclosed to him the nature of all the relevant material evidence including documentary and real evidence; (v) to know the case he has to meet at the hearing and have adequate opportunity to prepare for his defence and (vi) to give evidence by himself, call witnesses if he likes and make oral submission either personally or through counsel of his choice, referring to JSC of Cross River State & anor v. Dr (Mrs) Asari Young [2013] 5 – 7 MJSC (Pt. II) 97 at 103, Baba v. NCATC [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388 and PHMB v. Edosa [2001] 5 NWLR (Pt. 707) 612.

 

  1. The claimant continued that in the letter of suspension dated 6th June 2017, the defendant stated that “management at its meeting held on Tuesday, June 6, 2017 considered the report of the Panel to Investigate Activities in the Sports Centre”. That the letter went further to state that “…the new panel found you culpable of mismanagement of the Sport Centre”. That the said report of the panel which found the claimant culpable was never shown to the claimant. That the panel shrouded its report in secrecy and yet same report was used to suspend the claimant. That the letter of invitation to the claimant by a panel set up by the defendant did not disclose the nature of allegation against her, the names of her accusers, the nature of evidence against her and did not give her adequate opportunity and materials to defend herself. That this is even more worrying considering the fact that the claimant was denied access to her office where she has materials that she could use in her defence. That the defendant has gone ahead to appoint one Dr Joseph Olayinka Awoyinfa as acting Director of Sports. That the said panel by the letter dated 6th June 2017 stated in very clear terms that the claimant has been found culpable, yet it is inviting the claimant to its sitting in other to investigate. That the question is what is the defendant investigating having already “found the claimant culpable?” That it is crystal clear that the requirements for fair hearing has not been met in respect of this matter. That the panel is nothing but a kangaroo panel which already has a predetermined mandate to dismiss the claimant even before its sitting began. That the sitting of the panel is a mere formally to carry out a witch hunt. That the right to fair hearing is guaranteed by section 36 of the 1999 Constitution to every citizen of Nigeria; and it cannot be waived, neither can its breach be acquiesced to. That the right is a fundamental and constitutional right of a party to a dispute to be afforded an opportunity to present his case to the adjudicating authority. That the right lies in the procedure followed in the determination of a case and not in the correctness of the decision arrived at in the case, referring to FBN v. TSA Industries Ltd [2010] “155 NWLR” (Pt. 1216) 247.

 

  1. The claimant went on that section 16 of the University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016 provides for the discipline of members of staff of the University and states that “i. Discipline of all Senior Staff shall be in accordance with Section 17 of the University of Lagos Act, 1967 (as amended)”. That the claimant is a Senior Staff and not only that, the Head of the Unit (Director of Sports). That section 16 of the Regulations Governing Service in the University of Lagos refers to section 17 of the University of Lagos Act. That a cursory look at the provisions section 17 of the University of Lagos Act, shows that the said section of the Law actually provides for the removal of Pro-Chancellor, Chairman of court of governors and certain members of council of court of governors. That the claimant in this suit does not fall among the persons listed in section 17 of the Act; as such one may be constrained to assume that the section which is most appropriate in this case is section 18 of the Act which provides for removal of academic and administrative officers and staff. That the claimant is a Senior Staff and it is the Council that is empowered to constitute a panel to investigate her. That the Vice-Chancellor does not have the powers to constitute a panel to investigate the claimant. That in the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor was the person who constituted the said panel. That this is in gross violation of the provisions of the University of Lagos Act. That the procedure, therefore, adopted by the defendant in investigating the claimant is faulty; as such whatsoever decision taken by the said panel is null and void and of no effect, citing Essien v. University of Calabar [1990] 3 NWLR (Pt. 140) 605 at 617 – 618, Mcfoy v. UAC [1961] AC 152 and Egwu v. Uniport (supra). It is thus the claimant’s submission that the procedure adopted in suspending her and her suspension by “Management” violates the provisions of section 36 of the 1999 Constitution 1999, section 17 of the University of Lagos Act Cap U9 LFN 2004 and section 16 of University of Lagos, The Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff, 2016. The claimant, therefore, prayed the Court to nullify the setting up of the administrative panel of the University of Lagos to investigate her and every decision taken by the said panel. The claimant in conclusion urged the Court to grant her application.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT

  1. To the defendant, the claimant is still in the employment of the defendant; and that the cause of action is her suspension by the defendant pending the final determination of investigation of various acts of misconduct and malpractices. That the claimant has not been suspended as a disciplinary measure for acts of misconduct. That investigation of her unit i.e. Sports Centre is still on going; and the defendant (sic) is yet to appear before the Senate Committee/panel for misconduct. That the defendant’s Governing Council has not even considered any report of Senate Panel which should be the platform for sanctioning the defendant’s employee for misconduct. Further, that it is also common ground that the claimant still lives in the University and she is still earning her monthly salaries. Further still, that it is not disputed that the defendant received various petitions with respect to the administration of the defendant’s Sports Centre which is headed by the claimant; for which two fact finding panels were set up by the defendant to investigate the various allegations. That on the strength of the petitions, the claimant was queried with respect to the allegations contained in various petitions. The claimant replied to some of the queries and appeared before some of the panels. That it is instructive that one of the panels indicted the claimant of financial malpractices. The report of the panel went before the defendant’s Governing Council. The claimant was reprimanded and requested to refund monies misappropriated by her. That the claimant did not contest the findings of the panel or the reprimand. That the defendant subsequently received petitions against the defendant (sic) and activities at the defendant’s Sports Centre under the defendant’s (sic) headship. Queries were again issued to the defendant (sic) and she was also invited to appear before various fact finding panels. That it is also common ground that in some cases the claimant outrightly refused to reply to the queries issued by the Registrar and also failed to appear before one of the panels. That one of the panels found that a prima facie case of misconduct was established against the claimant and there was need for further investigation of the activities of the Sports Centre under the claimant’s headship. Consequently, an Administrative panel was set up by the defendant. That the claimant wrongly believed that the Administrative panel is a kangaroo panel that has been set up purposely to find her guilty of misconduct and, therefore, recommend to Council that she should either be dismissed or removed from office as an employee of the defendant. That the claimant wrote a petition (Exhibit OO14) dated 22/6/2017 to the Chairman of the defendant’s Council and without awaiting a response hurriedly approached this Court on 23/6/2017 vide her originating summons.

 

  1. The defendant submitted three issues for determination, namely:
  • Whether the claimant who petitioned the defendant’s Council’s Chairman did not jump the gun by hurriedly commencing this suit without fully exploring her local/internal remedies i.e. awaiting the response to her petition dated 22/6/2017 addressed to the Chairman of defendant’s Governing Council.
  • Whether the claimant who is yet to be brought before the Senate panel on the instruction of the Governing Council is entitled to rely on the fair hearing provisions of section 36(1) with respect to proceedings of various investigating/fact finding panels and administrative panels set up by the d
  • Whether the claimant who still resides in the defendant’s quarters and who still earns salaries and allowances can claim immunity from being suspended from office pending the outcome of investigation of her activities as Director of defendant’s Sport Centre.

 

  1. On issue (1), the argument of the defendant is that this suit is hasty and premature. That it is common ground that the claimant was suspended by the defendant; and the claimant by Exhibit OO14 wrote a letter to the Pro Chancellor of the defendant, but rather than await the response of the Pro Chancellor, the claimant proceeded to file this suit. That the case of the claimant is similar to that of a student expelled by a University who has an option of appealing to the Council for a review of her case but rather hurriedly commences an action in Court challenging the decision of the University. That it is very trite as evidenced in a plethora of authorities, that the Court would not entertain a suit involving an establishment such as a University where the claimant has not exhausted all forms of internal remedy provided for by the said establishment, referring to: Magit v. University of Agric Makurdi [2005] 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 211 at 244, Unilorin v. Oluwadare [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 751 at 781, Akintemi v. Onwumechili [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 68 and Thorne v. University of London [1966] 2 QB 237. The defendant then submitted that the failure/refusal of the claimant to exhaust available internal remedies before commencing this suit renders the suit incompetent.

 

  1. The defendant treated issues (2) and (3) together. That the claimant has challenged the legality of her suspension from duties pending the outcome of investigation into the affairs of the Sports Centre headed by her. That it is obvious from the claimant’s processes that the suit was instituted on the wrong footing that the claimant’s suspension is a punitive measure for misconduct. That there is no doubt that claimant fails to appreciate the distinction between punitive suspension (after a final decision that an employee has misconducted himself/guilty of misconduct) and suspension during investigation. That there are separate procedures which are not interchangeable and should in no account be interchanged. That contrary to the claimant’s misconception, her suspension is not punitive; rather her suspension is designed to pave way for the hitch free investigation of the activities of the Sports Centre. The defendant then submitted that the claimant who is an employee of the defendant has no immunity from suspension from duties by the defendant pending on-going investigation by defendant’s panel set up to investigate the affairs of the Sports Centre. Furthermore, that the defendant has statutory power and common law rights to suspend the claimant from duty pending the outcome of the said investigations. That section 16 of the Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff 2016, empowers the defendant to suspend a staff against whom a prima facie case of misconduct has been established and it is necessary to further investigate the matter. Such suspension is pending the determination of the investigation. After the suspension, the matter is to be referred to the appropriate Committee, citing section 16(ii)(a) of the Regulations Governing the Condition of Service of Senior Staff 2016. That given this provision, it is evident that the claimant has been rightly suspended by the defendant pending investigation. That the claimant’s case has subsequently been referred to the appropriate administrative panel; if the panel confirms a prima facie case of misconduct against the claimant, the case proceeds to the next level of Senate Committee of the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 18 of the University of Lagos Act and thereafter to the level of the Governing Council for final decision.

 

  1. Continuing, the defendant submitted that it is trite law that an employer has a right to suspend its employee. That the provisions of the University of Lagos Act or the Staff Condition of Service do not prevent the defendant from suspending the claimant. That the under-listed cases also support its position that an employee such as the claimant has no immunity against suspension from duties pending investigations: University of Calabar v. Esiaga [1997] 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 739, Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 at 60, Amadiume v. Ibok [2006] 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 158 at 181, Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (PT. 1262) 624 at 649 and Ayewa v. University of Jos [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 142 at 144. And that where, as in this case, the employee is suspended pending further investigation such employee is forbidden from carrying out his duties and should not (except with the Vice-Chancellor’s permission) visit the place of work (office inclusive). That the decision to suspend is to be communicated to the employee in writing by the Registrar. That the management of the defendant is headed by the Vice-Chancellor who is the Chief Executive of the defendant, and the decision to suspend the claimant was conveyed to her by the Registrar of the defendant; as such, the claimant’s suspension is lawful and proper.

 

  1. To the defendant, the claimant’s submission on scope of misconduct is completely off point because at this stage which is pre-senate investigating committee stage, the claimant is not on trial. That the various panels which precede Senate Committee are fact finding panels; as such, the defendant acted perfectly within its powers when it suspended the claimant pending the outcome of investigations of the activities of the Sports Centre, which she heads. That after the claimant’s suspension an administrative panel was set up by the defendant to conduct further investigation; it is after the Administrative Panel establishes a prima facie case against the claimant that the defendant will proceed to the next stage. That if no case is made against her before the panel, then it will not be necessary to proceed to the next stage, which is the application of section 18 of the University of Lagos Act. In the alternative, that the definition of misconduct under Chapter 1 section 4(m) of the Constitution (sic) of service governing employment of defendant’s senior staff is wide enough to cover deliberate and negligent acts/omissions of employees as well as failure/neglect to appear or answer questions satisfactorily before the investigating panel. That the definition of misconduct under the conditions governing service of the defendant (Exhibit OO6) extends to “…Disobedience of any order issued by legally constituted authority of the university, unjustified failure to answer questions satisfactorily in any investigations before any person or body designated by the University or any of its constituent bodies for the purpose of investigating any matter provided for or arising out of those regulations”. That the claimant who is still an employee of the defendant has the abiding duty to answer queries given to her by the University’s Registrar and Secretary to the Governing Council. That it is an act of misconduct on the part of the claimant to either ignore the query given to her or fail/neglect to dignify the administrative panel that invited her to its inaugural meeting with her presence at the said meeting. That so long as the claimant remains in the defendant’s employment, she cannot claim immunity against appearance before the defendant’s administrative panel. That the claimant cannot use the machinery of the Court to avoid appearance before the administrative panel set up to investigate activities at the defendant’s Sports Centre which she heads. That the claimant has the abiding duty to appear before the panel and register any protest she has or request for further and better particulars of the issues being investigated in so far as they affect her.

 

  1. The defendant went on that section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution does not apply to the claimant, submitting that the claimant wrongly relied on the fair hearing provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution to argue that the fact finding panel/administrative panel is not in a position to remove the claimant from office and is also bound to observe the fair hearing provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. That section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution deals with the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations. That civil rights and obligations do not extend to investigative bodies such as the defendant’s investigating/administrative panel whose duty is essentially a fact finding panel. That by virtue of section 18(b)(ii) of the University of Lagos Act, the defendant’s Senate panel investigative committee is the body that is in a position to recommend that the claimant should either be removed from office or suspended from office for a definite period as a disciplinary measure. Therefore, the various fact finding/administrative panels set up by the defendant are not the type of adjudicatory bodies envisaged by section 36(1) of the Constitution that are bound to observe the principles of fair hearing, relying on Baba v. NCATC [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388 at 424, which shows that a fact finding panel or administrative panel which does not determine civil rights of a person is outside the scope of requirements of the fair hearing provisions in section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution and, therefore, not bound to observe fair hearing in the conduct of its proceedings. The defendant then submitted that the administrative panel is still a fact finding and non-adjudicatory panel, which is not empowered to find the claimant culpable. It has no power to sanction the claimant for any act of misconduct. That before the panel, activities of the Sports Centre are to be investigated. No one has been brought before the panel for trial for misconduct. That contrary to the claimant’s submission, it is not a panel that is bound to observe the fair hearing provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. In any event, that the law is trite that the principles of fair hearing would be satisfied where an employee is given the opportunity to be heard in the proceedings against her, relying on Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 at 648 and Baba v. NCATC [1991] 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388 at 418.

 

  1. To the defendant, the issue, therefore, is not about the vagueness of the phrase “activities of the Sports centre” as submitted on behalf of the claimant; rather, the issue is about investigating activities of the Sports Centre in general. That the administrative panel is not the disciplinary panel; it is the Senate panel which will be constituted if there is need to proceed against any staff based on the findings of the administrative panel that is bound to observe the fair hearing provision of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. That this is the reason why section 18(ii)(c) of defendant’s enabling Act provides that when the Governing Council refers a case of misconduct to the Senate Committee, the defendant shall make arrangements for the affected staff or his representatives to be afforded an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by the investigating committee with respect to the matter. The defendant accordingly urged the Court to hold that the fair hearing provisions of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution do not avail the claimant in the circumstance. That the administrative panel is an investigating panel; it is not an adjudicatory panel which determines rights of the parties. That contrary to the submission of the claimant, a suspended employee has no right of access to his/her office during suspension, save with the consent of the Vice-Chancellor of the defendant, referring to section 16(ii)(b) of the Regulations governing the conditions of service of the senior staff 2016, which provides that when an employee has been suspended, he/she shall thereupon be forbidden to carry on his duties and visit his place of work without express provision of the Vice-Chancellor. Incidentally, that this provision is an integral part of the terms and conditions of service of the claimant and consequently binding on her. That the claimant is, therefore, estopped from asserting that she has wrongly been disallowed access to her office. That the claimant is expected to seek permission for access to her office. That she has not taken the proper step in the right direction.

 

  1. The defendant continued that it concedes that the Governing Council is empowered to institute an investigating panel against her because she is a senior staff. However, that the panel set up by the Vice Chancellor is not the investigating panel provided for in section 18 of the defendant’s enabling Act. That all the panels are fact finding panels, the findings of which are expected to be placed before the Governing Council which will take informed decisions on whether to proceed to arrange for a Senate investigating panel. That this is the effect of the phrase “if it appears to the Council…” which appears at the beginning of section 18 of the University of Lagos Act. That the reports of the various fact finding/administrative panels will make it apparent to the Governing Council. That the defendant’s Vice-Chancellor, therefore, acted perfectly within the law when he set up various fact finding panels to investigate issues affecting the Sports Centre headed by the claimant and the various petitions written against the claimant. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to resolve all the issues against the claimant because: the claimant hurriedly instituted this suit without fully exploring local/internal remedies; the claimant has no immunity against being suspended during investigation; and the fact finding panels are outside the scope of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

THE CLAIMANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW

  1. In reacting on points of law, the claimant referred to section 6(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution in terms of the defendant’s issue (1), and then submitted that that there is a substantial issue to be tried in this suit. That it is a genuine complaint falling within the Court’s constitutionally vested judicial power under section 6(1)(6) of the 1999 Constitution “for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations” of the claimant’s employment, in which case the Court would be justified to grant this relief to save the situation. That the defendant’s contention that the claimant filed this suit without waiting to get a response to her letter from the Chairman of the defendant’s Governing Council, thereby jumping the gun does not hold water at all. That the claimant has a constitutionally guaranteed right of having an unfettered access to a court of law if she believes her rights have been breached, is being breached or about to be breached. That the fact that the claimant wrote a letter of complaint to the Chairman of the Governing Council does not in anyway stop her from instituting this action. Besides, that there is no place in the University of Lagos Act or the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff in the University of Lagos that it is provided that the claimant has to exhaust all internal measures before instituting an action in court to enforce or protect her right. The claimant then referred to Chief Mene Kenon v. Chief Albert Takam [2012] 7 QRR (Evidence Compendium) 279 – 282, which held that every citizen has the right of access to a court as well as the right of fair hearing. That the argument of the defendant with regard to this issue is misconceived and should by discountenanced by this Court.

 

  1. On the defendant’s issues (2) and (3), the claimant submitted that it is settled law that whether a trial or proceeding had been fair or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, citing Bill Construction Co. Ltd v. Imani & Sons Ltd/Shell Trustees Ltd [2006] NWLR (Pt. 1013) 1 at 12. That the defendant submitted that where the panel is an Administrative Panel, the rules of fair hearing as enshrined in section 36 of the Constitution need not be adhered to. That is not the position of the law, citing Adeyanju v. WAEC [2002] NWLR (Pt. 785) 479 CA at 500, which held that the rules of natural justice cannot be circumvented by an administrative body on the ground that it was not convenient to observe the tenet of the rule of law; and that rules cannot be abandoned in an administrative proceeding where guilt is determined and punishment meted on the lame ground that it is not convenient to follow the due process of law. It is thus the claimant’s submission that it is immaterial whether the panel is a fact finding panel, an administrative panel or an investigative panel, the due process of law and the rules of natural justice must be followed, urging the Court to resolve these issues in favour of the claimant. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to grant her application.

 

COURT’S DECISION

  1. I carefully considered the processes filed and the submissions of counsel. The key issue at hand is that the claimant is challenging her suspension by the defendant arguing that procedure/process adopted in suspending her is wrong and so praying amongst others that the suspension be set aside. The defendant in response to the claimant’s case raised what approximates to an objection to the suit itself when it argued that the claimant hurriedly instituted this suit without fully exploring local/internal remedies. The reaction of the claimant to this objection is that the defendant did not point to any provision of the law governing the defendant that stipulates that the claimant must exhaust local/internal remedies before coming to Court. In Dr (Mrs.) Mojisola Olubunmi Nkiko v. Federal University of Agriculture Abeokuta unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/385/2-13, the ruling of which was delivered on 2nd February 2015, the issue before the Court was whether there is an obligation on the part of the claimant to exhaust domestic remedy before coming to this Court. In raising this issue, the defendant cited Rule 5.12.1 of the University of Agriculture Abeokuta Senior Staff Rules and Regulations as the provision laying down the domestic remedy that the claimant is expected to exhaust before coming to this Court. The said rule provides as follows: “Without prejudice to the procedure for disciplinary action, any aggrieved member of staff who is disciplined or punished under the appropriate regulations shall have the right of appeal through the normal channel to Council. The ruling of Council on such appeal shall be final”. This Court found that this rule makes provision for domestic remedy, which the claimant MUST exhaust before she can come to this Court, relying on a number of authorities cited by the defendant therein including the additional concurring judgment of His Lordship Nweze, JCA (as he then was) in Gbenga Bodunde & anor v. Staff Cooperative Investment & Credit Society Ltd, OAUTH Complex & ors [2013] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1367) 197. The point here is that the defendant raising the argument of domestic remedies referred the Court to the rule providing for the domestic remedy in the defendant University. In the instant case, however, the defendant did not refer to any rule of the law or Regulations of the University of Lagos making the provision for domestic remedies to be exhausted before a staff can access the Court. The University of Lagos (the defendant) is an artificial entity; and the rule applicable to it is that all things are prohibited except those specifically allowed. This is in contradistinction to human beings for whom all things are permissible except those specifically prohibited. The cases cited by the defendant are cases decided based on their respective enabling laws. The issue at hand is one of suspension; and the law is quite clear that an employee can challenge in Court his/her suspension if he/she thinks it is unlawful. See Mrs. Abdulrahaman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board & anor [2013] 35 NLLR (Pt. 103) 40 NIC, ACB Ltd v. Ufondu [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 169 CA and Mr. Bisiriyu Adegoke Sheu v. Lagos NURTW (First BRT) Cooperative Society Limited [2015] 62 NLLR (Pt. 216) 40. I accordingly agree with the claimant that the argument of the defendant that the claimant hurriedly instituted this suit without fully exploring local/internal remedies is unsustainable. It fails and is hereby discountenanced.

 

  1. The claimant’s question (1) is whether the investigation of the activities at the University of Lagos Sports Centre constitutes misconduct as prescribed under section 18 of the University of Lagos Act 2004 and section 16 of the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff 2016 to warrant the constitution of an administrative panel by the defendant. The claimant’s argument is that investigation of the activities at the University of Lagos Sports Centre does not constitute misconduct as prescribed under section 17 of the University of Lagos Act 2004 and section 16 of the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Service of Senior Staff in the University of Lagos to warrant the constitution of an administrative panel by the defendant. This argument raises a critical question as to distinction between investigating a staff and investigating the activities of the department or unit where a staff is the head. Alternatively put, where an employer decides to investigate a department or unit, does it have the power to ask the head of the department or unit to go on suspension? In making the distinction between investigating the claimant as a staff and investigating the unit she heads, the claimant is arguing that in the latter sense, she cannot be asked to proceed on suspension. Is this argument defensible in law? The employer’s right to suspend a staff is a right that often inures in the interest of the organization or institution. See Mrs. Abdulrahaman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board & anor. It stands to reason that even if it is the activities of the Sports Centre that are being investigated, the employer reserves the right to ask the head of the Sports Centre to step aside and allow an unfettered investigation. In any event, Exhibit K dated 6th June 2017 (the letter of suspension) made it clear that the claimant had been warned in 2015 and instructed to guide against any further act of impropriety in the management of the Sports Centre, which warning and instruction she did not heed as a new panel found her culpable of mismanagement of the Sports Centre. She was then asked to proceed on suspension immediately to enable further investigation. From the content of Exhibit K, I find and hold that the activities of the Sports Centre are being investigated in the context of its mismanagement by the claimant. This is sufficient to ground the suspension of the claimant as has been done by the defendant. I accordingly answer the claimant’s question (1) in the affirmative.

 

  1. The claimant’s questions (2) and (3) question the procedure adopted in suspending her as well as the suspension itself by management, hinging the questions primarily on section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, arguing that it is immaterial whether the panel is a fact finding panel, an administrative panel or an investigative panel, the due process of law and the rules of natural justice must be followed. In proof of her case, therefore, the claimant relied on section 36 of the 1999 Constitution and Garba & ors v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NSCC (Pt. 1) 245 at 249. The reliance of the claimant on section 36 of the 1999 Constitution is evident in her submissions relating to question (1) she posed, as well as questions (2) and (3) as farmed. Since section 36 of the 1999 Constitution is critical, in fact the very basis of the questions/issues the claimant posed for determination in her originating summons as well as the supporting written address, it becomes pertinent whether the claimant’s case can stand on that score. This is the very basis of the defendant’s argument that the claimant has no immunity against being suspended during investigation; and the fact finding panels are outside the scope of section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

  1. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rev. Prof. Paul Emeka v. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & ors [2017] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1577) 410 suggests the fallacy/error of the claimant’s reliance on section 36 of the 1999 Constitution especially with the Court of Appeal decision in Adeyanju v. WAEC relied upon by the claimant. In Rev. Prof. Paul Emeka v. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & ors, the Supreme Court, relying on Bakare v. LSCSC [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt. 266) 641 at 699 – 700 and Ekunola v. CBN [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224 at 262 – 263, held that breach of a fundamental right under section 36(1) of the Constitution arises only where the denial of fair hearing has been charged against a Court or tribunal established by law and not before a domestic or standing ad-hoc tribunal raised departmentally by parties. In other words, there would be no case of infringement of the right to fair hearing under section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution when the decision alleged to have violated one’s constitutional right to fair hearing, is that of a non-judicial body. The Supreme Court then concluded by holding that while the appellant may contend that he has not been treated fairly by the respondents, since they or the Assemblies of God Church are not a Court or Tribunal established by law, his remedy does not lie under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). That the right to be a member of a particular church or the right to worship at a particular church or to be a minister of a particular church is not a right cognizable under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. A careful reading of Rev. Prof. Paul Emeka v. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & ors will reveal that the Supreme Court acknowledged that fair hearing comes in two forms: the constitutional form under section 36 of the 1999 Constitution; and the common law form in terms of the rules of natural justice as expressed in the Latin maxims – audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua. In Honourable Justice Bassey Tambu Ebuta v. National Judicial Council & 3 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/301/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 13th July 2017, I noted that “since Mr Yesufu Amuda Garba & ors v. University of Maiduguri [1986] LPELR-1305(SC); [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550; [1986] All NLR 149; [1986] 2 SC 128, fair hearing in the world of work has been successfully watered down to just opportunity to be heard”. The defendant’s administrative panel set up is not a Court or a tribunal established by law; as such, the applicability of section 36 of the 1999 Constitution does not even arise. The defendant cannot be accused of not complying with section 36 of the 1999 Constitution in the circumstances of the instant case and as the claimant has done in her submissions. I so find and hold.

 

  1. The claimant’s reliance on the enabling law of the defendant and the regulations governing the conditions of service of senior staff requires an excursion into the law relating to suspension generally. The law as to suspension was considered and summarized by this Court in Mr. Bisiriyu Adegoke Sheu v. Lagos NURTW (First BRT) Cooperative Society Limited (supra) in the following words:

It was the contention of the claimant that the letter of invitation to the disciplinary committee and the letter of indefinite suspension of the claimant by the defendant (both dated 6th March 2012) are null, void and of no legal effect whatsoever, having contravened section 36 of the 1999 Constitution and the rules of natural justice. The authorities are pretty clear that when it comes to suspension, the question of fair hearing and/or natural justice is immaterial. For instance, Longe v. FBN Plc (supra) held that the suspension of an employee when necessary cannot amount to a breach of the employee’s fundamental or common law rights. See also Ayewa v. University of Jos [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 142, Akinyanju v. University of Ilorin [2005] 7 NWLR (Pt. 923) 87 and Shell Pet. Dev. Co. v. Lawson Jack [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 249…

 

I indicated earlier that the yardstick for challenging a suspension is whether the suspension is necessary, reasonable, valid and hence lawful. In this respect, an exposition of the law as to suspension may not be out of place. The learned author, EM Rao, in the book, Industrial Jurisprudence: A Critical Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths: New Delhi, India), 2008 variously discussed the ambit of the law relating to suspension. For instance, the learned author first acknowledged the right of the employer to suspend; and then at page 116, relying on Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers’ Union [1995] I LLJ 544 (SC), the learned author asserts that in the regulation of an employment relationship, the power to suspend an employee is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between an employer and an employee. The Supreme Court in Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (supra) acknowledged this much too. Such a power can only be the creation of either a statute governing the contract or of an express term in the contract itself; and, in the absence of it, the employer would have no power to suspend an employee and, if he does, he will have to pay wages during the so-called period of suspension. To the learned author at page 178, relying on Khem Chand v. Union of India [1963] I LLJ 665 (SC), suspension either pending enquiry or as a punishment is not termination. See also Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (supra). That even though an order of suspension affects the employee injuriously, he continues to be in service. The learned author continues at pages 236 – 237 that there are two types of suspension: ‘suspension pending enquiry’ and ‘suspension as a punishment’. Suspension pending enquiry is not a punishment per se, for if the employee is not found guilty, the suspension has to be lifted and he has to be paid to full wages for the period, as if he was never suspended. On the other hand, suspension imposed on the establishment of guilt is in the nature of punishment; it can have adverse impact on the career prospects of the employee within the organization. The learned author then concludes the discourse that the power of suspension is not an unfettered power; the power has to be exercised sparingly, reasonably and on good grounds. The Nigerian case of Udemah v. Nig. Coal Corp. [1991] 3 NWLR (Pt. 180) 477 CA also acknowledged this state of the law holding that an employer has the right to suspend an employee for the purpose of investigation or disciplinary action. The case went on that in doing that, the employer must comply with any existing regulation governing such action.

 

This Court, in Mrs. Abdulrahaman Yetunde Mariam v. University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board & anor [2013] 35 NLLR (Pt. 103) 40 NIC, also had cause to review the law on suspension. This is what it said –

There is no gainsaying that an employer has the right to discipline an erring staff (and suspension is one such disciplinary measure – see University of Calabar v. Esiaga [1999] 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 719 at 739 – 740, Boston Sea Fishing Co. v. Ansell (1886-90) All ER 65 at 67, Lewis v. Heffer & Sons [1978] 3 All ER 254 and The Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd v. Lawson-Jack [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 249) in the interest of the organization or institution, although it may be otherwise if the contract of employment either expressly or impliedly rules out recourse to discipline by the employer. See NEPA v. Olagunju [2005] 3 NWLR (Pt. 913) 602. Indeed, as held in Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd v. Omu [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) 672, it is a disruption of an ordinary employer’s business to fetter him with an injunction not to discipline his servant. Here, the employer has the right to suspend an employee when necessary, with or without pay or at half pay. The English cases of Hanley v. Pease & Partners Ltd [1915] 1 KB 698 and Marshall v. Midland Electric [1945] 1 All ER 653, however, held that employers cannot suspend without pay where there is no express or contractual right to do so. The rationale is that in suspending an employee without pay, the employer has taken it up upon itself to assess its own damages for the employee’s misconduct at the sum which would be represented by the wages of the days the employee remains suspended.

 

……………………………..

 

What I gather from all these authorities is that the power to suspend and its ambit is a function of law and/or the terms and conditions of the contract of employment…

 

  1. Now, Exhibit K as has been pointed out is the letter suspending the claimant. It reads:

Management at its meeting held on Tuesday, June 6, 2017 considered the report of the Panel to Investigate Activities in the Sports Centre.

 

Recall that at the directive of Council in 2015 you were issued a warning and instructed that you should “guide against any further act on impropriety in the Management of Sorts Centre and to adhere strictly to with University Financial regulations and Control”.

 

Management noted with dismay that regardless of Council’s directive, the new panel found you culpable of mismanagement of the Sport Centre.

 

In view of the above and in line with the University Conditions of Service Chapter II Section 16, Management directed that you should be suspended from work with immediate effect while further investigation is being carried out.

 

During the period of investigation, you are requested to stay away from the office, albeit, you will be expected to avail yourself fro any meeting or part of investigation.

 

Please note that you will be duly informed of the outcome of the investigation.

 

  1. From this exhibit, it is incorrect for the claimant to argue that she has been found guilty by the defendant. The third paragraph of the exhibit has it that “Management noted with dismay that regardless of Council’s directive, the new panel found you culpable of mismanagement of the Sport Centre”. The communication here is as to the finding of the new panel. And by the fourth paragraph, the claimant was suspended with immediate effect “while further investigation is being carried out”. I note that by Exhibit L dated 15th June 2017, the claimant was invited to the meeting of the administrative panel and by Exhibit M dated 19th June 2017, the claimant turned down the invitation. This is wrong of the claimant. The argument of the claimant that it is only when an act of misconduct is of such a nature that can affect the smooth running of the University that an administrative panel can be set up to investigate such is patronizing. The claimant is accused of mismanaging the Sports Centre, and yet she is arguing that “only when an act of misconduct is of such a nature that can affect the smooth running of the University that an administrative panel can be set up to investigate such”. If it is established that the claimant actually mismanaged the Sports Centre, will that not amount to something that is affecting the smooth running of the University? I do not think that the claimant is serious here.

 

  1. The claimant complained that having suspended her, the defendant denied her access to her office. In reaction, the defendant argued that a suspended employee has no right of access to his/her office during suspension, save with the consent of the Vice-Chancellor of the defendant, referring to section 16(ii)(b) of the Regulations governing the conditions of service of the senior staff 2016, which provides that when an employee has been suspended, he/she shall thereupon be forbidden to carry on his duties and visit his place of work without express permission of the Vice-Chancellor. There is no evidence before the Court to indicate that the claimant wrote to be allowed access to her office and was denied the request. As it, therefore, the complaint of the claimant in that regard goes to no issue.

 

  1. I indicated earlier that the yardstick for challenging a suspension is whether the suspension is necessary, reasonable, valid and hence lawful. The claimant has not shown that her suspension was unnecessary, unreasonable, invalid and hence unlawful. The claimant’s plea for perpetual injunction against the defendant is equally patronizing. As held in Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd v. Omu [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) 672, it is a disruption of an ordinary employer’s business to fetter him with an injunction not to discipline his servant. As it is then, the claimant’s case must fail. It is accordingly dismissed.

 

  1. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.

 

 

 

……………………………………

Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD

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