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COMRADE NDUBUISI NGOZI & Anor VS. COMRADE NDUBUISI

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT OWERRI

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE O.O. AROWOSEGBE

 

DATE: THURSDAY 24TH MAY2018

 

SUIT NO. NICN/OW/65/2017

 

 

BETWEEN:

  1. COMRADE NDUBUISI NGOZI
  2. COMRADE HYGINUS OHAZURUIKE CLAIMANTS

 

 

 

AND

 

  1. COMRADE NDUBUISI UCHEHARA
  2. COMRADE HIPPO LOTUS NDUKWU
  3. COMRADE AGATHA EJIMMA
  4. COMRADE AYIAM FRANKLIN
  5. COMRADE KENNETH UZOWURU DEFENDANTS
  6. COMRADE STELLA N. C. IWUEZE
  7. COMRADE UBANI LAWRENCE
  8. COMRADE TONYE JAJA (JP)

 

 

APPEARANCES:

  1. B.C. IKWO FOR THE 1ST AND 2ND CLAIMANTS.
  2. M.OBINNA FOR THE 3RD AND 4TH CLAIMANTS.
  3. J.N. OPARA FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

This suit was commenced by way originating summons on 17/11/2017. The originating summons was accompanied with an affidavit of 14 paragraphs deposed to by one Comrade Chikwendu Ngozi and a written address.  The reliefs sought in the originating summons are as listed hereunder:

  1. A declaration that the tenure of the defendants has expired.
  2. A declaration that the tenure of the Claimants are still subsisting.
  3. A declaration that the defendants have no powers to conduct elections in any of the local branches at all or the 16 local branches of NULGE.
  4. An Order of perpetual inunction restraining the defendants from conducting any election in the 16 Local branches of NULGE or interfering in any manner with the rights, privileges, duties and functions of the Claimants. [sic]

 

The following questions were equally submitted for the determination of the originating summons:

  1. Whether upon the true constriction of Rules 11(1), 16(i) and 6(iii) of the constitution of the Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) the tenure of the state caretaker committee Imo State has not expired. [sic]
  2. Whether the state caretaker Committee of NULGE has the powers to dissolve any existing local branch of NULGE or the elected members at all and conduct elections save subject to the approval of the National Executive Council. [sic]

 

Against the above, the defendants filed a counter affidavit on the 11th December 2017 with an accompanying written address dated 11th December 2017.  In reaction to the counter affidavit of the defendants, the 1st and 2nd claimants filed a further affidavit on 14th February 2018. In support of this further affidavit was a written address dated 13th February 2018 and filed 14th February 2018. In addition, the 1st and 2nd claimants also filed a reply on points of law dated 13th February 2018 and filed 14th February 2018. On behalf of the 3rd and 4th claimants, a final written address dated 2nd May 2018 was filed on the same date. It is pertinent to note that the 3rd and 4th claimants were joined by an order of this Court on the 18th April 2018.

The above constitute the history of processes filed in the matter. On the 3rd May 2018, the substantive case came up for hearing. B.C. IKWO, of counsel to the 1st and 2nd claimants first drew attention of the Court to the fact that the Originating Summons was dated and filed 17th November 2017 accompanied with a 14-paragraph affidavit and 6 annexures. The learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd claimants relied on all the paragraphs of this affidavit and the 6 annexures. Thereafter, the learned IKWO drew attention of the Court to the fact that a written address dated 17th November 2017 and filed same day also accompanied the originating summons. Counsel thereafter adopted the written address as part of their arguments in the case.

Subsequently, J.N. OPARA, of counsel to the defendants drew attention of the Court to the fact that a counter affidavit of 17 paragraphs was filed on the 11th December 2017 against the originating summons with 6 exhibits attached. The learned counsel also drew attention of the Court to the fact that a written address dated 11th December 2017 and filed same date accompanied the counter affidavit. The learned counsel went on to adopt the written address as part of their arguments against the originating summons.

Thereafter, the learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd claimants: B.C. IKWO stated that, in reaction to the counter affidavit of the defendants, the 1st and 2nd claimants filed a further affidavit of 17 paragraphs on the 14th February 2018. Counsel indicated that this further affidavit was accompanied with 3 exhibits. Counsel also indicated that a written address dated 13th February 2018 and filed 14th February 2018 accompanied this further affidavit. The learned counsel thereafter adopted the written address as part of their arguments in the case. Further more, counsel drew attention of the Court to the fact that the 1st and 2nd claimants also filed a reply on points of law dated 13th February 2018 and filed 14th February 2018. Counsel also adopted this as part of their argument in the case. Thereafter, the learned IKWO on behalf of M. OBINNA, of counsel to the 3rd and 4th claimants, drew attention of the Court to the fact that the 3rd and 4th claimants filed a written address dated and filed on the 2nd May 2018 and adopted same as the argument of M.OBINNA for the 3rd and 4th defendants in the case.

Thereafter, the Court adjourned the case to 24th May 2018 for judgment. Having carefully narrated the story of adoption of processes filed by counsel, the next duty placed on me is to go ahead to summarise the cases of the parties as borne out in their written addresses. In doing this, I shall take the addresses seriatim.

 

CASES OF THE PARTIES

 

  1. Case of the Claimants

 

In the written address for the 1st and 2nd claimants, settled by B.C. IKWO, a lone issue was stated for the determination of the case, to wit: “Whether the claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought”. Arguing this lone issue, the learned counsel submitted that, actionscould be commenced by originating summons, where the issues submitted are strictly that of construction of documents and; there is no likelihood of substantial dispute of facts. Counsel stated that in the affidavit in support of the originating summons, it was deposed that the tenure of Imo State Caretaker Committee having expired, the defendants have no powers to conduct elections in any of the local branches at all or the 16 local branches of NULGE.Counsel submitted that this being an undisputed fact, the action was therefore properly brought via originating summons. Counsel urged the Court to so hold.

Counsel argued further that the action being properly commenced in the circumstances of the facts of the suit, the claimants are therefore entitled to the reliefs sought, as they fall within the equitable jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, counsel ended the written address. I move to the address filed by the counsel to the defendants.

 

  1. Case of the Defendants

 

In the written address settled by J.N. OPARA, of counsel to the defendants, a lone issue was equally formulated, to wit: “whether the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought”. [sic] In arguing this lone issue, the learned J.N. OPARA, submitted that the outlined provisions of the NULGE Constitution, which the claimants submitted for interpretation are so clear that they need no interpretation.  Counsel submitted further that members of the NULGE, an incorporated body, chose voluntarily to belong to the union and abide by its Constitution of either 2005 or 2016 as altered. Counsel reiterated that paragraphs 5-16 of defendants’ counter affidavit are germane in that, they related that the claimants erred as local branch executives during their tenure and during the conduct of the claimants’ cancelled elections of 2016.

Counsel, relying on paragraphs 14 and 15of their counter affidavit, stated that the claimants herein are unrepentant unlike their counterparts in Orsu L.G.A. Branch. Counsel argued that Rule 11(i) of the NULGE Constitution 2016 gives the NEC the power to establish and dissolve a State Chapter of NULGE, and to suspend any State executive and appoint a caretaker committee in its stead, if, in its opinion, the local branch executives or the SEC has seriously violated the provisions of the union’s constitution. Counsel submitted that by committing electoral malpractices as evident in the committee’s report exhibited with the counter affidavit, the claimants seriously violated the provisions of the NULGE Constitution.

Counsel submitted further that Rule 16(i)(i) [the constitution not stated] is basically inapplicable but that it is sufficient to state that during the tenure of the claimants, the claimants enjoyed all rights, privileges and allowances. Counsel also submitted that Rule 6(iii) as referred is inapplicable and that the NEC, by virtue of the NULGE Constitution 2016, has exclusive power to appoint or direct the appointment of a caretaker committee, for a specified period, to take charge of the affairs of SEC in any State and extend the period as occasion demandsor, direct the appointment/dissolution of any local branch executive. Counsel argued that, at al times material to this action, NEC, in writing, gave the defendants approval to do all the acts stated in exhibits A and B of the counter affidavit as shown in paragraphs 8-13 of the counter affidavit.

Counsel submitted that an indicted officer, such as the claimants herein, who are indicted in exhibit B1 produced by the committee of 4th October 2016, cannot make certain claims, such as the 4 reliefs claimed in this action. Subsequently, counsel urged the Court to decline the reliefs claimed by the claimants and dismiss the case with substantial cost.

I now move to second address titled “Written Address of Counsel”dated 13th February 2018 and filed along with the further affidavit on 14th February 2018 and filed by counsel to the 1st and 2nd claimants. Let me observe first that,I do not know where to place this second address. This address has no place under the rules of this Court and neither do law and practice know it. I have observed the strange occurrence of not addressing the merits of the originating summons in the so-called written address filed in its support on 17th November 2017 by not discussing the questions submitted for interpretation of the Court at all.

I think this second address is meant to fill the obviously strange gap created by the counsel to the 1st and 2nd claimants who went discussing only the proper commencement of the suit via originating summons and left the substantive questions for determination unattended to, whereas, no objection was raised on bringing the suit by way of originating summons. It is clear that counsel did not know what to do with the written address in support of originating summons and did not do it. It is too late in the day to do that by subterfuge. Even though, the counsel on the other side did not raise objection to this approach, I have a duty to put an end to an obviously irregular, unlawful and wrongful process.

Order 17, Rule 11 of the NICN Rules 2017 makes provision for the filing of Further and Better Affidavit, and in doing this, it only provides for filing a reply on points of law to accompany the Further and Better Affidavit. The claimants herein have filed a reply on points of law permitted by law and in addition, decided to play smart by filing another address in support of the Further Affidavit. This second written address titled “Written Address of Counsel” is unknown to law and practice and therefore irregular. Besides, no leave of Court was obtained to file it. Relying on P.W. Resources Ltd. & Anor. v. James Kporah & Anor. (2010) LPELR-4825 (CA) 21-22, paras. F-B; andparticularly, Chief Michael Chiedu v. Joseph Uti & Ors. (2012) LPELR-14391 (CA) 8, paras. D-E, where the Court of Appeal held that – “a court process which is filed but not known to law is nulland void ab initio. If the court process results in a judgment, ruling or orders, the judgment ruling or order, is also null ab initio…”-I hold that, the second written address titled “Written Address of Counsel”, dated 13th February 2018 and filed 14th February 2018 is null and void. And for these reasons, I shall not take cognizance of it.

Having settled with the issue of the second written address, I shall now move to the reply on points of law.

 

  1. Reply on Points of Law by the Claimants

 

In summarizing the reply on points of law, let me sound a warning: I shall not bother myself with irrelevancies. I shall confine myself to reply on points of law stricto sensu. Relying on Davandy Finance and Security Limited & Ors. v. Elder Emmanuel Mba Aki & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24495 (CA) 18, paras. A-C, I shall ignore the issues formulated for the reply on points of law as part of the irrelevancies. Counsel argued that facts admitted are no longer in issue between parties and that the parties are agreed that the defendants, upon constituting themselves as the Imo State Caretaker Committee of NULGE, cancelled the election that ushered in the claimants, which election was conducted before the appointment of the defendants as Caretaker members. Counsel also submitted that the defendants admitted that they, in paragraph 11 of their counter affidavit, published a notification of NULGE Local Branch elections slated for 20th and 21st November 2017 after the commencement of this suit challenging the powers of the defendants to dissolve any existing local branch and conduct elections without the approval of the NEC. Counsel submitted that,the said paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit of the defendants did not indicate that any approval was secured from the NEC to dissolve local branches and conduct elections thereto in accordance with Rule 6(1)(i) of the NULGE Constitution.

Counsel submitted that the exhibits attached to the counter affidavit are inconsistent with the body and as such, the counter affidavit should be discountenanced. Counsel cited Ekereugba Fiberisima (Rtd.) 3 NWLR (Pt. 335) 707 at 73 to the effect that a party cannot approbate and reprobate.Counsel submitted that Exhibit A, being touted in paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the counter affidavit, as the approval letter to dissolve the local branch and conduct election, is clear on its face that, it was the letter constituting the caretaker committee saddled with the responsibility of looking into the problems of the SEC and not an approval letter. Counsel also submitted that Exhibit B, introduced by paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, is concocted for the purpose of this suit and even self-contradictory as the tenure of the defendants could only be extended after three months as provided by Rule 6(1)(i) of the NULGE Constitution 2016 and not after eleven months; and that, as such, the Court should not act upon it.

 

  1. Case of the 3rd and 4th Claimants

 

The 3rd and 4th claimants filed another written address dated 2nd May 2018 and filed 3rd May 2018. What is the status of this third written address filed by the joint claimants in this action? Do the claimants have a right to file two sets of written addresses? This question is answered by the Supreme Court inFadayomi v. Sadipe & Ors. (1986) LPELR-1223 (SC)10, paras. C-G; and16-17, paras. G-E,respectively in the following words:

“A person may not be joined as a plaintiff without his consent. There must be no conflict between plaintiffs, they must not sever or take inconsistent steps, nor can one co-plaintiff make an application in the action independently of the other. Co-plaintiffs must act and appear at the trial by the same counsel and if separately employed by the co-plaintiffs, must act together. But once a person has been in an action as co-plaintiffs, he has no absolute right to withdraw from the action and have his name struck out if he is a necessary party to the action. In a proper case he may apply to have his name struck out as a plaintiff and added as a defendant, subject to the defendant being safeguarded as to costs. [10, paras. C-G]

‘The general principle is well settled that a person cannot be made a plaintiff in an action without his consent. But this general principle is subject to the principle to prevent multiplicity of actions. Hence where persons have the same interest in an action, they could join as plaintiffs. This joinder is more commonly granted where common question of law and fact would arise from injury arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions, whether jointly, several or in the alternative… It can also be granted where common questions of law and fact would arise from actions in respect of each of the parties where brought separately… It is therefore important that there should be no conflicts between co-plaintiffs in their prosecution of the action. Where co-plaintiffs are represented by different counsel, such counsel must act together. Once a person has been joined properly as a co-plaintiff to an action, he has no absolute right to withdraw from the action and be struck out, if he is a necessary party.” [16-17, paras. G-E]

 

These are the exact excerpts relied on in granting the joinder. So, the two counsel to the claimants were aware of the precepts set therein beforehand. They just decided to do things their own ways and must have the natural result that follows. The 3rd and 4th claimants styled their written address as “Final Written Address by 2nd Set of Claimant’s [sic] Counsel”. From the title of the address, it is clear that the so-called 2nd set of claimants were acting independently of the 1st and 2ndclaimants, forgetting that by the order of joinder, they became an indissoluble part of the original claimants together with all processes filed by the original claimants. And this fact was made abundantly clear in the ruling granting the joinder. I think it does not matter that this third written address by the joint claimants, was not opposed by the counsel on the other side and that it was adopted by the counsel to the 1st and 2nd claimants on behalf of the counsel to the 3rd and 4th. To my mind, I have the firm conviction that this third address by the joint claimants was an abuse of court’s process, possibly still trying to steal a match to fill in the strange gap created in not doing the proper thing in the original written address filed in support of the originating summons.

Apart from being an abuse of the court’s process, it is very clear that the written address goes against the rules enunciated by the Supreme Court inFadayomi v. Sadipe & Ors [supra]. From the underlined portions of the quotations from this authority, it is very clear that co-claimants must file joint written address. That is the essence of forbidden anyone of them from severing court processes or filing any process independent of the others; and still,why all of the co-claimantsare commanded to act together, even though, represented by different counsel. Flowing from the above reasoning, it is clear that the third written address filed by the 3rd and 4th claimants separately and independently of the other co-claimants is irregular and unlawful. If the 3rd and 4th claimants had intended to repair any damage observed in the original written address, what ought to have been done was for the joint claimants counsel to seek the leave of the Court to file another joint written address incorporating the contributions of the 3rd and 4th claimants’ counsel to replace the initial one. This was not done. Once this was not done, the original written address in support of the originating summons becomes the joint written address of both the original claimants and the additional twoco-claimants joined by the Court’s order.

To compound the problem, no leave of Court was also obtained to file this obviously irregular third written address by the joint claimants – see Aprofim Engineering Construction Nigeria Ltd v. Jacques Bigouret & Anor (2010) LPELR-3796 (CA) 4, paras. A-D.In all, this written address filed by the 3rd and 4th claimants in this case, which is the third written address filed by the 4 joint claimants, is not known to law and practice and therefore amounts to abuse of the Court’s process and liable to be dismissed – Chevron Nigeria Limited v. Napoleon A.O.A. Aguma & Ors. (2005) LPELR-12472 (CA) 22, paras. D-G. And,it is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s authority on how processes are to be filed by co-claimants. Relying onChief Michael Chiedu v. Joseph Uti & Ors. (2012) LPELR-14391 (CA) 8, paras. D-E [supra], and Chevron Nigeria Limited v. Napoleon A.O.A. Aguma & Ors. [supra].I hereby declare this written address a nullity and decline to take cognizance of it.

That is all about the third written address. The reply on points of law therefore remains the last address in the series. I shall now move on to the resolution of the case. In doing this, I take cognizance of the law that whether or not there is address from counsel, the Court is still duty bound to make its research to discover the truth in accordance with law.This, I am duty bound to do in spite of the obvious deficiency of the address of the claimants. In discovering the truth in this case, the affidavits filed by the parties, which constitute evidence of parties are the abode where the truth is to be deciphered.And I must not forget that this must be in accordance with the law.

 

DECISION OF THE COURT

 

In resolving the dispute here, I will depart from the issues formulated by the parties and formulate these issues, which, in my own opinion, accurately capture the picture as painted by the facts of the case, to wit:

  1. Whether the Court can construe the provisions of NULGE Constitution 2016, which is not placed before it?
  2. If answer to issue 1 is in the affirmative, whether,by a proper construction of the provisions of Rules 11(1), 16(1)(i) & 6(iii) of the NULGE Constitution 2016, the acts of defendants in issue are intra-vires?And,
  3. If the answer to issue 2 is in the negative, whether the claimants are entitled to the reliefs claimed?

 

ISSUE 1:

Whether the Court can construe the provisions of NULGE Constitution 2016, which is not placed before it?

 

In taking issue 1, I wish to state at the outset that the salient facts of the case are not in dispute. In fact, counsel to the defendants in his written address justified the acts in question by saying the claimants had not been recalled because they were unrepentant, unlike their counter-parts in other LGAs who were recalled because they showed remorse. Parties are also inferentially of consensus id idem with regard to the fact that it is the NULGE Constitution 2016 that applies to thesuit because both sides relied on it.The area of disagreement is really in the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the NULGE Constitution 2016. While the claimants are saying the defendants acted ultra vires the relevant provisions of the NULGE Constitution 2016, the defendants are of the view that they acted intra vires these provisions.In fact, that is why no issue has been made of the propriety of commencing the suit with originating summons. So, the main thing is to examine these provisions and determine which view is right in consonance with thetenor and intendments of the NUGE Constitution 2016.

For the Court to examine these provisions and determine which view is right and in consonance with the tenor or intendment of the NULGE Constitution 2016, then, the document, that is, the NULGE Constitution 2016,must be placed before the Court. But strangely again, as this suit has turned out to be, counsel to the two sets of claimants did not deemit fit to exhibit the NULGE Constitution 2016 with any of affidavits filed and neither did the counsel to the defendantsexhibit same in their affidavits. I mean, the NULGE Constitution 2016 is not tendered with all the affidavits and counter affidavits in the case file or even irregularly with any of the processes within the file. It must be realized that the NULGE Constitution 2016 is a contract between the parties, even though, with some statutory flavours by virtue of section29(1) of the Trade Unions Act, CAP. T14, LFN 2004, as held by this Court in Suit No. NICN/OW/66/2017-Richard Eze & Ors. v. Ibrahim Khaleel & Ors (Unreported decision of Owerri Division on 30/04/18) pp. 23-24.

Not withstanding the statutory flavour,the NULGE Constitution 2016, is nevertheless still a contract between members of the union and, is as such, not one of the acts of government or facts which the Court is obliged to take judicial notice of, meaning that, it must be produced before the Court for the Court to take cognizance of it and thereby be able to construe its provisions. Contracts are agreements between parties on the rules of engagement between them, so, when disagreements ensue on these rules, as in the instant case, for the Court to do justice, the documents containing the contracts, or rather, the rules of engagement, must be placed before the Court before it can assume jurisdiction to construe the terms or rules of engagement in dispute. Hence, NULGE Constitution 2016 must be placed before this Court before it can assume jurisdiction to construe its provisions in dispute – see Wassah & Ors. v. Kara & Ors. (2014) LPELR-24212 (SC) 43, paras. B-E.

Even if the contrary were the case, the Court still retains its discretion to insist on the production of the document in issue before it could take judicial notice of it. The document is obviously not one of the documents, which the Court can search out by itself or obliged by law to fish outby itself– see Global Soap & Detergent Ind. Ltd. v. NAFDAC (2011) LPELR-4202 (CA) 30-31, paras. F-A. It should be noted that nobody has even invited the Court to take judicial notice of anything in this case. It should also be noted that in interpreting contracts or in construing the provisions of instruments and statutes, it is not the particular provisions submitted for interpretation that a court construes in isolation, a court construes the particular provisions submitted along with all other provisions of the instrument in question to arrive at the true meaning of the provisions submitted for its consideration. Let me state that the provisions in dispute have not even been reproduced verbatim. A court does composite interpretation. It is for this additional reason that the whole of such instrument or contract must be submitted before the Court can assume jurisdiction to interpret the provisions in issue – seeEmuwa v. Consolidated Discounts Ltd. (2000) LPELR-6871 (CA) 7-8, paras. G-B, where the Court of Appeal held:

“In interpreting a document, due regard must be given to the entire document so as to find the correct meaning of the words in relation to the agreement.”

 

In consonance with the foregoing, Order 3, Rule 17 – (1)(b) of the NICN Rules 2017 mandates a party bringing an action by way of originating summons to accompany the originating summons with copies of the instruments and other related documents (except statutes) sought to be construed with the relevant parts clearly indicated. So, the procedure adopted by the claimants in not exhibiting the NULGE Constitution 2016, an instrument sought to be construed, is clearly irregular and goes to the root of their case. This is because, a court of law cannot pronounce on the provisions of a document, instrument or contract not placed before it: to do so would amount to engaging in speculation, which a court of law is forbidden from doing – see Omenka Mathew Ode & Ors. v. Attorney General of Benue State & Ors. (2011) LPELR-4774 (CA) 54-55, paras. A-B. The Court of Appeal in Aremu v. Chukwu (2011) LPELR-3862 (CA) 43, paras. D-E held, and I quote: “It is trite that for a trial court to allow itself to be guided by a documentary evidence, that document in issue must be properly placed before it.” See also Omale v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi & Ors. (2011) LPELR-4366(CA) 28, paras. C-D, where the Court of Appeal held that: “A party who relies on a document in proof of his claim must tender the document as extrinsic evidence of its contents is not admissible in evidence”. What is more, in a case where the rule provides that judgment of the court must be exhibited to obtain order nisi, and in its stead, an enrolled order of the judgment was exhibited, the Court of Appeal held in Shittu v. Kwara State Polytechnic, Ilorin & Ors (2014) LPELR – 23820 (CA) 26, paras. D-F that:

“In the final analysis and for what I had said above the enrolled orders – Exhibits A and B attached to the motion ex-parte did not satisfy the requirement that the judgment sought to be enforced must be placed before the Court and as such the material necessary to assist the trial Court in arriving at its decision in the exercise of its discretion to make the Order nisi was not placed before it. This accordingly robbed the Court of the jurisdiction to make the Order nisi in the first place.”

 

The above is a good example of a case where the Court held that a document that could be judicially noticed [judgment of court] must still be produced before the court could act on it. The instant case is one in which the material in issue was not placed before the Court at all by any of the parties, and the material in issue is likewise not one of which the Court is to obliged to take judicial notice. Thus, the situation of the instant case is worse than the one dealt with by the Court of Appeal above where enrolled orders of the judgment were exhibited. It simply follows that since the NULGE Constitution 2016 is not before me, I am not in a position to speculate as to which of the conflicting interpretations is correct or what the correct interpretation is. I am not enabled to effectively perform my duty of interpretation of the provisions of the NULGE Constitution 2016,which are supposedly submitted for the interpretationof the Court.

It follows that the claimants have not placed the very vital and most important material before the Court to assist the Court to determine the propriety or otherwise of their suit. It must also be noted that this suit has, as its main reliefs, declarative reliefs, on which the claimants must succeed on the strength of their case and not on the weakness of the defendants’ case – see Ihekoronye v. Hart & Anor (2000) LPELR-6032 (CA) 22, paras. A-C.As it is now, it is not even necessary to examine the defendants’ defence. The failure to place before the Court the necessary document to decide the case is an issue that touches the jurisdiction of the Court and ought to be raised and decided by the Court suo motu – see Shittu v. Kwara State Polytechnic, Ilorin & Ors [supra] 27-28, paras. F-A; and Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) LPELR-20184 (SC) 38, paras. A-C. In effect, the jurisdiction of this Court to construe the provisions of the NULGE Constitution 2016, which is not placed before it, is negatively affected. The Court thus lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

Besides, it has always being the law and practice that it is the duty of a claimant to adduce necessary documentary evidence that would anchor his case, failing, which the Court does not need to call attention of the claimant to such omission before dismissing the suit for lack of necessary evidence. It simply means there is failure to discharge the burden of proof devolved on the claimant. I therefore hold that the Court, lacking jurisdiction to speculate, cannot construe or interpret the provisions of the NULGE Constitution 2016, which is not placed before it. Issue 1 is therefore resolved against the claimants. Arising from the aforesaid, there is no need to examine issues 2 and 3, which are corollaries to a positive answer to issue 1.Issue 1, having been answered in the negative, issues 2 and 3become axiomatically otiose. The case of the claimants therefore fails, and is consequently dismissed in its entirety.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

…………………………..

HON. JUSTICE O.O. AROWOSEGBE

Presiding JUDGE

OWERRI DIVISION

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURTOF NIGERIA

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