UCHE v. FRN
(2020)LCN/15653(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, June 29, 2020
CA/L/417CA/2018
Before Our Lordships:
Joseph ShagbaorIkyeghJustice of the Court of Appeal
Ugochukwu Anthony OgakwuJustice of the Court of Appeal
Ebiowei TobiJustice of the Court of Appeal
Between
OBIEKWE FRANK UCHE APPELANT(S)
And
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
THE EXPLANATION AND INTREPRETATION OF CHARGES BEFORE TAKING A PLEA
It was opined that in order to comply with the stipulations of the law and properly arraign the Appellant, the lower Court had the obligation to call on the Registrar or other officer of the Court to read and explain the Charge to the Appellant in the language he understands. It was stated that there was nothing on record showing that this was done or that there was an interpreter who interpreted the Charge. The cases of EREKANURE vs. THE STATE (1993) 5 NWLR (PT. 294) 385 at 393 and KAJUBO vs. THE STATE (supra) at 737 were called in aid. It was asserted that there is nothing on the record showing thatthe Charge was read and/or explained to the Appellant before he pleaded to the same, which is fatal to the plea of guilty. This Court was urged not to speculate that the Appellant’s plea of guilty was because the Charge was read to him since the Court can only look at the Record of Appeal in order to decipher what took place and act only on the evidence before it and act only on the evidence before it. The case of SAMBO vs. THE STATE (1993) 6 NWLR (PT 300) 390 at 418 was referred to. UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
THE ESSENCE OF ARRAIGNMENT IS ABOUT TAKING PLEA OF A DEFENDANT.
Now, an arraignment is about taking the plea of a defendant in a criminal trial. The procedure provides the defendant the opportunity of giving his formal response of guilty, not guilty, or, still, no contest to the Charge. Arraignment is one of the fundamental requirements of a valid trial. Given its fundamental nature, objection to the plea for being in contravention of the constitutional and procedural requirements on arraignment, though more appropriately taken before trial, may be raised even on appeal, as in the instant case. Whenever the arraignment is defective, an Appellate Court will intervene as the defect renders the entire proceedings a nullity. See KAJUBO vs. THE STATE (supra), EYOROKOROMO vs. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 3, MOHAMMED vs. FRN (supra), and FRN vs. ABUBAKAR (2019) LPELR (46533) 1 at 7-8.The arraignment and taking the plea of a defendant in a criminal trial is the commencement of the trial. It is at that stage that the defendant appears in Court, the Charge is read and explained to him and to his understanding and he makes his plea thereto. It is a very fundamental aspect of a criminal trial and underscores the need for strict and mandatory compliance with the requirements in respect thereof. Any criminal trial, no matter how wellconducted without the plea of the defendant having been properly taken is a nullity: SANMABO vs. THE STATE (supra), ALAKE vs. THE STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (PT 205) 567 and EDIBO vs. THE STATE (2007) LPELR (1912) 1 at 15. UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
THE RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE APPROACH IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW
In OKO vs. THE STATE (2017) LPELR (42267) 1 at 48-49, Peter-Odili, JSC stated:
“What the appellant is seeking is a rigid and inflexible approach in the application of the law before full compliance would be said to have been carried out. That is neither the intendment of the legislature nor within the spirit of the law itself which in my view and in keeping with interpretations already made thereto is that a substantial compliance showing that what is expected has been done is all the law ask of the Court of trial. … UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AND THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IN EFFECT
A narrow and strict interpretation of the provisions and application… would not serve the interest of justice but would defeat the course of justice. There is no need to put down the minute details of what took place at the plea taking, such as the language of explanation and who made the explanation and the issue of satisfaction of the judge that accused was explained to and he understood. It is sufficient that substantial compliance was in effect.”
See also EDUN vs. IGP (1966) 1 ALL NLR 17, PETER vs. THE STATE (supra) and ALADU vs. THE STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (PT. 563) 618. UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
THE QUESTION AS TO FAIR HEARING AND BURDEN OF PROOF
It is based on the foregoing provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, that the question of whether there was a fair hearing or fair trial can be interrogated. The Appellant having been properly arraigned, and he pleaded guilty, the pertinent question would be whether the proceedings leading up to his conviction and sentence were in line with the stipulations of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, in which case there cannot be any question as to whether there was a fair hearing or fair trial. Let me hasten to state that the Appellant’s submission that the Prosecution Counsel was both counsel and witness in the matter cannot be correct. The role played remained that of counsel since by Section 274 (1) (b) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, the Court upon a plea of guilty shall invite the prosecution to state the facts of the case. The learned counsel stating the facts of the case and tendering documents in support of the facts cannot be equiparated to being a witness in the matter since the effect ofthe Appellant having pleaded guilty is that it obviated the need for a formal hearing:OMOJU vs. FRN (2008) LPELR (2647) 1 at 19, DONGTOE vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PLATEAU STATE (2001) LPELR (959) 1 at 37-38, MOHAMMED vs. FRN (2013) LPELR (21384) 1 at The law is elementary that if anaccused person pleads guilty, the burden of proof placed on the prosecution becomes light, like the feather of an ostrich. It no longer remains the superlative compelling burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the guilty plea has considerably shortened the distance and brought in some proximity the offence and the mens rea or actus reus of the accused as the case may be. That makes it easier to locate causation or causa sine qua non.” UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
APPELANT PLEA OF GUILTY IS AS GOOD AS JUDICIAL CONFESSION
In consideration of issue number one, after setting out the“It is evident from the record of appeal that the charge was read and fully explained to the appellant … and he pleaded guilty to same. The further fact that the appellant was represented by counsel at the trial Court, the propriety of the affirmation of which decision by the lower Court is being agitated in this appeal, the chance for success of the appeal is further lessened. … Appellant’s plea of guilty is as good as judicial confession, his valid admission of the commission of the two offences in the charge… It must be restated that appellant was represented by counsel at trial, who this Court insists, is duty bound to raise all objections in the conduct of trial belatedly being presently sought to be addressed. The appellant, whose counsel failed earlier to raise these concerns is stopped from doing so now …”
So be it. I kowtow. See also SHARFAL vs. THE STATE (1992) LPELR (3038) 1, TORRI vs. THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE OF NIGERIA (2011) LPELR (8142) 1, MOHAMMED vs. THE STATE (1991) 5 NWLR (PT. 192) 438, AKPAN vs. THE STATE (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 1106) 72 and ALO vs. THE STATE (2015) LPELR UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant was arraigned with one other person before the Federal High Court, Lagos Division in CHARGE NO. FHC/L/325C/2017: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA vs. OBIEKWE FRANK UCHE & ANOR. They were charged on two counts of conspiracy to deal in cocaine and conspiracy with intent to export cocaine. Upon their arraignment, they pleaded guilty to the Charge and after a review of the facts, the lower Court convicted and sentenced them to three years and four years imprisonment respectively on each of the two counts. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively.
The Appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court which was delivered on 30th November, 2017. The Appellant filed two Notices of Appeal on 20th February, 2018 and 27th February, 2018 respectively. The Appellant further filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on 8th May, 2018 but deemed as properly filed on 25th October, 2018. However, the Notice of Appeal on which the appeal was argued is the Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 22nd January, 2019 and deemed as properly filed on 24th January, 2019.
The Records of Appeal were compiled and transmitted and briefs of argument were filed and exchanged by the parties. The extant Appellant’s brief is the Amended Appellant’s Brief filed on 22nd January, 2019, but deemed as properly filed on 24th January, 2019. The Appellant also filed a Reply Brief on 17th January, 2020, but deemed as properly filed on 28th May, 2020. The Respondent’s Brief was filed on 20th September, 2019, although deemed as properly filed on 28th May, 2020. At the hearing of the appeal, learned counsel for the parties urged the Court to uphold their respective submissions in the determination of the appeal.
The Appellant distilled two issues for determination, which issues were adopted by the Respondent. The said issues are:
“1. Whether or not the learned trial Court complied with the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) and all other applicable laws especially the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 in the arraignment of the Appellant so as not to make the proceedings before the trial Court a nullity. Grounds 1, 4.
2. Whether considering the totality of theproceedings before the trial Court, the Appellant was given a fair hearing by the Court. Grounds 3, 5 and 6.”
The Appellant abandoned ground two of the grounds of appeal and, as a matter of fact, he did not formulate any issue from the said ground. The said ground two having been abandoned, is hereby struck out. The two issues crafted for determination flow from the decision and proceedings at the lower Court and they also take their roots from the grounds of appeal. It is therefore on the basis of the said issues that I will consider the submissions of learned counsel and resolve this appeal.
ISSUE NUMBER ONE
Whether or not the learned trial Court complied with the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) and all other applicable laws especially the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 in the arraignment of the Appellant so as not to make the proceedings before the trial Court a nullity.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
The Appellant submits that trial commences with arraignment and ends with sentence, and that for a trial to be a successful criminal prosecutionthere must be a valid and lawful arraignment; otherwise the trial will be nullity vide BLESSING vs. FRN (2015) 13 NWLR (PT. 1475) 1 at 44, ADEWUNMI vs. THE STATE (2016) 10 NWLR (PT. 1521) 614 at 625 among other cases. It was stated that the right to fair hearing enshrined in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution requires that an accused person be informed of, and fully understand the Charge in order for there to be a fair trial. The case of JOSEPH vs. THE STATE (2014) 1 NWLR (PT 1387) 33 at 54-55 was referred to. It was asserted that it is only where there has been a valid arraignment that a trial Court will have the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate and that where there is no proper, lawful and/or valid arraignment the trial conducted will be a nullity. The case of MOHAMMED vs. FRN (2018) LPELR 43908, S.C was relied upon.
It is the further submission of the Appellant that his arraignment was done in total disregard of the provisions of Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution and the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, such that the entire trial is null and void. Sections 271 and 274 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act were referred to and it wasstated that where a mode is prescribed for doing an act, that mode must be followed otherwise the act done will be a nullity. The cases of UNTHMB vs. NNOLI (1994) 8 NWLR (PT. 363) 376 at 400-401 and NNPC vs. FAMFA OIL LTD (2012) 17 NWLR (PT. 1328) 148 at 195 were cited in support. The Appellant maintained that the requirements of the law for a valid arraignment are strict and that the lower Court failed to comply with the provisions of Sections 271 and 274 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act vide KAJUBO vs. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 73) 721 at 737.
It was opined that in order to comply with the stipulations of the law and properly arraign the Appellant, the lower Court had the obligation to call on the Registrar or other officer of the Court to read and explain the Charge to the Appellant in the language he understands. It was stated that there was nothing on record showing that this was done or that there was an interpreter who interpreted the Charge. The cases of EREKANURE vs. THE STATE (1993) 5 NWLR (PT. 294) 385 at 393 and KAJUBO vs. THE STATE (supra) at 737 were called in aid. It was asserted that there is nothing on the record showing thatthe Charge was read and/or explained to the Appellant before he pleaded to the same, which is fatal to the plea of guilty. This Court was urged not to speculate that the Appellant’s plea of guilty was because the Charge was read to him since the Court can only look at the Record of Appeal in order to decipher what took place and act only on the evidence before it and act only on the evidence before it. The case of SAMBO vs. THE STATE (1993) 6 NWLR (PT 300) 390 at 418 was referred to.
It is the submission of the Appellant that non-compliance with the stipulations of Section 274 (1) (b) & (c) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, which require that the prosecution state the facts of the case and for the Court to enquire from the Appellant whether the facts stated are what he pleaded guilty to vitiates the entire proceedings. Furthermore, that the lower Court did not record that it was satisfied that the Charge was read and explained to the Appellant as required by Sections 271 (3) and 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The cases of OKEKE vs. THE STATE (2016) 7 NWLR (PT. 1512) 417 at 438, PETER vs. THE STATE (1997) 12NWLR (PT. 531) 1 at 25 and IWUNZE vs. FRN (2013) 1 NWLR (PT. 1334) 119 at 162 were referred to as representing the previous position under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, where the trial Court did not have to expressly record that it was satisfied that the accused understood the Charge. The current position under Section 271 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, it was stated, expressly requires the trial Court to record its satisfaction. It was maintained that Section 271(3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act imposed an obligation on the trial Court, with no room for discretion, since the provision employs the word “shall”. The cases of EMORDI vs. IGEKE (2011) 9 NWLR (PT. 1251) 24 at 39 and BAMAIYI vs. AGF (2001) 12 NWLR (PT. 727) 468 at 497 were relied upon.
The Appellant submitted that it has always been good practice for the trial Court to specifically record that the Charge was read and explained to an accused person to the satisfaction of the Court; more so as the language of the law in which the Charge is couched may not be comprehensible to a layman. The cases ofEFFIOM vs. THE STATE (1995) 1 NWLR(PT. 373) 507 at 609, OGUNYE vs. THE STATE (1999) 5 NWLR (PT. 604) 548 at 567, the legal work “Practice and Procedure of Criminal Litigation in Nigeria” by Y. D. U. HAMBALI at page 506 and the unreported decisions of this Court in APPEAL NO. CA/I/403C/2013: TAWAKALITU FALOLA vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA delivered on 10th June 2016 and APPEAL NO. CA/I/174/2012: RAJIDAT KOLEOSHO vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIAdelivered on 18th March, 2014 were called in aid. It was conclusively submitted that since the lower Court failed to comply with the provisions of Sections 271 (2), 274 (1) (b) & (c), 271 (3) and 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, the arraignment of the Appellant is invalid, null and void.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL
The Respondent, referring to the provisions of the Constitution and the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, submits that the lower Court complied with the relevant stipulations. It was stated that the Appellant was represented by Counsel at the lower Court, and the said Counsel did not raise any objection that the Charge was not understood, but rather affirmed that they wereready. The case of UDO vs. THE STATE (2006) 15 NWLR (PT 1001) 179 at 189 -190 was referred to. It was maintained that all the conditions for a valid arraignment were satisfied as the Appellant was placed before the Court unfettered, the Charge was read to him by the Registrar/or any other officer of the court to the satisfaction of the Court and the Appellant was then called upon to plead to the Charge, which he did. The cases of KALU vs. THE STATE (2002) 3 LRC NCC @ Vol. 3 page 39, AMANCHUKWU vs. FRN (2007) 6 NWLR (PT. 1029) 1 at 16-17, IDEMUDIA vs. THE STATE (1999) 7 NWLR (PT. 610) 202 and KAJUBO vs. THE STATE (supra) were relied upon. It was opined that the presumption of regularity that the Charge was read and explained to the Appellant applied, more so, when the Appellant was represented by Counsel and the Appellant stated that he understood the Charge. The cases of SOLOLA vs. THE STATE (2005) 2 NWLR (PT. 937) 460 at 493-494, IDEMUDIA vs. THE STATE (supra) at 222, JOSEPH vs. THE STATE (2013) LPELR – 22604 CA at 30 and PETER vs. THE STATE (supra) were cited in support.
The Respondent, maintaining that the arraignment of the Appellant was inconformity with the provisions of the law, on the authority of the cases ofDIBIE vs. THE STATE (2007) LPELR – 941 (SC), SANMABO vs. THE STATE (1967) NMLR 314 and EBEM vs. THE STATE (1990) 7 NWLR (PT. 160) 113 at 118-119; submitted that records of Court are not supposed to be a carbon copy of all that transpired in Court. It was argued that the fact that the name of the person who read the Charge is not stated in the record is not fatal, especially as the Courts now abhor mere technicality. The cases of SOLUADE vs. COP (2001) 7 NWLR (PT. 712) 432, DIBIE vs. THE STATE (supra) and OYEDIRAN vs. THE REPUBLIC (1967) NMLR 122 were called in aid. The Respondent posited that apart from the Appellant’s plea of guilty, the lower Court relied on other corroborative evidence to reach a verdict and that the Appellant’s Counsel, not having raised any objection when the exhibits were tendered, cannot raise any procedural defects on appeal. The cases of OMOJU vs. THE STATE [reference not stated] at 649 and SHARFAL vs. THE STATE (1992) 9 SCNJ 1 at 6 or (1992) 7 NWLR (PT 255) 510 were referred to.
The Respondent conclusively submitted that Section 36 of the Constitutionwas complied with as the Appellant was served a copy of the Charge before the day of arraignment. Without conceding that Section 36 was not complied with, the Respondent stated that even if it was not, the failure did not occasion a miscarriage of justice as the Appellant had made a statement in English Language admitting the facts and the lower Court was satisfied that the Appellant understood the Charge. The cases of DURWODE vs. THE STATE (2000) 12 SCNJ 1 at 14-15, EWE vs. THE STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (PT. 246) 147 and EREKANURE vs. THE STATE (supra) at 396 were relied upon. This Court was urged to invoke the presumption of regularity due to material compliance with all the procedure and the fact that the Appellant was represented by Counsel at the lower Court vide JOSEPH vs. THE STATE (supra).
APPELLANT’S REPLY ON LAW
The Appellant submits in the Reply Brief that the Respondent’s contentions are premised on the legal position under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which has been supplanted by Sections 271, 274 and 356 (2) of Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The presumption of regularity, it was stated, no longerapplies as the procedure for arraignment has now been explicitly and comprehensively laid down, which procedure is to be followed and that it was no longer open to any presumption in law.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER ONE
The crux of the contention under this issue is neither convoluted nor penumbrous. It is all about procedure. The procedure by which the lower Court conducted the proceedings leading to the conviction and sentence of the Appellant consequent upon his plea of guilty. The Appellant has contended that the arraignment was flawed and that the proceedings at the lower Court is therefore a nullity. For good measure, the Appellant contended that the Administration of Criminal Justice Act has raised the stakes with regard to what a trial Court ought to do in the arraignment of a defendant in a criminal matter, taking the requirements over and above the position under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act; the Criminal Procedure Act having been expressly repealed by Section 493 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act.
Now, an arraignment is about taking the plea of a defendant in a criminal trial. The procedure provides thedefendant the opportunity of giving his formal response of guilty, not guilty, or, still, no contest to the Charge. Arraignment is one of the fundamental requirements of a valid trial. Given its fundamental nature, objection to the plea for being in contravention of the constitutional and procedural requirements on arraignment, though more appropriately taken before trial, may be raised even on appeal, as in the instant case. Whenever the arraignment is defective, an Appellate Court will intervene as the defect renders the entire proceedings a nullity. See KAJUBO vs. THE STATE (supra), EYOROKOROMO vs. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 3, MOHAMMED vs. FRN (supra), and FRN vs. ABUBAKAR (2019) LPELR (46533) 1 at 7-8.
The arraignment and taking the plea of a defendant in a criminal trial is the commencement of the trial. It is at that stage that the defendant appears in Court, the Charge is read and explained to him and to his understanding and he makes his plea thereto. It is a very fundamental aspect of a criminal trial and underscores the need for strict and mandatory compliance with the requirements in respect thereof. Any criminal trial, no matter how wellconducted without the plea of the defendant having been properly taken is a nullity: SANMABO vs. THE STATE (supra), ALAKE vs. THE STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (PT 205) 567 and EDIBO vs. THE STATE (2007) LPELR (1912) 1 at 15.
The legal provisions on the forefront of the contention in this issue are Section 36 (6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution and Sections 271, 274 (1) and (2) and 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The provision of the Constitution is as follows:
“36 (6) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to –
(a) be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence.”
The stipulations of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act are as follows:
“271 (1) Before a defendant takes his plea, the Court shall inform him of his rights under the provisions of Section 269 of this Act.
(2) The defendant to be tried on a charge or an information shall be:
(a) brought before the Court unfettered unless the Court sees cause otherwise to order, and the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to thesatisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court; and
(b) called upon to plead instantly unless, where the person is entitled to service of the information, he objects to the non-service and where the Court finds that he has not been duly served.
(3) The Court shall record the fact that it is satisfied that the Defendant understands the charge or information read over and explained to him in the language he understands, and shall record the plea of the Defendant to the charge or information as nearly as possible in the words used by him.”
“274 (1) Where a defendant pleads guilty to an offence with which he is charged, the Court shall:
(a) record his plea as nearly as possible;
(b) Invite the prosecution to state the fact of the case; and
(c) enquire from the defendant whether his plea of guilty is to the fact as stated by the prosecution.
(2) Where the Court is satisfied that the defendant intends to admit the truth of all the essential elements of the offence for which he has pleaded guilty, the Court shall convict and sentence him or make such order as may be necessary, unless there shallappear sufficient reason to the contrary.”
“356(2) Where the defendant pleads guilty and the Court is satisfied that he intends to admit the offence and shows no cause or no sufficient cause why sentence should not be passed, the Court shall proceed to sentence.”
In IDEMUDIA vs. THE STATE (supra) at 222, Karibi -Whyte, JSC (of blessed memory) stated:
“It would seem to me that the mandatory provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law which requires that the charge be read and explained to the accused is complied with if there is evidence on the record to show that the accused understood the charge and was in no way misled by the absence or explanation ex facie. It is conceded that the subsequent validity of the procedure rests on the validity of the plea on arraignment. However, where there is counsel in the case defending an accused person, the taking of the plea by the Court it ought to be presumed in favour of regularity, namely that even if it was not stated on the record, the charge had been read and explained to the accused on arraignment before the plea was taken. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniteresse acta. Accordingly in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption prevails. See also Section 150 (1) Evidence Act [now Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011].
It does not seem to me that the requirement that the judge should be satisfied that the charge has been read and explained to the accused is one which need to appear on the record and the non-appearance of which affects the justice of the case. It is good practice to so indicate. It is sufficient on the record as a whole if it could be gathered that the accused understood the nature of the charge.”
The case of IDEMUDIA vs. THE STATE (supra) was decided based on the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The Appellant, without citing any authority, has forcefully argued that the legal regime has changed under the Administration of Criminal Justice Act and that there is no longer room for presumption of regularity and that the trial Court is now required to expressly record the fact of its satisfaction that the defendant understood the Charge that was read over and explained to him. We will find out anon if the legal position has so changed as contended bythe Appellant.
But first, it is abecedarian that when it is alleged that there has been invalid arraignment in that the mandatory provisions of the law were not complied with, it is incumbent upon the appellate Court to examine the Records of the proceedings for the day of the arraignment to see if the arraignment is proper. So we turn to the Records.
The Appellant was arraigned before the lower Court on 9th October, 2017 and the proceedings as reflected on pages 8-8A of the Records reads thus:-
“IN THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT
HOLDEN AT LAGOS NIGERIA
ON MONDAY THE 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2017
BEOFRE THE HONOURABLE
JUSTICE A. M. ANKA
JUDGE
SUIT NO: FHC/L/325C/2017
BETWEEN:
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA … COMPLAINANT
AND:
OBIEKWE FRANK UCHE & ANOR …. ACCUSED
The Defendants present in Court.
I. J. Igwubor for the prosecution.
Chief B. O. Ndakara for the two defendants.
Prosecution: We have a charge of 20/9/17 and filed same date.
We ask it be read to the defendant.
Chief: We are ready.
Court: Ordered the reading of the charge to the defendants.
Court: Do youunderstand the 1st count?
1st Defendant: Yes I understand.
2nd Defendant: Yes I understand.
Court: Are you guilty or not guilty?
1st Defendant: I am guilty
2nd Defendant: I am guilty.
Court: Do you understand the 2nd count?
1st Defendant: Yes I understand
2nd Defendant: Yes I understand.
Court: Are you guilty or not guilty?
1st Defendant: I am guilty.
2nd Defendant: I am guilty.
Sgd.
HON. JUSTICE A. M. ANKA
JUDGE
9/10/17
Prosecution: In view of their plea I pray for a short date for review.
Chief: No objection.
Court: Case is adjourned to 18th day of October, 2017 for review of facts. The defendants shall be remanded in prison.
HON. JUSTICE A. M. ANKA
JUDGE
9/10/17.”
It is evident from the proceedings that the Appellant was represented by Counsel at the lower Court. It is settled law that it is the duty of counsel to notify the Court where the defendant does not understand the language used in the trial. In DURWODE vs. THE STATE (2000) LPELR (973) 1 at 28-29, Onu, JSC stated:
“In the realm of criminal justice, it is a cardinalprinciple of our jurisprudence that it is the duty of the accused or his counsel, acting on his behalf to bring to the notice of the Court, the fact that he does not understand the language in which the trial is conducted, otherwise it will be assumed that he has no cause for complaint … The fact that the accused does not understand the language in which the trial is being conducted is a fact well known to the accused and it is for him or his counsel to take the initiative of bringing to the notice of the Court at the earliest opportunity or as soon as the situation has arisen. If he does not claim the right at the proper time … He may not be able to have a valid complaint afterwards, for example, on appeal.”
See alsoAKINLOLU vs. THE STATE (2017) LPELR (42670) 1 at 44-45 and MADU vs. THE STATE (1997) 1 NWLR (PT 482) 386 at 402.
It is instructive that the Appellant has not complained that he did not understand the Charge. He has rather complained that the lower Court did not record that it was satisfied that the Appellant understood the Charge as required by Section 271 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. TheAppellant further complained that the lower Court did not record the name of the Registrar or other officer of the Court who read and explained the Charge. Let me reiterate that the Appellant was represented by Counsel at the lower Court. The Records reflect that the lower Court ordered that the Charge should be read to the Appellant. It is true that the Record did not reflect the name of the Registrar or other officer of Court that read the Charge to the Appellant as ordered by the Court. The Appellant insinuates in his submission that the Charge was read by the Prosecutor. Section 122 (2) of the Evidence Act deals with matters of which a Court may take judicial notice. By Section 122 (2) (m) of the Evidence Act, the Court shall take judicial notice of the course of proceeding and all rules of practice in force in any Court established by or under the Constitution. See AIYEOLA vs. PEDRO (2014) 13 NWLR (PT 1424) 409, NJC vs. AGUMAGU (2015) 10 NWLR (PT. 1467) 365 at 419 and DERIBA vs. THE STATE (2016) LPELR (40345) 1 at 34. Accordingly, I take judicial notice of the fact that when the lower Court directs or orders that a Charge be read, that it is the Registraror other officer of Court that reads the Charge, not the Prosecutor. Equally, applicable is the presumption of regularity enshrined in Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act. By the provision the Court is entitled to presume that the Charge was read and explained to the Appellant by the Registrar or other officer of court as stipulated in Section 271 (2) (a) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. See SULE vs. THE STATE (2017) LPELR (47016) 1 at 33-34, SALISU vs. FRN (2017) LPELR (47146) 1 at 11-14 and 24-25 and OLANREWAJU vs. THE STATE (2020) LPELR (49569) 1 at 11-13. The presumption of regularity is not absolute. It is a rebuttable presumption. The Appellant has not been able to rebut the said presumption in order to dislodge the presumption that the Charge was read to the Appellant in the manner stipulated under Section 271 (2) (a) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. In any event, it seems to be good law to state that it is not fatal that the Records did not state the name of the Registrar or other officer of Court that read and explained the Charge to the Appellant. The non-reflection of the person did not mislead the Appellant, who wasrepresented by Counsel and also did not occasion any miscarriage of justice. See ABDULLAHI vs. THE STATE (2018) LPELR (44455) 1 at 11-12.
By parity of reasoning or analogous reasoning, I am unable to accept the Appellant’s contention that there can be no presumption of regularity because of the stipulation of Section 271 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act which requires the trial Court to record that it is satisfied that the defendant understood the Charge. The question of whether there has been a valid and proper arraignment is a matter of evidential proof. The Evidence Act governs matters of evidence in judicial proceedings in or before Courts in Nigeria. The Evidence Act has made provisions on proof of matters by presumptions. The rule as to presumptions as stipulated in Section 145 of the Evidence Act is as follows:
“145 (1) Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.
(2) Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unlessand until it is disproved.
(3) When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.”
Section 168 (1) of the Evidence Act provides for the presumption of regularity of judicial acts. By Section 145 (2) of the Evidence Act, the Court shall regard as proved the fact that the judicial act was regularly done, unless it is disproved. There is nothing in the Administration of Criminal Justice Act which forbids the proof of judicial acts by presumption. I am consequently at odds with the Appellant in his contention that there can no longer be presumption of regularity because Section 271 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act expressly requires the Court to record its satisfaction that the defendant understands the charge that was read over and explained to him. No; it is because the proceedings had been regularly done, but the Court did not graphically record its satisfaction, that the presumption of regularity would still apply, unless rebutted, just as it used to apply underthe provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 271 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice has not changed our corpus juris as it relates to the applicability of the presumption of regularity.
At the expense of prolixity, I restate that the Appellant was represented by Counsel. The law is that the Counsel has the duty to inform the Court if the defendant does not understand the Charge. The Appellant’s Counsel participated actively in the proceedings as borne out by the Records of Appeal. He did not inform the Court that the Appellant did not understand the Charge. This being so, there can be no doubting the fact that the Court was satisfied that the Appellant understood the Charge. The non-reflection of this in the Records is therefore not fatal. Even though it would have been proper and ideal to so reflect it, since Section 271(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act employs the mandatory word ‘shall’, the Appellant has not rebutted the presumption of regularity and has also not established in what respect he suffered prejudice or how a miscarriage of justice was occasioned as a result of the non-reflection of thesame in the Records: OLANREWAJU vs. THE STATE (supra). Therefore, in the diacritical circumstances of this matter, where the Appellant was represented by Counsel who participated actively in the proceedings, and the Charge was read and explained to the Appellant without any objection by his Counsel that he did not understand the Charge, it is not fatal that the Court did not record that it was satisfied that the Appellant understood the Charge. The facts of this matter are clearly distinguishable from the unreported decision of this Court in KOLEOSHO vs. FRN (supra) and FALOLA vs. FRN (supra). In KOLEOSHO, the appellant therein was not represented by Counsel at the trial Court, while in FALOLA, even though the Appellant was represented by Counsel, this Court found that the said Counsel did not take any part in the proceedings In IDEMUDIA vs. THE STATE (supra) at 222, Karibi -Whyte, JSC (of blessed memory) stated:
“It would seem to me that the mandatory provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law which requires that the charge be read and explained to the accused is complied with if there is evidence on the record to show that the accused understood the charge and was in no way misled by the absence or explanation ex facie. It is conceded that the subsequent validity of the procedure rests on the validity of the plea on arraignment. However, where there is counsel in the case defending an accused person, the taking of the plea by the Court it ought to be presumed in favour of regularity, namely that even if it was not stated on the record, the charge had been read and explained to the accused on arraignment before the plea was taken. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniteresse acta. Accordingly in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption prevails. See also Section 150 (1) Evidence Act [now Section 168 In OKO vs. THE STATE (2017) LPELR (42267) 1 at 48-49, Peter-Odili, JSC stated:
“What the appellant is seeking is a rigid and inflexible approach in the application of the law before full compliance would be said to have been carried out. That is neither the intendment of the legislature nor within the spirit of the law itself which in my view and in keeping with interpretations already made thereto is that a substantial compliance showing that what is expected has been done is all the law ask of the Court of trial. …
A narrow and strict interpretation of the provisions and application… would not serve the interest of justice but would defeat the course of justice. There is no need to put down the minute details of what took place at the plea taking, such as the language of explanation and who made the explanation and the issue of satisfaction of the judge that accused was explained to and he understood. It is sufficient that substantial compliance was in effect.”
See also EDUN vs. IGP (1966) 1 ALL NLR 17, PETER vs. THE STATE (supra) and ALADU vs. THE STATE (1998) 8 NWLR (PT. 563) 618.
In a summation, though Section 271 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act provides for the Court to record that it is satisfied that the defendant understood the Charge, it is not fatal if it is not recorded, when as in the instant case the defendant was represented by Counsel who did not inform the Court that the defendant did not understand the Charge. It is a duty on the Court which may have different consequences where the defendant is not represented by Counsel. The presumption of regularity would therefore apply, the same not having been rebutted by theAppellant, that the requirements of Section 271 (2) (a) and (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act were substantially complied with such that no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was occasioned to the Appellant. I will, in consideration of issue number two dealing with fair trial examine the stipulations of Sections 274 (1) & (2) and 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act.
Suffice it to say that this issue number one will ineluctably be resolved against the Appellant. The provisions of Section 36 (6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 271 (2) (a) and (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, were complied with in the arraignment of the Appellant.
ISSUE NUMBER TWO
Whether considering the totality of the proceedings before the trial Court, the Appellant was given a fair hearing by the Court.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
The Appellant submits that the implication of all that transpired at the lower Court is that he did not have a fair trial and that there was a blatant denial of fair hearing which is the substratum of a valid trial. The cases of UZUDA vs. EBIGAH (2009) 15 NWLR(PT. 1163) 1 at 22 and EZEJI vs. IKE (1997) 2 NWLR (PT. 486) 206 at 224 were referred to. It was posited that the Records show that the Prosecutor combined the role of counsel and witness; as it was the counsel that gave evidence of the drug subject of the Charge and as such it cannot be said that there was evidence of any drug allegedly seized from the Appellant. The trial, it was asserted, was a nullity.
It was further submitted that even where there is a guilty plea, the Prosecution still has to lead evidence to prove the specific drug referred to in the Charge. The cases of KOLEOSHO vs. FRN (supra), FRN vs. DANIEL (2011) LPELR – 4152 (CA) and FRN vs. MICHAEL (2018) 6 NWLR (PT. 1616) 438 were relied upon. It was opined that the Prosecutor not being the maker of the test result cannot tender the same, even if the Prosecutor can give evidence, which he cannot do, videBELGORE vs. AHMED (2013) 8 NWLR (PT. 1355) 60 at 100. The procedure which the lower Court adopted, it was stated, was neither summary trial nor a full-fledged trial, as the Appellant was not allowed to cross examine the Prosecutor who gave the evidence nor to even see the exhibits tendered. Thecase of FRN vs. MICHAEL (supra) was cited in support. The Appellant conclusively submitted that the decision of the lower Court should be set aside and an order of discharge and acquittal made since there was no evidence on record disclosing a case against the Appellant, apart from the purported plea of guilt. It was contended that ordering a retrial would afford the Prosecution the opportunity of re-presenting its case and that such would amount to double jeopardy. The case ofABODUNDU vs. THE QUEEN (1959) SCNLR 162 at 167 was called in aid.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL
The Respondent asserts that the Appellant was given a fair trial as he had adequate time to present his case. That it is for the Appellant who alleges breach of fair hearing to prove it, but that the Appellant failed in that regard. It was stated that the Appellant was represented by Counsel when the Prosecution reviewed the facts of the case and tendered the relevant documents without any objection. It was posited that after the review of the facts, the Appellant’s Counsel informed the court that he had no reason why the Appellant should not be convicted. Itwas maintained that the plea of guilty foreclosed the conduct of a trial so there can be no complaint of lack of fair trial. The cases of OMOJU vs. FRN, SC 167/2007 delivered on 15th February, 2008, OKOYE vs. COP LER (2015) SC 279/2011, ADIGWE vs. FRN LER (2015) SC, UCHE vs. THE STATE LER (2015) SC 167/2013 and HAMMA vs. ABOH LER (2015) SC were referred to.
It is the further submission of the Respondent that the Appellant made a confessional statement which was tendered in the course of review of facts, without objection, and that it corroborated the Appellant’s plea of guilty. The Appellant having pleaded to the Charge, issues were joined and the lower Court rightly exercised jurisdiction in the matter vide OKEGBU vs. THE STATE (1979) 11 SC 1 at 9. This Court was, in conclusion, urged to dismiss the appeal as it was based substantially on mere technicality and that no miscarriage of justice was occasioned. The cases of OKONJO vs. ODJE (1985) 10 SC 260 at 268, NISHIZAWA LTD vs. JETHWANI (1984) 12 SC 234 at 279, ONAH vs. THE STATE (1985) 3 NWLR (PT. 12) 236 or (1985) 12 SC 593 and IKUMONIHAN vs. THE STATE (2018) LPELR 44362 (SC) SC592/2013deliveredon 4th May 2018 were relied upon.
APPELLANT’S REPLY ON LAW
The Appellant submits in the Reply brief that, there is nothing on record to show that the lower Court relied on any confessional statement to convict. It was further contended that the Respondent did not file a Respondent’s Notice and therefore this Court cannot pronounce on the effect of the confessional statement.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER TWO
Section 274 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act requires the Court, where a defendant has pleaded guilty, to invite the prosecution to state the facts of the case and thereafter enquire from the defendant whether his plea of guilty is to the fact as stated by the Prosecution. The Court shall, if satisfied, that the defendant intends to admit the truth of the essential elements of the offence to which he pleaded guilty, convict and sentence him or make such order as may be necessary, unless there shall appear sufficient reason to the contrary. Furthermore, by Section 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, where the defendant pleads guilty and the Court is satisfied that he intends to admit the offenceand shows no cause or no sufficient cause why sentence should not be passed, the Court shall proceed to sentence.
It is based on the foregoing provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, that the question of whether there was a fair hearing or fair trial can be interrogated. The Appellant having been properly arraigned, and he pleaded guilty, the pertinent question would be whether the proceedings leading up to his conviction and sentence were in line with the stipulations of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, in which case there cannot be any question as to whether there was a fair hearing or fair trial. Let me hasten to state that the Appellant’s submission that the Prosecution Counsel was both counsel and witness in the matter cannot be correct. The role played remained that of counsel since by Section 274 (1) (b) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, the Court upon a plea of guilty shall invite the prosecution to state the facts of the case. The learned counsel stating the facts of the case and tendering documents in support of the facts cannot be equiparated to being a witness in the matter since the effect ofthe Appellant having pleaded guilty is that it obviated the need for a formal hearing:OMOJU vs. FRN (2008) LPELR (2647) 1 at 19, DONGTOE vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PLATEAU STATE (2001) LPELR (959) 1 at 37-38, MOHAMMED vs. FRN (2013) LPELR (21384) 1 at 16, AMANCHUKWU vs. FRN (2007) 6 NWLR (PT. 1029 ) 1 and NKIE vs. FRN (2014) LPELR (22877) 1.
In consideration of issue number one, after setting out the proceedings on the day of arraignment, verbatim ac literatim, I held that the arraignment was valid and in substantial compliance with the stipulations of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The Appellant having pleaded guilty, the lower Court upon the application of the Prosecution Counsel, which was not opposed by Appellant’s Counsel, adjourned for review of the facts as required by the stipulations of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The proceedings at the review of facts are copied at pages 9-12 of the Records. It is clear from the Records that the lower Court scrupulously complied with the provisions of Section 274 and 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The Appellant’s Counsel was in Court andactively participated in the proceedings and at a point actually objected to a substance which the Prosecutor wanted to tender in the course of review of facts (See page 10 of the Records). Among the documents tendered in the course of the review of facts are the relevant documents on the seizure, packing, test analysis forms and report. The documents were shown to the Appellant’s Counsel who actively participated in the proceedings and agreed with the Prosecution on how the products were to be separated and tendered in evidence (See pages 10-11 of the Records). It is therefore duplicitous for the Appellant to submit as it did in paragraph 5.16 of the Amended Appellants Brief that the lower Court did not afford the Appellant the opportunity of examining the tendered exhibits/drugs. That is definitely not borne out by the Records. By all odds, the procedure adopted by the lower Court is in accordance with the legal provisions in that regard. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant is therefore not flawed.
Apropos the foregoing, it is necessary to specifically address the alleged denial of fair hearing and whether the offence charged was provedthat it was actually hard drugs. I will invite my Lord, Tobi, JSC (of blessed memory) to speak to these matters. It is from his leading judgment in OMOJU vs. FRN (supra). He had this to say at page 18:
“…learned counsel submitted that the appellant was denied fair hearing. How? In what way? An accused person who pleads guilty to an offence is not entitled to a hearing and so the issue of fairness or unfairness of a hearing is neither here nor there. In other words, by entering a guilty plea, hearing is foreclosed, as the next and last procedural step of the Judge is to convict and pass appropriate sentence.”
The learned jurist continued on the issue of burden of proof and this is what he said at pages 20-21:
“It is in evidence that the prosecution tendered,
(a) forensic or drug analysis report;
(b) packing of substance form;
(c) certificate of test analysis;
(d) recovered drugs;
(e) the statement of the appellant; and
(f) travelling documents…
These were admitted without objection by the appellant. And so I ask: what is the burden of proof palaver?
The law is elementary that if anaccused person pleads guilty, the burden of proof placed on the prosecution becomes light, like the feather of an ostrich. It no longer remains the superlative compelling burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. After all, the guilty plea has considerably shortened the distance and brought in some proximity the offence and the mens rea or actus reus of the accused as the case may be. That makes it easier to locate causation or causa sine qua non.”
As it is in OMOJU (supra), so it is in this matter. The very same exhibits tendered in OMOJU were tendered in this matter. They were tendered by the Prosecuting Counsel just as in this matter. Like it was in OMOJU, so it is here. There was no objection by the defence counsel. I add my pen and ink to that of my Lord, Tobi, JSC, and I also ask, what is the burden of proof palaver? What is the brouhaha all about? The Appellant pleaded guilty. The facts were reviewed. The necessary documents were tendered and admitted without objection. The lower Court pursuant to Sections 274 (2) and 356 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act was satisfied that the Appellant intended to admit the truth of all theessential elements of the offence and it convicted accordingly. From the provision as worded, the satisfaction is within the mind of the trial judge. It does not go out to meet the accused. The question of satisfaction vel non, remains the subjective judgment of the lower Court. Once the lower Court was satisfied, it rightly convicted and sentenced the Appellant. All the ruckus being made about fair trial, fair hearing and calling of witnesses or not, is with respect, a mere storm in a teacup. The horse escaped from the stable when the Appellant entered a plea of guilty upon his valid arraignment. The chivalrous efforts to close the stable door after the horse had escaped are already too late to accomplish anything. See also BABANGIDA vs. FRN (2017) LPELR (42350) 1 at 14-15.
I have read the decision in FRN vs. MICHAEL (supra). The facts which informed the decision in MICHAEL are distinguishable from the facts of this matter. In MICHAEL, the defendant was not represented by counsel which state of affairs called for more circumspection by the trial Court. As it was in MICHAEL, so also it was in KOLEOSHO vs. FRN (supra) and FRN vs. DANIEL (supra), allreferred to by the Appellant’s counsel. There was no defence counsel in the said matters at the trial Court and the trial judge in DANIEL acted with the required circumspection. In the instant case, the Appellant was represented by counsel who actively participated in the proceedings. Facts are the fountainhead of the law. The pronouncements in MICHAEL quoted by the Appellant are intimately linked to the circumstance of the case, id est, that the defendant was not represented by counsel. The situation is different in this matter. The Appellant was represented by counsel. The pronouncements in MICHAEL can therefore not be pulled out of context and given a general application. No! See FAWEHINMI vs. NBA (NO. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT 105) 558 at 650, ADEGOKE MOTORS vs. ADESANYA (1989) 5 SC 92 at 100 and ONWUAMADIKE vs. IGP (2018) LPELR (46039) 1 at 31. The apex Court recently had cause to pronounce on the effect of a plea of guilty by an accused person. This was in MOHAMMED vs. THE STATE (2019) LPELR (47044) 1 at 17-19, which is latter in time than FRN vs. MICHAEL (supra) relied upon by the Appellant’s counsel. Hear the words of Muhammad, JSC:<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>
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“It is evident from the record of appeal that the charge was read and fully explained to the appellant … and he pleaded guilty to same. The further fact that the appellant was represented by counsel at the trial Court, the propriety of the affirmation of which decision by the lower Court is being agitated in this appeal, the chance for success of the appeal is further lessened. … Appellant’s plea of guilty is as good as judicial confession, his valid admission of the commission of the two offences in the charge… It must be restated that appellant was represented by counsel at trial, who this Court insists, is duty bound to raise all objections in the conduct of trial belatedly being presently sought to be addressed. The appellant, whose counsel failed earlier to raise these concerns is stopped from doing so now …”
So be it. I kowtow. See also SHARFAL vs. THE STATE (1992) LPELR (3038) 1, TORRI vs. THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE OF NIGERIA (2011) LPELR (8142) 1, MOHAMMED vs. THE STATE (1991) 5 NWLR (PT. 192) 438, AKPAN vs. THE STATE (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 1106) 72 and ALO vs. THE STATE (2015) LPELR (24404) 1.Ineluctably, the concatenation of the foregoing is that this issue number two must be resolved against the Appellant. From the totality of the proceedings before the lower Court, the lower Court acted in consonance with the provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, and the Appellant and his counsel actively participated in the proceedings. The proceedings were therefore a fair trial.
In a coda, the two issues for determination have been resolved against the Appellant. The appeal is therefore devoid of any merit. It fails and it is hereby dismissed. The decision of the lower Court delivered on 30th November, 2017 embodying the conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellant is hereby affirmed.
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I agree with the succinct judgment prepared by my learned brother, Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu, J.C.A.
EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu, JCA and I am in agreement with his resolutions on the various issues presented for determination. I have nothing more to add as whatever is added will amount to a mererepetition of what my learned brother has said.
Appearances:
Rashidi Isamotu, Esq. For Appellant(s)
I. J. Igwubor, Esq., Assistant Chief Legal Officer, NDLEA For Respondent(s)