No. 81-6756
Argued: March 1, 1983Decided: March 30, 1983
Held:
Under the interpretation of 5021(b) plainly suggested by its language, the conviction of a youth offender placed on probation under 5010(a) is not set aside where, as here, the court has not exercised its discretion to discharge him unconditionally “prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court.” This limitation is fully consistent with the YCA’s rehabilitation purposes as well as with Congress’ intent to employ the set-aside as an incentive for positive behavior by youths sentenced under the YCA. Accordingly, the trial court was free to take petitioner’s previous conviction into account in imposing sentence under the recidivist provision of the District of Columbia Code. Pp. 663-668.
440 A. 2d 1008, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. [460 U.S. 660, 661]
Linda Gillespie Stuntz argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Erwin N. Griswold.
Barbara E. Etkind argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Kathleen A. Felton.
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a conviction upon which a youth offender was sentenced to probation under the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950, 18 U.S.C. 5005 et seq., was automatically set aside after he served his full term of probation.
I
In 1971 petitioner Melvin Tuten, who was 19 years old, pleaded guilty to the charge of carrying a pistol without a license in violation of D.C. Code 22-3204 (1981). 1 He was placed on probation for two years under the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950 (YCA), 18 U.S.C. 5005 et seq. At the end of the 2-year probationary period, petitioner was unconditionally discharged from the YCA program.
In 1980 petitioner was tried and convicted of carrying a pistol without a license under the same provision of the D.C. Code. The prosecutor urged that petitioner’s previous conviction made him subject to the enhanced penalty provided [460 U.S. 660, 662] by D.C. Code 22-3204 (1981) for one who previously “has been convicted in the District of Columbia of a violation of this section.” The trial judge agreed and, based on the earlier conviction, sentenced petitioner as a felon rather than a misdemeanant. The judge imposed a sentence of two to six years’ imprisonment.
On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the earlier conviction could not properly provide the basis for his being sentenced as a recidivist because that conviction had been expunged under the YCA, 5021(b), following his successful completion of the 2-year probationary term. The court rejected this assertion and affirmed the sentence. 440 A. 2d 1008 (1982). It relied primarily upon the “ordinary meaning” of the language of 5021. 440 A. 2d, at 1013. Section 5021 provides:
- “(a) Upon the unconditional discharge by the Commission of a committed youth offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed upon him, the conviction shall be automatically set aside and the Commission shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
- “(b) Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the court may thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth offender from probation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the conviction, and the court shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.”
The court concluded that the automatic set-aside provision of subsection (b) applies only to a youth offender who receives an unconditional discharge before the expiration of his probationary period. The court also stated that “the legislative history contains no persuasive reasons” to depart from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, and noted that [460 U.S. 660, 663] “the case law and public policy support the plain meaning of the statute.” 440 A. 2d, at 1013. 2 We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 905 (1982), and we now affirm.
II
This Court has in previous decisions described and analyzed the YCA in considerable detail in the course of deciding particular issues arising under the Act. See Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201 (1981); Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542 (1978); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974). The Act generally applies to persons under 22 years of age at the time of their conviction 3 who are sentenced in federal courts or in courts of the District of Columbia. 4 “[T]he principal purpose of the YCA is to rehabilitate persons who, because of their youth, are unusually vulnerable to the danger of recidivism.” Ralston v. Robinson, supra, at 206. To achieve this purpose, the Act gives courts a number of alternatives in sentencing youth offenders. First, a court may commit a youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for institutional treatment and supervision under the Act. 18 U.S.C. 5010(b) and (c). The Act affords the Attorney General a broad range of discretion in providing institutional treatment, which includes educational and vocational training as well as psychiatric counseling. 5006(g), [460 U.S. 660, 664] 5011, 5013. See Dorszynski, supra, at 434. 5 Second, if the court finds, as it did in this case, that a youth offender does not need to be committed to custody, it may place him on probation under the supervision of a probation officer or supervisory agent. 5010(a). Finally, if the court finds that the defendant will not benefit from rehabilitative treatment, it may sentence him under any of the penalty provisions applicable to adult offenders. 5010(d).
As we noted in Durst v. United States, supra, at 548, “[a] particularly valuable benefit for the offender sentenced under the YCA is the prospect of obtaining a certificate setting aside his conviction” under 5021 of the Act. Congress’ purpose in adopting 5021 was to promote the rehabilitation of youth offenders by providing a substantial incentive for positive behavior while serving a sentence under the YCA. 6 Congress recognized that a criminal conviction often carries with it numerous civil and social disabilities. For example, a conviction may result in the loss of the rights to vote, to hold a public office, to serve on a jury, and to practice various occupations and professions. 7 As in this case, a conviction may also make an offender subject to increased penalties for [460 U.S. 660, 665] subsequent convictions. Like various state expungement statutes, 8 5021 enables an eligible youth offender to reenter society and conduct his life free from the disabilities that accompany a criminal conviction. Dorszynski, supra, at 429, n. 6. 9
Until 1961, the YCA’s set-aside provision was applicable only to a youth who was committed to the custody of the Attorney General under 5010(b) or 5010(c) and was unconditionally discharged prior to expiration of the maximum sentence imposed. 10 It was not applicable to an offender who, like petitioner, was sentenced initially to probation rather than to confinement. The YCA was amended in 1961 to add 5021(b), Pub. L. 87-336, 75 Stat. 750, in order to correct this inconsistency in the Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 433, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1961); S. Rep. No. 1048, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1961). Under 5021(b), youth offenders sentenced initially to probation under 5010(a) are afforded an opportunity to have their convictions set aside similar to that which [460 U.S. 660, 666] had previously been afforded only to youth offenders sentenced under 5010(b) and (c).
We are now asked to decide when 5021 requires the setting aside of the conviction of a youth offender who has been placed on probation. Petitioner maintains that after a youth offender successfully completes the term of probation to which he was initially sentenced, his conviction must be automatically set aside under 5021(b). As the court below noted, however, this interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute itself, which provides that a “discharge shall automatically set aside the conviction” if the court “unconditionally discharge[s] [the] youth offender from probation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court” (emphasis added). The clear import of 5021(b) was described by this Court in Durst. “[Section 5021(b)] extend[s] the benefit of a certificate [setting aside the conviction] to youths sentenced to probation under 5010(a) when the court unconditionally discharges the youth prior to expiration of the sentence of probation imposed.” 434 U.S., at 548 (emphasis added). See also Dorszynski, 418 U.S., at 435 . Statements in the legislative history of the 1961 amendment echo the language of 5021(b) limiting the set-aside to youth offenders discharged before their original probationary terms expire. 11 [460 U.S. 660, 667]
Under the interpretation of 5021(b) plainly suggested by the language of the statute, the conviction of a youth offender who has been placed on probation under 5010(a) is not set aside where, as here, the court has not exercised its discretion to discharge him unconditionally “prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court,” which in this case was two years. This limitation is fully consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of the YCA as well as with Congress’ intent to employ the set-aside as an incentive for positive behavior by youths sentenced under the Act. The incentive might be significantly weaker if convictions were set aside regardless of whether the youth offender, by his conduct during the probationary period, had convinced the sentencing court to discharge him before the expiration of his probationary term. Although it would also have been reasonable for Congress to make the set-aside available to any youth offender who completes probation without incident, this result is certainly not compelled by the purposes of the Act. Moreover, the remedial purposes of the Act are not frustrated by the possibility that a court may [460 U.S. 660, 668] inadvertently fail to grant an early unconditional discharge. 12 A youth offender who believes that the sentencing court’s failure to grant an early unconditional discharge from probation was an oversight may, following the completion of his probationary period, move that court to exercise its discretion to grant him an early unconditional discharge nunc pro tunc and to set aside his conviction. See United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11, 13, n. 3 (CA6 1976). 13
In short, the language of 5021(b), the legislative history, and the rehabilitative purposes of the YCA all point to a single conclusion: that petitioner’s previous conviction was not set aside under 5021(b) because he was unconditionally discharged from probation upon the completion, not prior to the completion, of the 2-year term of probation to which he was initially sentenced under 5010(a). The trial court was therefore free in this case to take petitioner’s previous conviction into account in imposing sentence under the recidivist provision of the District of Columbia’s penal statute.
