PHARMABASE NIGERIA LIMITED v. MR. ILEGBUSI OLATOKUNBO
(2019)LCN/13094(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 24th day of May, 2019
CA/AK/201/2017
JUSTICE
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMAJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHIJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUDJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
PHARMABASE NIGERIA LIMITEDAppellant(s)
AND
MR ILEGBUSI OLATOKUNBORespondent(s)
RATIO
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JURISDICTION
The issue of jurisdiction is very important in the adjudication process. Jurisdiction is the life blood of any adjudication. I uphold the submission of respondents counsel when he cited the case of Madukolu V Nkemdilim (supra) as laying down the three conditions to exist before a Court can be said to be competent or claim to have jurisdiction in respect of any matter. See also the cases of ADETOYINBO & ORS V THE PRESIDENT & OTHER MEMBERS OF WAKAJAYE GRADE C CUSTOMARY COURT, WAKAJAYE, IBADAN & ORS (2015) LPELR 41714 (CA) and BUREMOH V AKANDE (2017) LPELR 41565 (SC).
In other to determine whether or not a Court is competent to entertain a matter, it is important to examine the statute creating the Court and the subject matter of the claim. See, ADEYEMI & ORS V OPEYORI (1976) LPELR 171 (SC). There is no quarrel with the first and last conditions; i.e. that the Court was properly constituted. The main grouse of the appellant is whether the subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court before which this matter was brought is regulated by SECTION 251 (1) OF THE 1999 Constitution. SECTION 251 (1) (R) & (S) confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court for any action/proceeding for a declaration or injunction against and such other civil or criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly. By virtue of ORDER 1, Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) RULES, 1979, Court means the Federal High Court or the State High Court. See, GAFAR V GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE (2007) 4 NWLR, PT 1024, 375 (SC) and FMCT V EZE (2006) 2 NWLR, PT 964, 221 (CA). PER MAHMOUD, J.CA.
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The respondent, the claimant in the Court below by an originating motion dated the 25/09/2014 and filed on the 30/09/2014 sought the enforcement of his fundamental rights allegedly violated by the appellant. He sought the following four reliefs:-
(a) A DECLARATION that the arrest, humiliation and detention of the applicant on the 24th April, 2014 and the planned arrest and/or trial of the applicant by police officers from Anthony Police Station, Lagos in connivance with officers of Oba-Ile Divisional Police Station of Ondo State Police Command any moment from now acting for and under the instruction of the 1st Respondent on a false allegation and/or on a debt the 1st Respondent unjustifiably claimed the applicant owed her is/are illegal, unlawful and an infraction of applicants constitutional rights to dignity and liberty of persons.
(b) AN ORDER of this Honourable Court restraining the 1st Respondent, his agents, representatives, privies and anybody acting for her from further molesting, harassing and embarrassing the applicant on a debt the 1st
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Respondent unjustifiably claimed the applicant owed her.
(c) AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents either by themselves or through their representatives, privies and agents from further molesting, harassing, intimidating, indicting, incriminating, and arresting the applicant on a debt the 1st Respondent unjustifiably claimed the applicant owed her or on any unsubstantiated allegation(s).
(d) AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents jointly to pay to the applicant the sum of N5, 000, 000 (Five Million Naira) only being damages for the false allegation, unlawful arrest, detention, molestation, harassment and grievous body injuries caused the applicant and discomfort caused him and his family by his arrest and detention on 24th April, 2014 and his plan re-arrest.
The appellant, 1st respondent in the lower Court filed a counter affidavit in reply to this originating motion on the 12/11/2014. The appellant thereafter sought and obtained an order of the Court below to regularize its processes, having filed the counter affidavit out of time, which order was granted as prayed.
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On the 10/12/2014, the appellant raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the trial Court on the grounds that the transaction that gave rise to the suit for enforcement of fundamental right of the applicant arose from a work environment/relationship. The implication of this in my view is that the 1st respondents contention was premised on the fact that the National Industrial Court had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter thereby ousting that of the Federal High Court before which the matter was instituted. In opposition to the preliminary objection, the applicant filed a written address on points of law on the 02/03/2015. The 1st Respondent filed a reply thereto on points of law on the 06/03/2015.
The learned trial judge, Justice F. A. Olubanjo of the Akure Division of the Federal High Court considered the Preliminary Objection together with the substantive application. In a considered judgment delivered on the 14th February, 2017, the learned trial judge found in favour of the applicant against the respondent.
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the appellant in an amended notice of appeal filed on the 29/03/2018 but deemed on
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the 25/10/2018 appealled to this Court on the following three grounds:
1. The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the 1st Respondent (now Appellant) regarded the funds obviously converted by the Respondent as a debt by virtue of Exhibit PH1 and PH3 and merely reported the Applicant to the Police so as to be able to collect that debt.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
A) The trial Court failed to consider the implication of Exhibit PH1 as evidence of the Respondents criminal intention which showed that the Appellant had good grounds to report him to the police it was convinced of his mens rea.
B) The trial judge failed to construe the chronology of Exhibits PH1 and PH3 to agree with the appellant that the respondent had animus criminis but rather played down the legal import of Exhibit PH1.
2. The learned trial judge erred in law when he failed to appreciate the law that citizens are entitled to report allegation of crime to the police for investigation and trial where a prime facie case is established or for the police to release the suspect on administrative bail as contemplated by the
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Constitution pending trial within 24 hours of arrest.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
A) Exhibit PH1 in particular exposed the Applicants (now Respondents) criminal intention to defraud upon which the 1st Respondent (now Appellant) is entitled to report the criminal infraction to the police as required in civilized society, being a more viable option to self-help.
B) The Respondent did not show how the Appellant interfered with the investigation of the police from the time of arrest to his eventual release on administrative bail.
C) The Commissioner of Police Lagos State as 3rd Respondent at the lower Court is obliged to have released the Respondent when it was discovered that the Respondent was not going to be charged for any offence.
3. The learned trial judge erred in law when he treated the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as if they were agents of the Appellant.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
A) Even though the Applicant (now Respondent) claimed jointly and severally against all the Respondents in the Court below, however, the said Applicant did not show in his originating application or documentary evidence, any covert or overt act
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of the Appellant indicative of malfeasance or liability in the alleged detention of the Applicant.
B) The appellant is not vicariously liable for the action or inaction of the police in the latter’s enforcement of law and orderliness in society.
Whereof the appellant urged that the appeal be allowed and the judgment of the Federal High Court be set aside.
The appellant filed a brief of argument on the 06/12/018 in compliance with the rules of Court and in furtherance of the prosecution of their appeal. In arguing the appeal, Mr. Steve Adebowale of counsel for the appellant adopted the said brief as the legal arguments in support of the appeal. In it counsel raised three issues for determination of this court thus:-
(i) Whether the trial Court was clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the Respondent having regard to the following contentions:-
(a) The facts leading to the suit at the trial Court arose from employer/employee relationship.
(b) Judgment and reliefs were granted against an improper party
(ii) Whether the Appellant is not duty bound to report allegation of crime to the police for investigation
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and if vicarious liability is created where such report is investigated. See Grounds 2 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal.
(iii) Whether there is a debtor/creditor relationship between the Appellant and Respondent to foreclose the allegation of crime arising from contract. See Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal.
On issue (1) Mr. Adebowale submitted that the facts leading to this suit at the trial Court arose from employer/employee relationship of the appellant and the respondent. That the substratum of the respondent’??s complaint against the appellant is connected to a transaction in the course of employment and therefore the complaint is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. That SECTION 254 A (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended by SECTION 6 of the Third Alteration Act of 2010 clearly places exclusive jurisdiction in employer/employee relationship in the National Industrial Court.
Counsel has also argued that the joinder of the Commissioner of Police, Lagos State is wrongful in law. That being an agent of a disclosed principal, it is the Nigerian Police Force, the disclosed principal that ought to have been joined
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as a party. That it is against the Nigerian Police Force that the award of damages ought to have been made but they were not joined as a party. That the outcome of the judgment cannot be enforced against the Nigerian Police Force who are vicariously liable for the action of the Commissioner Of Police Lagos State, not having been joined as a party.
In arguing issues (2) and (3) together, Mr. Adebowale submitted that on the strength of the documents marked TOKUNBO -? 2 and TOKUNBO -? 3, there is a fiduciary relationship between the respondent and the appellant. That the corollary of the various undertakings made by the respondent to return money misappropriated by him to the appellant is that the hands of the respondent were soiled. That there was no debtor/creditor relationship between the appellant and the respondent. Mr. Adebowale contended that the respondent unlawfully took or converted the funds of the appellant with the intention of permanently depriving the appellant of access to same. That the respondent was granted a soft landing to refund the money which was converted as indebtedness to the appellant. That to this end the
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respondent returned over N200, 000 before he stopped. That it was the fear that the appellant may reopen the allegation of fraud already incidented by the Police that caused the respondent to approach the lower Court to cover his wrongful act. Counsel also submitted that their reporting the respondent to the police was part of their civic responsibility to bring a crime to the notice of the police for investigation and prosecution. That this was all they did. That the exercise of their civic responsibility and the steps taken by the police based on their complaint ought not to constitute a violation of the fundamental right of the respondent having regard to all the circumstances of this case. That the appellant having admitted that he misappropriated the money being property of the appellant ought not be heard of alleged violation of his fundamental right or likelihood of such violation. Counsel urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court inclusive of the order for the payment of the N500, 000 damages.
The respondents brief was settled and filed by Mr. Lawal Alabi on the 08/01/2018 in opposition to this
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appeal. On the 25/02/2019 when the appeal came up for hearing the registry of this Court informed the Court that the respondents counsel had been served hearing notice on the 20/02/2019 through the telephone. He was neither in Court nor had he sent word to Court explaining what difficulty if any prevented him from being in Court. Pursuant to the powers of the Court under ORDER 19(9) (4) of the Rules of Court, 2016, the respondents brief was treated as having been argued. In it counsel had raised two issues for determination by the Court:-
1. Whether the trial Court was clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the suit, being a fundamental right enforcement application. (Grounds 1, 2, and 3 of the notice of appeal)
2. Whether from the affidavit evidence and attached exhibits before the Court, a bonafide criminal complaint was made to the police by the appellant and if so, whether the trial Court was wong (sic) to have awarded damages to be jointly paid by the appellant and the 3rd respondent (Grounds 2 and 3 of the Notice of Appeal).
In arguing on issue 1, the respondents counsel referred to the case of MADUKOLU V NKEMDILIM
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(1962) 2 SCNLR, 341 to show the three ingredients that must exist before a Court can assume jurisdiction. Counsel submitted that a condition precedent to the exercise of the Courts jurisdiction in a Fundamental Rights Enforcement procedure litigation, securing the enforcement of fundamental right must be the main claim and not an ancillary claim. Counsel referred to the cases of UNACHUKWU V AJUZIE (2009) 4 NWLR, PT 1131, 336 AT 349 and TUKUR V GOVERNMENT OF TARABA STATE & ORS (1997) 6 NWLR, PT 510, 549 AT 574. Counsel submitted that the originating application contained at pages 1-3 of the records show clearly that the main claim/relief is for the enforcement of the 1st respondents fundamental human right.
On the contention by the appellants counsel that the dispute that led to the filing of this enforcement process was premised on financial impropriety against the respondent, counsel responded that the respondent went to the trial Court to ventilate his grievance upon the arbitrary use of executive power by the police in connivance with the appellant and against the respondent.
On the argument of appellants counsel
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that the dispute was a work place dispute which the trial Court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate on, counsel contended that even though a master/servant relationship had existed between the appellant and the respondent, there was no dispute connected with the service of employment or labour related as a claim by the respondent to have brought the claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court as claimed. That to determine whether or not the trial Court had jurisdiction, there is the need to interrogate the cause of action and when it arose. Counsel referred to the cases of SAVAGE V UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC, 214 AT 221 and UWAZURUONYE V GOVERNOR, IMO STATE (2013) 8 NWLR, PT 1355, 28 AT 56-57 PARAS H-C. Counsel submitted that the act of arrest, detention, threat to re-arrest and the perceived abuse of his constitutionally guaranteed rights are the wrongful acts which the respondent approached the trial Court to complain about.
Mr. Alabi of counsel for the respondent referred to the case of FRN V IFEGWU (2003) 15 NWLR, PT 842, 113 to support his submission that his claim was properly before the Court as the enforcement of
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fundamental was not only the principal claim but the only claim. He also referred to the case of GARBA V UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR, PT 18, 555. He urged the Court to resolve issue (1) in favour of the respondent.
On issue (2) Mr. Alabi referred to the case of CHIEF (DR) O. FAJEMIROKUN V COMMERCIAL BANK NIGERIA LTD & ANOR (2009) 2-3 SC, PT 1, 34 to concede that when a citizen in the exercise of his civic duty reports a crime to the police, unless it is shown to be done malafide, he cannot be held culpable. Counsel also conceded that the rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution are not absolute but subject to permissible derogations like, right of the police to arrest for the purposes of investigation and prosecution in applicable circumstances. Counsel however added a rider: that such arrest must be based on a reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime. Counsel opined that in the instant case the appellants criminal complaint to the police was not made bonafide. He referred to Exhibit PH1 which he alleged clearly shows that the transaction which led to the arrest of the respondent was civil in nature
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devoid of any criminal coloration. Mr. Alabi contended that the appellant instigated the police to collect the debt it believes the respondent owes her. That on the authority of OMMAN V EKPE (2001) 1 NWLR, PT 641, 374, Exhibit PH5, same as TOKUNBO- 3 which was made under duress cannot be enforced.
On the Nigerian Police Force being the proper party in the suit in the Court below, Mr. Alabi referred to SECTION 215(2) of the Constitution to contend that at the State level the Commissioner of Police is the proper authority to be sued. That there is no principal/agent relationship between the Nigeria Police Force and a state Commissioner of Police. Counsel urged the court to also resolve this issue in favour of the respondent and to dismiss the appeal with substantial costs.
The appellant filed a reply brief on the 01/02/2019. Taking a cursory look at this process, I find that it is just an elucidation/explanation and repetition of his arguments in his brief. It does not show and respond to any new issues raised by the respondent. It is therefore not a reply brief in accordance with the Rules. ORDER 19(5) (1) of the Rules Court, 2016 provides as
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follows:-
19(5)(1) The appellant may also, if necessary, within fourteen days of the service on him of the Respondents brief, file and serve or cause to be served on the Respondent a reply brief which shall DEAL WITH ALL NEW POINTS ARISING from the Respondents brief. (Emphasis mine)
It is clear that this reply brief which does not answer or deal with any new point(s) raised by the respondents brief cannot stand. I accordingly discountenance it.
I have observed that the issues raised for determination more or less overlap. Since the appellant is the party who appealed to this Court I will determine this appeal on the three issues raised by the appellant. The first issue is whether the trial Court had or lacked jurisdiction to try the matter. The issue of jurisdiction is very important in the adjudication process. Jurisdiction is the life blood of any adjudication. I uphold the submission of respondents counsel when he cited the case of Madukolu V Nkemdilim (supra) as laying down the three conditions to exist before a Court can be said to be competent or claim to have jurisdiction in respect of any matter.
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See also the cases of ADETOYINBO & ORS V THE PRESIDENT & OTHER MEMBERS OF WAKAJAYE GRADE C CUSTOMARY COURT, WAKAJAYE, IBADAN & ORS (2015) LPELR 41714 (CA) and BUREMOH V AKANDE (2017) LPELR 41565 (SC).
In other to determine whether or not a Court is competent to entertain a matter, it is important to examine the statute creating the Court and the subject matter of the claim. See, ADEYEMI & ORS V OPEYORI (1976) LPELR 171 (SC). There is no quarrel with the first and last conditions; i.e. that the Court was properly constituted. The main grouse of the appellant is whether the subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court before which this matter was brought is regulated by SECTION 251 (1) OF THE 1999 Constitution. SECTION 251 (1) (R) & (S) confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court for any action/proceeding for a declaration or injunction against and such other civil or criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly. By virtue of
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ORDER 1, Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) RULES, 1979, Court means the Federal High Court or the State High Court. See, GAFAR V GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE (2007) 4 NWLR, PT 1024, 375 (SC) and FMCT V EZE (2006) 2 NWLR, PT 964, 221 (CA). What this means is that both the Federal High Court and State High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters for the enforcement of a persons fundamental rights: GAFAR V GOVT OF KWARA STATE (SUPRA); FMCT V EZE (SUPRA); TUKUR V GOVT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR PT 117, 517 (SC) and JACK V UNAM (2004) 5 NWLR, PT 865208 SC. It follows that the jurisdiction to entertain any matter/suit which seeks to enforce the observance of a fundamental human rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution lies only with the High Court of a State or the Federal High Court. See KALU V STATE (1998) 13 NWLR, PT 583, 531 (SC). To access the Court to secure the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution the complainant must follow the procedure provided for in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules: NUT V COSST (2006) 5 NWLR PT 974, 590 (CA) and DONGTOE V CSC OF PLATEAU STATE (2001) 19 WRN, 125 AT
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147 (SC). When an application is made under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, a condition precedent to the exercise of the Courts jurisdiction is that the securing of the enforcement thereof should be the main claim and not an ancillary claim. See GAFAR V GOVT OF KWARA STATE (SUPRA); SEA TRUCKS NIGERIA LTD and NWACHUKWU V NWACHUKWU (2018) 17 NWLR, PT 1648, 357.
I have looked at the claim of the respondent in the Court below as contained at pages 1-2 of the records:-
(a) A DECLARATION that the arrest, humiliation and detention of the applicant on 24th April, 2014 and the planned arrest and/or trail of the applicant for arrest by police officers from Anthony Police Station, Lagos in connivance with officers of Oba-Ile Divisional Police Station of Ondo State Police Command any moment from now acting for and under the instruction of the 1st Respondent on a false allegation and/or on a debt the 1st Respondent unjustifiably claimed the applicant owed her is or/are illegal, unlawful and an infraction of applicants constitutional rights to dignity and liberty of persons.
(b) AN ORDER of this honourable Court
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restraining the 1st Respondent, his agents, representatives, privies and anybody acting for her from further molesting, harassing and embarrassing the applicant on a debt the 1st Respondent unjustifiably claimed the applicant owed her.
(c) AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st 2nd and 3rd Respondents either by themselves or through their representatives, privies and agents from further molesting, harassing, intimidating, indicting, incriminating, and arresting the applicant on a debt the 1st Respondent unjustifiably claimed the applicant owed her or on any unsubstantiated allegation(s).
(d) AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents jointly to pay to the applicant the sum of N5, 000, 000.00 (Five Million Naira) only being damages for the false allegation, unlawful arrest, detention, molestation, harassment and grievous body injuries caused the applicant and discomfort caused him and his family by his arrest and detention on 24th April, 2014 and his plan re-arrest.
In my humble view, all these are claims for enforcement of fundamental rights. It does not include any other claim or
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relief nor is it merely an ancillary relief to another claim outside fundamental rights. I hold on the basis of the authorities cited that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter from all angles. The learned trial judge was right to have assumed jurisdiction in this case and I so hold.
This takes us to the other ancillary issue of whether the issue before the Court was an employer/employee relationship thereby giving the National Industrial Court exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. There is no dispute that by SECTION 254 C (1) of the Constitution as amended by SECTION 6 of the Third Alteration Act of 2010, the National Industrial Court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters;
(a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from the workplace, the condition of service including health, safety welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.
There is also no argument that the hitherto relationship between the appellant and the respondent was that of employer/employee. However that was not the
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claim of the respondent in the Court below. The claim as stated earlier is for enforcement of the respondents fundamental right. It is in my view not an answer that the appellant made a report to the police. There was no evidence of such a complaint before the lower Court. It is not the duty of the Court to determine whether the respondent had committed an offence or not. It was up to the appellant as respondent along with the other respondents to justify the infraction of the respondents right which he was seeking to enforce. As conceded by the respondents counsel, these rights are not absolute. However it is not enough that you have an allegation against a party for an offence and you take no step to properly prosecute him or have him prosecuted. You will not for instance be entitled to lock him up with no intention to prosecute him but only to make him pay a debt. The law has its limits for both the citizen and the law enforcement agents. It is a known practice that debtors in particular often run to Court to enforce their rights using this procedure to keep off their obligation. It has not been shown from the circumstances of
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this case that it falls into that category.
It is important to point out that by virtue of ORDER 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, the National Industrial Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement procedure matter brought under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules. It is only the Federal High Court and State High Court which include the High Court of Federal Capital Territory that have the jurisdiction to entertain such applications. However a person who alleges infraction of his fundamental right need not invoke the constitutional procedure of under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. He may initiate an ordinary civil claim under the relevant rules of court. See NUT V COSST (SUPRA) and ONWO V OKO & ORS (1996) 6 NWLR PT 456, 584 AT 603-604. This is what normally happens in National Industrial Court when the infraction forms part of the reliefs sought. Counsel is therefore misconceived when he thought that the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules.
The point must also be
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made here that in this procedure, it is not the facts that constitute the claim under the procedure for Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules. Rather it is the allegation of infraction of the fundamental rights of the claimant that is relevant. It therefore does not matter what really the relationship is as long as that is not what constitutes the claim. Of necessity infraction of fundamental right must arise from some form of relationship or failure of such relationship. It is therefore in my view completely irrelevant whether or not in this case there was employer/employee relationship as long as the claim or relief is not a fall out of that relationship but a claim for enforcement of fundamental rights, the Federal High Court has jurisdiction. The learned trial Judge rightly found accordingly.
On the contention of the appellant that judgment and reliefs were granted to an improper party, I think this contention is peasantry and beggars the question. I wondered for a moment whether the appellants counsel was also representing the 3rd respondent. The appellant seems to be simply crying more than the bereaved in this case. But more
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fundamentally the respondents brief has adequately answered this contention when it referred to and quoted SECTION 215(2) of the 1999 Constitution thus:
The Nigeria Police Force shall be under the command of the inspector-General of Police and any contingents of the Nigeria Police Force stationed in a state shall, subject to the authority of the Inspector-General of Police, be under the command of the Commissioner of Police of that State.
I only need to add that since the Commissioner of Police is a legal entity who can sue and be sued, it is a proper party in law. It is not open to the appellant to challenge the legal personality of the 3rd respondent in the circumstances and in the manner done. They are mere busy bodies. This contention is discountenanced.
On the third issue raised by the respondent, I find that this too has been adequately answered in the respondents brief. It concedes that every citizen has a civic duty to report crime to the police. The point is whether such report is done bonafide or malafide. In the instant case, it is very clear that the report to the police was for the recovery of money which
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the respondent allegedly diverted. There was no issue of crime. The allegation of crime is an afterthought and I so hold. The report to the police was malafide and was not done in furtherance of any civic duty as alleged. I accordingly resolve all the issues against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
I find no merit in this appeal and I dismiss it. Consequently I affirm the judgment of Hon. Justice F. A. Olubanjo of the Federal High Court, Akure in Suit No: FHC/AK/CS/88/2014 delivered on the 14/02/2017.
I assess costs at N200, 000 against the appellant and in favour of respondent.
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I have read in draft the leading judgment and agree with my learned brother, Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud, JCA that the appeal be dismissed. There is no merit therein.
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: Having read in draft form the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, JCA, I became convinced of the approach and consideration of issues for determination in the appeal. The reasoning and conclusion are apt and
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accepted by me with nothing to add.
The appeal lacks merit and qualified for dismissal which I followed the trend of my Lord in dismissing same. I therefore affirm the judgment of Hon. Justice F. A. Olubanjo of the Federal High Court, Akure in Suit No. FHC/AK/CS/88/2014 delivered on the 14th day of February, 2017.
I abide by the order of costs in the lead judgment of N200,000 in favour of the Respondent.
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Appearances:
Mr. Steve Adebowale, with him, Messrs Kolawole V. Adetula and D. EmmanuelFor Appellant(s)
Respondent’s Counsel was served with Hearing Notice but was absent without explanationFor Respondent(s)
>
Appearances
Mr. Steve Adebowale, with him, Messrs Kolawole V. Adetula and D. EmmanuelFor Appellant
AND
Respondent’s Counsel was served with Hearing Notice but was absent without explanationFor Respondent
