OSIM LIVINUS ATU & ORS -VS- CIVIL DEFENCE, FIRE, IMMIGRATION & & PRISON SERVICES BOARD & 1 other

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

ON WEDNESDAY 6TH DAY OF MARCH 2019

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE SINMISOLA ADENIYI

SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/404/2016

BETWEEN:

OSIM LIVINUS ATU
UKUJEDE FELIX O…….…………………….CLAIMANTS

AND

CIVIL DEFENCE, FIRE, IMMIGRATION

& PRISON SERVICES BOARD

NIGERIA PRISON SERVICE………………….DEFENDANTS

J U D G E M E N T

The summary of the Claimants’ case, as gathered from the Complaint and Statement of Facts filed on 11/11/2016 to initiate the instant action is that, the Claimants were senior officers of the 2^nd Defendant until they were dismissed on 16/08/2016 for serious misconduct. It is the Claimants’ case that their actions did not constitute serious misconduct as alleged by the Defendants to warrant their dismissal. They further alleged that due process was not followed by the Defendants and that they were not accorded fair hearing before they were dismissed; hence they contend that the dismissal by the Defendants was wrongful and unlawful.

Being aggrieved, the Claimants commenced the instant action, whereby they claimed from the Defendants, the reliefs set out as follows:
An Order of the Honourable Court for immediate re-instatement of the Claimants by the Defendants.
An Order of the Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay the Claimants all their outstanding salaries and benefits.
An Order of the Honourable Court directing the Defendants to release the Claimants’ promotion and all other deserving entitlements.
The sum of Two Million Naira (N2,000,000.00) only as general damages.
The sum of One Million Naira (N1,000,000.00) only being cost of litigation.
It is borne by the records of the Court that the Defendants had initially filed separate Statements of Defence on 29/11/2016 and 04/07/2018 respectively but both were withdrawn and were struck out by the order of Court on 26/09/2018. The Joint Statement of Defence of the Defendants was filed on 21/09/2018, whereby they denied the entirety of the Claimants’ claim; contending that the Claimants were dismissed for serious misconduct and that due process was accorded to them before they were dismissed.
At the plenary trial, the Claimants testified in person as CW1 and CW2 respectively. They both adopted their written depositions and additional depositions on oath and tendered sixteen (16) documents as exhibits. At the conclusion of their evidence – in – chief, they were both subjected to cross-examination by the Defendants’ learned counsel.
The Defendants on their part called a sole witness, by name Agun Olatunji, the Comptroller of Prisons, Provost Marshall of the 2^nd Defendant. He equally adopted his written depositions. Although seven (7) documents were listed by the Defendants in their list of documents, no document was tendered by the Defendants since the documents listed had been tendered by the Claimants. The Defendants’ witness was also subjected to cross-examination by the Claimants’ learned counsel.
Upon conclusion of plenary trial, parties filed and exchanged their written final Addresses as prescribed by the provision of Order 45 of the Rules of this Court.

In the final Address filed on behalf of the Defendants on 25/10/2018, their learned counsel, Madesola Olatunde, (Mrs), formulated two issues as having arisen for determination in this suit, namely:

1. “Whether or not, the actions of the Claimants constitute gross/serious misconduct as to warrant their dismissal?”
“Whether or not the Claimants were lawfully and/or rightfully dismissed by the Defendants.

The Claimants filed their final Address on 06/11/2018, whereby their learned counsel, S.U. Adani, Esq., framed two issues for determination which are similar to the issues raised by the Defendants, that is:

“Whether or not the actions of the Claimants constitute gross misconduct to warrant their dismissal?
“Whether or not the Claimants were lawfully and/or rightfully dismissed by the Defendants?

The Defendants did not file a Reply on Points of Law.

The issues raised by the parties, in my view, cover the field of dispute in this suit. As such the Court hereby adopts the same in determining this suit. In doing so, I should also state that I had carefully considered and taken due benefits of the totality of the final addresses filed by the respective learned counsel; and I shall make specific reference to their submissions as I deem necessary as I proceed with this judgment.
ISSUE ONE:

To be determined at first is the issue whether or not the actions of the Claimants constitute serious misconduct to warrant their dismissal.

As a starting point, the general principles guiding the proof of a claim for termination of employment have remained sacrosanct. It is the law that a Claimant who alleges unlawful dismissal from employment must plead and prove the following facts to succeed in his claim:

That he or she is an employee of the Defendant;
Place before the court the terms and conditions of his or her employment;

State who can appoint and who can remove him or her;

In what circumstances his or her employment can be determined and
In what manner the said terms of the employment were breached by the Defendant.

See Oloruntoba – Oju Vs Abdul-Raheem [2009] All FWLR (Pt. 497) 1 at 42; Imasuen Vs University of Benin [2011] All FWLR (Pt.572) 1791 at 1809.

As I had earlier stated, the Claimants in the instant case have sought from this Court, among others, an order for immediate re-instatement and the payment of all salaries and allowances due to them from the date of their dismissal. Therefore, they are duty bound to prove the facts alleged by them that entitle them to the reliefs sought. To establish that they were employees of the 2^nd Defendant, the Claimants tendered Exhibits C7, C9 and C8 namely; Letters of Appointment and the List of 2015 approved promotion of officers of the 2^nd Defendant respectively.
The testimony of the Claimants on the issue of whether or not their actions constitute serious misconduct is to the extent that while they were in the employment of the 2^nd Defendant, they were attached to one Ali Baba Salihi, the DCG (ITP) CD who was their immediate boss. The CW1 was attached to said boss as his personal assistant and the CW2 was in charge of revenue in the office. They both testified that the said boss had issued a directive stating that his personal mails should not be collected on his behalf from anybody and they also testified that the office of the DCG (ITP) CD has a clerk who receives letters/mails for the office. The CW1 and CW2 tendered in evidence as Exhibits C1 and C11, copies of the written directive issued by the DCG (ITP) CD respectively.
The CW1 and CW2 further testified that on 11/07/2016, their boss informed them that he had refused to receive and acknowledge his letter of retirement from the Controller General of Prisons (CGP) because he (the boss) was not due for retirement. The Claimants testified that on that same day, the letter of retirement which their boss had refused to acknowledge was sent by the CGP for them to receive and sign but they refused to acknowledge it based on their boss’ earlier directive; and that they advised the bearer to either serve it personally on their boss or on the clerk of the office who were both in the office at the material time. The CW1 and CW2 testified further that they were immediately summoned by the CGP, to explain the reason for refusing to accept the letter but in spite of the fact that they both explained that the refusal was based on the directive of their boss, they were issued queries. The copies of the queries were tendered in evidence as Exhibit C2 and Exhibit C12, whilst their replies to the said queries were tendered as Exhibits C3 and C13 respectively.
The testimony of DW1 in this regard, is that the written directives – Exhibits C1 and C11 relied upon by the Claimants as to their explanation or defence for their refusal to receive the letter has no relevance to this case as the said directive had been issued two years prior to the incidence. DW1 further testified that the CGP is the most superior officer in the 2^nd Defendant and being a regimented organisation, his instructions supersedes that of any other officer below him. DW1 further testified that the failure of the Claimants to carry out lawful instruction/directive of the most superior officer amounts to insubordination and flagrant disobedience of extant rules; hence queries were issued to them and they were subsequently dismissed by the 1^st Defendant based on the recommendation of the Investigative Committee.
Now, the learned Defendants’ counsel had argued that the disobedience of the Claimants to carry out lawful order or their failure to carry out lawful instruction from the CGP, as the most superior officer of the 2^nd Defendant was an indicator that they had divided loyalty between their immediate boss who was an Assistant Comptroller General and who was lower in rank to the CGP.

Citing the cases of Teliat Sule Vs Nigeria Cotton Board [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt 5) 17 at 19, the learned counsel for the Defendants submitted that where an order is made by an officer or one in authority, a latter directive different in nature from the former made by a more superior officer overrides that of the former. She further submitted that disobedience to lawful orders, insubordination, and unruly behaviour and divided loyalty exhibited by the Claimants amounts to misconduct/serious misconduct for which they were dismissed.

On his own part, learned counsel for the Claimants argued that to ascertain whether the actions of the Claimants amounts to gross/serious misconduct, it must first be established that the order issued by the CGP was a lawful order. Learned Claimants’ counsel argued that retirement letter is a personal letter that is addressed to a person in his personal name and not in his official capacity and as such, the proper person to sign and receive a retirement letter is the person the letter was addressed. He further argued that the standing directives issued by the Claimants’ immediate boss in 2014 – Exhibits C1 and C11 is relevant to the instant case as the Claimants were reminded of the directive when their boss informed them that he (their boss) had refused to collect his retirement letter from the CGP. Learned Claimants’ counsel submitted that collecting and acknowledging a personal letter against the person’s directive is unlawful as this is an infringement on the person’s fundamental human right. He also submitted that it would equally have been misconduct on the part of the Claimants if they had refused to obey the instruction of their immediate boss. In further support of his propositions, learned counsel cited the cases of Ologhere Vs Portland Paints & Products (Nig) Ltd & 2Ors [2013] All FWLR (Pt 661) 1593; ANPP & Anor Vs Na’allah & 47 Ors and the provisions of Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and Code of Conduct For Public Officer Fifth Schedule, Part 1 Section 9 of the 1999 Constitution (supra).
Now, as borne by the evidence before the Court and as correctly noted by both learned counsel, the Claimants’ conditions of service is governed by the Public Service Rules (PSR), the 2^nd Defendant being a Federal Government Parastatal. See Rule 160101 of the Public Service Rules (2008) which provide that the PSR is applicable to Parastatals in the Public Service of the Federation.

Exhibit C4 and C14, (the letters of dismissal) in view also stated that the Claimants were dismissed for serious misconduct bordering on dereliction of assignment and refusal to carry out official instructions in line with the PSR 030402(w). As earlier noted, the Claimants were issued queries, Exhibits C2 and C12 before they were dismissed.

It is imperative at this point to reproduce the relevant portion of the queries.

“I am directed sequel to the unfortunate incident that transpired in the office of the CGP in the glaring presence of the superior officers of the Service in the early hours of the morning of 11^th July 2016 to issue you a query:

To show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for your act of unruly behaviour, foul language, insubordination, divided loyalty and an act unbecoming of a public officer and gross misconduct and refusal to take/carry out lawful instruction from the CGP:
In that you refused to accept and acknowledge the receipt of a letter with a dispatch book meant for your boss
And that you, haven (sic) failed to receive the said letter in the office of your boss, you were summoned by the CGP and

Haven (sic) been summoned by the CGP in respect of same, you did also flagrantly refused to receive and acknowledge the said letter despite the direct instruction and order of the CGP to the same effect in the presence of some superior officers of the Service.

(b) That the above conduct which amount to a direct affront to a constituted authority and inimical to the interest of the Service, a travesty of discipline and therefore inconsistent with good order, conduct and sense of judgement and responsibility expected of a senior officer and which conduct and action contravene the enabling provisions of PSR (2008) Rule 030301(ii) (iv) (m) (o) and Rule 030402(s) and (w) and punishable under Rule 030301 and 030401 of same.”

As reflected in the Claimants’ answers to the queries (Exhibits C3 and C13) and in their letters appealing their dismissal (Exhibits C5 and C15), the Claimants admitted that they both refused to receive and acknowledge the letter for their immediate boss even after being summoned by the CGP and were directed to receive same. The defence of the Claimants was that they were acting in line with the directive of their immediate boss. The Claimants had this to say under further cross-examination by the Defendants’ learned counsel.

CW1:

“The CGP is the highest ranking officer but I refused to collect the personal letter. I attended to the summons of the CGP and he directed me to receive the personal letter which I refused.”

CW2:

“I was summoned by the CGP and I was directed to receive the letter but I refused to receive the letter because the letter was personal.”

From the above evidence, the Claimants acknowledged the fact that their immediate boss is lower in rank to the CGP but yet they chose to obey the instructions of their boss against that of the CGP.

Now, misconduct is defined by Rule 030301 of the PSR as:

“a specific act of wrong-doing or an improper behaviour which is inimical to the image of the service, and which can be investigated and proved, and can lead to termination and retirement”.

Acts of misconduct includes inter – alia, unruly behaviour, foul language, refusal to take/carry out lawful instruction from superior officers and insubordination.

And by Rule 030402 of the PSR, serious misconduct is defined as:

“a specific act of very serious wrongdoing and improper behaviour which is inimical to the image of the service, and which can be investigated and if proven may lead to dismissal”.

Serious acts of misconduct include divided loyalty and any other act unbecoming of a Public Officer.

By Exhibits C5 and C15 and from the analysis of the evidence on record, particularly the Claimants’ admission under cross – examination, it is firmly established that the Claimants indeed refused to receive and acknowledge the letter of their boss as directed by the CGP. The contention of the Claimants’ however, is that the act of their refusal to receive the letter cannot amount to serious misconduct because the order by the CGP was not lawful particularly in correlation to the specific directive issued by their immediate boss in 2014 which by the submission of the learned Claimants’ counsel was subsisting and relevant at the material time.
The question then is was the order directed by the CGP to the Claimants unlawful? Or can the Claimants elect and determine which acts are unlawful within the context of the contract of their employment? My answer to these posers is in the negative.

In the present case, I find no reason to fault the decision of the Defendants that the action of the Claimants is serious misconduct. The directive by the CGS is lawful within the parameters of the terms and conditions of their employment. The word “unlawful” is defined in the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary as “not allowed by the law”.
And in Black’s Law Dictionary Eighth Edition, “unlawful” – means not authorised by law, illegal.

I also hasten to find that the learned Claimants’ counsel’s submission that collecting and signing for someone’s personal letter against his directives infringes on the person’s right is inapplicable in the instant case. It is not for the Claimants to allege violation of fundamental right; or to put it in another way, the Claimants cannot on behalf of their immediate boss allege the violation of fundamental right, whose right would have been violated if they had obeyed the order of the CGP. The Claimants’ have not established that the directive given by the CGP was unlawful. I am of the view that the order from the CGP to the Claimants to receive a letter of the Claimants’ immediate boss was lawful. I so hold.

The conditions of service have been described as the bedrock of any contract of service. See Kale Vs CBN [1999] 5 SCNJ 2; Jowan & Ors Vs Delta Steel Co [2010] LPELR 4377. It is trite that in any employer/employee dispute, it is the applicable conditions of service or any other stipulation incorporated or deemed to have been incorporated into it that must be referred to and applied in the resolution of the dispute.

In the instant case, the Claimants are bound by the conditions of service incorporated in the PSR. By Rule 030301 of the PSR, refusal to take or carry out lawful instruction from superior officers is an act of misconduct.

It is a settled common law principle, that what constitutes a serious or gross misconduct of an employee is a question of fact and degree. Misconduct in every given circumstance must be such as to undermine the relationship of trust and confidence supposedly existing between the employer and the employee. See Nwobisi Vs ACB [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt 404) 658; Yusuf Vs Union Bank Plc [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 457) 632; Uzondu Vs Union Bank Plc [2008] LPELR 4535

Furthermore, it is also firmly settled that misconduct on the part of any employee, which is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express or implied conditions of service, may justify the dismissal. It is apt to further state that misconduct has been defined as that act carried out, in which the will is a party. To be guilty of misconduct, the person concerned must appreciate that he is acting wrongfully and yet persists in so acting regardless of the consequences, or acts with reckless indifference as to what the result may be. See Harka Air Services (Nig) Ltd Vs Keazor Esq. [2011] LPELR 1353.
The evidence put forward by the Defendants is that failure to carry out lawful instructions and/or directives of the most superior officer is improper behaviour and is inimical to the image of the Defendants. On a close examination of the evidence, I entirely agree that the unjustifiable defiance by the Claimants’ of the CGP’s lawful orders is, to say the least, reckless and grave and clearly undermined the relationship of confidence which should exist between an employer and an employee especially the 1^st Defendant, being a para – military or regimented agency. It is a wilful disobedience of very significant standing directives and guidelines. Such a conduct is in my view a serious misconduct as known to law. The principle of law is well settled that wilful disobedience of a lawful and reasonable order of an employer by an employee is of definite act of misconduct which, at common law, attracts the penalty of dismissal since such wilful disobedience of a lawful order is a reflection of a total disregard of an essential condition of a contract of service, namely, that the servant must obey a proper, reasonable and lawful order of the master in default of which their contractual relationship cannot be expected to continue. See Teliat Sule Vs Nigerian Cotton Board (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 17, cited by the learned Defendants’ counsel where the legal effect of disobedience in a master and servant relationship was considered by the Apex Court per Obaseki JSC, as follows:

“When a servant grows too big to obey his master, the honourable cause open to him is to resign in order to avoid unpleasant consequences should an occasion which calls for obedience be serviced with disobedience. Both common law and statute law brook no disobedience of lawful order from any servant, high or low, big or small. Such conduct normally and usually attracts the penalty of summary dismissal. Disobedience ranks as one of the worst form of conduct in any establishment.”

I must, with very great respect, fully endorse the above view.

Having regard to the analysis of the evidence on record in the foregoing, it further becomes easy for the Court to find that, the action of the Claimants constitute serious misconduct to warrant their dismissal. And I so hold.

On the premises of the foregoing, I hereby resolve the first issue for determination against the Claimants.

ISSUE TWO

I proceed to determine and resolve the next issue as to whether or not the Claimants were lawfully and/or rightfully dismissed by the Defendants.

There is no dispute between parties that the 2^nd Defendant is a statutory body and from the facts of the case, the Claimants’ case is founded on statutory employment. In such employment, the staff cannot be validly removed from the employment unless the provisions provided in the statute for removing the staff is followed strictly. See Adeniyi Vs Governing Council of Yaba College of Technology [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 300) 426; Oloruntoba-Oju Vs Abdul-Raheem (supra) at 42. In other words, for the Claimants to succeed in their claim, they must prove that the Defendants did not comply with the procedure stipulated by law for their removal.

The case put forward by the Claimants, and as also gathered from their evidence is that due process was not followed by the Defendants in dismissing them from service. In support of their assertions, the Claimants tendered in evidence Exhibits C2 and C12, (the queries), Exhibits C3 and C13 (answers to the queries), Exhibits C5 and C15; (the Claimants’ letters of Appeal) and Exhibits C6 and C16 (the letters of their solicitor demanding for immediate reinstatement).

Ordinarily, a master has the right to terminate his servant’s employment for good or bad reasons or no reasons at all, but where the employment has statutory flavour, the employment has to be terminated in accordance with the way and manner prescribed by statute or regulations governing the employment. The Apex Court in Union Bank Vs Charles Ogboh [1995] 2 NWLR (380) 647 at 669 held that:

“Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute and any other form of termination inconsistent therewith is null and void and of no effect.”

See also: Eperokun Vs University of Lagos [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 34) 162; Bamgboye Vs University of llorin (1990) 10 NWLR (Pt.622) 290 at 320; Edet Vs Chief of Army Staff (1994) 2 NWLR (324) 41; Omale Vs University of Agriculture, Makurdi [2011] LPELR 4366. 26. The disciplinary procedure for the Defendants for misconduct and serious misconduct are set out in Rules 030302 – 030307 of the PSR. The procedure is similar to the procedure stated in Part V of the Guidelines for Appointment, Promotion, Discipline and General Purposes 2013 of the 1^st Defendant (The Guidelines). The disciplinary procedures in the PSR for serious misconduct are stated in Rule 030307 as follows:

(i) The officer shall be notified in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to discipline him/her. The query should be precise and to the point. It must relate the circumstances of the offence, the rule and regulation which the officer has broken and the likely penalty. In serious cases which are likely to result in dismissal, the officer should be given access to any such document(s) or report(s) used against him/her and he/she should be asked to state in his/her defence that he/she has been given access to documents. The officer shall be called upon to state in writing, within the period specified in the query any grounds upon which he/she relies to exculpate himself/herself;

(ii) If the officer submits his/her representations and the Federal Civil Service Commission is not satisfied that he/she has exculpated himself/herself, and considers that the officer should be dismissed, it shall take such action accordingly.

Where necessary, the Commission may set up a board of inquiry which shall consist of not less than three persons one of whom shall be appointed chairman by the Commission. The members of the board shall be selected with due regard to the status of the officer involved in the disciplinary case and to the nature of the complaint which is the subject of inquiry. The head of the officer’s department shall not be a member of the board.

(iii) The officer shall be informed that, on a specific day, the question of his/her dismissal shall be brought before the board and he/she shall be required to appear before it to defend himself/herself and shall be entitled to call witnesses. His/her failure to appear shall not invalidate the proceedings of the board;

(iv) Where witnesses are called by the board to give evidence before it, the officer shall be entitled to put questions to the witnesses and no documentary evidence shall be used against the officer unless he/she has previously been supplied with a copy thereof or given access thereto;

(v) The board having inquired into the matter shall make a report to the Commission. If the Commission considers that the report should be amplified in any respect or that further

inquiry is desirable, it may refer any matter back to the board for further inquiry or report. The Commission shall not itself hear witnesses. If upon considering the report of the board together with the evidence and all material documents relating to the case, the Commission is of the opinion that the officer should be dismissed, such action shall immediately be taken;
26. The duty to prove the wrongfulness or nullity of the summary dismissal rests with the Claimant, not the Defendant. See Ziideel V. RSCSC [2007] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 554 SC, Morohunfolu V. Kwara Tech. [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506 SC, Ningi V. FBN Plc [1996] 3 NWLR (Pt. 435) 220, Katto V. CBN [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 SC.

Now, the Claimants’ case is that even though they explained the reason they refused to receive the letter to the CGP when they were summoned to his office, that queries were issued on them by the Defendants on the same date of the incident; that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee in line with the PSR to investigate the allegation before the Claimants were tried and dismissed by the 1^st Defendant and that the offence of serious misconduct does not carry the penalty of dismissal.

Contrary to the case put forward by the Claimants, the evidence on the record of the Court is that after the Claimants replied the queries that were issued on them, preliminary investigations were conducted by the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee – SSDC (or the Panel). These facts were stated by the Claimants in their letters of appeal, Exhibits C5 and C15, where they stated that they were paneled within three weeks of the incident. The Claimants also testified under cross – examination by the Defendants’ counsel, that they received summons from commission of inquiry and that they appeared before the panel.
I am of the firm view that the Claimants merely made assertions of lack of due process without prove of the particular process to be followed and how the process was breached by the Defendants. The Claimants ought to have proved the authority to appoint and remove them; the circumstances by which their employment may be determined, and the particulars of the breach of the terms of their employment by the Defendants.

The Defendant on their part denied the claims of the Claimants that due process was not followed in dismissing them from service. They also established that preliminary investigation was conducted by the SSDC and that by its report to the 1^st Defendant, the Claimants were recommended for dismissal.

In the circumstances therefore, I hold the firm view that the Claimants have not established the fact that due process was not followed by the Defendants in dismissing them from service.

Let me also deal with the allegation made by the Claimants that one Barrister Olatunji Agu who issued the queries was the Secretary of the Board of Inquiry that recommended their dismissal. In essence, the Claimants posited violation of their right to fair hearing. The learned Claimant’s counsel had tried strenuously to convince this Court in his written Address that the Claimants were not given fair in the proceedings leading to the termination of their appointment. However, there is no proof on record to support learned Claimants’ submission other than the allegation made. It is imperative at this point to restate the trite position of law that no amount of brilliance in a written Address can make up for the lack of evidence; a written Address cannot be a substitute for evidence. See Elumeziem & Ors V Amadi [2014] LPELR 22459; Ekpeyong V Etim [1990] 3 NWLR (PT 140) 594.
It is trite that in employment cases, fair hearing does not require more than disclosing the allegation to the employee and giving the employee an opportunity to answer to the allegation. Once a person likely to be affected by a disciplinary proceeding is given adequate notice of the allegation against him and he is given an opportunity to enable him make a representation in his own defence, the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, would have been satisfied. See NEPA Vs Enyong (2003) FWLR (Pt. 175) 452 at 472

The allegation of violation of breach of fair hearing was denied by the Defendants. The DW1 testified that the SSDC made recommendation of the Claimants’ dismissal to the 1st Defendant and that the DW1 only acted as Secretary of the SSDC. It is clearly established from the evidence of the Defendants, that indeed the Claimants were given fair hearing before they were dismissed. Based on the foregoing therefore, I am of the firm view that the Claimants have not successfully proved that their dismissal was either wrongful or null and void. I so hold.

The Claimants also claim for salaries, allowances and damages. I am also of the view that these reliefs cannot be granted since these reliefs are hinged on the wrongfulness of their dismissal.

In the final analysis, what the Court had demonstrated, through the evidence led on record and the totality of the circumstances of this case is that the dismissal of the Claimants from service by the Defendants is valid. The final result therefore is that the case of the Claimants must and hereby fails in its entirety. It is hereby accordingly dismissed.
Parties are to bear their respective costs.

SINMISOLA O. ADENIYI

(Presiding Judge)

06/03/2019

Legal representation: