IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT KANO
Before His Lordship:-
HON. JUSTICE E.D. E ISELE – JUDGE
DATE: 10TH DECEMBER, 2019 – SUIT NO: NICN/KN/17/2018
BETWEEN
- MUSA YARO BARI – CLAIMANT
AND
- MINISTRY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT KANO STATE
- ROGO LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL – DEFENDANTS
- ATTRONEY GENERAL OF KANO STATE
REPRESENTATION: parties absent.
Claimant – Present
Defendants – Absent
APPEARANCE
M.Y. Ngu, Esq. with R.O. Ekirigwe, Esq. for the Claimant
Defendant unpresented.
RULING/JUDGMENT
The claimants commenced this suit by General Form of Complaint filed on an 13th of April, 2018 in which he seeks the following reliefs from this Court.
- A DECLARATION that the dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the second Defendant vide a dismissal letter dated 17/10/2017 is illegal, wrongful, null and void.
- ANO ORDER setting aside the letter of dismissal dated 17/10/2017 purportedly dismissing the Claimant from the employment of the 2nd Defendant and consequently re-instating the Claimant to his employment with his full salaries, allowances and other prerequisites of office.
- The sum of N42,104,554;00 (Forty Two Million One Hundred and Four Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Naira Only) as outstanding salaries due the Claimant from 1997 to 2017.
- AN ORDER directing the Chairman of the 2nd Defendant to calculate other allowance and prerequisites for office that the Claimant is entitled to had he not been wrongfully stopped from service.
- The sum of N100,000,000:00 (One Hundred Million Naira Only) as general damages caused as a result of the act of the Defendants against the Claimant for over 20 years.
- Cost of this action.
At paragraph 29 of the statement of fact the Claimant averred that on He 2nd January, 2018 he was served with a letter of dismissal dated 17th of October, 2017 by the second defendant citing secondment from duty as the reason for his dismissal by the 2nd Defendant who had been his employers. He maintained he was not given any fair hearing before the dismissal letter was issued to him neither was he issued with any query by the Second Defendant. He maintained that since 1997 he has not received salaries.
On the 3rd December, 2018, the Defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection praying for:
(1) AN ORDER of this Honourable Court dismissing and striking out this matter for want of jurisdiction.
(2) ANY FURTHER ORDERS the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance
The grounds of the objection are that:
(a) The suit is not constituted in accordance with due process of law which makes the suit incompetent before this Honourable Court.
(b) That this suit is not brought within the stipulated period prescribed by law.
(c) That this suit is Statute barred thereby robs thus Honourable Court of jurisdiction to entertained the case.
Now, in support of the Preliminary Objection is a written address in which two issues were formulated for determination.
- Whether having regard to date of filing this suit and the date contained in the claimant’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim (Fact) this suit can be entertained having been in contravention of the Public Officers Protection Law?
- Whether the cause of Action arose on the 28thday of August, 2011 but filed on the 14thNovember, 2017 is not Statute barred.
The Claimant/Respondent filed a Counter Affidavit and a written address. The Objector had in the course of advancing legal arguments buttressing the issues they formulated for determination submitted that in determining the time of limitation to institute an action before a court was brought within the prescribed period allowed by law, the Originating process of the Claimant i.e the writ (Complaint) of Summons and or Originating Motions were of paramount importance, citing the case of INYANG V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES FIRST CENTURY GOSPEL CHURCH (2008) ALL FWLR, Part 314, pg. 278 at 281 where it was held that “Whether an action is filed outside the period of limitation is determined by examining the writ of summons and statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff the cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence. If the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law then the action is undoubtedly Statute barred”
In the written address of the Respondent in support of the Counter Affidavit the Claimant had stated in the second paragraph that for the purpose of Statute of limitation, time bigins to run from the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action accrues.
Relying on the case of NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITIES PLC V. LOTUS PLASTICS LTD (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) p. 158 at 161. That in the instant case the Respondent was served with the letter of dismissal in January, 2018.
Now, looking simply at the date the Originating Process i.e the General Form of Complaint and the Statement of fact was filed is the 13th day of April, 2018. I had referred earlier to paragraph 29 of the Claimant statement of fact which contained
The averment that the Claimant was served with a letter of dismissal on the 2nd January, 2018 I hold straightaway that time began to run from that date being 2nd January, 2018 because as at date the Claimant’s cause of action had accrued. And the window of time as spelt out in the limitation law, i.e section 2 (a) of the Public Officer (Protection) Law Cap 121 of Kano State is that every action or other proceedings commenced against a Public Officer as this matter must commence within three months next after the act.
The Law is further established that for computation of the limitation period time will not stop running because there was a negotiation between parties. See FRONTER PETROLEUM RESOURCES INC. V. NDIC (2009) LPLR – 47527 CA See also EBOIGBE V. NNPC (1994) 5 NWRL (PT. 347) 649 AT 659.
It is abundantly clear to me that by the time the Claimant filed this action on the 13th April, 2018 the action had become Statute barred. If the action had been filed on the 2nd of April, or 30th March or thereabout it probably would heve been within time. But the 13th April, 2018 had gone into a 4th Months clearly outside the 3 Months limitation period.
Claim of the Claimant is hereby dismissed it being Statute barred
__________________________
HON. JUSTICE E. D. E. ISELE
JUDGE
