MR. EDMUND IBE ANOLIEFO v. MRS. AGATHA NNEKA ANOLIEFO
(2019)LCN/12985(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 29th day of March, 2019
CA/E/703/2017
JUSTICES
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ABUBAKAR SADIQ UMAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MR. EDMUND IBE ANOLIEFO Appellant(s)
AND
MRS. AGATHA NNEKA ANOLIEFO Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE PROVISION OF THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO CUSTODY, GUARDIANSHIP, WELFARE, ADVANCEMENT OR EDUCATION OF CHILDREN OF A MARRIAGE
Section 71 MCA provides that:
(1) ?In proceedings with respect to the custody, guardianship, welfare, advancement or education of children of a marriage, the Court shall regard the interests of those children as the paramount consideration; and subject thereto, the Court may make such order in respect of those matters as it thinks proper.
(2) The Court may adjourn any proceedings within Subsection (1) of this section until a report has been obtained from a welfare officer on such matters relevant to the proceedings as the Court consider desirable, and any such report may thereafter be received in evidence.
(3) In proceedings with respect to the custody of children of a marriage, the Court may, if it is satisfied that it is desirable to do so, make an order placing the children, or such of them as it thinks fit, in the custody of a person other than a party to the marriage.
(4)”Where the Court makes an order placing a child of a marriage in the custody of a party to the marriage, or of a person other than a party to the marriage, it may include in the order such provision as it thinks proper for access to the child by the other party to the marriage, or by the parties or a party to the marriage, as the case may be.?
The above provision of MCA has been considered in several cases. See WILLIAMS V. WILLIAMS (SUPRA), FALOBI V. FALOBI (1976) 9-10 SC (REPRINT) 1, NANNA V. NANNA (SUPRA), ELUWA V. ELUWA (SUPRA). The settled position of the Court is that in the consideration of who should get custody of the children of the marriage, the welfare and best interest of the children are paramount considerations. It is not the law that custody of a child of tender age must in all cases be awarded to the mother. However, there is a presumption which is supported by the fact that there is natural bond and affection between a child of a tender age and his mother that a child of tender age will be happier with the mother. It is a presumption rebuttable only by evidence of insanity, immorality, infectious disease or cruelty of the mother to the child or lack of reasonable means. See ODOGWU V. ODOGWU (SUPRA), NANNA V. NANNA (SUPRA), ODUSOTE V. ODUSOTE (2011) LPELR ? 9056 (CA) AT 25 ? 26 (F ? A). PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.
FACTORS THE COURT IS TO CONSIDER IN AWARDING MAINTAINANCE ALLOWANCE TO CHILDREN OF A MARRIAGE IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
Section 70 of MCA provides that:
(1) Subject to this section, the Court may, in proceedings with respect to the maintenance of a party to a marriage, or of children of the marriage, other than proceedings for an order for maintenance pending the disposal of proceedings, make such order as it thinks proper, having regard to the means, earning capacity and contract of the parties to the marriage and all other relevant circumstances.
(2) Subject to this section and to rules of Court, the Court may, in proceedings for an order for the maintenance of a party to a marriage, or of children of the marriage, pending the disposal of proceedings, make such order as it thinks proper, having regard to the means, earnings capacity and conduct of the parties to the marriage and all other relevant circumstances.
(3) The Court may make an order for the maintenance of a party notwithstanding that a decree is or has been made against that party in the proceedings to which the proceedings with respect to maintenance are related.
(4) The power of the Court to make an order with respect to the maintenance of children of the marriage shall not be exercised for the benefit of a child who has attained the age of 21 years unless the court is of opinion that there are special circumstances that justify the making of such an order for the benefit of that child.?
The law is settled that in awarding maintenance allowance for the upkeep of the children of the marriage, the Court must take into consideration the means, income, earning capacity of the parties, their status in life and all other circumstances. See AMAH V. AMAH (2016) LPELR 41087 (CA). In paragraph 12(c) of this petition, the appellant averred that:
(c) The Petitioner by virtue of his profession and employment as Chief Camera Man of Grade Level 15 with the Anambra Broadcasting Service (ABS) is financially sound and is capable and has the full capability to finance and maintain wholly the said Lovelyn Chiamaka Aneliefo and Precious Chimamanda Anoliefo to the best standard.?
On pages 15 and 17 of the appellant?s brief the appellant?s counsel again emphasized the fact that the appellant is a senior management staff and Deputy Director at the Anambra Broadcasting Service and thus has the capability to finance and maintain the children. The law is settled that what is admitted needs no further proof. See AMAH V. AMAH (SUPRA) AT 43 (E). MUELLER V. MUELLER (2005) LPELR ? 12687 (CA) AT 21 ? 22 (E ? A). PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.
MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of High Court of Enugu State delivered in suit number HAGB/25D/2012 by Honourable Justice A.O Anidi. The appellant had filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage between him and the respondent wherein he sought for the following reliefs:
(a) A decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
(b) Custody of the Two (2) children of the marriage.
The respondent in response to the petition filed an answer and cross-petition wherein she sought for the following reliefs:
i. An order dismissing the petitioners petition, or in the alternative striking it out as incompetent.
ii. A decree of judicial separation on the ground that since the marriage the petitioner/respondent has behaved in such a way that the respondent/cross petitioner cannot be reasonably expected to live with the petitioner/respondent.
?iii. An order granting custody of the two children of the marriage, Lovelyn
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and Precious Anoliefo to the respondent/cross petitioner with reasonable access to the petitioner/respondent upon due notice and at reasonable hours.
iv. An order that the petitioner/respondent pays the sum of N80,000.00 per month for the maintenance of Lovelyn and Precious effective from 1st April, 2011 when the petitioner refused to cater for them and respondent/cross petitioner took them into her custody subject to upwards review.
v. An order that the petitioner pays to the respondent/cross petitioner for her maintenance the sum of N50,000.00 per month with effect from 25th March, 2011 being the day he maliciously drove her out of her matrimonial home.
vi. An order that the petitioner bears the cost of this petition.
The appellant testified in support of his petition and called one witness. The respondent also testified and called one witness. Written addresses were filed and exchanged by counsel. The Court in its judgment delivered on 28/6/2017 granted a decree of dissolution of marriage as sought by the appellant. Custody of the children and maintenance allowance of
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N50,000:00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) monthly were awarded to the respondent.
The appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment filed a notice of appeal on 11/7/17 which was amended pursuant to the leave of this Court. The amended notice and grounds of appeal filed on 18/1/18 was deemed as properly filed and served on 5/2/19. It contains six grounds of appeal which are stated below without their particulars:
GROUND ONE
?The learned trial Judge erred in law in granting reliefs for maintenance and custody of the Children of the dissolved marriage based on an incompetent cross-petition which did not comply with the mandatory law or pre-requisite for competence of petitions and/or cross-petition.
GROUND TWO
The decision is against the weight of evidence.
GROUND THREE
The learned trial judge erred in law in granting reliefs 63(iv) and (v) of the respondent?s cross-petition when the respondent/cross-petitioner did not lead sufficient evidence to establish these claims and the Court did not evaluate the evidence of the parties in its judgment.
GROUND FOUR
The learned trial judge erred in law by awarding reliefs not
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claimed by the respondent/cross-petitioner.
GROUND FIVE
The Honourable trial Court misconceived or erred in law by misapplying the principles of law relating to custody of children and even applied extraneous matters not supported by evidence in the case and thus occasioned injustice to the appellant.
GROUND SIX
The learned trial Court erred in law by awarding to the respondent reliefs not claimed by her in her cross petition.?
The appellant?s counsel formulated the following five (5) issues for determination:
1. ?Whether the cross-petition is competent and can ground the granting of maintenance and custody of the children without the Honourable trial Court first determining the issue of jurisdiction. (Ground One)
2. Whether the cross-petitioner/respondent established her entitlement to maintenance in reliefs 63(iv) and (v) of her cross- petition awarded to her by the Honourable Trial Court without proper evaluation of evidence. (Grounds Three and Four).
3. Whether the Honourable Court awarded the custody of
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the two (2) children of the marriage properly in accordance with established principles for custody and the facts and evidence of the instant case. (Ground 5).
4. Whether the appellant proved his case on the balance of probabilities. (Ground 2).
5. Whether the trial Court is competent to award the respondent reliefs not claimed in her cross petition. (Ground six).?
The respondent?s counsel adopted the above issues. I have considered the issues formulated by counsel for the determination of this appeal. I find issues 1, 2 and 3 to be apt for the determination of this appeal.
On issue 1, the appellant?s counsel submitted that the cross-petition is incompetent for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Order V Rule 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules. He referred to IBEZIAKO V. IBEZIAKO (2016) LPELR ? 40958 (CA) AT 14 ? 15 (F ? A). He further submitted that the cross ? petition is not predicated on any ground, all the evidence adduced by the cross-petitioner proves nothing and she is not entitled to any of the reliefs in the cross-petition. He referred to Sections 15 (2), 16 (1) and
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39 of the Matrimonial Causes Act. Counsel argued that the cross-petition not having been initiated by due process of law is incompetent and should have been struck out as the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. He referred to: ?MULTICHOICE NIGERIA LTD. V. HON. JERRY AKPAN (2014) LPELR-22681 (CA), MADUKOLU & ORS V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR (PT 4) 587, NWABUEZE V. OKOYE (2002) 10 WRN 123 AT 155, INEC V. DPP (2014) ALL FWLR (PT 738) 909 CA AT 1932 (PARAS D-F). AMOBI V. NZEGWU (2014) ALL FWLR (PT 730) 1284 SC AT 1299 PARAS C-E, JAMES V. INEC (2015) ALL FWLR (PT 787) 652 SC AT 713-714, PARAS F-A”. He urged the Court to strike out the petition.
In response to the above submission, the respondent?s counsel referred to Order V Rule 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules. He submitted that the respondent substantially satisfied the provisions of the rules and the general rule of Order V Rule 3 is relaxed by Rule 24 in the interest of justice and the approach of Order XXI Rule 2 is not to render the proceedings void for non compliance with the rules. He submitted that the Court below did substantial justice by dissolving the marriage as prayed for by the appellant.
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RESOLUTION:
Order V Rule 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules on which the appellant predicated his objection to the cross-petition provides that a petition for decree of judicial separation shall be in accordance with Form 6. Paragraphs 1 ? 5 of Form 6 requires that the particulars of the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent, their conjugal condition as at date of marriage, the surname of the petitioner before the marriage, the place and date of birth of the petitioner and respondent, whether or not petitioner or respondent has been previously married, particulars of the marriage and how it was dissolved be pleaded. However, the appellant?s counsel ignored the fact that the respondent sought for a decree of judicial separation by way of her answer and cross-petition. Order VII Rule 1 (4) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules provides that an answer shall be in accordance with Form 15. Rule 2 (1-5) provides that:
(1) This rule shall apply to an answer by which a respondent institutes proceedings for a decree of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) of the definition of ?matrimonial cause?, in
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section 114 (1) of the Act.
(2) An answer to which this rule applies shall state that the respondent is, within the meaning of the Act, domiciled or resident, as the case may be, in Nigeria, and, if the respondent relies, for the purpose of establishing his domicile or residence in Nigeria, on any facts other than facts included in the petition, the answer shall state those other facts.
(3) The facts, but not the evidence by which the facts are to be proved, upon which the Court shall be asked to make the decree sought in proceedings instituted by an answer to which this rule applies shall be stated in the answer in as concise a form as the nature of the case allows.
(4) An answer instituting proceedings for a decree of dissolution of marriage or of judicial separation upon a ground specified in paragraphs (a) to (g), inclusive, of Section 15(2) of the Act, shall contain-
(a) a statement that the respondent has not connived at that ground; and
(b) a denial that he has condoned that ground, or a statement of all facts relevant to the question whether he has condoned that ground, including any facts relevant to the question whether that
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ground has been revived.
(5) An answer instituting proceedings for a decree of dissolution of marriage or of judicial separation shall contain a statement that, in bringing the proceedings, the respondent has not been guilty of collusion with intent to cause a perversion of justice.?
Order VII Rule 2(9) provides that an answer to which the rule applies shall be in accordance with Form 15A. By the combined reading of Order V Rule 2 (1-5) and the content of Form 15A, an answer to a petition by which a proceeding for judicial separation is instituted shall contain a statement that the respondent has not connived with the petition or condoned the ground for seeking judicial separation and any facts relevant to the question whether that ground has been revived. The answer and cross-petition of the respondent contains the facts of the domicile/residence of the respondent, facts in proof of the judicial separation, cohabitation, particulars of the children of the marriage, proposed arrangement for the children, previous proceedings and that she has not condoned or connived at the ground specified and is not guilty of collusion in presenting the
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petition. The answer clearly complied with the MCR and the prescribed Form. The answer and cross-petition is valid and competent. The jurisdiction of the Court was activated by the due process of law. See ELUWA V. ELUWA (2013) LPELR ? 22120 (CA) AT 50 ? 55 (C ? B).
I cannot conclude the determination of this issue without reference to Order 1 Rule 14 of MCR which provides that ?strict compliance with the Forms in the First Schedule to the rules is not necessary and substantial compliance or such compliance as the circumstances of a particular case allow, is sufficient.? Order XXI Rule 2 also provides that:
?Subject to these Rules, non-compliance with these Rules, or with a rule of practice and procedure of a Court applicable under the Act to proceedings, shall not render proceedings void unless the Court so directs, but the proceedings may be set aside, either wholly or in part as irregular, or may be amended or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit.?
The wordings of the above rules are very clear and unambiguous. Though it is the law that the rules of Court are
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not made for fun and should not be treated with levity, a combined reading of Order 1 Rule 14 and Order XXI Rule 2 of MCR clearly shows that non-compliance with the rules would not render the process or proceedings invalid or void especially when the non-compliance is as to Form only. See TABANSI V. TABANSI (2008) LPELR ? 4365 (CA) AT 18 (A ? E). TECHNIP V. AIC LTD & ORS. V. P. D. P. & ORS. (2015) LPELR ? 24351 (SC) AT 30 ? 31 (C-C).
For these reasons, issues 1 is resolved against the appellant.
On issue 2, the appellant?s counsel submitted that the Court below did not act on established principles but exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or illegal manner. He referred to Section 71 of MCA, the averments in his petition and the entire evidence on record. He submitted that the Court relied on the age and gender of the two children to award custody to the respondent when there is no settled rule that a child of tender age or a female child should be in the custody of the mother. He referred to NANNA V. NANNA (2006) 3 NWLR (PT. 966) 1 (13). NWABOGU V. NWABOGU (1974) UILR 280, WILLIAMS V. WILLIAMS (2002) 5 MC, 326
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S.C AT 360. He further submitted that the arrangement for the education of the Children or opportunities for proper upbringing of the children are matters which may affect the determination of who should have custody. He referred to OTTI V. OTTI (2002) 116 AT 137. WILLIAMS V. WILLIAMS (1987) 2 NWLR (PT. 54) 66 AT 76. Counsel argued that the children required parental care and the respondent being a working mother would leave the children at the mercy of relations and house maids which is not in the interest of the children. AKINBUWA V. AKINBUWA (2002) 15 MC 1 AT 20 ? 21. He urged the Court to exercise its discretion and award custody of the children to the appellant with limited access to the respondent/cross-petitioner during school holidays.
?
In response, the respondent?s counsel submitted that the welfare of the children is of paramount importance in awarding custody of the children of the marriage. He further submitted that in deciding the welfare of the children, the Court shall have regard to (a) Degree of familiarity between the children and the parents. (b) the level of affection between a child and his parents (c) income and position
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in life of each parent. (d) arrangement made by the parties for the education of the child (e) the fact that one of the parents lives as a man or a wife with a third party. (f) the fact that young siblings should as far as possible live and grow up together (g) the fact that children of tender age should be put under the care of their mother unless other facts or circumstances make it undesirable. (h) the desire of a party to remarry and the fact the child may become an impediment. He submitted further that the appellant failed to show the trial Court how he would take care of the children if custody is awarded to him. And the Court below awarded custody of the children in accordance with the established principles.
RESOLUTION:
Section 71 MCA provides that:
(1) ?In proceedings with respect to the custody, guardianship, welfare, advancement or education of children of a marriage, the Court shall regard the interests of those children as the paramount consideration; and subject thereto, the Court may make such order in respect of those matters as it thinks proper.
(2) The Court may adjourn any proceedings within Subsection (1) of this
13
section until a report has been obtained from a welfare officer on such matters relevant to the proceedings as the Court consider desirable, and any such report may thereafter be received in evidence.
(3) In proceedings with respect to the custody of children of a marriage, the Court may, if it is satisfied that it is desirable to do so, make an order placing the children, or such of them as it thinks fit, in the custody of a person other than a party to the marriage.
(4)”Where the Court makes an order placing a child of a marriage in the custody of a party to the marriage, or of a person other than a party to the marriage, it may include in the order such provision as it thinks proper for access to the child by the other party to the marriage, or by the parties or a party to the marriage, as the case may be.?
The above provision of MCA has been considered in several cases. See WILLIAMS V. WILLIAMS (SUPRA), FALOBI V. FALOBI (1976) 9-10 SC (REPRINT) 1, NANNA V. NANNA (SUPRA), ELUWA V. ELUWA (SUPRA). The settled position of the Court is that in the consideration of who should get custody of the children of the marriage, the welfare and best
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interest of the children are paramount considerations. It is not the law that custody of a child of tender age must in all cases be awarded to the mother. However, there is a presumption which is supported by the fact that there is natural bond and affection between a child of a tender age and his mother that a child of tender age will be happier with the mother. It is a presumption rebuttable only by evidence of insanity, immorality, infectious disease or cruelty of the mother to the child or lack of reasonable means. See ODOGWU V. ODOGWU (SUPRA), NANNA V. NANNA (SUPRA), ODUSOTE V. ODUSOTE (2011) LPELR ? 9056 (CA) AT 25 ? 26 (F ? A).
In the instant case, the children of the marriage were 7 and 5 years old when the respondent moved out of the matrimonial home. They were 8 and 6 years old when the petition was filed. They were 13 and 11 years old when judgment was delivered on 28/6/2017. Thus at all times material to this appeal, the two children of the marriage were of tender ages. The children are now about 15 and 13 years old. They are female children. There is no doubt that they need the moral upbringing, direction and guidance of their
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mother. From the pleadings and the evidence of both parties, both parties are gainfully employed. The demands of their job are almost equal. The appellant is a camera-man. He lives in Enugu and travels to Awka, Anambra State where he works every day.
From his evidence, when the respondent went back to the matrimonial home to take the children it was his neighbour that informed him that the appellant was the one that took the children. He said that the appellant left his doors open. That evidence is a confirmation that children of 7 and 5 years were left on their own unsupervised and unprotected in the appellant?s home. The Court below in awarding custody of the two children to the respondent held as follows at pages 107 ? 108 of the record of appeal;
?After considering the facts, the age of the children, the fact that they are females, the likelihood of Petitioner remarrying and the close ties already established between the children and the respondent/cross-petitioner; it will be in the best interest of the children of the marriage Lovelyn Chiamaka Anoliefo and Precious Chimamanda Anoliefo to continue staying with the respondent/cross-petitioner.?
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In UZOCHUKWU V. UZOCHUKWU (2014) LPELR ? 24139 (CA) 26-27, Custody of a 14 year old male child was awarded to the father because the Court was of the view that the child?s interest would be better served as his father would naturally be able to provide strong guidance for the teenage boy. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case and the situation in life of both parties, the Court below was right in awarding custody of the children to the respondent. I cannot find any reason for interfering with the order especially when the children have been in custody of the respondent for about 8 year now. They have settled down and established a pattern of living. Without a cogent, credible and substantial reason, taking them away from the respondent will be a serious disruption to their life and will not be in their best interest and welfare. For these reasons, issue 2 is resolved against the appellant.
On issue 3, the appellant?s counsel submitted that the Court below erred in law by awarding the sum of N30,000 per month from the time the action was filed until when judgment was delivered in
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line with Exhibit 2 which is the letter from the Ministry of Gender Affairs and Social Development of Enugu State when the respondent?s evidence contradicted her pleadings. It is also submitted that the award of N50,000.00 per month from the date of judgment is speculative, capricious and arbitrary as the earnings capacity of the appellant was not established. He referred to Section 70(1) of the MCA. MENAKAYA V. MENAKAYA (2001) LPELR SC 169/96. NANNA V. NANNA (SUPRA).
In response to the above submissions, the respondent?s counsel submitted that the respondent having been granted custody of the children of the marriage is entitled to maintenance allowance for the children who are entitled to basic needs of school fees, clothing, shelter, feeding and health care.
RESOLUTION
Section 70 of MCA provides that:
(1) Subject to this section, the Court may, in proceedings with respect to the maintenance of a party to a marriage, or of children of the marriage, other than proceedings for an order for maintenance pending the disposal of proceedings, make such order as it thinks proper, having regard to the means,
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earning capacity and contract of the parties to the marriage and all other relevant circumstances.
(2) Subject to this section and to rules of Court, the Court may, in proceedings for an order for the maintenance of a party to a marriage, or of children of the marriage, pending the disposal of proceedings, make such order as it thinks proper, having regard to the means, earnings capacity and conduct of the parties to the marriage and all other relevant circumstances.
(3) The Court may make an order for the maintenance of a party notwithstanding that a decree is or has been made against that party in the proceedings to which the proceedings with respect to maintenance are related.
(4) The power of the Court to make an order with respect to the maintenance of children of the marriage shall not be exercised for the benefit of a child who has attained the age of 21 years unless the court is of opinion that there are special circumstances that justify the making of such an order for the benefit of that child.?
The law is settled that in awarding maintenance allowance for the upkeep
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of the children of the marriage, the Court must take into consideration the means, income, earning capacity of the parties, their status in life and all other circumstances. See AMAH V. AMAH (2016) LPELR 41087 (CA). In paragraph 12(c) of this petition, the appellant averred that:
(c) The Petitioner by virtue of his profession and employment as Chief Camera Man of Grade Level 15 with the Anambra Broadcasting Service (ABS) is financially sound and is capable and has the full capability to finance and maintain wholly the said Lovelyn Chiamaka Aneliefo and Precious Chimamanda Anoliefo to the best standard.?
On pages 15 and 17 of the appellant?s brief the appellant?s counsel again emphasized the fact that the appellant is a senior management staff and Deputy Director at the Anambra Broadcasting Service and thus has the capability to finance and maintain the children. The law is settled that what is admitted needs no further proof. See AMAH V. AMAH (SUPRA) AT 43 (E). MUELLER V. MUELLER (2005) LPELR ? 12687 (CA) AT 21 ? 22 (E ? A). The appellant having pleaded and testified to his earning capacity and financial capability
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to take care of the children and considering the purchasing power of our currency, the rate of inflation and cost of living, I cannot interfere with the discretion of the Court below. There is no reason to do so. Issue 3 is resolved against the appellant.
The conclusion is that this appeal lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the High Court of Enugu State delivered in suit no. HAGB/25D/2012 ON 28/6/17 CORAM: A. O. ANIDI, J., is hereby affirmed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: The draft of the Lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, JCA was made available to me before now.
I am in tandem with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein to the effect that the instant appeal has no merit whatsoever. Additionally, that it should be dismissed. In this regard and more, I also dismiss the Appeal. The Judgment of the High Court of Enugu State delivered in suit No. HAGB/25D/2012 on 28/6/17 by A. O. ANIDI, J. is hereby affirmed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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ABUBAKAR SADIQ UMAR, J.C.A. : I had the opportunity of reading in advance, the well-considered judgment of my learned brother, MISITURA OMODERE BOLAJI-YUSUFF, JCA just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein.
For the detailed reasons adumbrated in the lead judgment, I too, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and I accordingly dismiss it. The judgment of the trial Court is hereby affirmed. I abide myself by the consequential orders.
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Appearances:
B. C. Ezeunegbu with him, V. C. Ebuoh and B. C. EkweagaFor Appellant(s)
K. C. Nnawihe holding the brief of Ugwu-EzehFor Respondent(s)
Appearances
B. C. Ezeunegbu with him, V. C. Ebuoh and B. C. EkweagaFor Appellant
AND
K. C. Nnawihe holding the brief of Ugwu-EzehFor Respondent
