JUSTICE ONNOGHEN NKANU WALTER SAMUEL v. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2019)

JUSTICE ONNOGHEN NKANU WALTER SAMUEL v. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2019)LCN/13235(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 10th day of May, 2019

CA/A/44C/2019

RATIO

JURISDICTION: THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION WHEN RAISED SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BEFORE ANY OTHER ISSUE BECAUSE IT IS FUNDAMENTAL

The general principle of law, backed up by legion of authorities from the apex Court is that where a jurisdiction of a Court is challenged, the Court should expeditiously attend to the objection before taking any other further step in the proceedings. The rationale behind this practice is that the question of jurisdiction of Court is a radical and crucial question of competence, for if a Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case, the totality of the proceedings, including orders made therein, are and remain a nullity, no matter how well conducted and brilliantly decided they might be. In other words, once an issue of jurisdiction is raised, until it is resolved, the Court cannot hear any other applications or any issue except to first determine whether it is possessed of the jurisdiction to determine the case. The Supreme Court has stated severally that it is an exhibition of wisdom to first determine when the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the matter before it. See Yusuf vs. Egbe (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 56) 341, Dapianlong vs. Dariye (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1036) 332, Ukwu vs. Bunge (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 518) 527, Nnonye vs. Anyichie (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 623, A – G Anambra vs. A-G, Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 321) 962.
This general principle of law was restated by the Supreme Court in Brittania U (Nig) Limited vs. Seplat Pet. Development Co. Limited (2016) 4 NWLR (PT. 1503) 541 at 610 – 611 paragrphs per Peter Odili JSC that:
“It is a matter now trite that the jurisdiction of any Court is sacrosanct and fundamental to the adjudicatory powers of a court and being a’ threshold issue can be raised at any point or stage of the proceedings even on appeal for the very first time.”PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

JURISDICTION: THE NEW ATTITUDE OF COURTS TOWARDS JURISDICTION
However, in recent times, there appears to be a move or a shift by the courts away from the general principle of law which state that the issue of jurisdiction must be determined first before taking any other step in the proceedings.
This is due to some unscrupulous litigants who perch on the general principle of objection of jurisdiction to intentionally delay litigation and prosecutions of cases to the annoyance of their adversaries and in most cases resulting to abuse of court processes. In such cases the litigants are bent to drag the issue of jurisdiction up to the Apex Court while the substantive matter is stayed in the trial court thereby resulting in delay of cases. In order to honour the time adage of “justice delayed is just denied,” some courts have employed the practice of hearing preliminary Objections on jurisdiction along with the substantive matter but decide the issue of jurisdiction first in the judgment. Some courts also in the spirit of quick dispensation of justice, have also made Rules of Court which have provided for the consolidation of preliminary objection with any other court process where the other process is an originating summons where the facts are not in dispute. See Order 29 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court Rules, 2009; Inakoju vs. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423, First Inland Bank Plc. vs. Alliance International Nigeria Limited delivered on 23/1/2013 in CA/E/96/2009.PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

STATUTORY LAW: HOW THE COURTS ARE TO INTERPRET AND APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE
It has long been established that the provisions of statute must be construed conjunctively and not disjunctively. In other words, a section of statute should not be read in isolation thereby rendering other relevant sections ineffective or unnecessary. The Court must read together related provisions of the Statute in order to discover their meaning and their objection so as not to defeat the intention of the legislature in the promulgation of the law. Oke vs. Atoloye (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 578 (SC), Wilson vs. A-G Bendel (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt4) 572, Astra Industry Nig. Limited vs. NBCI (1998) 3 SCNJ 97 at 115, Amaechi vs. INEC 33 NSCQR 332 at 423, Bronik Motors Limited vs. WEMA Bank Limited (1983) 1 SCNLR 296. Sections 306 and 396 must necessarily be construed together in order to proper construe the meaning and the intention of the provision of the law.PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

SECTION 396(2) OF ACJA: INTERPRETATION
The interpretation of this Section 396 (2) was highlighted in the case of Destra Investments Limited vs FRN & anor (2018) LPELR ? 43883 (SC) where the Supreme Court per Aka’ahs, JSC at pages 8, paragraphs B ? O held as follows:
“This appeal is most unnecessary as it seeks to question the exercise of discretion by the learned trial Judge who decided to deal with the preliminary objection alongside the substantive case which charged the appellant and the 2nd respondent (who was 1St accused) with the offence of money laundering. After the no case submission was overruled, the appellant and the 2nd respondent entered their defence by calling DW 1. As shown in the record the matter was adjourned for cross examination by 2nd defendant’s counsel and instead of proceeding with the cross-examination on the adjourned date, the 2nd defendant (now appellant) filed the preliminary objection challenging the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain courts 1 and 2 of the charge. I totally agree with the reply given by learned counsel for the 1st respondent to the effect that the application could not stop the Court from proceeding with the substantive trial since Section 396 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 allows for a consideration of any objection to be done at the time of delivery of judgment in the substantive case. The section provides:
“396(2) After the plea has been taken, the defendant may raise any objection to the validity of the charge of the information at any time before judgment provided that such objection shall only be considered along with the substantive issues and a ruling thereon mode at the time of delivery of judgment.”PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF LAW SUPERCEDE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF LAW

The law is trite that where there is a specific legislation on a matter, the general principle of law must give way and cannot override the specific provisions of law on the subject. See Orubu v. INEC (1988) 12 SCN) 256 at 349, Unity Bank Plc. v. Kay Plastic Nig. Limited & anor (2011) LPELR 8839 (CA).PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

AN INVALID CHARGE OR INFORMATION WILL ROB THE COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION

Conversely, a court would not have the jurisdiction to try a criminal case if the charge or information is invalid or incompetent for any reason. See Madukolu & ors vs Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; (1962) 1 All NLR 587 at page 595, Tukur & anor vs. Government of Taraba State & ors. (1997) LPELR 3273 (SC); Abiodun vs. AG of Federation (2007) LPELR 8550 (CA).PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

FAIR HEARING: FAIR HEARING BASED ON THE GROUND OF CONSOLIDATION OF MOTIONS
In the same vein, the contention that the Appellant’s right of fair hearing was breached by the consolidation of the two pending motions is also of no moment. It is not every time a party complains about lack of fair hearing that the court will respond to his request. There must be specific proof of such denial of opportunity to be heard and not a mere presumption of its breach Osayande vs Hon. Aikpitanyi & ors (2010) LPELR 4802 (CA), Adebayo vs. Ogun (2005) 20 WRN at page 19.PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

SPECULATION: ATTITUDE OF THE LAW TOWARDS SPECULATION

It is well settled that speculation has no place in our Courts. See Onwuka vs. Ononuju (2009) LPELR ? at Page 41, (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt 1151) 174, Bamgbegbin vs. Oriare (2009) LPELR ? 733 (SC) pages 32 -33, (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1158) 370.PER TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A.

JUSTICES

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

PETER OLABISI IGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

JUSTICE ONNOGHEN NKANU WALTER SAMUEL Appellant(s)

AND

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment) This is an appeal against the decision of the Code of Conduct Tribunal delivered on the 14th day of January, 2019 which ordered that the Appellant’s application challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Respondent’s application for the removal of the Appellant to be adjourned to the same day and the “motions to be taken that day.” The Appellant dissatisfied with the decision filed a Notice of Appeal the same day containing three grounds.

?Briefly the facts of the case are that on the 9th of January, 2019, the Code of Conduct Tribunal received a petition against the Appellant stating that the Appellant failed to declare and submit written declaration of all his assets and liabilities after being sworn in as the Chief Justice of Nigeria on the 8th day of June, 2005, and false declaration of his assets in the Asset Declaration Form submitted to the Bureau in 2016 and thereby contravened the provisions of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, punishable under the same Act.

?Subsequently, the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation on the 11th

of January, 2019 filed at the Code of Conduct Tribunal six counts charge against the Appellant. On the said 11th January 2019, the Respondent filed a Motion on Notice seeking the following reliefs:
“(iv). An interlocutory order directing the defendant/ respondent to “step aside” as the Chief Justice of Nigeria and the Chairman of the National Judicial Council over allegation of contravening the provision of Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act CAP C 15 Laws of Federation of Nigeria 2004 pending determination of the case.
(v) An interlocutory order of the Honourable Tribunal directing the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to take all necessary measures to swear in the most senior Justice of the Supreme Court as acting Chief Justice and Chairman of the National Judicial Council in order to prevent a vacuum in the judicial Arm of Government 2004 pending determination of the case.”(sic)

?The arraignment of the Appellant and the motion were fixed for 14th January, 2019. The Appellant also filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Code of Conduct Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) or ‘the

lower Court’. At the proceedings of 14th January, 2019, it was established that the Appellant had not been served with the charge. The Counsel to both sides also notified the Tribunal about the pending applications. After some deliberations on the issue of service of the charge and the pending applications, the Tribunal adjourned the matter to Tuesday, the 22nd of January 2019, ordering that “Motions to be taken that day.” Dissatisfied with this order, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on three grounds to wit.
“Ground One
The Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Tribunal erred in law when they ordered that a motion for interlocutory injunction pending the final hearing of the case against the Appellant, be heard together with the application challenging the competence and the constitutionality of the criminal charges and the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear and exercise powers over the criminal allegations, when the two applications are mutually exclusive and inconsistent in their nature thereby occasioning a grave miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. The application challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is

so fundamental to the exercise of powers that it cannot be heard together with a motion seeking interlocutory injunction pending the final hearing of the case.
2. The law has become settled that where there is an application challenging the competence of the proceeding and the jurisdiction of the court, the latter shall be given priority, heard and determined first before any other application.
3. The Tribunal was legally bound to hear and determine first the issue of jurisdiction before any other application is entertained.
4. The Tribunal by its decision in adjourning for the hearing of the two applications assumed jurisdiction without having same.
5. The decision of the Tribunal to hear and determine the two mutually exclusive and unrelated applications together is not backed by any law.

Ground Two
The Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Tribunal erred in law when they gave equal priority to the hearing of an application challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the one by the Complainant seeking an interlocutory injunction pending the hearing of the criminal allegation and thereby denied the Appellant his right

to fair hearing preserved by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)
PARTICULARS OF ERROR IN LAW
1. The law has become settled that where a defendant is challenging the jurisdiction of the Court, the application should be first heard and determined before any other application or process be heard.
2. The order directing the hearing of the application for injunction with the jurisdiction application is an exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
3. The decision constitutes a denial of right to fair hearing in the determination of the jurisdictional application.
Ground Three
The Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Tribunal erred in law when they made an order for substituted service of the charge on the appellant.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. It is settled law that a Court or Tribunal does not grant a relief not asked or prayed for.
2. The prosecution did not formerly ask for any order for substituted service of the charge on the appellant either orally or by way of motion.
3. The Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Tribunal suo motu made the order for

substituted service of the charge on the appellant
4. The Chairman and members of the Code of conduct Tribunal lack jurisdiction to make an order not prayed or asked for.
5. The order for substituted service ought not to have been made since the Jurisdiction of the Code of Conduct Tribunal is being challenged.

In this Court, parties filed their respective briefs of argument; wherein both parties distilled a sole similar issue for determination. The Appellant couched his issue thusly:
“Whether or not, having regard to the law and the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower Tribunal was right in ordering the joint hearing of the Appellant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection to the lower jurisdiction and the Respondent’s Tribunal’s interlocutory application for the removal of the Appellant from office.”
The Respondent framed its issue as follows:
“Whether the lower Tribunal rightly exercised its discretion to consolidate or hear together the Appellant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection and Respondent’s interlocutory application to the 2nd January, 2019 for hearing.”
Subsequently, the Respondent filed a Notice of

Preliminary Objection challenging the competence of the appeal, argued in its brief, on the following grounds:
1. Grounds 1-3 as formulated in the Notice of Appeal by the Appellant are grounds of mixed law and fact which required prior leave of court.
2. Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal is defective/ incompetent.
3. The issue distilled for determination is not (sic) incompetent in view of the fact that it comprises all the grounds of appeal including ground 3 which does not emanate from the proceedings of the lower court on the 14th of January 2019 or any other date before the filing of this Appeal.
Relief Sought:
An Order striking out this Appeal in its entirely for being incompetent and for lack of jurisdiction
The Respondent distilled three issues for determination on this objection namely:

1. Whether in view of the grounds of appeal herein, the instant appeal can be said to be competent in the absence of the requisite leave to appeal
2. Whether Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal is defective/competent.
3. Whether the issue distilled for determination is not incompetent in view of the fact

that it does not emanate from the proceedings of the lower court on the 14th January 2019 or any other date before the filing of the Appeal.

On issue one, it was the submission of the learned senior counsel for the Respondent, Aliyu Usman, SAN, that the complaints of the Appellant are predicated on the adjournment of the Appellant’s application, arguing that such is an exercise based on the discretion of the Tribunal which can only be competently appealed against after leave has been properly sought and obtained before the lower or appellate court, as such an appeal is not as of right as envisaged under Section 241(1)(a) ? (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). He placed reliance on Solanke vs. Ajibola (1968) 1 ANLR 46. Ceekay Trader Limited vs. General Motors Limited (1992) 2 Anor. (1974) NSCC 622 at 627 -628 Odusote vs. Odusote (1971) 1 ANLR 221; Aliyu vs. Musa & anor (2012) LPELR ? 20793 (CA),CCB Plc. vs. Ekperi (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 493 at 511, Baibi & anor vs Pachi & ors (2018) LPELR 45992 (CA) at pp 25 ? 28.

On issues 2 and 3 it was submitted that ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal is incompetent having not emanated from the decision of the lower Tribunal which never ordered any substituted service of any process on the Appellant. An appeal not arising from the ratio decidendi appealed against, he submitted is incompetent ? Awusa vs. Nigerian Army (2018) LPELR ? 44377 SC at P. 25, Ministry for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs & ors. vs. Unity Bank Plc. & ors (2018) LPELR ? 44654 (CA)

It was noted that the Appellant based the sole issue for determination on all the grounds that and any issue distilled from an incompetent ground of appeal, is itself incompetent and must be struck out alongside any arguments based therein. He added that by distilling a single issue for determination from all the grounds lumped together, the Court cannot embark on the exercise to decipher which argument is in support of which grounds of appeal, therefore the entire sole issue has been contaminated, rendering the entire appeal incompetent. In support of this argument learned counsel relied on the following authorities: Odeh vs. FRN (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt.

1103), AIB Limited vs. Intergrated Dimensional System Limited (2012) LPELR 9710 (SC), Akpan vs. BOB (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 431, 200 LPELR ? 376 (SC) Jev vs. Iyortyom (2014) LPELR 23000 (SC), Aribo vs. Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) LPELR 4751 (CA) to urge the court to strike out this appeal.

Responding learned Senior counsel for the Appellant, Chief Adegboyega Awomolo (SAN) submitted that ground one of the appeal is an issue of law which can be appealed against as of right ? Iloabache vs. Iloabache (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 363) 173 First F. Limited vs. NNPC (2007) vol. 4 WRN 105 at 139, arguing that an application challenging the issue of jurisdiction of a court is one predicated on law ? AG Federation vs. Abacha (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1221) 1 at P 37. Ground 2, he noted, is based on fair hearing which is also an issue of law which requires no leave of court to be appealed. With regard to ground 3, learned senior counsel submitted that the sole issue for determination emanates from grounds 1 and 2, irrespective of the allusion to all the grounds.

?I have considered the submission of both learned senior council on the competence of the

grounds of appeal which have been reproduced at the commencement of this judgment.

Let me start from the last point made by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant upon which I agree. A cursory consideration of the totality of the argument canvassed by the Appellant in his brief of argument evinces the fact, glaringly, that no argument was advanced in respect of ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal. The mere fact that the Appellant stated that “this issue is distilled from all the grounds” does not automatically prove that the issue so argued is predicated on all the grounds irrespective of the allusion to all grounds when in fact, there is no iota of argument canvassed in respect of ground 3 of the ground of appeal.

?In my view, the appropriate objection to have been raised is the prayer to strike out ground 3 upon which no issue was formulated. It is not in all cases that a Court nilly willy accepts, the classification of issues in relation to grounds of appeal as sacrosanct. What is important is whether any point was canvassed in respect of a ground upon which an issue has been said to have formulated. A ground of appeal which no issue has been

formulated or has no bearing with any issue canvassed in the appeal is deemed abandoned and liable to be struck out. See Oyede vs. Olusesi (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt 951) 341. Ground 3 is hereby struck out.

Now Ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal, having been struck out, cannot therefore contaminate the other grounds of appeal. The authorities cited by the learned senior counsel for the Respondent are not apposite to this issue. With regard to grounds one and two, the issue in this appeal is not based on the Tribunal’s decision on the adjournment of the application as to when to take the application. Rather the grouse of the Appellant is on the decision to take the application challenging the jurisdiction of the court along with the Respondent’s application requesting the Chief Justice to step aside; which they regard as breaching the constitutional right of fair hearing of the Appellant.

?In other words, the Appellant was not complaining about the fact that the matter was adjourned to 22nd January, 2019. He was not in any way questioning the discretionary power of the Tribunal to adjourn the matter. His complaint is that having regard to the nature of his

objection, which is based on the challenge of jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the matter, the decision of the Tribunal to hear this application together with the motion for interlocutory injunction is erroneous because the application on jurisdiction should be heard first and determined before any other application or process. It is settled law that a ground of appeal challenging the jurisdiction of Court is a ground of law. see Ngige vs. Achukwu (2004) LPELR 5564 (CA), Owelli Rochas Anayo Okorocha vs. PDP & ors. (2014) LPELR – 22058 (SC). It is also settled law that a ground of appeal which complains of a breach of fair hearing is a ground of law. See Electric Com. Vs. Akande (2010) LPELR ? 9356 (SC), Govt. of Kwara State vs. Gafar (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt 511) 51 at 59.
?I have examined the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in Chapter vii, Part 1 (B) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended on its supervisory jurisdiction over various Courts and Tribunals created by the Constitution. I observed that Sections 240 to 245 spelt out the different categories of appeal as of right or which require leave

from the decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal and appeals from Customary Court of Appeal to the Court of Appeal. It is interesting to note that by Section 246 (1) (a) “An appeal shall as of right from the decisions of the Code of Conduct Tribunal established by the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution”. Unlike all the other Courts, there is no provision for seeking to leave to appeal against the decision of the Code of Conduct Tribunal. The implication is that any appeal from the decision of the Code of Conduct Tribunal to the Court of Appeal is as of right in any circumstance.
Leave is not required for a party to appeal to the Court of Appeal any against decision of the Code of Conduct Tribunal, either on interlocutory or final decisions. It is also immaterial if the grounds of appeal are based on facts or mixed law and facts.
And intending appellant has a direct and unconditional access of appeal to the Court of Appeal from any decision of the Code of Conduct Tribunal Section 241(1)(a)-(d) of the 1999 Constitution, upon which the learned Silk for the Respondent based his objection deals with the appellate

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over the Federal High Court or High Court of a State and not the Code of Conduct Tribunal, which is specifically provided for by section 246 of the Constitution. The contention of the Respondent that the Appellant requires leave to appeal to this Court is misconceived. It is not borne out from the constitutional provision of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over decisions of the Code of Conduct Tribunal. On the whole, the totality of objection of the Respondent is misconceived. It is hereby dismissed.

Let me now proceed to the merit of this appeal
In arguing the appeal, the learned senior counsel for the Appellant anchored the Appellant’s position on four grounds namely:

? “The lower Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s Interlocutory application at the same time with Appellant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection.

? As the lower Tribunal’s jurisdiction was being challenged, it had no jurisdiction to hear or grant the interlocutory reliefs sought by the Respondent.
? As the lower Tribunal jurisdiction was being challenged, the only course of action validly opened to

it is to determine whether it has jurisdiction.
? By consolidating the hearing of the two applications, the lower court had effectively overreached the Appellant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection and breached his right to a fair hearing.

The strong contention of the Appellant on grounds one, two and three of his submission, is that the principle of law is trite that once an issue of jurisdiction is raised, and until it is resolved, the court cannot hear any other interlocutory application except there are specific rules of court for consolidation of such processes. He relied onBogban vs. Diwhre (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt 951) 274 at 302, Brittania ? U (Nig) Limited vs. Seplat Pet. Development Co. Limited (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt 1503) 541 at 610 ? 611 paragraphs A ? E. It was argued that since there is nothing in the rules of practice empowering it to adopt the procedure of consolidating the two applications, the decision of the Tribunal is erroneous. Menakaya vs. Menakaya (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt 738) 203 at 252 paragraph E ? F. He added that where exigencies compel a court to employ innovations, “where such innovations conflict with the rules

of procedure, they must give way to the rules.” It was further submitted that the a law is settled that where a court has no jurisdiction, it has no vices or power to grant any relief or make any order ? Nwankwo vs. Ononoeze-Madu (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt 910) 470 at 482 paragraph H, Cadbury Nig Plc vs. FBIR (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1179) 561 at 576, paragraphs D ? G , Nnonye vs. Anyichie (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt.910) 623 at 655 ? 656 paragraph A-B.

In his further argument, that by consolidating the two pending applications, the impression created is that the Tribunal had pre- judged or pre-determined the issue of jurisdiction emphasizing that a court of law should not take any step that would overreach or in any way breach a party’s right to fair hearing citing Ezechukwu vs. Onwuka (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt 963) 151 at 198 -1999 paragraphs H ? C, Okon vs. Okon (2009 LPELR 8699 (CA) pages 9 -10, paragraphs C- B, Pollyn vs Miejene (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1321) 567 at 580 paragraph E- H. Learned Senior Counsel concluded by submitting that the lower Tribunal ought to have exhibited its neutrality by

adjourning the matter for the hearing of the Appellant’s preliminary objection only while urging us to allow this appeal.

In response to all the arguments above, the learned senior counsel narrowed his submission on the compass of the import of the provision of Section 396 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 which provides:
“After the plea has been taken, the defendant may raise any objection to the validity of the charge or the information at any time before judgment provided that such objection shall only be considered along with the substantive issues and a ruling thereon made at the time of delivery of judgment.

Learned Senior Counsel, in a simplistic manner, merely cited the case of Destra Investments Limited vs. FRN & anor (2018) LPELR ? 43883 (SC) for the interpretation of this provision and submitted that the lower Tribunal rightly exercised its discretion to consolidate or decide to take the applications pending before it together. We were urged to dismiss this appeal as unmeritorious and academic.

The summary of the argument of the Appellant is that the learned lower Tribunal erred in law when it

“consolidated” the interlocutory applications challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal with the one praying for the Appellant to step aside.
The general principle of law, backed up by legion of authorities from the apex Court is that where a jurisdiction of a Court is challenged, the Court should expeditiously attend to the objection before taking any other further step in the proceedings. The rationale behind this practice is that the question of jurisdiction of Court is a radical and crucial question of competence, for if a Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case, the totality of the proceedings, including orders made therein, are and remain a nullity, no matter how well conducted and brilliantly decided they might be. In other words, once an issue of jurisdiction is raised, until it is resolved, the Court cannot hear any other applications or any issue except to first determine whether it is possessed of the jurisdiction to determine the case. The Supreme Court has stated severally that it is an exhibition of wisdom to first determine when the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the matter before it. See Yusuf vs. Egbe (1987) 2

NWLR (Pt. 56) 341, Dapianlong vs. Dariye (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1036) 332, Ukwu vs. Bunge (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 518) 527, Nnonye vs. Anyichie (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 623, A – G Anambra vs. A-G, Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 321) 962.
This general principle of law was restated by the Supreme Court in Brittania ? U (Nig) Limited vs. Seplat Pet. Development Co. Limited (2016) 4 NWLR (PT. 1503) 541 at 610 ? 611 paragrphs per Peter ? Odili JSC that:
“It is a matter now trite that the jurisdiction of any Court is sacrosanct and fundamental to the adjudicatory powers of a court and being a’ threshold issue can be raised at any point or stage of the proceedings even on appeal for the very first time.”
Therefore once brought up no other thing should be allowed within the focus of the Court than the resolution of that jurisdiction being so since a Court merely wastes its precious time when it has embarked upon a trial when it has no jurisdiction since everything therein done including the decision and order come to naught, indeed a futile exercise. That is why it is a bounden duty of the Court to have that question settled

first and foremost before it can go further into the
matter before it. State differently, the court must ask itself if it has the power to handle the case and so when it is brought to a court’s attention that it lacks jurisdiction, it has to pause a while to answer the question first and if positive go forth but if in the negative the court says so before anything else. I place reliance on Okarika vs. Samuel (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1352) 19; Osakue vs. Federal College of Education (technical) Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 1; Cadbury (Nig.) Plc vs. FBIR (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1179) 561.
A Court is naked and exposed without jurisdiction. It is therefore the general rule to determine jurisdiction first whilst it is an exceptional rule to take steps in defending of protecting the authority of the court first before jurisdiction.”
However, in recent times, there appears to be a move or a shift by the courts away from the general principle of law which state that the issue of jurisdiction must be determined first before taking any other step in the proceedings.
This is due to some unscrupulous litigants who perch on

the general principle of objection of jurisdiction to intentionally delay litigation and prosecutions of cases to the annoyance of their adversaries and in most cases resulting to abuse of court processes. In such cases the litigants are bent to drag the issue of jurisdiction up to the Apex Court while the substantive matter is stayed in the trial court thereby resulting in delay of cases. In order to honour the time adage of “justice delayed is just denied,” some courts have employed the practice of hearing preliminary Objections on jurisdiction along with the substantive matter but decide the issue of jurisdiction first in the judgment. Some courts also in the spirit of quick dispensation of justice, have also made Rules of Court which have provided for the consolidation of preliminary objection with any other court process where the other process is an originating summons where the facts are not in dispute. See Order 29 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court Rules, 2009; Inakoju vs. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423, First Inland Bank Plc. vs. Alliance International Nigeria Limited delivered on 23/1/2013 in CA/E/96/2009. This new trend has

ignited the promulgation of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, (ACJA).
Although the Court is not at liberty to construe a statute by the motives which influenced its enactment, yet when the reason for the enactment is known it is the duty of the court to read the Statute or Sections of it in such a way as to fairly and accurately carry out that object of the Decree, Act or Statute.
-J. Onyebuchieze vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1987) 2 SCNJ 76 at 87, FCSC vs. Laoye (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652 at 682, Ibrahim vs. Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513. It is now settled that one of the objectives of the enactment of this law is to ensure that Economic Crimes and Corruption cases are treated with utmost dispatch; in order to achieve speedy dispensation of justice by eliminating undue delay occasioned by the use of interlocutory applications. I have had some examination of the provisions of ACJA. It appears to me that the introduction of Sections 221, 306 and 396, inter alia are such sections to reduce the incidents of delay employed by litigants in the prosecution of criminal charges against them. See Olisa Metuh vs. FGN

(2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1579) 156 at 176 ? 178, see also Joshua Dariye vs. FRN (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1467) 212, FRN vs. Babalola Borisade All FWLr (Pt. 785) 227 where the court held that Section 306 of ACJA is an unprecedented provision in that it aims to stop delays occasioned by interlocutory applications to stay proceedings pending appeal on preliminary matters when the substantive issues are yet to be tried on the merit.
Section 221 provides
“Objections shall not be taken or entertained during proceeding or trial on the ground of an imperfect charge or erroneous charge.”
Section 306 provides:
“An application for stay of proceedings in respect of a criminal matter before the court shall not be entertained.”
Section 396 1 and 2 provides:
“396.(1) The defendant to be tried on an information or charge shall be arraigned In accordance with the provisions of this Act relating to the taking of pleas and the procedure on it.
(2) After the plea has been taken, the defendant may raise any objection to the validity of the charge or the information at any time before judgment provided that such objection shall only be

considered along with the substantive issues and a ruling thereon made at the time of delivery of judgment.
In my view, the import of the community reading of subsections (1) and (2) of section 396 and Section 306 of ACJA firstly, is to the effect that a preliminary objection cannot be taken until after the arraignment of a defendant before the Code of Conduct Tribunal. Secondly, even though a defendant may subsequently object to the validity of a charge or information after he has taken his plea, at any time before judgment, the Court shall not rule on such objection until at the time of delivery of the judgment. I have come to this conclusion bearing in mind the canon principles of interpretation of statutes.
It has long been established that the provisions of statute must be construed conjunctively and not disjunctively. In other words, a section of statute should not be read in isolation thereby rendering other relevant sections ineffective or unnecessary. The Court must read together related provisions of the Statute in order to discover their meaning and their objection so as not to defeat the intention of the legislature in the promulgation

of the law. Oke vs. Atoloye (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 578 (SC), Wilson vs. A-G Bendel (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt4) 572, Astra Industry Nig. Limited vs. NBCI (1998) 3 SCNJ 97 at 115, Amaechi vs. INEC 33 NSCQR 332 at 423, Bronik Motors Limited vs. WEMA Bank Limited (1983) 1 SCNLR 296. Sections 306 and 396 must necessarily be construed together in order to proper construe the meaning and the intention of the provision of the law.
The interpretation of this Section 396 (2) was highlighted in the case of Destra Investments Limited vs FRN & anor (2018) LPELR ? 43883 (SC) where the Supreme Court per Aka’ahs, JSC at pages 8, paragraphs B ? O held as follows:
“This appeal is most unnecessary as it seeks to question the exercise of discretion by the learned trial Judge who decided to deal with the preliminary objection alongside the substantive case which charged the appellant and the 2nd respondent (who was 1St accused) with the offence of money laundering. After the no case submission was overruled, the appellant and the 2nd respondent entered their defence by calling DW 1. As shown in the record the matter was adjourned for cross

examination by 2nd defendant’s counsel and instead of proceeding with the cross-examination on the adjourned date, the 2nd defendant (now appellant) filed the preliminary objection challenging the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain courts 1 and 2 of the charge. I totally agree with the reply given by learned counsel for the 1st respondent to the effect that the application could not stop the Court from proceeding with the substantive trial since Section 396 (2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 allows for a consideration of any objection to be done at the time of delivery of judgment in the substantive case. The section provides:
“396(2) After the plea has been taken, the defendant may raise any objection to the validity of the charge of the information at any time before judgment provided that such objection shall only be considered along with the substantive issues and a ruling thereon mode at the time of delivery of judgment.”
This provision allows for speedy trial of cases and is meant to obviate the difficulties often encountered by trial judges who are most often bogged down by interlocutory appeals filed by

defence counsel in order to stultify proceedings and if possible truncate trials of accused persons
His lordship, Ejembi Eko, JSC.
“The trial Court, in exercise of its undoubted discretion, had decided to deal with the preliminary objection in the final judgment, the Preliminary Objection was brought by the appellant herein through its counsel, Chief Tochukwu Onwugbufor, SAN, after the trial Court had dismissed its no case submission. The defence had commenced before the notice of preliminary objection, challenging the jurisdiction, was raised. The trial court, in its wisdom, thought it wiser and more expenditious that the points raised in the final judgment. it took into consideration the point in the proceedings at which the preliminary was raised. Purporting to be irked by the trial Court’s exercise of discretion to defer ruling on the preliminary objection, the appellant lodged his appeal against the interlocutory decision on an issue that is purely discretionary. The appellant did not seek leave 1,0 lodge this interlocutory appeal to the lower Court. The lower Court upheld the contention of the prosecutor, the respondent

thereat, that the appellant needed to have first sought and obtained leave before filing the interlocutory appeal challenging the exercise by the apparently mischievous application designed merely to slow the pace of the trial. The lower Court had correctly ruled that the interlocutory appeal was incompetent and struck it out. On the merits, the lower Court further held that there was nothing wrong in the trial Court considering the preliminary objection with the substantive issues in the trial in the final judgment of the trial Court. this further appeal, completely unnecessary and frivolous, is a gross abuse of Court’s process in view of the unambiguous provisions of Section 396(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015. The learned senior counsel for the appellant should have been more circumspect in not only associating himself with the appeal in the first place but pursuing it further to the apex Court. for the records, Section 396(2) of ACJA, 2015 provides-
“After the plea has been taken, the defendant may raise any objection to the validity of the charge or the information at any time before judgment provided that such objection shall

only be considered along with the substantive issues and a ruling thereon made at the time of delivery of judgment.
?The proviso to Section 396(2) ACJA offers statutory backing justifying the stance of the trial Court. in my Firm view, the trial Court and Court of Appeal were right. The misconception of the appellant’s counsel in this appeal is conspicuous. The course embarked upon by the appellant does not seem intended to further the course of justice, particularly speedy trial that Section 396 (2) ACJA and Section 36(1) of the Constitution are all about.”
It is noted that the learned senior counsel for the Appellant placed his reliance heavily on the revered principle of law that once an issue of jurisdiction is raised in a proceedings, it ought to be dealt with expendiously before taking any other step in the proceedings. That is a general principle of law. However, the introduction of Section 396 is a specific provision on interlocutory objections in a charge for any reason whatsoever, whether predicated on jurisdiction or otherwise. Section 396 must therefore prevail over the general principle of law on preliminary objections on jurisdiction. The

law is trite that where there is a specific legislation on a matter, the general principle of law must give way and cannot override the specific provisions of law on the subject. See Orubu v. INEC (1988) 12 SCN) 256 at 349, Unity Bank Plc. v. Kay Plastic Nig. Limited & anor (2011) LPELR 8839 (CA).
?Let me also add that an objection to jurisdiction of a criminal charge or information, on the ground that the charge has not been initiated by due process of law in that constitutional condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled as contended by the Appellant (page 112 of the record) in my view, is tantamount to an objection on the validity of the charge as envisaged by Section 396(2) of ACJA. The invalidity of a charge or information affects the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the case. Conversely, a court would not have the jurisdiction to try a criminal case if the charge or information is invalid or incompetent for any reason. See Madukolu & ors vs Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; (1962) 1 All NLR 587 at page 595, Tukur & anor vs. Government of Taraba State & ors. (1997) LPELR 3273 (SC); Abiodun vs. AG of Federation (2007) LPELR ? 8550 (CA).

In the light of the foregoing, the contention of the Appellant that as the lower Tribunal’s jurisdiction was being challenged, the only course of action validly opened to it is to determine immediately, whether it has jurisdiction first, is not tenable having regards to the provision of Section 396 (2) of ACJA.
In the same vein, the contention that the Appellant’s right of fair hearing was breached by the consolidation of the two pending motions is also of no moment. It is not every time a party complains about lack of fair hearing that the court will respond to his request. There must be specific proof of such denial of opportunity to be heard and not a mere presumption of its breach ?Osayande vs Hon. Aikpitanyi & ors (2010) LPELR ? 4802 (CA), Adebayo vs. Ogun (2005) 20 WRN at page 19.

I find it expedient to refer again at this juncture to the decision of the lower Tribunal on the issue leading to this appeal. The grouse of the decision is in respect of the decision of the lower Tribunal where it held thus.
“Matter is hereby adjourned to Tuesday the 22nd of January, 2019. Motions

to be taken that day.”

This was all that was decided by the Tribunal that day; and nothing more. The issue of whether or not the lower Tribunal would entertain any other application before it determined the issue of jurisdiction had not arisen. It is presumptuous. The decision of the Tribunal as quoted above does not reflect the strong contention of the Appellant that the two motions were “consolidated.” The basis of the objection of the Appellant at that stage of the proceedings therefore is merely speculative. It is well settled that speculation has no place in our Courts. See Onwuka vs. Ononuju (2009) LPELR ? at Page 41, (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt 1151) 174, Bamgbegbin vs. Oriare (2009) LPELR ? 733 (SC) pages 32 -33, (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1158) 370.

The totality of this appeal is based on speculation and preemption. It is inchoate. The sole issue distilled for determination is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant. The appeal on the whole lacks merit. It is hereby dismissed.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by learned

brother Tinuade Akomolafe ? Wilson, JCA.
I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and Conclusion that the appeal is inchoate and speculative and must be dismissed.

A judge of a Court or tribunal is the master of the proceedings. He is in charge of how and when the matters before him are heard. That is all within his prerogative. No one can remove that from the Court or tribunal. When the lower tribunal in the instant case adjourned proceeding to Tuesday 22nd January, 2019 for the motions to be taken that day, he was simply directing or setting time for the hearing of the pending motions.
Adjournment is at the discretion of the Court. There is nothing done by the lower tribunal in this respect to endanger this appeal. I therefore agree with my learned brother in the lead judgment to hold that the appeal is bereft of merit and it is hereby dismissed.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances:

Chief Adegboyega S. Awomolo (SAN), Chief Chris Uche (SAN), P. A. Akubo (SAN), R. A. Lawal Fabana (SAN), J.U.K. Igwe (SAN), Okon Nkanu Ofut (SAN), Chief Ogwu James Onoja (SAN) Joe Abraham (SAN), Chukwuma Machukwu Ume (SAN), Dr. J. Y. Musa (SAN) with them, Emmanuel Okori, Frank Molokoli, Kunle Lawal, Smart Ukoija, Queen Uche Kukwu & Amina TunaFor Appellant(s)

Aliyu Umar, SAN with him, Abdul Mohammed, Sunusi Musa & Mariam Kekelomo ShittaFor Respondent(s)

Appearances

AND

Aliyu Umar, SAN with him, Abdul Mohammed, Sunusi Musa & Mariam Kekelomo ShittaFor Respondent