JATAU & ANOR v. JATAU & ANOR
(2022)LCN/16933(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(GOMBE JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Tuesday, May 24, 2022
CA/G/67/2021
Before Our Lordships:
Jummai Hannatu Sankey Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ibrahim Shata Bdliya Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ebiowei Tobi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. VICTOR ILIYA JATAU 2. YOEL IDRIS JATAU APPELANT(S)
And
1. EZEKIEL LASS JATAU 2. EZRA JATAU RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE POSITION OF LAW WHEN DEALING WITH APPEALS FROM AREA COURTS OR CUSTOMARY COURTS
The law as long settled is that, in dealing with appeals from Area Courts or Customary Courts, an appellate Court is exhorted to be liberal with regard to matters of procedure or technicality, as the whole object of such trials is that the real dispute between the parties should be fairly adjudicated upon. Put another way, appellate Courts are enjoined to look at the substance rather than the form when considering the judgment from an Area Court. Therefore, great latitude must be given to and broad interpretation placed upon cases decided by an Area Court. Its proceedings have to be carefully scrutinized to ascertain the subject matter of the case, as well as the issues raised therein. See Faleye V Dada (2016) LPELR-40297(SC) 34-36, E-B, per MD Muhammad, JSC, & 39, B-F, per Okoro, JSC; Onwuama V Ezeokoli (2002) LPELR-2712(SC) 10-11, D-A, per Uwaifo, JSC; Kamalu V Umunna (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 505) 321.
In Agbasi V Obi (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 1, 14, Belgore JSC (as he then was) stated the rationale of the law thus:
“The native Courts are Courts of common sense and simplicity, they are never burdened by strict adherence to procedure. They are Courts for quick and cheap manner of dispensation of justice. Most of the time their decisions reflect the very justice and truth of the cases. It is because these Courts are not tied to technicality of procedure that the appellate Court must look to the totality of the proceedings to find who were the parties before them, what were the issues before them and what they have decided.”
Onu JSC, in commenting on this issue, stated at page 18 of the E-Report as follows:
“Indeed, … judgments of Native Courts should be treated differently from those of a High Court. When dealing with such judgments, an appellate Court is entitled to go beyond what appears on the face of the claim and ascertain from the entire evidence before the Native Court (Customary Court or Area Court) what really the nature the nature of the dispute is involved. In other words, that great latitude must be given to, and broad interpretation placed upon Native Court cases and that the whole proceedings, the evidence of the parties and the judgment, must be looked at in order to decide what a Native Court case was about.” PER SANKEY, JCA.
THE ONUS OF PROOF IN A CLAIM FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND
Also, it is a trite principle of law that in a claim for declaration of title to land, the onus is always on the Plaintiff to establish his claim. The standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities or a preponderance of evidence. The usual test is whether the plaintiff has been able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he has a better title than the defendant. In addition, a party must establish the method by which he acquired the said title as ownership cannot be claimed without establishing how it came about. The law is that a claimant must satisfy the Court as to:
(a) The precise nature of the title claimed, that is to say whether it is title by original ownership, customary grant, conveyance, sale under customary law, long possession or otherwise; and
(b) Evidence establishing the nature of title claimed.
See Dayya V Dayya (2021) LPELR-56576(CA) 12-15, E-B; Yakubu V Jauroyel (2014) LPELR-22732(SC); Odunukwe V Ofomata (2010) LPELR-2250(SC); Oyeneyin V Akingkube (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1184) 265 Thus, in due obedience and complete obeisance to the position of the law, I will examine the decision of the lower Court to see whether it applied these principles of law to the proceedings of the trial Upper Area Court in arriving at its decision. PER SANKEY, JCA.
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Justice Gombe State sitting in its appellate jurisdiction in Suit No. GM/92A/2018, delivered on 25th January, 2021, Coram: B.I. Iliya J. and A. Jauro J.
The Appellants were the Respondents at the lower Court and Plaintiffs at the trial Upper Area Court, Filiya; while the Respondents were the Appellants at the lower Court and Defendants at the trial Upper Area Court.
The Claim of the Appellants at the Upper Area Court Filiya was for a declaration of title to portions of land which was given to their fathers, (Iliya and Idris) as gifts by Jatau during his lifetime, and which land subsequently devolved on them by inheritance from their deceased fathers. In proof of their claim, the Appellants adduced evidence through four witnesses while the Respondents in their defence, adduced evidence through three witnesses. At the close of trial, judgment was entered in favour of the Appellants. This resulted in an appeal filed at the lower Court by the Respondents. After the appeal was heard, the lower Court delivered judgment on 25th January, 2021 wherein it upheld the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial Upper Area Court Filiya. In addition, it declared the Respondents as the rightful owners of the land in dispute.
Dissatisfied, the Appellants, with the leave of Court sought and obtained, filed an appeal to this Court on 17th February, 2021 wherein they complained on four grounds. Therein, they seek the following reliefs from this Court:
a. “AN ORDER allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the lower Court sitting on appeal delivered on 25th day of January, 2021.
b. AN ORDER upholding the decision of the trial Upper Area Court, Filiya confirming title in the disputed land on the Appellants.”
At the hearing of the appeal on 01-03-22, learned Counsel for the Appellants, H.N. Onyekwere Esq. adopted the submissions in the Appellants’ Brief of argument filed on 28-07-21, deemed filed on 18-01-22 and settled by the same Counsel in urging the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court. On his part, learned Counsel for the Respondents, Y.L. Yunana Esq. adopted the submissions contained in the Respondents’ Brief of argument filed on 17-02-22 and settled by the same Counsel in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court.
In their brief of argument, the Appellants culled three issues for the determination from three Grounds of Appeal, and abandoned the omnibus Ground of Appeal. The Respondents adopted the issues framed by the Appellants. The issues for determination are as follows:
1. “Whether or not the Appellants proved their root of title of the customary gift to the land in dispute before the trial Court? (Ground 3)
2. Whether the lower Court was right when it found that the Appellants were “placed in possession” based on the evidence adduced at the trial Court? (Ground 2)
3. Whether the Respondents are entitled to the order made by the lower Court declaring them as the rightful owners of the land in dispute in the absence of any counterclaim? (Ground 1)
The three issues which are interwoven, shall be addressed together.
ARGUMENTS
In arguing the appeal, learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that title to land can be transferred by way of sale or gift. Where it is transferred by gift under customary law, it requires that there must be proof of acceptance of the gift and handing over of the land by the donor, who must be the owner, to the donee in the presence of witnesses.
Counsel submits that the Appellants who adduced evidence through PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4, established customary gift of the pieces of land to their fathers through whom they derived their title. He contends that the evidence of DW1 and DW2 also supported their case. Counsel therefore submits that the lower Court, having found that the Appellants proved that their parents were put in possession by Jatau, cannot turn around to impose any further condition for the establishment of the gift, in the light of the clear evidence of witnesses to the effect that the land was given to Idrissa and Iliya to build and live on, as well as land to cultivate after he (Jatau) had married them off. He contends that no evidence was given that Jatau intended to revoke the gift given to their fathers. It was the lower Court that speculated that they were merely placed in possession as opposed to being an outright gift.
Counsel submits that Area Courts are Courts of substantial justice to which pleadings and rules of evidence are not strictly applicable. He relies on Section 256(1) (c) of the Evidence Act and Nwosu V Ekeigwe (2015) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1472) 80. Therefore, the finding of the lower Court that the fathers of the Appellants were put in possession and that the Appellants failed to prove absolute transfer of title by way of customary grant is not borne out by the evidence on record. He further contends that the lower Court ignored the evidence of PW1, PW3 and PW4, as well as those of DW2 and DW3 in this regard. Counsel therefore submits that the conclusion reached by the lower Court that their respective parents were merely placed in possession is perverse and extrinsic to the evidence adduced before it.
Counsel also submits that the evidence before the trial Court disclosed that the fathers of the Appellants were adopted as children of Jatau when he married their mother who came along to his house with her three children, namely: PW1, DW1 and Iliya. The 1st Defendant at the lower Court (deceased and substituted) denied any such gift while the 2nd Defendant claimed that Iliya (father of 1st Appellant) abandoned the land. Counsel therefore submits that the claims of the Appellants were established by the evidence of PW1, PW3, PW4, DW1, DW2 and DW3; whereas the defence of the Respondents was unsubstantiated.
Counsel finally submits that the order made by the lower Court declaring the Respondents as the rightful owners of the land in dispute was neither claimed nor sought for by the Respondents either at the trial Court or at the lower Court. Counsel urged the Court to resolve all three issues in favour of the Appellants, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower Court and grant the reliefs of the Appellants.
In response, learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that the identity of the pieces of land in dispute was established by the visit to the locus in quo where the 1st Appellant identified two pieces of land which he laid claim to and the 2nd Appellant equally identified one piece of land as his. Their claim before the trial Court is that the land was given to their fathers, Iliya and Idrisa to cultivate based on Tangale custom by Jatau, the Respondents’ father. Counsel thus submits that the onus of proving the Tangale custom rested on the Appellants.
In respect of the character of evidence placed before the trial Court, Counsel submits that PW1 did not give direct evidence as to the nature of the gift by Jatau neither was she an eyewitness to the alleged gift; PW2 admitted not knowing anything about the ownership or gift of the pieces of land; PW3 did not know anything about the land in dispute or about any gift, and being the wife to 1st Appellant’s younger brother, she could not have witnessed the gift of land made before her husband was born; PW4 only gave evidence of what he was told amounting to hearsay evidence which is not admissible. Counsel therefore submits that from the totality of the evidence adduced by the Appellants, there was nothing to establish the gift of any of the three portions of land claimed.
Counsel submits that to prove the gift of land inter vivos, there must be evidence of actual handing over of the lands and acceptance thereof in the presence of witnesses. Counsel submits that it is not in dispute that the Appellants are not descendants of Jatau and therefore not heirs to his estate. It is also not in dispute that their mother, Oyer, was Jatau’s wife who cultivated the land along with her children. However, that the only gift was in respect of the land given to DW1 as testified by him. DW3 however testified that a plot was also given to Iliya to live on. That Iliya subsequently abandoned the plot and the building which he had erected on it has since collapsed.
Counsel further submits that, since from the Appellants’ claim, the disputed land was given to their parents to cultivate based on Tangale custom, they were bound to prove and establish this custom of the Tangale people. He submits that being a claim for declaration of title to land, the onus lay squarely on the Appellants to prove their title to the land and they must rely on the strength of their case and not on any weakness in the case of the Respondents. Counsel submits that in the instant case, the totality of the evidence of the Appellants’ witnesses was against the Appellants and in support of the Respondents. That based on the principles for the grant of a declaratory relief, even an admission by a defendant does not relieve a Claimant of the onus of proving their claim.
In addition, Counsel submits that in law there can be no gift without handing over of physical possession by the donor in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, in order to transfer absolute title under customary law, it ought to be pleaded and proved by evidence that the sale was conclusive in the presence of witnesses; also the names of the witnesses should be pleaded and the fact that they witnessed the actual delivery or handing over of the land to the purchaser. Counsel submits that having failed to prove grant or gift, which is their root of title, what transpired between Jatau, Iliya and Idrisa can best be regarded as a trust, and thus the lower Court rightly held that Jatau placed Iliya and Idrisa in possession.
On the issue of whether the Respondents were entitled to the order made declaring them as rightful owners of the land in dispute in the absence of a counterclaim, Counsel submits that in land disputes before an Area Court, a claim and counter-claim is always inferred from the Plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s response thereto. Thus, in the instant case where both parties laid claim to the ownership of the land in dispute through inheritance from their parents before an Area Court where pleadings are not filed and rules of evidence are not strictly applied, the emphasis is on substantial Justice. Thus, the Respondents’ denial of the claim on the basis that the land belongs to them, means they counterclaimed since both sides laid claim to the land in dispute. Counsel relied on a number of decided cases. Finally, Counsel urged the Court to resolve the issues in favour of the Respondents, dismiss the appeal and uphold the decision of the lower Court.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
The law as long settled is that, in dealing with appeals from Area Courts or Customary Courts, an appellate Court is exhorted to be liberal with regard to matters of procedure or technicality, as the whole object of such trials is that the real dispute between the parties should be fairly adjudicated upon. Put another way, appellate Courts are enjoined to look at the substance rather than the form when considering the judgment from an Area Court. Therefore, great latitude must be given to and broad interpretation placed upon cases decided by an Area Court. Its proceedings have to be carefully scrutinized to ascertain the subject matter of the case, as well as the issues raised therein. See Faleye V Dada (2016) LPELR-40297(SC) 34-36, E-B, per MD Muhammad, JSC, & 39, B-F, per Okoro, JSC; Onwuama V Ezeokoli (2002) LPELR-2712(SC) 10-11, D-A, per Uwaifo, JSC; Kamalu V Umunna (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 505) 321.
In Agbasi V Obi (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 1, 14, Belgore JSC (as he then was) stated the rationale of the law thus:
“The native Courts are Courts of common sense and simplicity, they are never burdened by strict adherence to procedure. They are Courts for quick and cheap manner of dispensation of justice. Most of the time their decisions reflect the very justice and truth of the cases. It is because these Courts are not tied to technicality of procedure that the appellate Court must look to the totality of the proceedings to find who were the parties before them, what were the issues before them and what they have decided.”
Onu JSC, in commenting on this issue, stated at page 18 of the E-Report as follows:
“Indeed, … judgments of Native Courts should be treated differently from those of a High Court. When dealing with such judgments, an appellate Court is entitled to go beyond what appears on the face of the claim and ascertain from the entire evidence before the Native Court (Customary Court or Area Court) what really the nature the nature of the dispute is involved. In other words, that great latitude must be given to, and broad interpretation placed upon Native Court cases and that the whole proceedings, the evidence of the parties and the judgment, must be looked at in order to decide what a Native Court case was about.”
Hence, what this Court is called upon to decide is whether the lower Court sitting as an appellate Court over the decision of the trial Upper Area Court, looked at the entire evidence placed before it in order to discover whether substantial justice was done. This is because Customary or Area Courts are not bound, though guided, by the provisions of the Evidence Act. See Section 256(1) (c) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
Also, it is a trite principle of law that in a claim for declaration of title to land, the onus is always on the Plaintiff to establish his claim. The standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities or a preponderance of evidence. The usual test is whether the plaintiff has been able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he has a better title than the defendant. In addition, a party must establish the method by which he acquired the said title as ownership cannot be claimed without establishing how it came about. The law is that a claimant must satisfy the Court as to:
(a) The precise nature of the title claimed, that is to say whether it is title by original ownership, customary grant, conveyance, sale under customary law, long possession or otherwise; and
(b) Evidence establishing the nature of title claimed.
See Dayya V Dayya (2021) LPELR-56576(CA) 12-15, E-B; Yakubu V Jauroyel (2014) LPELR-22732(SC); Odunukwe V Ofomata (2010) LPELR-2250(SC); Oyeneyin V Akingkube (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1184) 265 Thus, in due obedience and complete obeisance to the position of the law, I will examine the decision of the lower Court to see whether it applied these principles of law to the proceedings of the trial Upper Area Court in arriving at its decision.
The Respondents have argued that the evidence led by the Appellants with respect to their claim of title to land by way of gift was not satisfactory; while the Appellants have argued conversely. However, since the case was tried in the Upper Area Court where pleadings are unknown, latitude must be given. So, the consideration should be based upon a broad view of the proceedings to see whether substantial justice was done without giving undue attention to technicalities or insisting on the strict application of rules of evidence within the procedure permitted by such Courts. Decisions of Area Courts on land cases arrived at after a fair hearing on relevant evidence should not be disturbed without very clear proof that they are wrong – Arum V Nwobodo (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1362) 374, 406, H (SC); Dayya V Dayya (supra).
At the trial before the trial Upper Area Court, the Appellants stated that when their fathers (Iliya and Idrisa) were of marriageable ages, their stepfather, Jatau, married wives for them and also gave them gave the land in dispute to build upon and to cultivate. Therefore, their claim was evidently anchored on customary grant or gift. To substantiate their claim, they adduced evidence through PW1-PW4.
PW1(Sarah Yason) is the sister of the 1st Appellant’s father (Iliya). She stated that their mother came to Jatau’s house along with Iliya and Raymond, her brothers when Jatau married their mother. Subsequently, Jatau (also referred to as Baba Bashak) gave her brothers the land in dispute to build upon and also married wives for them. PW3 (Polina Joshua Jatau), a daughter-in-law, came to Jatau’s house in 1973 and lived in Iliya’s house on the land in dispute, when she came home to be delivered of a baby. Jatau even gave her baby the name Molkaki. She confirmed that Iliya, Joshua (Joshuwa) and Idrisa all lived in Jatau’s house and that Jatau married wives for both Iliya and Idrisa. PW4 (Joshua Jatau) stated that he is the son of Jatau’s younger brother and he was brought to Jatau’s house as far back as 1958. He confirmed that Jatau married wives for both Iliya and Idrisa and gave each of them land to build upon.
For the Respondents, DW1 (Raymond Jatau) was Jatau’s son and the Appellants’ Uncle. As their fathers’ brother, he gave a detailed history of how Jatau married the 1st Appellant’s grandmother, Oyervide “customary inheritance marriage”. The 1st Appellant’s father (Iliya), Sara and DW1 came to Jatau’s house with their mother, Oyer, after their father’s demise. Mama Oyer cultivated the land along with both Iliya and DW1. Since the land was not adequate for all of them, DW1 decided to leave the land for his elder brother, Iliya and so he relocated to another village, Latarki, where Jatau gave him another piece of land which he cultivates to date. DW1 testified that the 1st Appellant’s father (Iliya) only left the land given to him by Jatau when he fell ill and travelled to Kalmai where he subsequently died.
DW2 confirmed the testimony of DW1 that Baba Jatau gave Iliya land upon which to build. That Iliya spent many years on the land before he left for Kalmai. However, when Jatau’s other children noticed that he was no longer there, they gave the land to one of Jatau’s grandchildren. DW3 (Garba John) testified that Iliya lived with Jatau and that Jatau gave him land upon which he erected a building. However, when the building collapsed, they gave the land to Jatau’s grandson. At the close of evidence, the trial Court moved to inspect the locus in quo where the Appellants showed the Court the exact dimensions of the land they claimed and the measurements were recorded, as well as the locust Bean Tree planted by Oyer, the Appellants’ grandmother and Jatau’s wife.
Based on the evidence preponderating in favour of the Appellants, including the landmarks stated in the evidence adduced by the Appellants’ witnesses, such as the two graves, a Locust Bean Tree planted by Oyer and Iliya’s collapsed building, which were pointed out during the visit to the locus in quo, the trial Upper Area Court found in favour of the Appellants and entered judgment, awarding title to the plots of land in dispute to them as claimed.
This judgment was however overturned by the lower Court principally on the ground that the Appellants did not prove that they acquired the land by way of gift from Baba Jatau to their fathers. In particular, the lower Court held that gift in customary law must be proved by witnesses who witnessed when the owner Jatau handed over the land to the fathers of the Appellants, and that they failed to prove it to the standard required by law in civil cases in line with Sections 131-133 of the Evidence Act. It also held that even if the evidence of the existence of the Locust Bean Tree and the two graves could pass as acts of possession, they can only complement evidence in proof of the gift to the Appellants.
It is indeed the law that it is the duty of the beneficiary of a gift to prove the existence of such gift, especially where the owner who made such gift is dead and he is survived by heirs who are entitled to inherit the property. However, I beg to differ with the lower Court in its finding that the Appellants did not prove the existence of the gift/grant of the land to their fathers by Jatau. From the record of proceedings of the trial Upper Area Court, even though there was no visual evidence of a physical hand-over of the land, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from credible witnesses that established that Jatau gifted the fathers of the Appellants (Iliya and Idrisa) the land in dispute. Following the grant, they cultivated the land, built a house thereon, married wives and lived on the land. This was in Jatau’s lifetime and even after his demise. Both the Appellants’ witnesses and the Respondents’ witnesses were ad idem on this. From the evidence in defence of the claim, the Respondents’ position is that after the demise of Jatau, they subsequently took back the land gifted to the Appellants’ fathers when they left and the building built on the land collapsed. Therefore, they gave the land to one of Jatau’s grandsons. However, this cannot suffice to defeat the claim of the Appellants who, by virtue of being the children of Iliya and Idrisa, inherited the land gifted to their fathers by Jatau.
In addition, it is the law that while rules of evidence may be strictly applied in trials before the High Court, they are not so strictly applied in Area Courts because in those Courts, the aim is simply to ensure that substantial justice is done. As has been consistently reiterated by the apex Court as well as this Court, Area Courts are simple, cheap and grassroots Courts where technical rules are not allowed to override substantial justice. Section 256(1) (c) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) expressly provides –
“256. (1) This Act shall apply to all judicial proceeding before any Court established in the Federal Republic of Nigeria but it shall not apply to –
(c) Judicial proceeding in any civil cause or matter in or before any Sharia Court of Appeal, Customary Court of Appeal, Area Court or Customary Court unless any authority empowered to do so under the Constitution, by order published in the Gazette, confers upon any or all Sharia Courts of Appeal, Customary Courts of Appeal, Area Courts or Customary Courts in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja or a State, as the case may be, power to enforce any or all the provisions of this Act.”
Therefore, the lower Court erred when it held that the oral evidence adduced by the Appellants, which was complemented by the hard evidence of the two graves and locust Bean Tree visibly seen during the visit to the locus in quo, amounted to only evidence of acts of possession. Rather, by the evidence of PW1, PW3, PW4, DW1, DW2 and DW3, it was established that Jatau evidently adopted his wife’s children (Iliya and Idrisa) as his, and when they were old enough, he married wives for them and in addition, gifted them the land in dispute to cultivate and erect their houses. Evidence abounds that Iliya erected a building and also cultivated the land in Jatau’s lifetime and continued cultivating it even after his death. The evidence is that at a point, Iliya fell ill and travelled to Kalmai where he died, and his building subsequently collapsed. It was following these events that the Respondents peremptorily took over the land and handed it over to one of Jatau’s grandsons.
For the lower Court to insist that the Appellants should have produced the actual persons who witnessed the actual handing over of the land by Jatau to the Appellants’ fathers (his stepsons), was stretching it too far. This is more so that it is in evidence that the major players, i.e., Jatau and his wife, Oyer as well as the Appellants’ fathers (Oyer’s children, Iliya and Idrisa), had long since died. However, Iliya’s younger brother, DW1, who testified for the Respondents at the age of 70 years old, confirmed that Oyer cultivated the land with her sons (Appellant’s fathers), after which DW1, also a brother, decided to leave the land for Iliya and went to cultivate another land which Jatau gave him at Latarki. This is evidence which is averse to the Respondents’ case. However, it further strengthens the Appellants’ case.
The combined effect of the circumstantial evidence of these witnesses therefore clearly preponderated in favour of the Appellants’ claim because even the Respondents’ witnesses DW1, DW2 and DW3 confirmed that they simply took over the land after the Appellants’ father left for Kalmai when he fell ill and handed it over to Jatau’s grandson. Based on the above findings, I resolve all three issues in favour of the Appellants.
In the result, I find the appeal meritorious. It succeeds and is allowed.
Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court of Gombe State in Suit No. GM/92A/2018 delivered on 25th January, 2021, Coram B.L. Iliya, J. and A. Abubakar, J., is set aside.
In its place, the judgment of the Upper Area Court, Filiya delivered on 19th July 2018, Coram: S.M. Danjin, L. Yaro and D.M. Kamo, is reinstated, affirmed and upheld.
IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft, the judgment of my learned brother, JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA, just delivered.
My learned brother exhaustively considered the issues for determination and I agree that the appeal is meritorious. The appeal succeeds and it is also allowed by me. The judgment of the High Court of Gombe State in Suit No. GM/92A/2018 delivered on the 25th of January, 2021, is hereby set aside.
I abide by the orders made in the lead judgment.
EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A.: I have read in draft, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, J. H. Sankey, JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein, I have nothing useful to add apart from stating that the law is trite and clear that proceedings in the Area Courts is based much more on sense of reasoning and justice and not on technicalities and strict adherence to the rules of procedure. See Bawa & Anor v. Wunji & Ors (2021) LPELR-54433(CA); Dayya & Ors v. Dayya & Ors (2021) LPELR-56576 (CA). I adopt same as mine.
Appearances:
H.N. Onyekwere, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Y.L. Yunana, Esq. For Respondent(s)