FRONTERA PETROLEUM RESOURCES INC v. NIGERIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (2019)

FRONTERA PETROLEUM RESOURCES INC v. NIGERIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

(2019)LCN/13259(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 15th day of May, 2019

RATIO

STATUTE BAR: WHETHER THE TIME DEDICATED TO NEGOTIATING SHOULD BE EXCLUDED IN COMPUTING WHETHER A MATTER IS STATUTE BARRED

Where the negotiation does not result in a settlement or in an admission of liability, the time devoted to negotiation will not be excluded from the period which should be taken into consideration in determining whether an action is statute barred. In EBOIGBE vs. N.N.P.C. (supra) at 659-660, Adio, JSC stated:

…the law is that when in respect of a cause of action, the period of limitation begins to run, it is not broken and it does not cease to run merely because the parties engaged in negotiation. The best cause for a person to whom a right has accrued is to institute an action against the other party so as to protect his interest or right in case the negotiations fails. If, as in this case, the negotiation does not result in a settlement or in an admission of liability, the law will not allow the time devoted to negotiation to be excluded from the period which should be taken into consideration for the determination of the question whether a claim has been statute barred. Negotiation by parties does not prevent or stop time from running.PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

STATUTE BAR: WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WILL STOP TIME FROM RUNNING FOR THE PURPOSE OF LIMITATION OF TIME

The only exception where negotiations will stop time from running will depend on the stage reached in the negotiations and if there has been an admission of liability during the negotiations and all that remained is fulfilment of the agreement and the party fails to perform, in such an instance it will not be just and equitable for the action to be barred after the statutory period. In NWADIARO vs. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD (supra) at 338-339, this Court (per Kolawole, JCA) stated the legal position thus:

The case of Lahan v. The Attorney-General of Western Nigeria (1961) WNLR 39 to which learned counsel referred is distinguishable. In that case, pleadings were filed and exchanged. Issues were joined. At the hearing of the preliminary question, it was contended that the letter written by the Government would not prevent time from running during negotiations between the parties. Fatayi Williams J. (as he then was) citing with approval the case of Hewllett v. London County Council (1908) 24 T.L.R. 331 at 332 said at page 44 that Although it would appear from the facts that the plaintiffs in the case cited above is on a much stronger footing than the plaintiffs in this case, the decision, nevertheless seems to support the view that negotiations between the parties will not stop the time from running.PER UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.

 

UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The provenance of this appeal is in the commercial transaction between the Appellant and the liquidated Gulf Bank of Nigeria PLC. Flowing from the said transaction, the Appellant, contending that Gulf Bank owed it monies on the said transaction instituted proceedings before the High Court of Lagos State against the Respondent, the Liquidator of Gulf Bank. The Respondent raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos State to entertain the action. Consequent upon this objection the Appellant filed a notice discontinuing the action at the High Court of Lagos State.

Thereafter the Appellant instituted a fresh action before the Federal High Court (hereinafter called the lower Court) in SUIT NO. FHC/L/CS/139/2011: FRONTERA PETROLEUM RESOURCES INC. vs. NIGERIA DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (LIQUIDATOR OF GULF BANK OF NIGERIA PLC. Upon being served, the Court processes, the Respondent filed an application challenging the competence of the action upon the ground that the action is statute barred. The parties filed and exchanged processes on the application and in its Ruling the lower Court held that the action was statute barred and dismissed the same. The Ruling of the lower Court is at pages 180-182 of the Records. The Appellant was dissatisfied and appealed against the said Ruling. The extant Notice of Appeal on which the appeal was argued is the Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 12th September, 2018 but deemed as properly filed on 17th September, 2018.

The Records of Appeal were compiled and transmitted and in obeisance to the Rules of Court, the parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. The extant briefs on which the appeal was argued are the Amended Appellants Brief filed on 12th September, 2018 but deemed as properly filed on 17th September, 2018, the Amended Respondents Brief filed on 9th November, 2018 but deemed as properly filed on 5th December, 2018 and the Appellants Reply Brief filed on 6th March 2019 but deemed as properly filed on 7th March 2019. At the hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the parties urged the Court to uphold their respective submissions in the determination of the appeal.

The Appellant distilled two issues for determination, as follows:

1. Was the lower Court right to have had recourse to the period of the pendency of Suit No: LD/1585/07 between the Appellant and the Respondent and in relation to the same cause of action pending before it in the determination of whether the Appellants suit was statute barred?

(Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal)

2. Was the lower Court right in its decision that there was no negotiation between the Appellant and the Respondent as would warrant the suspension of the running of the limitation period for instituting the action?

(Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal)

The Respondent equally formulated two issues for determination, namely:

i) Whether the lower Court was right to have had recourse to the period of the pendency of Suit No: LD/1585/07 between the Appellant and the Respondent and in relation to the same cause of action pending before it in the determination of whether the Appellants Suit was statute barred.

ii) Whether the lower Court was right in its decision that there was no negotiation between the Appellant and the Respondent as would warrant the suspension of the running of the limitation period for instituting the action.

Even though the Respondent did not expressly state that it was adopting the issues distilled by the Appellant, the issues formulated by the Respondent are the ipssissima verba of the Appellants issues. Accordingly, the issues as crafted by the Appellant would be our lodestar in considering the submissions of learned counsel and determining this appeal.

ISSUE NUMBER ONE

Was the lower Court right to have had recourse to the period of the pendency of Suit No: LD/1585/07 between the Appellant and the Respondent and in relation to the same cause of action pending before it in the determination of whether the Appellants suit was statute barred?

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS COUNSEL

The Appellant submits that a cause of action is statute barred when the time prescribed by the limitation law for the cause of action has elapsed. The cases of ARAKA vs. EJEAGWU (2000) LPELR – 533 (SC), EBONYI STATE UNIVERSITY vs. IFEANYI (2016) LPELR 41051 (CA), OGUNDARE vs. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE (2017) LPELR 41859 (CA) and A-G ADAMAWA STATE vs. A-G

FEDERATION (2014) LPELR 23221 (SC) were relied upon. It was stated that the Appellants cause of action accrued on 30th November, 2004 and that by Section 8 (1) of the Limitation Law of Lagos State, the limitation period was six years. The procedure to be followed in determining whether a cause of action is statute barred as laid down in JFS INV. LTD vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD (2010) 9 NWLR (PT 1225) 495 at 534 was referred to and it was opined that the limitation period will cease to run during the pendency of a suit filed within time in respect of the same cause of action, which suit is subsequently struck out for one defect or the other. It was contended that the Appellant commenced its action at the High Court of Lagos State within the limitation period and that the limitation period ceased to run while the said action was pending and that the lower Court was consequently wrong to have taken the period of the pendency of the said suit in calculating the limitation period. The case of SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (2015) LPELR 24655 (CA) was cited in support.

The Appellant further submits that its cause of action having arisen on 30th November, 2004, it filed its action at the High Court of Lagos State on 11th December 2007 and that the action lasted for a period of one year and three months before it was struck out on 24th March 2009. It was maintained that in computing whether its action was statute barred, the one year and three months when the same cause of action was pending at the High Court of Lagos State was not to be reckoned with in the computation. It was stated that when this is done, the action which it filed at the lower Court on 25th March, 2011 would be seen to have been filed within 5 years and 11 days, which is within the limitation period of six years. It was conclusively submitted that the action was not statute barred and that the Appellant can litigate the same without any hindrance.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS COUNSEL

The Respondent submits that in calculating the period of limitation, the Court looks at the writ and statement of claim to see when the alleged wrong was suffered and place it side by side with the date when the writ was issued in order to ascertain if the action was filed within the limitation period. The cases of AMACHERE vs.THE SPDC NIGERIA LTD (2011) LPELR 4474 (CA), AMUSAN vs. OBIDEYI (2005) 31 WRN 1 at 6 and JFS INV. LTD vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD (supra) were called in aid. It was asserted that the relevant processes to consider in determining whether an action is statute barred are the writ of summons and statement of claim vide TEIBOGREN vs. GOVERNOR OF DELTA STATE (2014) LPELR 23220 (CA) at 17, ERESIA-EKE vs. ORIKOHA (2010) 8 NWLR (PT 1197) 421 at 443, AYONROMI vs. NNPC (2010) 8 NWLR (PT 1197) 616 at 639, OFILI vs. CSC (2008) 2 NWLR (PT 1071) 238 at 258 ratio 2 and WILLIAMS vs. WILLIAMS (2008) 10 NWLR (PT 1095) 364 at 383.

The Respondent contends that where there are events which will prevent a cause of action from running, the said events have to be made part of the facts submitted before the Court. It was stated that the facts of the earlier suit before the High Court of Lagos State were not pleaded by the Appellant, and not being before the lower Court, it could not have acted on speculation or assumption as it only had a duty to consider the material facts placed before it. The cases of IROEGBU vs. MV CALABAR CARRIER (2008) 5 NWLR (PT 1079) 147 at 168 and DALYOP vs. MADALLA (2017) LPELR – 43349 (CA) were referred to. It was maintained that the facts which the Appellant did not plead in its Statement of Claim cannot be introduced in the counter affidavit filed in opposition to the Respondents application since the Court is only to consider the writ and statement of claim in order to ascertain if the action is statue barred. The lower Court, it was contended, was not wrong in including the period of pendency of the suit at the High Court of Lagos State in ascertaining that the suit was statute barred.

The Respondent conclusively submits that the doctrine of judicial precedent (stare decisis) is futuristic and not retrospective as it is meant to affect decisions to be taken after the precedent had been set, just as it is with statutes not having retrospective effect. The cases of OGIEFO vs. ISESELE I (2014) LPELR 22333 (CA) and AFOLABI vs. GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE (1985) LPELR – 196 (SC) at 90-91 were relied upon and it was submitted that the case of SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (supra) is consequently inapplicable having been decided after the decision of the lower Court subject of appeal.

APPELLANTS REPLY ON LAW

The Appellant submits that the fact of the existence of a prior suit does not constitute part of the facts grounding the Appellants cause of action but a fact which by implication of law suspends and/or freezes the running of the limitation period. It was stated that it therefore need not be pleaded since law or implication of law is not a matter for pleading vide UBA PLC vs. GODM SHOES INDUSTRIES (NIG) LTD (2010) LPELR – 9255 (CA), OKOEBOR vs. POLICE COUNCIL (2003) 5 SC 11 and NAWA vs. A-G CROSS RIVER STATE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 401) 807. It was posited that the Appellant having stated the fact of the previous suit in its counter affidavit, the Court was bound to take judicial notice of the processes filed before it. The case of GARUBA vs. OMOKHODION (2011) LPELR 1309 (SC) was called in aid.

The Appellant conclusively submits that the decision of this Court in SIFAX NIGERIA LIMITED vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (supra) which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (2018) 9 NWLR (PT. 1623) 138 remains binding, based on the doctrine of stare decisis irrespective of whether the action was filed before the decision in the case. The case of FBN vs. MAIWADA (2013) 5 NWLR (PT 1348) 444 was cited in support.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER ONE

The pertinent facts and circumstances of this matter are not disputed. Indeed they are simple and straightforward. It is agreed on all sides that the Appellants cause of action accrued on 30th November, 2004. It is also agreed on all sides that the limitation period is six years. Furthermore, there is no confutation of the fact that the Appellant in enforcing its cause of action instituted proceedings at the High Court of Lagos State on 11th December 2007, three years after the accrual of the cause action. The said action at the High Court of Lagos State remained pending thereat for fifteen months until it was discontinued and struck out on 24th March 2009. Thereafter the Appellant instituted another action at the lower Court on 25th March, 2011. Computing from 30th November, 2004, the date of accrual of the cause of action, to 25th March, 2011 when the action was filed at the lower Court is a period of six years and four months which ordinarily is outside the limitation period of six months.

The disceptation in this matter is whether the period of fifteen months when the previous action was pending at the lower Court ought to be reckoned with in computing the limitation period. If that period is discounted and not taken into account in the computation, then the action at the lower Court would have been instituted about five years after the cause of action accrued; in which case it would not be caught by the limitation period of six years. The lower Court took into account the period when the suit on the same cause of action was pending at the High Court of Lagos State and held that the action was statute barred. The narrow quodlibet is whether the lower Court ought to have taken the said period into account in computing the limitation period. The Appellant contends that the lower Court should not have, while the Respondent maintains that the lower Court was not wrong in including the period of the pendency of the action at the High Court of Lagos State as part of the computation period to ascertain that the suit was statute barred. This Court was confronted with a similar situation in SIFAX NIG LTD vs. MIGFO NIG LTD (supra). In resolving the matter, Oseji JCA stated as follows at page 48:

Where an aggrieved person commences an action within the period prescribed by the statute and such action is subsequently struck out for one reason or the other without being heard on the merit or subjected to an outright dismissal, such action is still open to be re-commenced at the instance of the claimant and the limitation period shall not count during the pendency of the earlier suit. In other words, computation of time during the pendency of an action shall remain frozen from the filing of the action until it is determined or abates. Thus in the instant case time ceases to run from the filing of Suit No. FHC/L/CS/664/2006 on 9-8-2006 until the 8-6-12 when it was struck out by the Supreme Court. My conclusion therefore is that the instant case is not caught by the statute of limitation.

The above decision was affirmed by the apex Court in SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (2018) 9 NWLR (PT 1623) 138. In the words of Augie, JSC at page 185:

I agree; the earlier suit filed by the Respondents cannot be dead; it is alive and so it can be resuscitated which is what the Respondents achieved when they filed this suit at the trial Court with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this matter, and the time spent at the wrong Court cannot be counted; it was suspended.

So, the settled state of the law is that time ceased to run for purpose of limitation period during the pendency of the previous action at the High Court of Lagos State. The lower Court would therefore appear to be wrong, having included the said period in its computation. The Respondent however argues that the lower Court was not wrong because the Appellant failed to plead the said previous proceeding at the High Court of Lagos State in its Statement of Claim. That may well be so, but the material consideration is whether in the consideration of the application, the fact of the previous proceedings was before the lower Court in order for the lower Court to apply the provisions of the law consequent thereon.

In the Appellants counter affidavit at the lower Court, the fact of the previous action is deposed to in paragraph 4 (c) (see page 149 of the Records) and the Court processes in respect of the said action were exhibited. (See pages 151-159 of the Records). Furthermore, in the written address in support of the counter affidavit, the Appellant submitted as follows in paragraph 5.05-5.06:

5.05 It is submitted that upon the Courts Order striking out an earlier suit in 2007 … in which the defendant?s present Solicitors entered appearance, the Claimant diligently instituted this present action in 2011…

5.06 It is submitted; and further to the above paragraph, that this Claimants present action in view of the earlier suit against the defendant in 2007 for the same reliefs/claim could not, in all arithmetical certainly, be said to be statute-barred …

So, there were clearly materials before the lower Court on which to make a determination on the point of law of whether limitation period ceased to run during the pendency of the action at the High Court of Lagos State. The lower Court however failed to make any pronouncement on the issue but indeed included the said period in its computation of time. The Appellant was definitely not obligated to plead the fact of the previous action in its statement of claim as the same does not form part of its cause of action. By the provisions of Order 13 Rule 4 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules a pleading shall contain a statement in a summary form of the material facts which a party relies for his claim or defence. The fact of the previous action is not a material fact which the Appellant was required to have pleaded as part of its cause of action which arose from the alleged failure by the Respondent to meet its obligations in the commercial transaction between them.

The Respondent further contended that the decision in SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (supra) was given after the decision of the lower Court and that the doctrine of judicial precedent is meant to affect decisions taken after the precedent had been set and that it is not retrospective. The cases of OGIEFO vs. ISESELE I (supra) and AFOLABI vs. GOV., OYO STATE (supra) relied on by the Respondent in this regard are not apposite as they deal with the principle that legislation does not have retrospective effect except where it is expressly stated. Be that as it may, I am not enthused by the Respondents contention. It is apothegmatic that the law is in the bosom of the judge. The judge is a repository of the law and he is bound to determine the effect of the law on a given state of facts, whether or not his attention had been drawn to the applicable law. See OKAFOR vs. NWAZOJIE (2015) LPELR (40690) 1 at 12-13 and MALHOTRA vs. BANK OF SINGAPORE LTD (2014) LPELR (22442) 1 at 28. It is therefore lame for the Respondent to argue that the decision of the lower Court is not wrong since the said decision was handed down before SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (supra). No. The SIFAX case restated the law. It was the law which the lower Court, being a repository of the law, should have applied in its decision on whether the action was statute barred. Having failed to give the correct legal effect on the set of facts before it, it was not right when it had recourse to the period of the pendency of the previous action at the High Court of Lagos State in determining whether the Appellants suit was statute barred. I iterate that the legal position is that time ceased to run for purpose of the limitation period during the pendency of the action at the High Court of Lagos State and when this is taken into consideration, the Appellants action is not statute barred: SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (supra). This issue is accordingly resolved in favour of the Appellant.

ISSUE NUMBER TWO

Was the lower Court right in its decision that there was no negotiation between the Appellant and the Respondent as would warrant the suspension of the running of the limitation period for instituting the action?

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS COUNSEL

The Appellant submits that it was in order to allow for the amicable resolution of the dispute between the parties that it discontinued the Suit filed at the High Court of Lagos State; but that arising from the failure of the negotiation it instituted the action at the lower Court. The negotiation it was submitted was to be taken into account in considering whether an action is statute barred vide NWADIARO vs. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (1990) 5 NWLR (PT 150) 332 at 338. It was stated that the fact of negotiations as deposed in the Appellants counter affidavit was not challenged by the Respondent and that the lower Court was wrong to have held that it was not sure that there has been anything that can be described as negotiation between the parties when the issue of negotiations was not challenged by the Respondent. The cases of BABALE vs. ABDULKADIR (1993) 3 NWLR (PT 281) 253 at 260, CHUGBO CHEMISTS LTD vs. CHUGBO (1996) 5 NWLR (PT 447) 246 at 252 among other cases were referred to. It was conclusively submitted that the lower Court was grossly in error when it dismissed the Appellants Suit especially as it did not evaluate the depositions in the Appellants counter affidavit and written address but resorted to speculation which a Court should not do. The cases of DALFAM vs. OKAKU (2001) WRN (P. 79), PDP vs. INEC (2012) 18 WRN (P. 145) among other cases were relied upon.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS COUNSEL

The Respondent submits that the parties were never engaged in any negotiations whatsoever and that the Appellants submissions in that regard were not borne out by the evidence and were merely speculative and should be discountenanced videRAJCO INTERNATIONAL LTD vs. LE CAVALIER MOTELS AND RESTAURANTS LTD (2016) LPELR 40082 (CA) and IWUANYANWU vs. HON.MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE & WATER RESOURCES (2016) LPELR 40208 (CA). It was asserted that even if there were negotiations between the parties, which was not conceded, it would not prevent or stop the limitation period from running. The cases of EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (PT 347) 649 at 659 to 600 [sic] and LAHAN vs. A-G, WESTERN NIGERIA (1961) WNLR 39 were cited in support.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER TWO

The contention under this issue is whether there was negotiation between the parties such that the running of the limitation period would have been suspended during the period of the negotiation. Without going into the dialectics of whether in fact there was negotiation between the parties, it seems to me that the legal effect of negotiations in computing the limitation period is well settled, and it is this: the period of limitation will not cease to run merely because the parties are engaged in negotiation. Where the negotiation does not result in a settlement or in an admission of liability, the time devoted to negotiation will not be excluded from the period which should be taken into consideration in determining whether an action is statute barred. In EBOIGBE vs. N.N.P.C. (supra) at 659-660, Adio, JSC stated:

…the law is that when in respect of a cause of action, the period of limitation begins to run, it is not broken and it does not cease to run merely because the parties engaged in negotiation. The best cause for a person to whom a right has accrued is to institute an action against the other party so as to protect his interest or right in case the negotiations fails. If, as in this case, the negotiation does not result in a settlement or in an admission of liability, the law will not allow the time devoted to negotiation to be excluded from the period which should be taken into consideration for the determination of the question whether a claim has been statute barred. Negotiation by parties does not prevent or stop time from running.

The only exception where negotiations will stop time from running will depend on the stage reached in the negotiations and if there has been an admission of liability during the negotiations and all that remained is fulfilment of the agreement and the party fails to perform, in such an instance it will not be just and equitable for the action to be barred after the statutory period. In NWADIARO vs. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD (supra) at 338-339, this Court (per Kolawole, JCA) stated the legal position thus:

The case of Lahan v. The Attorney-General of Western Nigeria (1961) WNLR 39 to which learned counsel referred is distinguishable. In that case, pleadings were filed and exchanged. Issues were joined. At the hearing of the preliminary question, it was contended that the letter written by the Government would not prevent time from running during negotiations between the parties. Fatayi Williams J. (as he then was) citing with approval the case of Hewllett v. London County Council (1908) 24 T.L.R. 331 at 332 said at page 44 that Although it would appear from the facts that the plaintiffs in the case cited above is on a much stronger footing than the plaintiffs in this case, the decision, nevertheless seems to support the view that negotiations between the parties will not stop the time from running.

This dictum is, of course, subject to qualification. It obviously must depend upon the stage which the negotiation had reached. It must also be qualified in one other way; if there has been admission of liability during negotiation and all that remains is fulfilment of the agreement, it cannot be just and equitable that the action would be barred after the statutory period of limitation giving rise to the action if the defendant were to resile from his agreement during the negotiation.

There is nothing on the cold printed records showing that even if there were negotiations, the stage reached or that it resulted in an admission of liability by the Respondent from which they later resiled. Accordingly, the lower Court rightly held that there was no negotiation that would warrant the suspension of the running of the limitation period. This issue number two is therefore resolved in favour of the Respondent.

Even though issue number two has been resolved against the Appellant, the resolution of issue number one in its favour necessary connotes that the decision of the lower Court dismissing its action for being statute barred is not correct. The action is not statute barred as the period of the pendency of the previous action at the High Court of Lagos State is not to be included in computing the limitation period. The appeal therefore has merit and it is hereby allowed. The decision of the lower Court delivered on 19th January, 2012 is hereby set aside. The case is remitted to the lower Court for expeditious hearing and determination of the action. There shall be no order as to costs.

TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of a preview of the draft judgment, delivered by my learned brother, UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, JCA. The resolution of the two issues thrown up in the appeal, is with my concurrence. I have nothing more useful to add.

I too allow the appeal. The judgment rendered in re-Suit No: FHC/CS/139/2011, at the Federal High Court, Lagos, on 19th January, 2012, is accordingly set aside.

I adopt the orders of remittance of the case to the Lower Court for trial on its merits and of costs of the appeal, as contained in the lead judgment as mine.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: I read in advance a draft copy of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU JCA and I adopt the judgment as mine with nothing to add.

Appearances:

Thaddeus Idenyi, Esq.For Appellant(s)

Adenrele Adegborioye, Esq. with him, Miss Faith OnuohaFor Respondent(s)

Appearances

Thaddeus Idenyi, Esq.For Appellant

AND

Adenrele Adegborioye, Esq. with him, Miss Faith Onuoha For Respondent