FELEMU v. AMCON
(2022)LCN/16672(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, May 26, 2022
CA/IB/343/2020
Before Our Lordships:
Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal
Folasade Ayodeji Ojo Justice of the Court of Appeal
Abba Bello Mohammed Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
BANKOLE FELEMU APPELANT(S)
And
ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT FACTS ADMITTED NEEDS TO BE PROVED
The law is quite settled that a fact admitted by an adverse party needs no proof. See Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223; Alhaji Mufutau Motunwase v. Isaiah Sorungbe & Anor. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90 and Lamulatu Shasi & Anor. V. Madam Shadia Smith & 2 Ors. (2009) 12 SC (Pt. III) 1. PER ADUMEIN, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF FACT DECISION NOT APPEALED AGAINST IS DEEMED TO BE CORRECT
As can be seen from the pronouncements reproduced above, the trial Court arrived at its decision mainly on the appellant’s admission and this aspect of the judgment has not even been appealed against by the appellant. It is trite law that a finding of fact decision not appealed against is deemed to be correct. See Kariwo Obasi v. Eke Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 364; Michael A. Ndiwe v. Anthony Chuma Okocha (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 252) 129; Alhaji Awesu Atanda Adeyemi v. Chief Olakunri (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt. 638) 104; Madam Adunola Adejumo & 2 Ors. v. Mr. Oludayo Olawaiye (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1421) 252; Wike E. Nyesom v. Dakuku A. Peterside (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 71 and Col. Mohammed Sambo Dasuki v. Federal Republic of Nigeria & Ors. (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1627) 320. PER ADUMEIN, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF BANK FAILURE
It is very sad that some bank workers and directors erroneously think that funds entrusted to their banks’ custody are their private funds, which they can manage at their whims and caprices. When bankers realize that they are just trustees of depositors’ funds – funds belonging to individuals, private and public agencies or organizations, they will always act with utmost good faith, so the public trust in them will not diminish but will always be justified. The reckless and even fraudulent granting of loans to directors and other members of staff of banks and the nonchalant attitude of debtors to pay their bank loans are the main causes of bank failures in Nigeria, with the attendant unpalatable consequences.
It is, perhaps, important to note and state that the conduct of the appellant, a former banker like most bankers, in thinking that funds entrusted to them are their personal money(ies) which they can apply or use with reckless abandon, is the main cause of most bank failures.
And a “bank failure” has been described as “the closing of an insolvent bank by a Federal or State regulator” and the consequences of bank failure include the following:
1. Unemployment: People working in the failed bank are rendered unemployed.
2. The economy may be in financial distress, as money which should be used to boost other sectors of the economy may be used by the Government to pay bailouts.
3. Loss of depositors’ money.
See “Bank Failure” by Julia Kagan (Investopedia Online, November 17, 2021). PER ADUMEIN, J.C.A.
MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The respondent was the applicant in Suit No: FHC/AB/CS/33/2017 which it commenced by way of an originating motion without notice in the Federal High Court, holden at Abeokuta. The respondent later filed a special claim form in which it sought the following relief in its statement of claim:
“a. The sum of N91,471,535.08 (Ninety-One Million, Four Hundred and Seventy One Thousand, Five Hundred and Thirty-Five Naira, Eight Kobo) only as the outstanding on the Defendant’s Account with the Claimant as at 31st May, 2016 as a result of the credit facility (mortgage loan) granted to the Defendant by the erstwhile Oceanic Bank International Plc now Ecobank Nigeria Plc.
b. Interest at 25% per annum from 31st May, 2016 until judgment is delivered and thereafter at 10% from the date of judgment until the whole sum outstanding and cost is liquidated.
c. Cost of this action.”
The appellant, as the defendant in the trial Court, contested the respondent’s claim by filing a statement of defence.
In proof of its claim, the respondent called one Mr. Olusola Abikanlu (PW1) as its sole witness and he tendered ten exhibits – exhibits “A1” to “A10”. The appellant testified as DW1 in his defence and tendered a photocopy of the Oceanic Bank International PLC Employee Handbook as exhibit “C”. At the close of final addresses of the learned counsel for the parties, the trial Court delivered a reserved judgment on the 6th day of March, 2020 whereby the first and second prayers of the respondent were granted and the sum of N200.000.00 (Two hundred thousand naira only) awarded as costs in its favour. This appeal is against the said judgment.
In the appellant’s brief, settled by O. H. Harris-Isa, Esq., and which was filed on 02/08/2021 but deemed as filed on 23/09/2021, three issues were distilled for determination as follows:
ISSUE NO. ONE
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right in granting the claim of the Claimant/Respondent when the agreed tenure of the loan was yet to elapse”.
ISSUE NO. TWO
“Whether the Claimant/Respondent proved the sum awarded by the trial Court in accordance with the law”.
ISSUE NO. THREE
“Whether the judgment is not against the weight of evidence adduced at the trial”.
In the respondent’s brief settled by Akeem Agbaje, Esq., and filed on 05/11/2021, two issues were framed for determination as follows:
“1. Whether this appeal is competent for which this Honourable Court can exercise jurisdiction over it”.
“2. Whether based on the facts and law, the Defence of the Respondent for not repaying the loan is tenable”.
When this appeal came up for hearing on 02/03/2022, learned counsel for the respondent applied to withdraw Issue No. 1 and it was accordingly struck out.
The three issues identified by the appellant adequately covers the five grounds contained in his amended notice of appeal filed on 02/08/2021 but deemed as filed on 23/09/2021. For easy understanding, the grounds in the appellant’s amended notice of appeal are hereby fully reproduced:
“A. Ground of Appeal 1.
The Learned trial Judge of the lower Court erred in law when he held wholly that the Claimant is entitled to reliefs as stated in its statement of claim to wit payment of the sum of N91,471,535.08
Particulars of Errors
i. The learned trial Judge failed to recognize that the agreed tenor for servicing the loan is for a period of 20 years which has not elapsed as contained in the Parties agreement and stated by the Claimant witness
ii. The learned trial Judge raised the issue of separation suo motu without allowing Counsel to address the Court on the issue.
iii. The learned trial Judge erred in law when (sic) accepted the Statement of account from a witness who lacked the capacity to tender or speak to same.
B. Ground of Appeal 2.
Trial judge erred in law when he disregarded the fact that Appellant continued to pay the loan even during the pendency of the suit and which was accepted by the Respondent.
Particulars of error
i. The learned trial Judge closed his eyes to the fact that no particular sum was demanded to be paid periodically by the Appellant upon his unlawful termination from the Bank
ii. The trial Judge totally ignored the fact that the Appellant became impecunious, sick and could not secure another employment termination.
iii. Also totally ignored the fact that the tenor of the loan has yet to expire.
B. Ground of Appeal 3
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he failed to recognize that the bank highly indebted to the Appellant, which included his entitlements, savings for his children and other benefits and yet awarded the reliefs sought by the Respondent.
Particulars of error
1. The learned trial judge failed to recognize the indebtedness of the bank (when the Defendant got the loan) to wit his entitlements in tunes of millions of Naira which the Claimant did not prove as paid and how much but yet awarded the Claims of the Claimant.
2. The trial Judge ignored totally the testimonies of the Claimant witness on cross-examination where he clearly stated he was not aware any of the entitlements was paid to the Appellant.
D. Ground of Appeal 4
The trial judge erred in law when he disregarded the fact that the sum claimed by the Respondent was not proved by a competent witness as required by law before granting same to the Claimant/Respondent.
Particulars of error
1. The learned trial Judge closed his eyes to the fact that the computation of debt was done by AMCON and not Oceanic Bank when in fact the Appellant is not a customer of AMCON, i.e. the account tendered was not that of the bank nor of its successor in title.
2. The learned trial Judge ignored the fact that the Claimant’s Witness works with Cavan Jordan and not even AMCON or Oceanic Bank and so could not have spoken appropriately to the Statement of Account tendered in exhibit.
3. The learned trial Judge went on a voyage of discovery when he calculated the sum representing the debt allegedly owed by the Appellant to the Respondent.
E. OMNIBUS GROUND
The judgment is against the weight of evidence adduced at the trial.
Particulars of error
1. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he disregarded the fact of continuing payment of the facility by the Claimant/Appellant, his health, age and deteriorating capacity, dependants and the society at large. The fact of continuing negotiation by parties”.
I adopt the three issues raised by the learned counsel for the appellant to determine the appeal. However, Issue No. 1 will be taken and treated first. Thereafter, Issues 2 and 3 will be treated together.
ISSUE NO. 1
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right in granting the claim of the Claimant/Respondent when the agreed tenure of the loan was yet to elapse”.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, as an elementary principle of law, parties are bound by their agreement – “Pacta sunt servenda.” Counsel argued that “by the content of exhibits A2 and A4 being letters of award from the Bank, the tenure of the loan was stated to be twenty years” and that the suit presented to the trial Court was “premature and incompetent as the 20 years period allowed by the award letter has not elapsed”.
Relying on the case of Beta Glass Holdings PLC v. Epaco Holdings Ltd (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1237), learned counsel for the appellant stated as follows:
“I submit that the making of a Balloon payment is inclusive of the 20 years period agreed to by the parties. It is incongruous to imagine the defendant whose only means of livelihood was his salary, and who could not liquidate the facility while in employment, would make a balloon payment immediately following the termination of his employment.
I submit that the loan agreement is still subsisting and that the action of the claimant is premature. The Claimant/Appellant has not breached the loan agreement and we urge your Lordships to hold that this action is incompetent thus resolving the issue in favour of the Appellant”.
In response, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the case of Ishola v. S. G. B (Nig.) Ltd (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 488) 405 and submitted that:
“The contention of the Appellant that a loan becomes due only at the end of the tenure of the loan is totally misplaced. A debt becomes payable either on demand or on notice given or upon any other condition agreed upon by the parties”.
Learned counsel for the respondent also argued that:-
“The clear condition for when the debt would become due is in Exhibit A2. Upon the termination of the employment of the appellant the debt became due. The contention and argument of the Appellant that the loan is still subsisting has no basis in law”.
From the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the appellant was a member of staff of Oceanic Bank International PLC, now Ecobank Nigeria PLC. The appellant was granted mortgage loans totaling N60,000,000.00 (sixty million naira) – which the appellant received in two trenches of N42,000,000.00 and N18,000,000.00, respectively. The two mortgage loan agreements were admitted by the trial Court as exhibits “A2” and “A4”, respectively. The contents of both exhibits are the same, save for the amounts of loan or money therein. Exhibit “A2” was fully reproduced by the trial Court, in its judgment, as follows:
“Mr. Bankole Felemu
16B, Bankole Felemu Street
Ibafo
Ogun State
Dear Sir,
RE: ₦42,000,000.00M (FORTY-TWO MILLION NAIRA) MORTGAGE LOAN
Further to your recent request, the Management of Oceanic Bank International Plc. has approved ₦42,000,000.00M (Forty-Two Million Naira) Mortgage Loan for you under the following terms and conditions:
Lender: Oceanic Bank International (Nigeria) Limited (“The Bank”)
Borrower: Mr. Bankole Felemu (“The Staff”)
Amount: ₦42,000,000.00M (Forty-Two Million Naira)
Facility type: Mortgage Loan
Purpose: To purchase a property at Magodo Residential Scheme, Somolu, Lagos.
Tenor: 20 Years Interest Rate: 5% per annum
Deduction: Deductions from Monthly Housing Allowance
Security: (1) Original sale receipt
(2) Original perfected titled Deed in Staff’s name domiciled with the Bank
(3) Execution of Mortgage Forms
(4) Personal Guarantee of Mrs. Esther Felemu
(5) Registration of Bank’s interest as Mortgage
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO DRAWDOWN
1. Acceptance of Oceanic Bank’s offer letter
2. Execution of all security documents.
REPAYMENT TERMS UPON SEPARATION
Ballon payment of all outstanding at separation, failing which, interest on the loan will revert to the current market rate.
EXPENSES
All out-of-pocket expenses, registration, legal and other fees incurred by the Bank in processing this Mortgage, enforcement of security and foreclosure of the Mortgage in the event of default will be for your account.
Yours faithfully,
For: OCEANIC BANK INTERNATIONAL PLC
SIGNED”
The terms of the mortgage loan between the parties are quite clear, simple and unambiguous and the duty of the Court, in interpreting the contract, is to attach the words used their plain and ordinary grammatical meanings. See Jabez Nwangwu v. E. N. Nzekwu & Anor (1957) SCNLR 61; Union Bank of Nig. Ltd v. Benjamin Nwaokolo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 127; Orient Bank (Nig.) PLC v. Bilante Int. Ltd. (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 515) 37 and B. O. Lewis v. United Bank for Africa PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329.
By the terms of the loan agreements, in both exhibits “A2” and “A4”, it is true that the tenor is “20 years”; the “Interest Rate” is “5% per annum”; and “Deduction” should be: “Deductions from Monthly Housing Allowance”. These terms were applicable if the appellant – the “Borrower” remained “The Staff” of the “Lender” – “The Bank”.
However, if there was a separation between the lender/bank and the borrower/appellant the specific term for repayment of the loan is as follows:
“Ballon payment of all outstanding at separation, failing which, interest on the loan will revert to the current market rate”.
The appellant was an employee of a bank and Special Aide to the then Chief Executive Officer of the bank, before his employment was terminated. The appellant, having been in the banking industry for some years, should be taken for granted to fully know the meaning of “Balloon payment.” For the avoidance of doubt, in legal parlance “Balloon payment” is:
“A final loan payment that is usually much larger than the preceding regular payments and that discharges the principal balance of the loan.”
See Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, page 1243.
Therefore, by the mortgage loan agreements between the appellant and the lender/bank, the appellant was to discharge the outstanding principal balance together with the accrued interest thereon by making a bullet or final payment, which in this case stood at N91,471,535.08 (Ninety-One Million, Four Hundred Seventy-One Thousand, Five Hundred and Thirty-Five Naira, Eight Kobo) as at the time the respondent filed its action in the trial Court; upon the separation of the parties, as a result of the termination of the appellant’s employment.
The trial Court was right when it held on pages 246 to 247 of the record of appeal as follows:
“The wordings in the mortgage loan document are clear, direct and unambiguous. It does not call for external aid for interpretation. It is the submissions of the Claimant the mortgage loan is immediately payable upon the termination (separation) and interest is chargeable. The Defendant on the other hand had submitted that the mortgage loan is for 20 years due for payment in 2022 and this action for recovery is premature. I have closely looked at the agreements, they are straight forward and precise. It is true that the agreement is for 20 years tenor, however, from the same agreement the parties envisage that separation or termination may occur and it put in the necessary safeguards for balloon repayment. From the arguments and submissions of the counsel, they all missed this vital phrase, the Claimant could be said to have grasped it in its reliefs from the Court. It is the view of this Court that by the wordings in the documents, that irrespective of the 20 years duration, this mortgage loan could also come to an end by separation. The separation in this case is the termination of the Defendant’s employment, the portion to which becomes the basis for which he secured the loan. In the absence of the employment, and separation ensure the amount becomes immediately payable.”
One settled principle of law is that parties to a contract are bound by the terms thereof and “the duty of the Court is strictly to interpret the terms of the agreement on its clear terms” – per Niki Tobi, JSC in Nika Fishing Co. Ltd. v. Lavina Corporation (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 509 at 543.
Put differently, the duty of the Court is not to make any contract between parties but to interpret or enforce an agreement entered into by the parties. See Augustine Ibama v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364 at 391, per Onnoghen, JSC and Aminu Ishola Investment Limited v. Afribank Nigeria Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380.
Where, therefore, parties have embodied the terms of their agreement or contract in writing, external evidence is inadmissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms thereof. See
Solicitor-General, Western Nigeria v. Dr. Festus O. Adebonojo & Ors. (1971) 1 All NLR 178, Union Bank Ltd. v. Professor Albert Ojo Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLLR (Pt. 333) 385 and Owoniboys Tech. Services Ltd. v. Union Bank of Nig. Ltd. (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 844) 545.
In paragraph 5 of his amended statement of defence, the appellant averred as follows:
“5. That the non-payment of the loan granted was not deliberate but because of the sudden unjustifiable termination of his services from the erstwhile Oceanic Bank ostensibly because of his purported closeness to the then embattled Chief Executive of the Oceanic Bank Cecelia Ibru one year after the grant of the sums to him vide letters dated 24th November, 2009 and 27th January, 2010 respectively. His inability to service the loan granted is due to the fact that the salary it was tied to had ceased to come due to the sudden precipitate action of the Bank. The Defendant shall rely on the two letters at the trial of this suit.”
It should be noted that the appellant’s employment contract with the lender/bank is a distinct and separate agreement from the mortgage loan agreement between the parties. See the case of B. O. Lewis v. United Bank for Africa Plc. (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329 at 346–347, per Peter Odili, JSC; where the Supreme Court made this point very clear by holding as follows:
“The stance of the appellant that his continued retention in the employment of the respondent is a condition precedent to his repayment of the personal loans and his employment having been terminated by the respondent, the enforcement of the personal loans had been frustrated is not sustainable either in the context of the facts of this case or the prevailing law. This is because the contract of employment and personal loans between the appellant and the respondent are two distinct contracts having distinct subject matters and their duration not co-existent nor can it be said one is dependent on the other or that the right to terminate the contract of employment by either party could operate as a condition precedent to the repayment or the personal loan or balance thereof.
A refresher to the situation is that the respondent had fully performed his obligation under the contract for the personal loan his employment has ended. This is because mere hardship, inconvenience or other unexpected turn of events which have created difficulties though not contemplated cannot constitute frustration to release appellant from that obligation. A situation which not even the death of the appellant, grave as that might be, would not alter the course of events of the repayment as his estate would bear the liability. I anchor on the case of Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. (1956) AC 696.”
Harris-Isa, Esq., learned counsel for the appellant emotionally argued as follows:
“We submit that this position of his Lordship is onerous and restrictive, as it will be extremely overreaching for the Claimant to advance loan to the defendant, terminate his employment abruptly for no just cause shortly afterwards and expect a balloon payment based on a three digit current market interest. Where could the Bank have expected the Defendant to raise such balloon amount? That will be grossly unjust and inequitable as it seeks to financially emasculate the defendant.
My Lords, the Defendant/Appellant resides in No 16B Bankole Felemu street Ibafo with his family as their only dwelling house. It is against natural justice that he be deprived of same when indeed he never stopped paying the loan even out of employment and within his capacity.”
I align myself with the contention of Akeem Agbaje, Esq; learned counsel for the respondent, that it is the duty of the Court to do justice according to law and not sentiments. The law has for long been settled that a Court of law does not carry out its judicial duties or functions on the basis of emotions, sentiments or sympathy but only on the facts and law presented before it by the parties. See Victor Ezeugo v. Nelson Ohanyere (1978) 6-7 SC 171; Louis Oniah & Ors. v. Chief Obi J. I. G. Onyia (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.99) 514; Omole & Sons Ltd. v. Sanusi Alaka Adeyemo & 19 Ors. (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 336) 48; Sunday Udosen v. The State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1023) 125;Adamu Suleman & Anor. v. Commissioner of Police (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 298; Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Senator Adulphus N. Wabara (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1347) 331; Mr. Ime Ime Umanah Jnr. v. Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1533) 458; Chief Nimi Barigha-Amange v. Hon. Justice M. A. A. Adumein & Anor. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1530) 349; Olu Ode Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. & Anor. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Christopher David v. Commissioner of Police (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1655) 178 and Engr. Peter Olusanya Fapohunda v. Reynolds Construction Co. Nig. Ltd. & Ors. (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1658) 163.
In this case, the appellant had the obligation to make a balloon payment in settlement of his loan, upon his severance from his lender’s employment, but failed so to do.
With specific reference to this case, the records relating to the mortgage transactions between the appellant and his bank show that the loan was advanced to the appellant to “purchase the property situate at Plot 16, Block 58, Magodo Residential Scheme, Shomolu Area of Lagos State”. However, there is nothing to show that upon receipt of the huge sum of money advanced to him by the bank, the appellant actually purchased the said property.
For all the foregoing reasons, I resolve this issue against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE 2
“Whether the Claimant/Respondent proved the sum awarded by the trial Court in accordance with the law”.
ISSUE 3
“Whether the judgment is not against the weight of evidence adduced at the trial.”
The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the statement of account, upon which the trial Court based its judgment – exhibit 10, was wrongly admitted as the witness who tendered it – Olusola Abikandu “was not the maker of the document and could not speak to it” and that “the document is also a computer generated document that should fulfill the requirement of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011”. In support of this argument, the learned counsel referred the Court to the case of Kubor v. Dickson (2012) 10-11 SC.
Learned counsel contended further that since exhibit 10 consists “of entries in bankers book” the conditions stated in Sections 89 and 90 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) “must be satisfied” and reliance was placed on the case of Olasehinde v. A. C. B. Ltd. (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 161) 180.
Relying on the cases of Onochie v. Odogwu (2006) 2 SC (Pt. II) 153 and Int’l Bank of W/A Ltd. v. Imano Nig. Ltd. (2001) 3 SC 182, learned counsel for the appellant argued that:
“apart from failure to comply with the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act as regards the tendering or admissibility of a computer generated evidence i.e. EX10, the learned trial Judge also erred in not ensuring that the claims of the Claimant as endorsed in its special claims form are properly established in accordance with the law. This Honourable Court has the power to expunge this inadmissible or wrongly admitted evidence and decide this suit only on the legal evidence before it.”
In urging the Court to resolve these two issues in the appellant’s favour, learned counsel contended that the judgment was against the weight of evidence.
To counter the appellant’s arguments, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011 can be complied with by affidavit or oral evidence. In support of this submission, the respondent placed reliance on the case of Dickson v. Sylva (2016) LPELR–41257 (SC). Counsel contended that the respondent complied with Section 84 of the Evidence Act by laying the necessary foundation in paragraph 14 of the written statement on oath of CW1.
Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant “admitted the amount owed and merely contended that the debt was not due”.
The parties contested the case in the trial Court on the basis of their respective pleadings. The law is that parties are bound by their pleadings. See Alhaji IbrahimYakassai v. Incar Motors (Nig.) Ltd. (1975) 5 SC 107; Etowa Enang & Ors. v. Fidelis Ikor Adu (1981) 11-12 SC 25; Incar (Nig.) Ltd v. Benson Transport Ltd (1975) 3 SC 117; Gbaniyi Osafile & Anor. v. Paul Odi & Anor. (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 137) 130 and SCOA Nigeria Ltd. v. Mr. Olabode Vaughan & Anor. (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 800) 210.
It has been held by the Supreme Court and this Court, in many cases, that in deciding cases contested on pleadings the Court should confine itself to evidence on only matters which have been included in the pleadings of the parties. See Ferdinand George v. United Bank for Africa Ltd. (1972) 8-9 SC 264; Chief Victor Woluchem & Ors v. Chief Simon Gudi & Ors (1981) 1-5 SC 291; Emegokwue v. Okadigbo (1973) 4 SC 113; National Investment & Properties Co. Ltd. v. Thompson Organisation Ltd. (1969) 1 NMLR 99; African Continental Seaways Ltd. v. Nigerian Dredging Roads and General Works Ltd. (1977) 5 SC 235 and Prince Adebajo Sosanya v. Eng. Adebayo Idowu Onadeko & 5 Ors (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 926) 185.
In this case, the respondent pleaded in paragraphs 1 to 15 of its statement of claim as follows:
1. The Claimant is a statutory financial institution established under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with the duty to recover non-performing loans of Banks in Nigeria in accordance with the provision of the extant law.
2. The Defendant was an employee of the erstwhile Oceanic International Plc now Ecobank Nigeria Plc.
3. The Defendant by letter dated 5th February, 2008 was offered the purchase of the property situate at Plot 16, Block 58, Magodo Residential Scheme, Somolu Area, Lagos State in the sum of N42,000,000.00 (Forty-two Million Naira).
4. The Defendant applied for and was granted Mortgage Loan vide offer letter dated 18th April, 2008 in the sum of N42,000,000.00 (Forty-two Million Naira) to purchase the property will all the terms and conditions therein contained and same was accepted by the Defendant.
5. Further to paragraph 4 above, the counsel to the Defendant by letter dated 3rd April, 2008 undertook to deliver all executed documents transferring title in the property to the Defendant to the erstwhile Oceanic Bank International Plc.
6. The Defendant sometimes in September, 2008 applied for enhanced mortgage loan to develop the property which was granted by letter dated 18th September, 2008 in the sum of N18,000,000.00 (Eighteen Million Naira) with all the terms and conditions therein contained and same accepted by the Defendant.
7. The security for the facilities granted by the erstwhile Oceanic Bank International Plc are as follows:
i. Original sale receipt
ii. Original perfected title Deed in the Defendant’s name domiciled with the bank.
iii. Execution of Mortgage Forms
iv. Personal Guarantee of Mrs. Esther Felemu
v. Registration of Bank’s interest as Mortgagee
8. The Claimant avers that the Defendant’s employment with the erstwhile Oceanic Bank International Plc was terminated on 24th November, 2009 and the outstanding balance of the credit facility became due and payable by the Defendant upon termination of his employment.
9. The Claimant avers that by letter dated 27th January, 2010 the erstwhile Oceanic Bank International Plc demanded for the repayment of the outstanding balance and the Defendant failed, refused and neglected to pay the outstanding balance of the credit facility and has over the years accumulated interest.
10. The Claimant avers that the Defendant’s indebtedness was assigned to it by Ecobank Nigeria Plc in line with the provision of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Act.
11. The Claimant avers that the Defendant’s total indebted to the Claimant as at 31st May, 2016 is the sum of N91,471,535.08 (Ninety-One Million, Four Hundred and Seventy One Thousand, Five Hundred and Thirty-Five Naira, Eight Kobo) which the Defendant has failed, refused and neglected to pay despite repeated demands.
12. The Claimant by letters dated 30th June, 2016 and 31st October 2016 demanded for the repayment of the debt but the Defendant has failed, refused and neglected to pay the debt.
13. The Claimant avers that due to the failure of the Defendant to liquidate the debt after repeated demands and in view the duty of the claimant to recover non-performing loans negatively affecting the nation’s economy, the Claimant instructed Cavan Jordan Resources Limited, one of its assets management partners through Agbaje Agbaje and Co. to commence legal proceedings against the Defendant to recover the debt and thereby incurred additional cost.
14. The Claimant hereby specifically pleads the Defendant’s statement of account and shall rely on same at the hearing of this suit.
15. The Claimant shall rely on all documents herein pleaded at the trial of this case and every other relevant document and hereby gives the Defendant notice to produce any original in his possession”.
In his defence, the appellant pleaded in paragraphs 1 to 18 of his amended statement of defence as follows:
“1. SAVE AND EXCEPT as hereinafter expressly admitted the Defendant deny every allegation of fact contained in the Claimant’s Statement of Claim as if same is set out seriatim and specifically traversed.
2. The Defendant admit Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 ,5 and 6 of the Claimant Statement of Claim to the extent that he was offered the loan as a bonafide senior member of staff of the defunct Oceanic Bank.
3. The Defendant unequivocally denies as pleaded all the documents in Paragraph 7 of the Statement of claim and put the Claimant to produce same i.e. original sale Receipt, original perfected Title Deed Issued on the defendant name domiciled with the bank, Execution of Mortgage Forms, Personal Guarantee Forms of Mrs. Esther Felemu and Registration of Bank interest on Mortgage. The Defendant states that all the above were waived for him as a special aide to the then Chief Executives Officer of the Bank Mrs. Cecelia Ibru thus converting same to a loan in the nature of a grant.
4. The defendant in response to Paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim states that the agreement was that the loan granted was repayable only from his monthly salary as an employee of the Oceanic Bank.
5. That the non-payment of the loan granted was not deliberate but because of the sudden unjustifiable termination of his services from the Erstwhile Oceanic Bank ostensibly because of his purported closeness to the then embattled Chief Executive of the Oceanic Bank Cecelia Ibru one year after the grant of the sums to him vide letters dated 24th November, 2009 and 27th January, 2010 respectively. His inability to service the loan granted is due to the fact that the salary it was tied to had ceased to come due to the sudden precipitate action of the Bank. The Defendant shall rely on the two letters at the trial of this suit.
6. That in furtherance to the Paragraph above, all his entitlement were ceased therefore having nothing to fall back to, notwithstanding the fact that he had put up more than 24 years in the employment of the Oceanic Bank as it then was.
7. The Defendant states that neither his gratuity, children savings, Pension refund were paid to him which further worsen his situation hence he was unable to be diligent in the payment of the loan granted.
8. The Defendant states that he has the duration period of 20 years to make the repayment as detailed in the letter of offer communicated to the Defendant same dated the 18th April, 2008 and the 18th September, 2008 respectively.
9. The Defendant further avers that the loan was granted in his name and not in the name of the bank viz a viz the property same was bought in the name of the Defendant contrary to the insinuation and conjectures raised by the Claimant and that there was no agreement stating and making the property in issue as collateral but the salary.
10. The Defendant further contends that the purported loan in issue has not been specifically crystallized because the duration period of 20 years has not been exhausted before his appointment was terminated by the Bank thus making this action incompetent.
11. The defendant denies Paragraph 10 of the statement of Claim of the claimant and put it to strictest proof.
12. The Defendant contends that his disengagement from the Erstwhile Oceanic Bank was the reason why the loan granted became unpayable and further asserts that since the claimant inherited all the assets of the Bank its liability should be correspondingly inherited, part of which is his unpaid entitlements.
13. The Defendant avers that letter dated 30th June and 25th August, 2016 was acknowledged upon which reply was duly done to its letters dated 5th November, 2016 and 26th April, 2017 respectively. We plead and shall rely on the letters in the course of the trial.
14. Further to the above the Defendant avers and shall contend at the trial of this suit that following series of protracted negotiation the Claimant vide its letter of 20th March 2018 through its solicitors accepted to take the sum of Fifteen Million in full and final settlement of all its claim against the Defendants. The Defendant pleads the said letter and all the letters of proposal for settlement from his counsel Tale Owolabi and Co.
15. The defendant states that following the understanding above and despite his joblessness a commitment sum of N100,000 (one hundred thousand naira) was paid into the account provided by the Claimant at First Bank Plc., which it accepted. The First Bank Teller dated 9th May, 2018 shall be relied on at the trial of this suit.
16. The Defendant shall plead at the trial of his cause that the Claimant is sopped from claiming the whopping sum endorsed on its writ before this Honourable Court having agreed to accept the sum of Fifteen Million communicated in its letter dated the 20th of March aforesaid, not without prejudice.
17. The Defendant shall rely on all the documents already pleaded and any other relevant documents to this suit including the Oceanic Bank employees’ Hand Book in the course of the trial WHEREOF the Defendant urge this honourable Court to dismiss the suit in its entirely as being frivolous or alternatively, the defendant gratuity be set-off against the purported loan granted to the Defendant.
18. WHEREOF the Defendant urge this Honourable Court to dismiss the suit in its entirely as being frivolous or alternatively, the defendant gratuity be set-off against the purported loan granted to the Defendant.”
As can be seen from the appellant’s pleadings, he did not join issues with the respondent’s specific pleading in paragraph 11 of its statement of claim “that the defendant’s total indebted (sic) to the claimant as at 31st May 2016 is the sum of N91,472,535.08” and this was exactly the sum awarded against the appellant by the trial Court.
Since the appellant did not traverse the averment in paragraph 11 of the respondent’s pleading, the fact pleaded therein remains unchallenged. The law is settled that it is not the duty of the Court to infer a denial and, therefore, an untraversed fact remains unchallenged and admitted. See Eko Odume v. Ume Nnachi & Ors. (1964) 1 All NLR 329; Ajibade v. Mayowa & Anor. (1978) 9-10 SC 1 and Attorney-General of Anambra State v. C. N. Onuselogu Enterprises Ltd. (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 66) 547.
The general traverse in paragraph 1 of the appellant’s amended statement of defence is unhelpful to him because it is a general traverse. For a denial or traverse to have any efficacy, at law, it must be specific and not general, it must precisely allude to the fact pleaded and not evasive or ambiguous. See Otta & Ors. v. C. Nnacho & Ors. (1965) NMLR 28 and Attorney-General of Anambra State v. C. N. Onuselogu Enterprises Ltd. (supra).
The law is quite settled that a fact admitted by an adverse party needs no proof. See Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 WLR 1223; Alhaji Mufutau Motunwase v. Isaiah Sorungbe & Anor. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90 and Lamulatu Shasi & Anor. V. Madam Shadia Smith & 2 Ors. (2009) 12 SC (Pt. III) 1.
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial Court based its decision on exhibit “10”, which exhibit was wrongly admitted. This assertion, with due respect, is obviously not correct. The trial Court did not base its judgment solely or significantly on exhibit “10”. In its judgment, the trial Court merely made an oblique reference to exhibit “10” by stating on page 250 of the record of appeal as follows:
“It is without gainsaying that the Defendant had not paid the balance of ₦91,471,535.08K inclusive of interest. This was admitted by the Defendant himself, see also exhibits A10, the statement of account”.
As can be seen from the pronouncements reproduced above, the trial Court arrived at its decision mainly on the appellant’s admission and this aspect of the judgment has not even been appealed against by the appellant. It is trite law that a finding of fact decision not appealed against is deemed to be correct. See Kariwo Obasi v. Eke Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 364; Michael A. Ndiwe v. Anthony Chuma Okocha (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 252) 129; Alhaji Awesu Atanda Adeyemi v. Chief Olakunri (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt. 638) 104; Madam Adunola Adejumo & 2 Ors. v. Mr. Oludayo Olawaiye (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1421) 252; Wike E. Nyesom v. Dakuku A. Peterside (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 71 and Col. Mohammed Sambo Dasuki v. Federal Republic of Nigeria & Ors. (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1627) 320.
Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that exhibit “10” ought not to have been admitted by the trial Court for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides as follows:
(1) In any proceeding a statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall be admissible as evidence of any fact stated in it of which direct oral evidence would be admissible, if it is shown that the conditions in Subsection (2) of this Section are satisfied in relation to the statement and computer in question.
(2) The conditions referred to in Subsection (1) of this Section are:-
(a) that the document containing the statement was produced by the computer during a period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period, whether for profit or not, by anybody, whether corporate or not, or any individual;
(b) that over that period there was regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities information of the kind contained in the statement or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived;
(c) That throughout the material part of that period the computer was operating properly or, if not, that in any respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of that period was not such as to affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) that the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities.
(3) Where over a period the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in Subsection (2) (a) of this Section was regularly performed by computers, whether –
(a) by a combination of compute operating over that period;
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period;
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
(d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers.
All the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
(4) In any proceeding where it is desired to gives a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate-
(a) identifying the document containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that document as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the document was produced by a computer.
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in Subsection (2) above related, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities, as the case may be,
Shall be evidence of the matter stated in the certificate; and for the purpose of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the persons stating it.
(5) For the purposes of this section –
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied to it in any appropriate form and whether it is supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
(b) where, in the course of activities carried on by any individual or body, information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
(c) a document shall be taken to have been produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
The above provisions have been considered and interpreted by this Court and the Supreme Court. For example, in the case of Hon. Henry Seriake Dickson v. Chief Timipre Marlin Sylva & 3 Ors. (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167 at 228, per Aka’ahs, JSC. The apex Court held that:
“The correct interpretation to be given to Section 84 of the Evidence Act where electronically generated document is sought to be demonstrated is that such electronically generated evidence must be certified and must comply with the preconditions laid down in Section 84 (2). See: Kubor v. Dickson (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 676) 392 at 429. (2013) 4 NWLR (1345) 534. In the instant case, PW51 made a written deposition at pages 349-351 of the Record which he adopted at page 353. The certification as well as the electronically generated evidence in issue, the DVD in question, were admitted in evidence as exhibits P42A and P42B respectively in support of the pleadings. Having met the pre-conditions, there is no impediment in the Evidence Act that would prevent the playing or demonstrating the contents of the already identified DVD on any computer such as the laptop, project and screen.”
In this case, exhibit “10” complained of by the appellant is his computer generated statement of account. The respondent’s witness- Olusola Abikanlu who tendered exhibit 10, deposed in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of his written statement on oath as follows:
“13 That the Defendant’s total indebted to the Claimant as at 31st May, 2016 is the sum of ₦91,471,535.08 (Ninety-One Million, Four Hundred and Seventy One Thousand, Five Hundred and Thirty-Five Naira, Eight Kobo) which the Defendant has failed, refused and neglected to pay despite repeated demands.
14 Further to paragraph 13 above, I hereby verify and attest as follows:
i. That the Defendant’s statement of account with the Claimant which contains the computation and summation of the Defendant’s indebtedness to the Claimant is an entry in the corporation’s ordinary course of business.
ii. That the Defendant’s statement of account was produced by the computer during the period when the computer was used regularly to store and process information pertaining to the credit facility over the period to which the credit facility relates and same is accurate.
iii. That the information contained in the Defendant’s statement of account for the period to which the statement of account relates are information that were regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of business and the content of the Statement of account is derived therefrom.
iv. That through the material part of the period to which the statement of account was generated was working properly.
v. That the information contained in the statement of account reproduces and same is derived from information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of business.
15. That I have compared the computer print-out of the Defendant’s Statement of Account with the one contained in the entry with the Corporation and hereby certify that the Statement of Account is correct and accurate.”
The depositions reproduced above, were not challenged nor contradicted by the appellant and these facts clearly show compliance with the provisions of section 84 of the Evidence Act.
It is for all the foregoing reasons that Issues 2 and 3 are also resolved against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
CONCLUSION
It is very sad that some bank workers and directors erroneously think that funds entrusted to their banks’ custody are their private funds, which they can manage at their whims and caprices. When bankers realize that they are just trustees of depositors’ funds – funds belonging to individuals, private and public agencies or organizations, they will always act with utmost good faith, so the public trust in them will not diminish but will always be justified. The reckless and even fraudulent granting of loans to directors and other members of staff of banks and the nonchalant attitude of debtors to pay their bank loans are the main causes of bank failures in Nigeria, with the attendant unpalatable consequences.
It is, perhaps, important to note and state that the conduct of the appellant, a former banker like most bankers, in thinking that funds entrusted to them are their personal money(ies) which they can apply or use with reckless abandon, is the main cause of most bank failures.
And a “bank failure” has been described as “the closing of an insolvent bank by a Federal or State regulator” and the consequences of bank failure include the following:
1. Unemployment: People working in the failed bank are rendered unemployed.
2. The economy may be in financial distress, as money which should be used to boost other sectors of the economy may be used by the Government to pay bailouts.
3. Loss of depositors’ money.
See “Bank Failure” by Julia Kagan (Investopedia Online, November 17, 2021).
The negative effects of bank failure, in some cases, can only be better imagined than experienced. I will say no more.
Having resolved all the issues against the appellant, this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of the trial Court delivered on 6th day of March, 2020 in Suit No: FHC/AB/CS/33/2017 is hereby affirmed.
The sum of ₦150,000.00 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira only) is awarded as costs against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, J.C.A.: I have read before now, the draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JCA. It represents my view in this appeal and I adopt it.
However, for the sake of emphasis, let me add a few words. I agree with my learned brother that the appellant did not join issues with the respondent when he averred as follows: “that the Defendant’s total indebted(sic) to the Claimant as at 31st May 2016 is the sum of N91,472,535.08”.
It is settled law that in an action based on pleadings, issues are joined by the parties in their pleadings. The existence or non-existence of fact is said to be in issue if the existence or non-existence of that fact is asserted by a party in his pleading and denied by the other party specifically, positively and unequivocally. Each party is required to prove the unadmitted averment by adducing evidence or eliciting evidence from the opponent through cross-examination. See DALEK NIGERIA LIMITED VS. OIL MINERAL PRODUCING AREAS DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (2007) 7 NWLR (PT. 1033)402: SAIDU VS. ABUBAKAR (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1100) 201; YUSUF VS. ADEGOKE (2007) 11 NWLR (PT. 1045) 332.
Applying the foregoing principle to the facts before us, it follows that the Appellant having not joined issues on his indebtedness to the Respondent, the need to prove same does not arise. The Appellant admitted being indebted to the Respondent. The learned trial Judge was therefore right when he awarded the sum of N91,472.535.08 being the outstanding loan sum which remained unpaid by the Appellant to the Respondent.
For the foregoing and the fuller reasons contained in the lead judgment that I too dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court. I abide by the consequential orders as to costs.
ABBA BELLO MOHAMMED, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the draft, the lead judgment ably delivered by my learned brother MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JCA. I fully agree with his reasons and conclusions.
Two features stand out from the printed record of appeal which makes this appeal glaringly unmeritorious. The first, is that by the repayment terms contained in the loan agreements executed by the parties (admitted at trial as Exhibits A2 and A4), the appellant who, as a staff of Oceanic Bank International PLC, was granted loan in the total sum of N60 Million by the Bank, was, upon separation from the Bank, obliged to make balloon repayment of all outstanding on the loan, failing which interest at current market rate will be charged. By elementary law of contract, once parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, they are bound by the written agreement, and no other extraneous evidence will be admitted to vary, add, subtract or contradict the contents of that written agreement: ATIBA IYALAMU SAVINGS & LOANS LTD. V SUBERU & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44069(SC), per Kekere Ekun, JSC at page 32 paras. A-C; LARMIE v DATA PROCESSING MAINTENANCE & SERVICES LTD. (2005) LPELR-1756(SC), per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was) at page 17 paras. B-C; and UBN LTD. & ANOR v NWAOKOLO (1995) LPELR-3385(SC), per Onu, JSC at page 13 paras. B-C.
The second feature that makes the appeal devoid of merit, is that after the Appellant had defaulted in making the balloon payment after separating from the Bank and he was sued by the Respondent before the trial Court, the Appellant had in his pleadings (his statement of defence) expressly admitted owing the outstanding loan of N91,471535.08 claimed by the Respondent. It was primarily based on this admission as well as the other evidence laid before it, that the trial Court entered judgment for the Respondent and granted the Respondent’s claim. It is also elementary law of pleadings and of evidence, that what is admitted in pleadings requires no further proof: BRONWEN ENERGY TRADING LTD v OAN OVERSEAS AGENCY (NIG) LTD & ORS. (2022) LPELR-57306(SC), per Eko, JSC at page 51 paras. A-B; ALAHASSAN & ANOR v ISHAKU & ORS (2016) LPELR-40083(SC), per Sanusi, JSC at page 73 paras. B-C; and SABRU MOTORS LTD. v RAJAB ENT. (NIG) LTD. (2002) LPELR-2971(SC), per Ogwuegbu, JSC at page 20 paras. B – B.
As succinctly elaborated in the lead judgment, the findings of fact by the trial Court at pages 246-247 and 250 of the Record of Appeal and indeed its judgment in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant, were essentially based on the pleadings and the evidence led before that Court, especially the written agreements of the parties and the Appellant’s admission of his outstanding indebtedness to the Respondent. Where, as in this case, the finding and/or decision of a trial Court is properly based on the pleadings and evidence led before it, an appellate Court has no business interfering with same. This is because the evaluation and ascription of probative value to evidence is primarily the duty of the trial Court, and unless the trial Court fails in such duty or its evaluation of the evidence is shown to be improper or the findings thereon shown to be perverse, an appellate Court will not interfere with same. See: OKONKWO & ORS. v OKONKWO & ORS. (2010) LPELR-9357(SC), per Adekeye, JSC at page 32 paras. A-D; MAINAGGE v GWAMMA (2004) LPELR-1822(SC), per Akintan, JSC at pages 16–17, paras. F-B; and ARE & ANOR v IPAYE & ORS (1990) LPELR-541(SC), per Nnamani, JSC at page 22 paras. A-C.
It is for the above and the more elaborate reasons ably espoused in the lead judgment of my learned brother ADUMEIN, JCA, that I also find this appeal totally devoid of merit. Accordingly, I join in dismissing same and affirming the judgment of the trial Court delivered on 6th day of March, 2020. I abide by the order as to cost.
Appearances:
O.H. Harris-Isa, Esq., with him, M. S. Ajinde, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Akeem Agbaje, Esq., with him, Oyinkansola Agbaje, Esq. and A. M. Pade-Aderibigbe, Esq. For Respondent(s)
