| IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
———————————————————- Suit No: NICN/OW/17/2016 Petitioner: Engr. Francis Onyebuchi And Respondent: Enugu Electricity Distribution Company ANOR Date Delivered: 2017-07-03 Judge(s): HONOURABLE JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Judgment Delivered Representation: P. E. Chima, with him, with N. Jonah-Abosi (Miss) and J. O. Ogali (Miss), for the Claimants S. Amadiobi, with him, V. Ukaegbu, S. N. Iheduru (Miss) and O. Ahaneku (Miss), for the Defendants JUDGMENT The Claimant instituted this action with a complaint dated 6th May 2016 and filed 7th June 2016. By an amended Statement of Claim filed with leave of Court on the 28th day of October 2016, the Claimant claimed against the Defendants the following reliefs: A. A declaration of Court that the purported termination of the Claimants employment by the 1st Defendant on the compromised report of the 2nd Defendant is wrongful, having been done in breach/disregard of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing, and consequently null, void and of no effect. B. (i). An Order of Court reinstating the Claimant to his employment with full benefits at the time of his reinstatement, including payment of all arrears of his entitlements. Or in the alternative B. (ii) N100,000,000.00 general damages against the 1st Defendant for wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment. The complaint was filed along with a Statement of Claim, an affidavit in verfication of complaint, Claimants list of Witnesses, Witness Deposition on Oath, Claimant’s list of documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. The Defendants entered appearance and subsequently filed a Statement of Defence dated 19th July 2016 and filed on the 20th July 2016 with a written deposition of the 2nd Defendant, along with other accompanying processes which were duly regularized. The Claimant’s Reply to the Statement of Defence was dated 5th August 2016 and filed 8th August 2016. Upon receipt of the Claimant’s amended Statement of Claim and Claimant’s further sworn deposition dated 27th October 2016 and filed on 28th October 2016, the Defendants filed a Statement of Defence dated and filed on the 10th of November 2016 along with the written deposition of the 2nd Defendant. Hearing commenced on 18th January 2017. Parties called one witness each. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1, while the 2nd Defendant testified for the Defendants as DW1. Hearing ended on 8th February 2017. Both parties were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Defendants’ Final Written Address was dated and filed on the 6th day of March 2017. The Claimant’s Final Written Address was dated 11th March and filed on 24th March 2017. Both parties adopted their final written addresses which were duly regularized on 5th April 2017. In the Defendants’ Final Address, counsel identified 2 issues for determination, to wit: 1. Whether the appointment of the Claimant was properly terminated. 2. Whether the employment of the claimant has any statutory flavour. On Issue One, the Defendants argued that by virtue of Exhibit A, the offer of appointment to the Claimant, staff policy is regulated by Exhibit H the employee handbook of the 1st Defendant. According to counsel, by Article 22 of Exhibit H, the termination of the Claimant’s appointment was properly done, as what is required of the Defendant is to abide by the terms and conditions of the contract of employment of the Claimant. By the provision of Article 22, the 1st Defendant reserves the right to terminate the Claimants appointment without any reason at all if it determines that the continued employment of the Claimant will be detrimental to the interest of the 1st Defendant. Counsel argued that in the instant case, the 1st Defendant had shown that the Claimant’s activities were detrimental to the interest of the 1st Defendant when evidence was adduced to show that the Claimant extorted money from the 1st Defendant’s customers; a fact which was further corroborated with Exhibit K, the statement of one Mrs. Esther Ajayi who stated therein that they usually gave money to officials of the 1st Defendant, whom the Claimant was one. Counsel further argued the Claimant had not discharged the onus on him, as there was no evidence that the 1st Defendant breached any of the conditions of the terms of employment of the Claimant. He cited OLUSEYE vs. LAWMA (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 849) Pg. 307 and submitted that it is clear that the 1st Defendant was within its rights to terminate the appointment of the Claimant. He urged the Court to so hold. On Issue 2, the Defendants argued that it is not correct that the 1st Defendant is a hybrid public company and as such, rules governing employment in the company has a statutory flavour. Counsel cited the case of DAODU vs. U.B.A. Plc. (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) Pg. 276 and IDONIBOYE-OBU vs. N.N.P.C. (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) Pg. 583 and argued that the contract and conditions of employment of the Claimant are contained in his appointment letter (Exhibit A) and the conditions of service (Exhibit H); and that nowhere in Exhibit A was reference made to any statute nor can any inference be made from the provisions of Exhibit A that its provisions will be governed by any statute. Counsel argued further that for a contract and conditions of employment to be governed by statute, the contract of employment must be governed by the provisions of a particular statute and the conditions of service must also derive its force from a statute. According to counsel, the terms and conditions of employment of the Claimant with the 1st Defendant do not purport to derive its force from any statute, and the court cannot look outside Exhibits A & H to determine the nature of employment of the Claimant with the 1st Defendant. The Claimant’s employment does not therefore have statutory flavour and the termination is governed by the relationship of master and servant, in which scenario, the Claimant can only be entitled to damages if in terminating his contract of employment, the 1st Defendant breached his contract of employment. No evidence was led to show that any of the terms of the Claimant’s employment were breached. Rather, evidence was led by the Claimant vide Exhibit F, his termination letter, that the terms of his contract were complied with in his termination. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the suit. The Claimant’s Final Written Address dated 4th of March 2017 and filed 24th of March 2017 distilled three issues for determination as follows; a. Whether the Claimant, from the evidence before the court is implicated in the collection of N200,000.00 as alleged by the Defendants. b. Whether the Claimant’s employment was validly terminated. c. Whether the Claimant is entitled to his reliefs in this suit. On Issue 1, Counsel for the claimant argued that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was triggered by a petition, Exhibit B which ironically did not mention the Claimant’s name whom the Defendants alleged N200,000.00 was given to for transformer oil. According to the Claimant, it beats logic that such an amount could be given to an unknown person who could be identified when seen, to give to another person. Counsel maintained that Exhibit J, the statement of one Mrs. Ajayi, the Financial Secretary of the Association and the petition writer at the time the N200,000.00 was given showed that the Association gives little money to the 1st Defendants staff at World Bank Unit who maintain their transformer has nothing to do with the Claimant nor does it give evidence of the unethical behaviour of the Claimant. Counsel further argued that DW1’s testimony under cross examination revealed that the Claimant does not work at the 2nd Defendant’s World Bank station but at the New Owerri Port Harcourt Road Unit. It is counsel’s submission that Exhibit D issued by the Claimant to the 1st Defendant as a result of Exhibit B is baseless and founded on nothing in the face of Exhibit J. The position of the Claimant is that Mrs. Ajayi clearly stated that at the time the alleged N200,000.00 was given, no such amount was approved or given by the association for transformer oil as alleged in the petition. Counsel submitted that even the purported investigation carried out by the 2nd Defendants revealed that the allegation in the petition was a farce and borne out of a vendetta in the face of Exhibit E and Exhibit C. Yet curiously, it was curious that the 2nd Defendant went ahead to issue Exhibit D which culminated to Exhibit F. According to counsel, nothing in the entire investigation implicated the Claimant of any wrong doing, and Exhibit D was issued out of malice and not as an outcome of any investigation. He urged the court to resolve issue one in favour of the Claimant. On Issue 2 the Claimants adopted all the arguments canvassed in Issue 1 and further submitted that assuming but without conceding that the Claimant was implicated in the N200,000.00 saga as alleged, the 1st Defendant is bound by law to comply with its own laid down procedures in investigating and terminating the Claimants employment. This the 1st Defendant failed woefully to do. Counsel pointed out that Exhibit H contains the terms and conditions governing the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant; and neither party is at liberty to violate the provisions of Exhibit H as regards the employment without consequences. DW1 admitted under cross examination that Exhibit B gave rise to Exhibit D and ultimately Exhibit F. Article 25 of Exhibit H provides for the procedures for dealing with disciplinary matters involving employees of the 1st Defendant including the Claimant. According to counsel, by the clear provisions of Article 25(b) of Exhibit H, it is the Claimant’s Departmental Manager that can issue a query to the Claimant for any indiscipline traced to him and not the 2nd Defendant who admitted under cross examination that he was not in the same department as the Claimant talk more of being his Departmental Manager. Counsel further argued that under Article 22(a)(iii) of Exhibit H, a disciplinary panel will be constituted by the 1st Defendant if a case of indiscipline is established against an employee and that none of these procedures were followed by the 1st Defendant when purporting to terminate the Claimant’s appointment. This according to counsel, constituted a violation of the clear and unambiguous provision of Exhibit H. Where a procedure has been laid down in a statute or document for the doing of an act, failure to follow that procedure renders any action, decision or conclusion reached pursuant to that statute or document void. See the case of LONGE vs. FBN PLC (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1 at 57 F-G; ABUBAKAR vs. NASAMU (N0. 2) (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1330) 523 at 577. Counsel stressed that this position is stricter in contracts of employment. He urged the court to resolve issue 2 in favour of the Claimant. On Issue 3, the Claimants adopted the all their arguments on Issues 1 and 2. Counsel cited the age-long law maxim Ubi jus ubi remedium and argued that the Defendants by their wrongful conduct have caused excruciating pain to the Claimant. The Claimant is therefore entitled to the reliefs he seeks. Counsel urged the court to resolve issue 3 against the Defendants. To counsel, the Defendants have made heavy weather of the Claimant’s employment not having statutory flavour. Assuming but not conceding that the Claimant’s employment did not have statutory flavor, that will affect relief B(i) of the Claimants relief and not otherwise. In conclusion, the Claimant submitted that he was not involved in the collection of N200,000.00 alleged in Exhibit B, and that the evidence before the court shows that Exhibit D was issued without any foundation. Worse still, it was issued without any authority and in contravention of Exhibit H. The Claimant is therefore entitled to his reliefs in the suit. COURT’S DECISION Having heard the submissions of the learned counsels to the parties in their final addresses, I will now proceed to examine the case presented before the court by the parties. The Claimant’s case, as stated by him in his pleadings and evidence is that he was employed by the 1st Defendant in a letter dated 14/4/2014 and worked for the 1st Defendant until his employment was terminated on 11th April 2016. His employer, the 1st Defendant, is a hybrid public company involved in distribution of electricity to its customers. The Claimant averred that 40% of the 1st Defendant is owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria which implies that the 1st Defendant, in its dealings with its employees, must observe the rules governing employment with statutory flavour. The 2nd Defendant is also a staff of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant worked in various offices of the 1st Defendant and he was at the Owerri office of the 1st Defendant as the Manager Operations at the time of termination of his employment. In his work as a the Manager Operations of the 1st Defendant, the Claimant never had any personal contact or conversation with representatives of Road 7 Extension, Federal Housing Estate Neighbourhood Association, New Owerri for the payment of N200,000.00 or any other sum for the purchase of transformer oil or any other item nor did he collect any such sum from the Association for himself or for his boss, Engr. Amaga. The association wrote a petition dated 25/1/2016 to the 1st Defendant but the name of the Claimant was not mentioned in the petition. When the 2nd Defendant came down to Owerri to investigate the petition, the Claimant was invited to meet the 2nd Defendant in Engr. Nwasolu’s office by Engr. Amaga. At that meeting, the 2nd Defendant accused the Claimant as the person who collected N200,000.00 from the Association on behalf of Engr. Amaga. The Claimant denied the allegation. The 2nd Defendant then insisted that all parties visit the site of the transformer. On getting there, they met one Mrs. Esther Ajayi, who is the financial secretary of the Association. Mrs. Esther Ajayi told the 2nd Defendant that she did not see the Claimant throughout the period of work on the transformer neither did the association give the sum of N200,000.00 to the Claimant for transformer oil. On the instruction of the 2nd Defendant, the said Mrs. Esther Ajayi reduced what she said into writing. The people who wrote the petition were present but none of them challenged Mrs. Esther Ajayi’s revelations. Despite there were evidence against the allegations in the petition, the 2nd Defendant issued the Claimant a query dated 18/2/2016. The Claimant replied the query to which he attached a fault report. While waiting to be invited to appear before a disciplinary panel to defend himself, the 1st Defendant, acting on the report of the 2nd Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment. Upon receipt of the termination letter dated 11/4/2016, the Claimant wrote a letter to the 1st Defendant requesting a re-investigation of the case but it was to no avail. The 1st Defendant refused to rescind the termination of the Claimant’s employment which was done in breach of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing. The Claimant also stated that he has 16 more years to serve in the 1st Defendant’s employment and he has dependants to maintain from his employment which the 1st Defendant wrongfully terminated. In the Claimant’s further evidence which was filed along with the Claimant’s reply to the statement of defence, the Claimant stated further that at no time was he given written or verbal warning in his employment and no customer has ever laid any complaint against him. In addition, no allegation was levelled against him in the petition but the 2nd Defendant brought him into the picture. Even then, the Defendants’ investigation exonerated him as it did not establish any link between him and the allegation. He was not invited before any panel on the matter to defend himself. He was never involved in any matter that was detrimental to the interest of the 1st Defendant. The case of the Defendant in their amended statement of defence and in the evidence of DW1 is that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant and his employment has been terminated. Contrary to what the Claimant alleged, the 1st Defendant is not bound to observe the rules applicable to employment with statutory flavour as it is a public company limited by shares and its employees are employed under the rules as agreed between the 1st Defendant and its employees. During the Claimant’s employment, he was given several verbal warnings as a result of misconducts in the discharge of his duties and complaints from customers of the 1st Defendant. Some customers of the 1st Defendant wrote a petition against the Claimant and the 1st Defendant directed the 2nd Defendant to investigate. In the course of the investigation, it was discovered that the Claimant was engaged in a lot of activities detrimental to the interest of the 1st Defendant. In contravention of the 1st Defendant’s policies, the Claimant took money from customers on the pretext to buy products for the maintenance of the 1st Defendant’s facilities. The Claimant was given opportunity to defend himself and he was allowed to cross examine his accusers but when he could not debunk the allegations against him, he was issued a query which he answered. A report of the investigation was submitted to the management of the 1st Defendant who, after reviewing the report, concluded that the continuous employment of the Claimant will be detrimental to the interest of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant’s employment was consequently terminated. The Claimant’s employment was not tenured and he did not have 16 years more to spend in the employment. In view of the facts of this case and the issues canvassed by the counsels to the parties in their final written addresses, the issue which, in my view, is to be determined in this matter is whether the Claimant has proved his case as to entitle him to the claims he sought in this case. The parties are at agreement on the facts that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant vide Exhibit A dated 14th April 2014 and the employment was terminated by the 1st Defendant on 29th March 2016 vide Exhibit F. The termination of the Claimant’s employment is the cause of the dispute in this suit. Before I proceed to resolve the issue I have identified for determination, certain averments of the Claimant makes it necessary that the nature of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant be determined. In paragraph 3 of the amended statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded that 40% of the 1st Defendant is owned by the Federal Government of Nigeria which implies that the 1st Defendant must observe the rules governing employment with statutory flavour in its dealings with its employees. The Claimant also gave evidence to this effect. The Claimant, in the pleaded facts and his evidence appears to suppose that his employment was an employment regulated by statute. Hence he sought, partly in relief A, a pronouncement that the termination is null and void and of no effect. On the other hand, the Defendants averred that the 1st Defendant is not bound to observe the rules applicable to employment with statutory flavour as it is a public company limited by shares, whose employees are employed under agreed contract of service. In other words, the Defendants’ position is that the employment is that of master and servant. Under the Nigerian labour law, employment can be those regulated by statute or those under common law relationship of master and servant. Where the terms and conditions of a contract of employment are specifically provided for by statute or regulations made under the statute, it is said to be an employment with statutory flavour or protected by statute. Where this is not the case, the employment is merely that of master and servant. See OBAJE vs. N.A.M.A (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 732) 1811 at 1826; ODONIBOYE-OBU vs. N.N.P.C (2003) FWLR (Pt. 146) 959 at 992; N.I.I.A vs. ANYAFALU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 325) 141 at 162. The question whether a contract of employment is governed by statute or not depends on the construction of the contract itself or the relevant statute. The Claimant pleaded the contract of employment in paragraph 1 of the amended statement of facts which he tendered in evidence as Exhibit A. This is his employment letter which contained some terms and conditions of the employment. Under the clause STAFF POLICY, the other terms of the Claimant’s employment were said to be made subject to the staff policies contained in the Employee Handbook. The Claimant pleaded the Employee Handbook in paragraph 15 of the amended statement of facts and the document is in evidence as Exhibit H. I have perused the content of both documents but I cannot find anywhere where the Claimant’s employment is made subject to any statute or regulation. The employment letter and the Handbook were not also stated to be issued under any statute or regulation. Furthermore more, the 1st Defendant has not been shown to be a statutory establishment. The Claimant merely averred that the Federal Government of Nigeria owns 40% of the 1st Defendant. The fact that the Federal Government owns shares in the 1st Defendant cannot transform the 1st Defendant to a statutory body or the contract with its employees to employment with statutory flavour. The 1st Defendant is only an incorporated company. It was not established in or by any law or Statute. I agree with the Defendants that the 1st Defendant is a public company limited by shares and its employees are employed under the rules as agreed between the 1st Defendant and its employees. I have also examined the Claimant’s employment letter and the condition of service but find that they do not have the character of employment under statute. From my assessment of the nature of the Claimant’s employment, I have no doubt that it has no statutory flavour but an employment of master and servant. Therefore, the Claimant’s employment is that of master and servant and not one governed by statute. In an employment of master and servant, termination of the servant’s employment cannot be considered to be null and void or of no effect as applicable to employment with statutory flavour. In ESIEVWORE vs. NEPA (2002) FWLR (Pt. 124) 398 at 408, the Supreme Court explained it this way: “Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute and any manner of termination inconsistent therewith is null and void and of no effect. But in other cases governed by only agreement of parties and not by statute, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed. Any other form connotes only wrongful termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void. See also EZE vs. SPRING BANK PLC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 609) 1076; UZONDU vs. U.B.N PLC (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 443) 1389; OPUO vs. NNPC (2002) FWLR (Pt. 84) 11 at 27. Consequently, the aspect of the first relief where the Claimant sought, among others, to have the termination pronounced null, void and of no effect is not an appropriate remedy in view of the nature of the Claimant’s employment. I will therefore discountenance that aspect of the claim, which leaves only the allegation of wrongfulness of the termination for consideration. In his first relief, the Claimant sought from this court a declaration that the termination of his employment by the 1st Defendant is wrongful. It is the law that where an employee is seeking, in an action, for a declaration that the termination of his employment is wrongful, the employee must plead and prove the terms of the condition of service and also plead and prove the manner in which the terms and conditions of the contract were breached by the employer in the termination of the employment. In other words, whether a termination of employment is wrongful or not depends only on the terms and conditions of the employment and the employee alleging wrongful termination has the burden to prove the terms of the employment and how it was breached. The principle was put this way in TEXACO NIG. PLC vs. KEHINDE (2002) FWLR (Pt. 94) 143 at 157: “The terms of the contract of service are the foundation of any case where the issue of wrongful termination or dismissal of employment falls to be determined. Therefore where an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated or dismissed, he has the onus to produce before the court the terms and conditions of employment and follow same up by proving in what manner the said terms and conditions were breached by the employer. It follows therefore that the success or other wise of such a party depends solely on the terms and conditions of that employment since the court is not permitted to go outside the agreed terms and conditions―. The requirement of the employee who claims for wrongful termination was also expressed thus by the Supreme Court in ZIIDEEH vs. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 354) 243 at 258:- “It has been firmly established that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, he has the onus (a) to place before the court the terms of the contract of employment and (b) to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. The law is that it is not the duty of the employer as a defendant in an action brought by the employee to prove any of these facts― See also UZONDU vs. U.B.N PLC (supra); W.A.E.C vs. OSHIONEBO (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 370) 1501 at 1512. In this case, for the Claimant to succeed in his claim, his first duty is to bring his case within the condition of the employment. His second duty is to plead and prove the relevant terms of the condition of service and finally to produce the condition of service and prove how and in what manner the terms were breached by the 1st Defendant when it terminated the Claimant’s employment. The Claimant pleaded and tendered in evidence his employment letter and the 1st Defendant’s Employee handbook in paragraphs 1 and 15 of the amended statement of facts but he did not plead or prove the specific terms of his employment contained in these documents which were breached by the 1st Defendant in the termination of his employment. After going through the entire pleading and evidence of the Claimant however, I observe that the only complaint he made about the termination of his employment is that which he pleaded in paragraph 15 of the amended statement of facts and in paragraph 3 of his reply to the amended statement of defence. In paragraph 15 of the amended statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded thus: “The 1st defendant has failed, refused and or neglected to withdraw/rescind its purported termination of the claimant’s employment which was done in flagrant breach, disregard and violation to claimant’s right to fair hearing.― In paragraph 3 of the Claimant’s reply, he pleaded, interalia, that “The claimant was never invited nor appeared before any panel on the matter to defend himself―. See also relief A where he sought that the termination of his employment be declared wrongful “having been done in breach of his right to fair hearing―. From these pleadings of the Claimant, it is clear that the only complaint he has made against the termination of his employment is simply that he was not given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. Let me reiterate the point that in master and servant employment, what determines the wrongfulness of a termination of the employment is if there is any breach of the terms or procedure in the contract of employment. It was on this notion the Supreme Court held in OSAKWE vs. NIGERIAN PAPER MILL (1998) 7 SCNJ 222 at 231 that the terms and conditions of the contract of employment are the foundation for a claim for wrongful termination of the employment and not on the basis of lack of fair hearing. Therefore, wrongfulness of termination cannot be founded on lack of fair hearing when a case had not been made out for any breach of the terms and conditions of the employment. Upon further examination of the Claimant’s case, it became even more difficult to find any merit in his allegation that he was not given fair hearing before his employment was terminated. It is a principle of law in master and servant employment that both parties thereto have the right to terminate the contract at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all. See IKHALE V. F.A.A.N (2003) FWLR (Pt.181) 1726 at 1743; TEXACO OVERSEAS PETROLEUM UNLIMITED vs. OKUNDAYE (2003) FWLR (Pt.136) 961 at 972. This right was expressly incorporated into the condition of service of the employment between the 1st Defendant and the Claimant. ARTICLE 22 (a) of Exhibit H provide: “The company reserves the right to terminate the appointment of an employee without assigning any reason if, in management opinion, the continued employment of the employee is detrimental to the interest of the company―. See also ARTICLE 22(d) which provides thus: “The company reserves the right to terminate the service of an employee when it is no longer required.― Now, the 1st Defendant, in exercise of its right under the contract, terminated the Claimant’s employment vide Exhibit F dated 29th March 2016. The 1st Defendant simply conveyed to the Claimant thus: “This is to inform you that your services with Enugu Electricity Distribution Company (EEDC) are no longer required. Consequently, your appointment is hereby terminated with immediate effect in line with Article 22 (a) of the company’s employee handbook― The 1st Defendant did not give any reason in the letter for terminating the Claimant’s employment. As such, the termination of the Claimant’s employment was not stated anywhere in the letter to be linked or connected with the petition by the Neighbourhood Association of Road 7 Extension, Federal Housing Estate, New Owerri, Imo State nor did it indicate that the Claimant’s employment was terminated because of a misconduct or disciplinary action. The Claimant’s employment was terminated simply for services no longer required. In such a case, the Claimant cannot read into his termination what is not contained therein by attributing his termination to a disciplinary action. It is trite that the court must confine the reason for termination of employment to the termination letter and cannot go out to look for reason for the termination. In TEXACO NIG. PLC vs. KEHINDE (supra) at 167, it was held thus: “It is however well established in our laws that the right to terminate a contract of employment can be exercised by both parties to the contract. When it is exercised, no reason need be given. It is not for a court to search for the reason for the termination of the contract―. Also, in IWUOHA vs. MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLTD (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 664) 144 at 150-151, PER AKA’AHS JCA, it was held thus: “Learned counsel submitted that the lower court was right when it held that in considering the issue whether the termination of the appointment of the appellant was right or wrong, the court must confine itself to the letter terminating the appointment and not go outside it to look for other reasons which the appellant thinks or suspect may have been behind the termination. This represents the correct position of the law. It is settled that where no other reason is stated for the termination of appellants appointment, except that his services “were no longer required―, the court cannot go outside the said letter to discover the reasons for the termination―. See also CHUKWUMA vs. S.P.D.C (NIG) LTD (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512; CBN vs. AMIKA (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 683) 21. When the Claimant narrated the incidence that led to the termination of his employment, he appears to contend that the termination of his employment was on disciplinary grounds. Perhaps, that was why he averred that he was not given fair hearing or invited to face a disciplinary panel. But the 1st Defendant did not give any reason in the termination letter for terminating the Claimant’s employment. Although the Defendants have averred that the Claimant’s employment was terminated as a result of his being found culpable in the petition written by the Neighborhood Association of Road 7 Extension, Federal Housing Estate, New Owerri, Imo State, it is trite that the court cannot go outside the letter of termination to discover the reason for termination of the employment. See IWUOHA vs. MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLTD (supra); TEXACO NIG. PLC vs. KEHINDE (supra). Therefore, it is only when the 1st Defendant gives the reason for terminating the employment in the letter to be on ground of misconduct or on disciplinary ground that the court can inquire into whether the disciplinary procedure stipulated in the condition of service or the principle of fair hearing was observed before the punishment of termination of employment was imposed on the Claimant. I have reviewed the facts of the Claimant’s case and the evidence adduced by him but I find that he has not discharged the requirements of proof to enable him succeed in his claims. He did not plead or prove the terms of his employment or how the terms have been breached by the 1st Defendant in the termination of his employment. He also failed to establish before this court how lack of fair hearing or non-invitation to panel constitutes a breach of the terms of the condition of service. The Claimant has placed nothing before this court on which to grant his claims. It is my view and I so hold that the Claimant has not been able to establish that the termination of his employment was wrongful. In reliefs B (i) and (ii) of the amended statement of facts, the Claimant sought for reinstatement and payment of arrears of entitlements or in the alternative, N100,000,000.00 as general damages for wrongful termination of employment. These claims also fail automatically in the absence of proof that the termination of his employment was wrongful. In the final result, I find that the Claimant is not entitled to his claims having failed to establish them. His case fails completely and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge |
