DANGOTE BAIL LTD & ANOR v. PATTA
(2022)LCN/16364(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, January 31, 2022
CA/PH/311M/2020(R)
Before Our Lordships:
Joseph ShagbaorIkyegh Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ridwan Maiwada Abdullahi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Olabode Abimbola Adegbehingbe Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. DANGOTE BAIL LIMITED 2. BASHIR MOHAMMED APPELANT(S)
And
MR. MICHAEL PATTA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
FACTS CONTAINED IN AN AFFIDAVIT THAT HAVE NOT BEEN CHALLENGED ARE DEEMED ADMITTED
It is settled that facts contained in an affidavit that have not been challenged are deemed admitted without ado vide the cases of Unibiz (Nig.) Ltd. v. C.B.L. (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.944) 47, Badejo v Federal Ministry of Education (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) 15, Ex parte Adesina (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.442) 254, A-G., Plateau State v A.G. Nasarawa State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 421. Accordingly, the applicants have established by the uncontroverted facts in their affidavit evidence that the delay in filing the appeal was caused by negligence or fault of their former counsel.
The portion of the affidavit that the applicants followed –up the case with letters to their former counsel but without fruition was not denied by the respondent and is therefore deemed admitted, thus satisfying the requirement that the client should not fold his hands or rest on his oars but should monitor the case with his counsel vide NNPC v Samfadek and Sons Ltd, (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt.1617) 1. JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A
IT IS NEVER TOO LATE TO APPEAL AGAINST A JUDGEMENT GIVEN WITHOUT JURISDICTION
It is also instructive that the Supreme Court stressed in the case of R Lauwers Import-Export v Jozebson Industries Co. Ltd (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.83) 429 at 450 that where a judgment or order was given without jurisdiction it could never be too late to appeal against it and that in such a situation it would appear that the reasons for delay in appealing against the said judgment would cease to be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in an application for extension of time within which to appeal against the said judgment.
It is but right that in the light of the discourse above, as one of the proposed grounds of notice of appeal (supra) is jurisdictional, time did not run against the filing of the appeal and, in that wise, the applicants were not obliged to furnish the reason for delay in filing the appeal. JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgement): The motion filed on 23.05.2018 prays for-
“1. AN ORDER of this honourable Court granting leave for extension of time within which the appellants/applicants may appeal against the judgment of the Rivers State High Court, Port Harcourt Judicial Division delivered by Honourable Justice J.N. Akpughunum on the 22nd day of April, 2016 in Suit No: NHC/11/2008 – MICHAEL PATTA V DANGOTE BAIL LIMITED & BASHIR MOHAMMED.
2. AN ORDER of this honourable Court extending the time within which the Appellants/Applicants may appeal against the judgment of the Rivers State High Court, Port Harcourt Judicial Division delivered by Honourable Justice J.N. Akpughunum on the 22nd day of April, 2016 in Suit No: NHC/11/2008 – MICHAEL PATTA V DANGOTE BAIL LIMITED & BASHIR MOHAMMED.
3. AND for such further orders as this honourable Court may deem fit in the circumstances of this case.
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE:
1. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court extending the time within which the Appellants/Applicants may seek leave to appeal against the judgment of the Rivers State High Court, Port Harcourt Judicial Division delivered by Honourable Justice J.N. Akpughunum on the 22nd day of April, 2016 in Suit No: NDC/11/2008 – MICHAEL PATTA V DANGOTE BAIL LIMITED & BASHIR MOHAMMED.
2. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court granting leave to the Appellants/Applicants to appeal the judgment of Honourable Justice J.N. Akpughunum delivered on the 22nd day of April, 2016 at the Rivers State, High Court, Port Harcourt Division in Suit No: NHC/11/2008 – MICHAEL PATTA V DANGOTE BAIL LIMITED & BASHIR MOHAMMED.
3. AN ORDER or this honourable Court extending the time within which the Appellants/Applicants may appeal the judgment of Honourable Justice J.N. Akpughunum delivered on the 22nd day of April, 2016 at the Rivers State, High Court, Port Harcourt division in Suit No: NHE/11/2008 – MICHAEL PATTA V DANGOTE BAIL LIMITED & BASHIR MOHAMMED as shown in the Proposed Notice of Appeal herein exhibited as Exhibit C.
4. AND for such further orders as this honourable Court may deem fit in the circumstances of this case.
The affidavit in support of the motion sworn to by Mr. Nonso Ottih, a legal practitioner in the law firm of counsel to the applicants, deposed inter alia thus-
“2. That I have the authority of the Applicants and that of my employers to depose to this affidavit in support of the applicants’ motion for extension of time.
3. That the facts to which I depose to in this affidavit are based partly upon my personal knowledge and partly upon the documents and sources to which reference is made in the body of this affidavit. Where the facts are within my personal knowledge, they are true, where the facts are not within my personal knowledge; I believe them to be true.
4. That I was informed by Yinka Funsho – Adebayo, a legal practitioner in the 1st Appellant’s company in our chambers at about 2:45PM on Friday, the 29th day of July, 2016 and I verily believe him as follows:
a. That the applicants instructed the law firm of IBEKWE CHUKWU & CO to conduct the defence of this case on their behalf at the lower Court.
b. That the applicants’ erstwhile counsel seized of the conduct of this matter at the lower Court was not giving the applicants the necessary updates on this matter in respect of the status and developments as they arose in the Court below.
c. That the applicants became seized of the fact that there is a subsisting judgment against them only after they received a letter dated July 21st, 2016 from the Respondent’s counsel demanding for the payment of the judgment sum in respect of the suit hereof.
d. That the applicants were not aware that judgment in this matter has been delivered on the 22nd day of April, 2016 as the erstwhile counsel instructed to conduct the defence of the subject suit at the lower Court did not inform them, despite several requests for update.
e. That the Judgment dated 22nd April, 2016 only came to the knowledge and notice of the Appellants/Applicants on account of the Respondent’s aforesaid demand letter dated 21st July, 2016. That shown to me and marked Exhibits A and B respectively are certified true copy of the said judgment dated 22nd April, 2016 and copy of the respondent’s solicitors letter dated July 21st, 2016.
5. That our filing this appeal out of time and within the time prescribed by the rules of this honourable Court was not as a result of negligence or disregard to this Court but due to the reasons aforestated hereof.
6. That there is merit in the appeal and substantial issues to be heard hereof. Attached herewith and marked Exhibit C is Proposed Notice of Appeal.
7. I verily believe that the Respondent will not be prejudiced if this application is granted.”
Attached to the motion on notice are Exhibits A, B and C, a certified true copy of the judgment of the lower Court, demand letter for judgment sum, and the proposed notice of appeal, respectively.
The applicants filed a written address on 11.11.21. The written address was adopted by the applicants’ learned counsel at the hearing of the motion on 13.01.22. The applicants opened arguments in the written address by placing reliance on the case of Bukoye & Ors v Adeyemo & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40852 (SC) for the proposition that a party’s right of appeal is fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed. The applicant proceeded to argue that by Order 6 Rule 9 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016(now Order 6 Rule 9 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021) read with Section 24 (4) of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004, as amended, and the case of Lafferri Nigeria & Anor v NAL Merchant Bank (2015) LPELR -24726 (SC) the applicant is obliged to furnish good and substantial reason(s) for failure to appeal within the prescribed period and exhibit good grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard.
The applicants argued in the written address placing reliance on paragraphs 4 (a) – (c) and 5 of the affidavit in support of the motion that their counsel at the lower Court did not inform them of the progress of the case even after they sought for information to that effect and that it was after they were served Exhibit B, demand letter for judgment sum, that they became aware that judgment had been entered against them.
The applicants argued that upon having knowledge of the judgment, Exhibit A, they caused their counsel to file a motion on notice on 03.08.2016, seeking for enlargement of time within which to appeal the said judgment.
According to the contention of the applicants, the said motion dated 03.08.2016 was struck out by the Court for absence of applicants’ counsel on the hearing date occasioned by wrong service of hearing notice on the applicants’ former counsel at the lower Court instead of counsel on record before the Court.
The applicants also argued that they have satisfied the twin conditions for the exercise of the discretionary powers of the Court to grant the application based on the arguable grounds of appeal contained in Exhibit C, and the reason for delay attributed to the sins of their former counsel.
The applicants referred to paragraph 3 of the respondent’s counter-affidavit filed on 01.11.2021, to submit that contrary to the deposition contained therein, the Court did not grant leave to the applicants to appeal the said judgment of the lower Court, so the respondent who asserted that leave was granted had the onus to establish it which the respondent failed to discharge in this case.
The applicants argued that the respondent did not oppose the application on the twin pillars required to be satisfied, but on the premise that the first motion on the same matter that was struck out, foreclosed the applicants from bringing a new application on the same issue which the applicants contended, on the contrary, that the striking out of the first motion did not foreclose the filing of a fresh motion in corrected version to comply with the law and rules of procedure governing the exercise of the applicants’ right of appeal.
The applicants relied on the case of Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v LGC Ltd (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt.1598) 431 at 449 for the contention that denial of extension of time to appeal constitutes a “big punishment” for a potential appellant as the applicants would have lost the chance of exercising their important constitutional right of appeal to have their appeal on the merits.
The applicants also relied on the case of Imegwu v Okolocha & Ors (2013) LPELR – 19886 (SC) for the contention that the twin consideration will depend on the peculiar facts of each case as the facts to be taken into account are not exhaustive.
The applicants argued in conclusion that the respondent has failed to show the wrong, prejudice or injustice it stands to suffer in the event the application is granted, upon which the applicants urged that the application be granted.
The respondent opposed the motion with a counter-affidavit filed on 01.11.21. Paragraphs 3-15 thereof deposed thus:
“3. That the applicants have severally applied for leave of this Honourable Court to appeal and were indeed granted leave but some were struck out because of their indolence while their appeal was also struck out for being incompetent.
4. That on 9/11/2016 applicants applied for leave of this Honourable Court to Appeal No. CA/PH/490/2016 is hereby attached and marked as Exhibit A. No mention is made of this in applicant’s supporting affidavit.
5. That this Honourable Court struck out the appellant motion and appeal for being incompetent on the 9/11/2017 and on the 5/7/2018, their appeal was struck out also.
6. The order of Honourable Court striking out Appellant motion and appeal dated 9/11/2017 and 5/7/2018 are hereby attached and marked as Exhibit B and C respectively.
7. A further motion – CA/PH/382M/2016 filed by applicant was struck out on 15/2/2019. A Certified True Copy is also attached and marked as Exhibit D.
8. That from the 22nd day April, 2016, when judgment was entered, Applicants who openly told judgment creditor that they will frustrate him doing nothing except each time the judgment creditor wants to enforce judgment they will run to this Court.
9. That paragraph 4 of affidavit in support is correct only to the extent that the law firm of Ibekwe Chukwu & Co. conducted the defence.
a. It is further correct that immediately after judgment was entered against applicant, they filed a notice of appeal which they abandoned. The said notice of appeal filed on the 2nd of August, 2016 is hereby attached and marked as Exhibit E.
b. That from the 22/4/2016 when applicant said they are seized of the matter, they filed a notice of appeal on 2/8/2016 but refused to prosecute same diligently.
c. That the other averments in paragraph 4 are not true as judgment was delivered on the 22/4/2016 while applicant counsel filed notice of appeal on 2/8/2016 but neglected to persecute same.
d. That I am informed by P.B. Dekor Esq. of Counsel and, I verily believe her to be true that Equity does not aid the indolent.
10. That paragraph 5 of affidavit in support of the above averment are false.
11. That there is no merit in the Exhibit C the applicant notice of appeal as same is what they filed on 2/8/2016 which copy is herewith attached and marked as Exhibit E.
12. That there is nothing applicants want to do save to delay the Respondent who is so sick that he can no longer move or come out. Whereas he would have use the debt sum to seek medical treatment abroad.
13. That applicants are only out to frustrate the Respondent.
14. That this application should be dismissed with exemplary cost.
15. That in the interest of justice, there should be an end to litigation.”
The Exhibits attached to the counter-affidavit were a similar motion filed by the applicants on 09.11.2016 as Exhibit A, a copy of the ruling of the Court (Orji-Abadua, Akeju and Sanga, JJ,CA,) striking out the application for want of prosecution on 02.11.2017 as Exhibit B; an enrolled order of the Court signed by the presiding Justice of the Division (Gumel, J.C.A.) striking out the record of appeal on 05.07.2018 along with Appeal No. CA/PH/490/2016 on the ground that there was no valid and competent appeal to sustain it as Exhibit C; a certified true copy of the ruling of the Court (Gumel, Orji-Abadua and Sanga, JJ. CA.,) striking out the motion filed on 12.01.18 for being ex facie incompetent as Exhibit D and the proposed notice of appeal sought to be filed out of time as Exhibit E.
It was based on these materials or evidence that the respondent argued in the written address filed on 30.11.2021 in opposition to the motion, that the previous motions struck out precluded the applicants from bringing the present application as the option open to the applicants was to appeal against the decision striking out their previous application, as to entertain the present application would be an abuse of the process of the Court citing in support the cases of Diamond PPMC v Delpt Pet Inc. (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt.928) 458, Otti v Ogah (2017) NWLR (Pt. 1563) 1 at 4 read with Section 318 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (1999 Constitution) and Order 6 Rule 9 (1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 (the same Order 6 Rule 9 (1) and (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021); upon which the respondent urged that the application be dismissed.
The principal plank upon which the application is opposed is that similar applications numbering three were previously filed but were struck out by the Court for want of diligent prosecution and for procedural defects as borne out by Exhibits A, B and D. I am of the considered opinion that a motion that was struck out can either be relisted upon application or a fresh motion can be filed by the applicant depending on the circumstances of the case vide the Supreme Court case of Panalpina World Transport (Nig.) Ltd v J.B. Olandeen International and Ors (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt.1226) 1 at 20 to the effect that an applicant whose motion is struck out can either file a fresh motion or file an application to relist it, depending on the circumstances that led to the striking out of the motion or the nature of the order made; and that where there was an attack on the contents of such motion prior to it being struck out, a fresh motion must be filed to the effect that a motion struck out can be relisted upon application by the applicant or a fresh motion on the same facts or even new facts can be filed by the applicant.
There is also a conspicuous distinction between a motion or action that has been struck out or dismissed. The distinction was made clear by the Supreme Court in the case of In Re: Apeh (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt.1576) 252 at 276 where the Supreme Court held that when an action is struck out, it is still alive and could be revived by the party whose action was struck out. But that where a matter or action is dismissed it comes to an end; therefore in the present case, where the motions were merely struck out, the applicants were at liberty to bring another motion.
The Supreme Court added in the case (supra) that where a matter is simply struck out for a reason such as non-compliance with a provision of law, rule or practice, or where a point of objection is raised, which point can be complied with thereafter, as where a process is technically bad, for a reason which can be later rectified, the originator/initiator of that process is at liberty to refile it in compliance with the correct position of the law, rule or practice as may thereof be required. There is therefore no substance in the contention of the respondent that the motions struck out precluded or estopped the applicants from filing the present motion.
This should have been enough to dispose of the opposition to the motion as it formed the fulcrum of the respondent’s opposition to the application. However, it is statutorily required by Order 6 Rule 9 (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021, successor of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016, that an application of this nature must set forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed period coupled with grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard before the application may succeed.
It is settled that facts contained in an affidavit that have not been challenged are deemed admitted without ado vide the cases of Unibiz (Nig.) Ltd. v. C.B.L. (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.944) 47, Badejo v Federal Ministry of Education (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) 15, Ex parte Adesina (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.442) 254, A-G., Plateau State v A.G. Nasarawa State (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 930) 421. Accordingly, the applicants have established by the uncontroverted facts in their affidavit evidence that the delay in filing the appeal was caused by negligence or fault of their former counsel.
The portion of the affidavit that the applicants followed –up the case with letters to their former counsel but without fruition was not denied by the respondent and is therefore deemed admitted, thus satisfying the requirement that the client should not fold his hands or rest on his oars but should monitor the case with his counsel vide NNPC v Samfadek and Sons Ltd, (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt.1617) 1.
In the present application, the affidavit evidence of the applicants attributed the reason for delay to the sins or transgressions or fault of counsel who would not update the applicants on the fortunes of the litigation even upon demand by applicants who wanted to be kept abreast of the case. The respondent’s affidavit did not challenge the applicants’ affidavit evidence that their counsel was to blame for the delay. The Supreme Court held in the pioneer case of Doherty and Anor v Doherty (1964) NMLR 144 that as the failure to comply with the conditions of appeal was entirely due to the fault of the appellants’ solicitors to shut the appellant out from hearing the appeal on the merits is to hold the appellants personally responsible for the negligence of their solicitors, more so, the respondent did not show he would be prejudiced or embarrassed by the hearing of the appeal. Doherty v Doherty (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in Bowaje v Adediwura (1976) 5-6 S.C. 143 at 147.
There is also the case of Nwadike v Nwadike (1987) NWLR (Pt.65) 394, where counsel took irregular procedural steps in the case which squandered the time within which to appeal, but the Court in granting the application to appeal out of time held that the applicant should not be penalised or punished for the short-comings of his counsel.
Based on the discourse above, I hold that the applicants supplied good and substantial reasons for the delay in appealing within time and satisfied the first limb of the statutory requirements of Order 6 Rule 9 (2) of the Rules of the Court.
The second and/or other requirement is ground(s) of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. Exhibit C attached to the motion paper comprises the proposed notice of appeal with five (5) grounds couched thus-
“GROUND 1
The learned trial Judge erred in law when she assumed jurisdiction to entertain and determine a case over a subject matter which borders on labour, employment, industrial dispute arising from workplace and the conditions of service that existed between parties hereof, a subject matter the Court fundamentally lacks the jurisdiction to entertain.
Particulars of Errors:
(a) Section 254C (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2011 confers exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and determine the subject matter of this suit upon the National Industrial Court to the exclusion of this honourable Court.
(b) Under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine a subject matter which borders on labour, employment, industrial dispute arising from workplace and conditions of service was expressly and unambiguously ousted.
(c) The subject matter of this suit borders on labour, employment, industrial dispute arising from workplace and the conditions of service that existed between parties hereof.
GROUND 2
The learned judge erred both in law and facts when he held that the claimant’s/respondent’s employment with the 1st appellant is still subsisting and further went ahead to award damages for the loss of claimant’s employment with the defendant.
Particular of Error
(a) It is trite that under a common law, contract of employment which is the case hereof, the Court cannot force a willing servant/employee on an unwilling master/employer, neither can a Court force an unwilling servant/employee on a willing master/employer.
(b) It is trite as held in a plethora of Supreme Court cases and by the Court of Appeal in NIGERIA AIRWAYS LIMITED V AHMADU (1991) 6 N.W.L.R., that a master may terminate the appointment of a servant for any reason or for no reason at all, upon due notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice thereof. Even if the employment of a servant is improperly terminated or dismissed, he can only recover damages to be calculated as his rightful entitlements.
(c) It is also trite that damages are only awarded where and when breach has occurred as held in plethora of cases such as UNION BEVERAGES LIMITED V OWOLABI(1998) 2 NWLR (part 68) at page 128, AJAYI V TEXACO (1987) 3 NWLR (part 62) at page 577.
GROUNDS 3
The learned judge erred in law when she discountenanced the evidence of CW1 given/elicited under cross-examination and also defendants’ final written address.
Particulars of Error
(a) That the honourable judge shut his eyes to the evidence available to her vide the cross-examination of CW1 and went on a voyage in coming to its findings, when there is no evidence/basis to support same.
(b) The honourable judge ought to have availed the defendants fair hearing by recognizing/considering the defendants’ final written address and making a determination on the merit.
GROUND 4
The learned judge erred in law and fact when she held that the termination of the Respondent’s employment with the 1st Appellant is unconstitutional, unlawful and of no effect.
Particulars of Error
(a) The judgment/decision of the lower Court was not substantiated or supported by any material/evidence whatsoever.
(b) The relationship between the Respondent and the 1st Appellant was regulated by the terms of the contract of employment between the parties and not by extraneous terms thereof by the trial Court.
GROUND 5
The learned judge erred in law and fact when she awarded reliefs that are not supported by any evidence placed before the trial Court.
Particulars of Error
(a) It is trite that pleaded facts not supported by evidence go to no issue.”
The proposed grounds of appeal (supra) are, at a glance or viewed on the surface or prima facie, formidable and arguable. Ground 1 (supra), in particular, is, on the face of it, jurisdictional in dimension. For it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of F.B.N. Plc v Agbara (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt.1748) 537 at 552 that where the ground or grounds of appeal challenged the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the action, the appellate Court adopts a permissive approach in considering the reason for the delay in filing the appeal in order not to shut out an appellant with an arguable appeal because any matter which touches on the jurisdiction of the trial Court, or any other Court, is never too late for an appellant to seek redress from a higher Court. See also the Supreme Court case of Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Nigeria Limited and Anor v Federal Inland Revenue Services and Anor. (2021) 17 NWLR (Pt.1806) 545 at 566-567.
It is noteworthy to indicate that there is the case of Adigwe v F.R.N. (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt.1490) 105 at 145 where the Supreme Court held that the requirement of the duality of good and substantial reasons for the delay and grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard is subject to the exception that when an issue of jurisdiction is raised in the ground of appeal (as in ground one(1) of the proposed notice of appeal (supra), the requirement of good and substantial reason for the delay may be dispensed with; because the issue of jurisdiction is so radical in nature and strikes at the foundation of adjudication that it cannot be defeated by the provision of rules of Court placing reliance on the case of Akagbejo and Ors V Ataga & Ors (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt.534) 459-469 to also, hold in conclusion that proceedings conducted without jurisdiction will be a nullity.
It is also instructive that the Supreme Court stressed in the case of R Lauwers Import-Export v Jozebson Industries Co. Ltd (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.83) 429 at 450 that where a judgment or order was given without jurisdiction it could never be too late to appeal against it and that in such a situation it would appear that the reasons for delay in appealing against the said judgment would cease to be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in an application for extension of time within which to appeal against the said judgment.
It is but right that in the light of the discourse above, as one of the proposed grounds of notice of appeal (supra) is jurisdictional, time did not run against the filing of the appeal and, in that wise, the applicants were not obliged to furnish the reason for delay in filing the appeal.
In the result, I find merit in the application. It succeeds and is hereby granted. The applicants are given 21 days from today within which to file the proposed notice of appeal attached to the motion paper as Exhibit C at the lower Court. Parties are to bear their cost.
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I read in advance the draft of the lead judgment just delivered by my noble brother, Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh, JCA.
I agree with his Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion reached therein with nothing useful to add.
I too find merit in the Applicants’ motion filed on 23/05/2018 praying inter alia an order for leave for extension of time to appeal against the judgment of the lower Court. It is hereby granted.
OLABODE ABIMBOLA ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.: I read the draft of the ruling delivered by my learned brother, JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and order stated in the ruling, which I hereby adopt as mine.
Appearances:
Mr. C.C. Ottih For Appellant(s)
P.B. Nfiri, Esq. For Respondent(s)