COMRADE UZOMA EKEANYANWU & 2 ors -VS- COMRADE (PASTOR)

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT OWERRI

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE I. S.GALADIMA

Dated: 11^thJuly, 2019 SUIT NO: NICN/OW/36/2018

Between:

COMRADE UZOMA EKEANYANWU
COMRADE EMMA AHAMS ————————————— CLAIMANTS
COMRADE MARYANN AGU

AND

COMRADE (PASTOR) RICHARD EZE

(FOR HIMSELF AND REPRESENTING THE

ENTIRE STATE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF ————————————DEFENDANTS

THE EXCO OF IMO STATE CHAPTER/BRANCH

OF NULGE).

NIGERIA UNION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

EMPLOYEES (NULGE).

COMRADE IBRAHIM KHALEEL

(NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NULGE).

REPRESENTATION:

Chief E.O. Onyema with S.U. Ekeh and C.J Oguzie for the Claimants.
B. Nwankwo for the 1^stDefendant.
Femi Aborisade with O.D. Ogunsola and N. D. Okafor for the 2^nd/3^rd

JUDGMENT:

These Claimants, as purported fullfledged members of the National Union of Local Government Employees (herein referred to simply as NULGE), are aggrieved that these Defendants (especially the 1^st along with his members in EXCO),despite purportedly serving out their four year term of office as Officers and Members of the Imo State EXCO of the Union, unconstitutionally remained beyond 14/6/2018 when they should have stepped down. The Claimants allege that the Defendants claim their tenure was elongated to six years.

Therefore, this originating summons was filed by these Claimants on the 15/8/2018 seeking this Court to resolve the following questions:

Whether having regard to the provisions of Rules 5 (ii); 5 (iii); 5 (iv); Rule 12 (vi); Rule 13; and Rule 21 (iv) (a) of the NULGE amended constitution and the provisions of Rule 5 (ii); Rules 10 (xiv); 10 (v) and Rule 13 (vi) (a) of the Reviewed Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees’ Constitution, 2005, the tenure of office of persons elected State Officers and members of the State EXCO of the State Branches/Chapters of NULGE including Imo State Branch, is a period of four (4) years and not six (6) years.

Whether having regard to the provisions of S.29 of the Trade Unions Act and Rules 5 (ii); 5 (iii); 5 (iv); 5 (v); 5 (vi); Rules 6 (i); 6 (iii); and Rule 7 of NULGE amended Constitution 2016 and the provisions of Rules 5 (ii); 5 (iii); 5 (iv); Rule 6 (i); 6 (iii) and Rule 7 of the reviewed NULGE Constitution 2005, any person, body, or organ in the NULGE has the power or competence to enlarge, extend, or elongate the four year tenure of office of persons elected as State Officers and Members of the State EXCO including the Imo State Branch, to a period of six (6) years.

The following 8 reliefs are sought consequently:

A declaration that in accordance with the constitution of NULGE, the tenure of office of the State Officers and Members of the State EXCO of the Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE who were elected on 14/6/2014, constitutionally expired by effusion of time on 14/6/2018.

A declaration that no person, officer, organ, or body in NULGE has the power or competence under the provisions of the Constitution of the union to elongate or extend to a period of six (6) years, the four year tenure prescribed in the Constitution of the unionas the tenure of office of persons elected as State Branch/Chapter of NULGE including Imo State Branch/Chapter.

A declaration that any decision, directive or resolution by any person, officer, organ or body in the NULGE purporting to elongate or extend to a period of six years, the four year constitutional tenure of office of the State Officers and members of the State EXCO of the union as prescribed in the union’s constitution, is illegal, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect.

A declaration that having exhausted their four year tenure of office on 14/6/2018, the 1^st Defendant and all other persons elected on 14/6/2014 as State Officers and members of the State EXCO of Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE, are no longer competent to administer, manage, or control the affairs of the Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE in any manner whatsoever.

An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^stDefendant and those he represents in this suit and their cohorts either by themselves or through their servants, agents, privies or Officers, committees, or other organs whatsoever from parading or holding themselves out as State EXCO of the Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE or administering, control, or manage the affairs and activities of the Imo State of NULGE.

An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants either by themselves or through their servants, agents, privies, officers, committees, or other organs whatsoever from according recognition to or in any manner whatsoever relating with the 1^st Defendant and all the other persons he represents in this suit, as State EXCO of Imo State NULGE.

An order of a Court nullifying and setting aside, for being illegal and unconstitutional, all steps, actions, decisions, resolutions or directives whatsoever taken or issued after 14/6/2018 by the 1^st Defendant and those he represents in this suit in their purported capacity as State Officers and members of the State EXCO of the Imo State NULGE.

An order of Court mandating the Defendants to immediately conduct an election of the State officers of the Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE in accordance with the NULGE constitution.

The originating summons is supported by a 30 paragraph affidavit duly deposed to by the 1^st Claimant and 4 documents as exhibits. The exhibits are :

Exhibit C1 – the 2016 NULGE Constitution;
Exhibit C2 – The 2005 NULGE Constitution;
Exhibit C3 – the appeal letter dated 27/6/2018 written by the Claimants to the 2^nd and 3^rdDefendants;
Exhibit C4 – letter issued by the 1^st Defendant dated 9/8/2018 titled “Notification for the conduct of Branch Elections.

A further affidavit of 14 paragraphs was filed on the 31/10/18 as well as a reply on points of law dated the 29/10/2018 by these Claimants.

The 1^st Defendant entered an appearance and filed a counter affidavit of 39 paragraphs duly deposed to by himselfon the 23/10/2018. Six documents were attached as exhibits marked Exhibits A to F as follows:

Exhibit A – Submitted names of delegates for the amendment of NULGE Constitution dated 4/10/2016.
Exhibit B – Notice of resolutionsby the Special National Delegates’ Conference (SNDC) 2016 dated 13/10/2016.
Exhibit C – NULGE Constitution 2016;
Exhibit D – State Delegates’ Conference (List of date of election held and expected expiration of tenure of each State’s EXCO)
Exhibit E – Judgment of this Court made on the 31/5/2018;
Exhibit F – Letter of appeal written by the Claimants’ Counsel to the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants dated 27/6/2018 (same as Exhibit C3 above);

The 1^stDefendant further filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 23/10/2018 seeking for the dismissal of this suit on the grounds that it is an abuse of Court process. There is a 23 paragraph affidavit accompanying the preliminary objection. There is also a reply on points of law in reaction to the Claimants’ counter affidavit filed in opposition to the 1^st Defendant’s preliminary objection.

The 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants entered a late appearance by leave of this Court, on 17/11/2018. They also filed a counter affidavit to the originating summons as well as another notice of preliminary objection dated 18/11/2018. According to their Counsel Femi Aborisade, the 2^ndand 3^rd Defendants challenge the Claimants’ institution of this suit as same is accordingly premature; the Claimants having not exhausted all constitutionally prescribed internal and administrative mechanisms for settling this matter. The 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants’ Counsel furthermore filed a reply on points of law on 24/1/2019 in an obvious attempt to solidify their arguments on their preliminary objection.

The Claimants of course, reacted to the various preliminary objections by filing opposing processes. The various applications were adopted before this Court on the 4^th of July, 2019 and the suit adjourned to today, the 11^th of July for judgment.

For the purpose of this judgment however, it shall be ideal for this court to deal with the preliminary objections first and if necessary thereafter, consider the fate of the substantive suit.

2^nd and 3^rd Defendants’ Preliminary Objection:

As stated above, the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants as applicants, filed a preliminary objection on the 18/11/2018which can be summed up under two heads, that is to say:

Whether the Claimants exhausted the domestic remedies provided for within the NULGE Constitutions before filing this suit;
Whether having regard to the nature of the Claims made by these Claimants, they are required to exhaust the procedures stipulated in Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the suit can be activated?

Their arguments on these issues are as contained in their written address and for the sake of this judgment, only the relevant submissions shall be considered. These include, that:

The Claimants’ suit of 13/8/2018 is premature since allrecognized modes of resolution of domestic and administrative disputes contained in both the NULGE2005 and 2016 Constitutions, were not exhaustively explored and utilized beforehand;
This thus deprive this Court of civil jurisdiction to entertain the claims filed by the Claimants.
The Claimants’ action is altogether, an abuse of judicial process.
The Constitutions of the 2^nd Defendant were made pursuant to the Trade Unions Act 2004 and the Claimants did not exhaust Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before filing this suit.
The Court of Appeal in WILLIAMS V. UDOFIA (citation supplied) purportedly held that where a statute requires that a communication should be addressed to a body, any communication to an individual is not the same as communication to such body.
In HAASTRUP AND ORS V. SSAEAC AND ORS (suit no NICN/LA/114/2014), a ruling by his lordship, J.D. Peters delivered on 9/7/14 had held that the union’s constitutional remedies are part of the domestic remedies that must be exhausted as part of Part 1 of the TDA before the Claimant can validly invoke the adjudicative powers of the Court. — see also OBIORAH AND ANOR V. NULGE AND ORS (suit no. NICN/AK/14/2017 and MOHAMMED AND ORS V. NULGE AND ORS (suit no. NICN/BEN/11/2017 — per O.O. Oyewumi, J.

The case of AKINTEMI V. ONWUMECHILI (citation supplied) wasrelied uponinter alia.

The crux of the learned Aborisade’s arguments is that although right of access to court is a constitutional right and it ordinarily cannot be abridged by or under whatever form or guise, but where in a union like this there is a provision in its constitution for the resolution of internal disputes, a request to exhaust such remedies or mechanisms is not intended to abridge or restrict the exercise of a party’s access to court. It only suggests that a condition precedent needs to be fulfilled before such right to court may be exercised. He referred to OWOSENI V. FALOYE AND ANOR (citation supplied), where the apex court purportedly remarked that where an aggrieved party has not resorted to the remedies statutorily available to him, such a party had therefore not exhausted the remedies available to him and has in consequence, not satisfied the preconditions for access to court.

Accordingly, the Claimants here were entitled to have filed an appeal against the decision of the National Executive Council to the National Delegates’ Conference which however was not done. That this exercise of their right to appeal is supposedly a precondition to vesting this Court with jurisdiction to entertain their suit. As such, not having done so, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain their cause. He relied on Rule 5 (iii) (a) of the 2005/2016 NULGE Constitution which provides that — “any member shall have the right to initiate action at his/her own expense in connection with any breach of the provisions of the Constitution subject to an appeal to higher organs of the union before such an action could be initiated”. Furthermore, learned Counsel relied on Rule 5 (iii) (b) of both 2005/2016 Constitutions of NULGE which provides — “grievance arising from the decision of the National Executive Council (NEC) or conduct of the National Delegates’ Conference (NDC), shall be reported to the National Executive Council for adjudication before the aggrieved person can initiate any further action. Strict compliance to the provision shall be observed by all members of the union”.

It is therefore the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants Counsel’s view that the Claimants should have taken advantage of the opportunity of addressing the NEC or any higher organ of their grievances against the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants instead of running to this Court directly to institute this cause. He went further to cite the case of WILLIAMS V. UDOFIA (citation supplied) where the Court of Appeal had said that “…it is unacceptable for parties to approach the court without exhausting the avenues prescribed under the said law”. Any such premature approach will render such an action incompetent and deprive the court of necessary jurisdiction.

Citing the case of NWABUEZE V OBI OKOYE (citation supplied), learned Counsel reemphasized that where a statute prescribes the doing of a thing as a condition for the performance of another, non performance of such pre condition renders the subsequent act void. He went on to further explain that provided the right to challenge an administrative decision is not precluded, the need to derive domestic remedies to a dispute prior to instituting an action in Court, receives blessings from Section 36 (1), (2), (a) and (b) of CFRN 1999. The case of NUHPSW V. NUFBTE (citation supplied) was cited and relied upon.

Moving on, learned Counsel also believes that the Claimants’ paragraph 20 of their supporting affidavit to the originating summons which said they had written to the NEC of the 2^ndDefendant (Exhibit C3), was not a letter properly addressed to the NEC. This is accordingly so because by the decision in WILLIAM V. UDOFIA (Supra), where a statute requires that a communication should be addressed to a body, any communication to an individual is not proper communication to such body. As such, he argued that this Court cannot hold that Exhibit C3 satisfies the provisions of the Constitution of the 2^nd Defendant union particularly since under Rule 16 (i), the functions of the President of NULGE does not include the receiving of correspondence meant for the union or the NEC. Accordingly, only the General Secretary has the mandate to attend to all corespondents meant for the union. He cited OBIORAH AND ANOR V. NULGE AND ORS (suit no. NICN/BEN/11/2017) which Judgment was delivered on 16/11/2017 where it was accordingly held that even though the General Secretary is deemed to receive communications addressed to the union, in the case of any correspondence relating to grievances in respect of the decisions of the NEC or the conduct of the NDC or a Special Delegates’ Conference, any correspondence addressed to the National President would not be in strict compliance with Rule 5 (iii) (b) of the Union’s constitution. Learned Aborisade urged that this Court should disregard the said Exhibit C3 and consequently, revert this suit for conciliation.

On the issue of compliance with Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, the learned Counsel had remarked that assuming this Court refuses their earlier contentions above, the fact still remains that these Claimants cannot acquire the right to come to this Court unless and until they have fully observed Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act. As such, pursuant to Section 254 C (1) (L) (iii) (sic) CFRN 1999 (as amended) and Section 7 (1) of NICA 2006, all disputes within a trade union must first go through the process of conciliation or arbitration before such matter can be heard in Court. Also, that according to the Trade Disputes Act 2004, all intra uniondisputes must first undergo and exhaust the process of conciliation, mediation or arbitration before it can finally be instituted before this Court. As such, any suit instituted without exhausting Part 1 of the TDA has always been held to be incompetent and the Court is deprived of jurisdiction to entertain same. He further refers to Sections 2 (1), and 2(3) TDA 2004 to elaborate his stance. The case of ARINZE AND ORS V. TUC AND ORS (citation supplied) was cited and relied upon whereupon he concluded that this Court must refrain from entertaining this suit in view of the fact that it lacks jurisdiction so to do. The suit is accordingly, “unquestionably, incontrovertibly, and indisputably premature as the domestic remedies in part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act had not been exhausted” before the institution of this suit by these Claimants. In addition to this Court lacking jurisdiction to entertain this action, the suit is an abuse of judicial process, says Mr. Aborisade. The only thing left for this Court to do is to accordingly dismiss this suit in limine.

In opposition, the Claimants filed a written address on the 28/11/2018 and specifically, raised the two issues above highlighted in opposing the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants’ preliminary objection. On the 1^st issue which is whether these Claimants exhausted the domestic remedies provided for under NULGE Constitution before filing this action, Chief Onyema for the Claimants animadverted that Rule 5 (v) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution does not require an aggrieved member, after appealing to the NEC of the union, to make any further appeal to the National Delegates’ Conference of the Union prior to approaching the law court for redress. Accordingly, the Court cannot read or import into a document or instrument, provisions that are absent therein.

Further, a perusal of the 2016 NULGE Constitution establishes that it will be impracticable to require an aggrieved member of the union to appeal the decision of the NEC to the NDC before seeking redress in Court. This is because the NDC only holds a convention after every four years and Special Delegates’ Conventions only take place under peculiar circumstances as stipulated in Rule 6 (iv) and 6 (v) of the Constitution. It is accordingly unreasonable for a member to wait that long before his grievances can be redressed particularly where the acts of the officers and members of the union which are complained of are continuous and inimical. Therefore, by Rule 7 (v) of the Constitution, the main business of the Delegates’ Conference is to determine questions of policy and to elect officers of the union. This is supposedly why Rule 5 (v) of the Constitution specifically requires that appeals by an aggrieved member may be made to the NEC and no such further appeal is necessary to the Delegates’ Conference. The essence of requiring a party to exhaust domestic remedies where they exist, said learned Counsel, is to offer an opportunity for amicable resolution of the dispute before resorting to litigation. It is therefore not meant to create a strategy to delay and to frustrate aggrieved persons such as these Claimants. Accordingly therefore, these 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants do not deny the fact that the Claimants appealed to the NEC. They do not accordingly also deny the inaction by NEC to remedy the Claimants’ grievances. As such, the Claimants did in fact exhaust all domestic remedies and that this suit before this Court is the final way of resolving the Claimants’ grievances.

On issue 2 which is whether the Claimants are mandated to exhaust the procedures under Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before they can successfully file this action in Court, the Claimants’ Counsel cited the Court of Appeal decision in RTEAN AND ORS V. OLUFEMI AJEWOLE AND ORS (citation supplied) which overruled the decision of the NICN and held categorically that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act are only applicable to “Trade Disputes” as defined under Section 48 of the TDA and does not extend to inter or intra union disputes. As such, a Claimant pursuing an inter union or intra union dispute does not need to comply with the procedures under Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before activating the jurisdiction of the NIC.

Said learned Counsel, there is clear evidence to show that this dispute here pertains to the tenure of the State EXCO members of NULGE in Imo State. It cannot be construed as a “trade dispute” under the Act. He reasoned therefore that the preliminary objection is far fetched and same ought to be dismissed in order to enable the Claimants vent their rights before this Court.

In response, the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants’ Counsel filed a reply on points of law on the 24/1/2019 and in it, submitted as follows:

The Claimants had not reacted to the fact that their Exhibit C 3 is not in compliance with the provisions of the NULGE Constitutions. They are accordingly running away from the fact that they have no legal cause to ventilate before this Court.
That the decision in the case of RTEAN AND ORS V. AJEWOLE (Supra) is subject to the decision of the apex court in UDOH V. ORTHOPEDIC HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD (citation supplied).
That the Trade Disputes Act and the National Industrial Court Act are both federal legislations and it is specifically provided under Section 7 (3) of NICA 2006 that all trade union disputes must go through the process of conciliation and arbitration before the matter can be heard in Court.
That by virtue of those Acts, the National Industrial Court does not have original jurisdiction in respect of intra union disputes but an appellate jurisdiction over the award made by an arbitration panel and it even criminalizes non observance of Section 2 of the Trade Disputes Act where a party refuses to utilize all internal mechanisms of resolving a grievance in a union.
That by Section 54 (1) of NICA 2006, an intra union dispute is interpreted as “a dispute within a trade union” or an employers’ association. And this definition was made in the case of DANIEL V. FADUGBA (citation supplied).

I was finally urged to reject the Claimants’ submissions opposing the preliminary objection and uphold the contention that this suit is premature and should be thrown out.

DECISION ON THE 2^nd and 3^rd DEFENDANTS’ PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

Having elaborately reproduced the arguments and submissions made by the respective Counsel on behalf of their clients in this preliminary application, I am compelled as well to adopt the two issues raised specifically by the Claimants’ Counsel in deciding on same. These two issues will adequately determine the objection raised. Consequently, the questions requiring my findings are:

Whether the Claimants exhausted the domestic remedies provided for within the NULGE Constitutions before filing this suit;

Whether having regard to the nature of the Claims made by these Claimants, they are required to exhaust the procedures stipulated in Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the suit can be activated?

On issue 1 above, the objectors that is the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants, believe that the process of initiating this action before this Court is premature in view of the fact that the NULGE Constitutions (2005/2016) specifically provide that all disputes must be first resolved internally by conciliation, mediation and or arbitration before an aggrieved person can proceed to file any action before this Court. Their Counsel meticulously argued on this question isolating instances where this Court had ruled in favor of refusing to entertain a matter that did not undergo the process of conciliation before they were filed in Court. On the other hand, the Claimants’ Counsel simply believes that by appealing their complaints to the 2^nd and particularly the 3^rd Defendants who represent the NEC of NULGE, there was no further need to refer the issue to the National Delegates’ Conference since the Defendants could not even redress the grievances and so there is justification to file this suit to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to wade into the questions raised in the originating summons.

It is necessary to state from the onset that before the NIC Act of 2006 and the third alteration Act which amended Section 254 C of CFRN 1999, the Appellate Courts had consistently held that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court (this Court) to entertain intra and inter union disputes was an appellate and not an original jurisdiction. This is due in part to the provision of Section 7 (3) of the NIC Act which stipulates that “notwithstanding anything contrary in this Act or any other enactment or law, the National Assembly may by an Act prescribe that any matter under subsection (1) (a) may go through the process of conciliation or arbitration before such matter can be held in Court”. As such, the provisions of the Trade Dispute Act subjecting disputes to the process of conciliation before they can be finally initiated before the NIC could thus be appreciated. The National Industrial Court was viewed as having only appellate jurisdiction over trade disputes which came under Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act.

Reverting back to the Constitutions of the 2^nd Defendant union here, there are express provisions under Rules 5 (iii) (a) and (b) which provide as follows:

Any member shall have the right to initiate action at his/her own expense in connection with any breach of the provisions of the constitution subject to an appeal to higher organs of the Union before such action can be initiated.

Grievance arising from the decision of the National Executive Council (NEC) or conduct of the National Delegates Conference (NDC) should be reported to the National Executive Council (NEC) for adjudication before the aggrieved person can initiate any further action. Strict compliance to this provision shall be observed by all members of the union.

Apparently, the intendment of these provisions is as follows:

To grant any aggrieved member of the union, the right to challenge any breach of the union constitution in Court on his/her expense, subject to appealing to higher organs of the union. The higher organs described here will be the NEC or the NDC;

If the grievance arises from any decision of the NEC or the conduct of the NDC, the matter should be reported to the NEC before the matter may be initiated in a Court; and importantly

Strict compliance with these provisions shall be observed by all members.

The Claimants have urged this Court to believe that by writing Exhibit C3 dated 27/6/2018 titled “RE: EXPIRATION OF TENURE OF OFFICE OF MEMBERS OF THE STATE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE IMO STATE CHAPTER/BRANCH OF NULGE AND REFUSAL TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS” through the National President of NULGE (that is the 3^rd Defendant), they had complied substantially with the provisions of Rule 5 (iii) (a) and (b) of the 2016 Constitution (which is for all intents and purposes, the current constitution utilized by the union having purportedly reviewed the 2005 Constitution). Not only has the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants refuted this fact stating that there hasn’t been compliance, but they also believe that a letter such as this should be properly addressed to theNEC through the Secretary General who is responsible for all correspondence addressed to the National Executive Council of the Union.

I agree that the NULGE 2016 constitution places a precondition of resolving any grievance internally by exhausting all remedies available for the resolution of all disputes intra union.However, this will certainly depend on the nature of the dispute which a member has. This is because where the right of access of a person to Court is either taken away or restricted by any statute, the language of any such statute or provision will not be extended beyond its obvious meaning unless clear words are used to justify such extension. It is the practice of the Courts to guide their jurisdiction jealously. Thus, while interpreting any ouster or restrictive clause in a statute, the Courts usually scrutinize every aspect of such provision with a view to ensuring that everything done under such statute is done strictly in compliance with the provisions of the statute.

Applying this canon of interpretation to the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act therefore, it is clear that they apply only to what is referred to as a “trade dispute” and not to any other type of dispute. I acknowledge that Section 2 of the TDA states that “no person shall commence an action, the subject matter of a trade dispute or any other inter or intra union dispute in a court of law”. It is obvious that that section relates to only trade disputes. The definition of “trade dispute” under Section 48 of the TDA was not expanded to include inter or intra union disputes. Since the Court cannot go outside what was provided by statute in its definition, it means that any dispute that does not come within the definition of trade dispute in Section 48 of TDA is not amenable to or covered by the provisions of Part 1 of the TDA — SEE RTEAN AND ORS V. AJEWOLE AND ORS (2016) LPELR — 41271 (CA).

There is now no dispute to the absolute jurisdiction of this Court over intra or inter union disputes following the third alteration to the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. Specifically, Section 254 C (1) (j) now provides that “…the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters-

(j) relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation and application ofany- (i) collective agreement; (ii) award or order made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a trade dispute or a trade union dispute; (iii) award or judgment of the Court; (iv) term of settlement of any trade dispute; (v) trade union dispute or employment dispute as may be recorded in a memorandum of settlement; (vi) trade union constitution, the constitution of an association of employers or any association relating to employment, labour, industrial relations or work place; (vii) dispute relating to or connected with any personnel matter arising from any free trade zone in the Federation or any part thereof;”

Now, it is the case of the plaintiff as endorsed on the writ of summons and elaborated in the statement of facts or any other originating processes that determines the jurisdiction of a Court — ELELU – HABEEB V. A.G, FEDERATION (2012) 13 NWLR (Part 1318) 423. From the action filed before this Court, it is undeniable that it is only this Court that has the jurisdiction to entertain, answer the questions and grant any of the reliefs sought by these Claimants. This has not been disputed by these parties anyway.However, whether or not they can proceed to file this action without exhausting all internal and domestic remedies provided for the settlement of disputes within the union, is what is contested. As a matter of fact, this issue was resolved in the case of RTEAN AND ORS V. AJEWOLE AND ORS (Supra) where the Court of Appeal stated clearly that: “the decisions of the National Industrial Court post the passing of the NICA 2006, that inter and intra union matters must undergo the conciliation and arbitration procedure in Part 1 of the TDA before they can come before the Court by way of an appeal were, with respect, predicated on presumptions, conjectures, and what the Court would prefer to happen rather than on clear provisions”.

In that case, the Court of Appeal found that a dispute intra union is not necessarily the same as a “trade dispute” which definition was expressly provided for under Section 48 of the TDA 2004 (and subsequently under Section 54 of the NIC Act 2006). It means that like in this case, the TDA cannot be utilized to prevent these Claimants from proceeding to Court directly to ventilate what they believe to be a breach of the union’s constitution — But see the decision in NUHPSW V. NUATE AND NEWREST ASL NIG. PLC (suit no. NICN/ABJ/207/2018) pages 17 and 18per Kanyip, J delivered on 4^th July, 2019where such distinction between a trade dispute and an intra or inter union disputewas eliminated.

Contrary to what the Counsel to the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants presumed, the case of RTEAN AND ORS V. AJEWOLE AND ORS (Supra) does not antagonize the Supreme Court decision in UDOH V. ORTHOPEDIC HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD AND ORS (1993) NWLR (Pt.304)139. It instead gives boost to the decision by the Supreme Court in explaining the scope of Section 2 of the TDA. The arguments and submissions raised in the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants Counsel’s reply on points of law on this issue are hereby discountenanced and rejected. The originating summons filed by the Claimants here essentially seeks this Court’s aid in the interpretation of certain provisions of the union’s Constitutions and to apply them. Thus found, this Court has an original jurisdiction to entertain the cause pursuant to Section 254 C (1) (j) (vi) and I so declare.

Besides, and this is by way ofobiter, in considering whether or not to refer this suit back to arbitration or conciliation, the Court is bound to consider all other surrounding circumstances like the nature of the matter, the stage of the trial, the age of the matter and the steps taken by the parties so far in the cause. Considering therefore that this matter has gotten to this stage of judgment, it will seem quite unreasonable for this Court to refuse to sit over the matter and instead return it back to the parties for conciliation. Section 5 (iii) (a) and (b) of NULGE Constitution is indeed subject to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which guarantees every person the right to fair trial and access to Court. Therefore, it seems equitable to refuse the preliminary objection and thereby deny the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants’ application to have this suit dismissed. Thisis notwithstanding the fact that any Industrial Arbitration Panel constituted to reconcile these parties’ grievances, shall lack the jurisdiction to construe the provisions of the union’s constitution and or grant the reliefs sought in view of the express provisions of Section 254 C (1) (j) (v) of the CRFN 1999.

On the issue of whether Exhibit C3 was not properly addressed and served on the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants, I am satisfied that the address and service of that document on the 3^rd Defendant who is the President of NULGE and Chairman of the NEC of the union, is in fact, good and proper service and the opinions raised that the Secretary General of the Union is the only person who can receive correspondentsof this nature here in view of Rule 16 of the union’s constitution on behalf of NEC, are hereby rejected. The presumption quite clearly is that this Court cannot allow undue technicality to defeat the ends of justice. There is clear presumption that when the 3^rd Defendant was served, the NEC became aware of the grievance sought to be redressed. All the arguments stating that the Claimants’ Counsel never rebutted the arguments on this point, are hereby also dismissed in toto. The case of WILLIAM V. UDOFIA (2017) 7 NWLR (Part 1563) 155 cited by the learned objectors’ Counsel cannot aid them in rejecting this document as suggested since the decision of the Court of Appeal therewas in respect of a dispute over traditional chieftaincy matter.

Furthermore,I rely on the fact that the letter was addressed as follows:

“The National President,

Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees,

NULGE House,

Plot 26, Ajose Adeogun Street,

Cadastral Zone B05,

Utako District,

FCT, ABUJA.”

Clearly by virtue of Rule 1 (ii) of the NULGE Constitutions, this same address was produced exactly as written above as the registered office of the National Union. It suggests therefore, that having sent and addressed Exhibit C3 through the National President to that address, there is substantial reason to believe it was properly served. Besides, apart from stating what the duties of the officers of the union are, nothing in those Constitutions state specifically that all correspondents must be addressed to particularly the Secretary General of the Union. In practice though, such is done giving the belief the Secretary handles all secretarial duties of an organization. However, the fact that it was sent to the National President or indeed any other official of the union, does not make the letter invalid by reason of wrong service and does presumably,puts the entire body of the union on notice of its contents.

Thus said, the preliminary objection by the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants fails and same is hereby dismissed.

1^ST DEFENDANT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

As stated earlier, the 1^st Defendant filed a preliminary objection on the 23/10/2018. The said objection is purportedly pursuant to Order 18 rules 1 and 2 inter alia. It seeks for the dismissal of this cause on the following grounds:

That the suit is highly premature for non – exhaustion of the prescribed mandatory domestic and or administrative remedies in the 2^nd Defendant’s Constitution and thus constitutes an abuse of Court’s process;
The Claimants did not comply with the condition precedent necessary for the commencement of matters of this nature;
The Claimants do not have the locus standi to bring this suit;
That this suit is self defeating. The relief sought is inconsistent with the affidavit of the despondent, the 1^st Claimant thereto;
The Claimants in this suit, do not have any right of action having not complied with the condition precedent.
This suit is brought mala fide and constitutes an abuse of court process as this court had already pronounced on this issue of the 1^st Defendant’s tenure of office.
This suit is incompetent and can not activate the jurisdiction of this Court.

In support of the motion is a 23 paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 1^st Defendant himself, 5 accompanying exhibits and a written address. The 1^st Defendant also filed a further affidavit of 17 paragraphs and a reply on points of law both dated 21/11/2018.

In his written address, a lone issue was raised which is “whether giving the facts and circumstances of this case, this suit filed by the Claimants is not incompetent and robs this Court of jurisdiction to entertain same”. The learned Counsel, U.B. Nwankwo, after variously describing and highlighting how a Court is likely to be deprived of jurisdiction over any cause, went on to state that because these Claimants had failed to exhaust constitutionally and mandatorily prescribed domestic and administrative remedies in resolving this matter prior filing same in Court, their cause is premature therefore it must be dismissed. He is equally convinced that the Claimants are only bent on destabilizing the 1^st Defendant’s tenure in office. He said according to Rules 3 (vi), 4 (v) (a) and (b) and 8 of NULGE Constitution 2016, these Claimants have acted prematurely in initiating this cause. Said he, where a grievance is raised by any member of the union, the following steps must be undertaken thus:

Forward a complaint to the NEC through the Secretary General;
The complaint must be done within 30 days of the action complained of;
The NEC must be given the opportunity to consider the complaint;
The said complaint must reach the NEC at least within 14 days to the next meeting of Council; and
The procedure must be strictly complied with.

It is accordingly a binding procedure and a pre condition to instituting a case in Court as such, this Court lacks the enabling jurisdiction to entertain this matter.

Accordingly also, the Claimants channeled their complaint written by their Counsel, to the National President of NULGE instead of to the Secretary General. This was the reason why it did not form an item for consideration during the NEC meeting held in 5/7/2018. The letter was accordingly not in compliance with the constitutionally laid down procedures as such it was in order for it to have even been ignored. Furthermore, assuming their complaint even qualified as one which could have been considered, the fact that it was not done within 30 days of the occurrence of the action complained of, is another reason not to have considered it. This is so because the action complained about which was the decision to elongate the tenures of the States’ EXCO tenure in office, took place on 13/10/2016. However, these Claimants’ made a complaint in June 2018 and served same on the 3^rd Defendant directly on 2/7/2018, two years after the action complained about.

Arguing on, learned Counsel animadverted that the National Executive Council was never given any opportunity to deliberate on this issue before this matter was even filed and this is litmus to suggest that the Claimants’ minds were made up and their sense of judgment beclouded in ensuring the destabilization of the Imo State’s NULGE EXCO. Rehashing the facts once more, the learned a Counsel said the Claimants had written the complaint on 27/6/2018 and served the National President on the 2/7/2018 whereas the NEC meeting was to take place on the 5/7/2018. The Claimants accordingly also never bothered to take any further steps to ensure their grievances were addressed by doing any follow up letters to the NEC body which may have assisted the NEC to probably come to the knowledge of an impending complaint. Counsel went on to cite FCDA V KURIPAMO (citation supplied) with respect to the need for a litigant to comply with acondition precedent, and concluded that these Claimants have indeed no right of action against the 1^st Defendant or any of the Defendants for that matter.

On the question of abuse of Court process, Counsel believes this suit was filed to merely irritate the 1^st Defendant because a prior decision by this same Court had already reinstated the 1^st Defendant as State Officers and members of NULGE and it is accordingly the Claimants’ bid to act as spoilers for the purpose of destabilizing the leadership in the State. He referred me to the decision in PASTOR (DR) RICHARD EZE AND ORS V. IBRAHIM KHALEEL AND ORS (suit no. NICN/OW/66/2017, wherein my learned brother, Arowosegbe, J had decided that the 1^st Defendant’s tenure shall last till the year 2020. That by this decision, the Claimants as members of NULGE in Imo State, are bound to abide by the judgment being privies to same. He relied on the portion of the Judgment made by this Court and argued that by virtue of the decision in OGUNLEYE V AINA (citation supplied) and Section 54 of the Evidence Act, these Claimants as privies, are bound by the said judgment. He reasoned on that the Claimants are estopped in law, from raising the same issues after they’ve been decided by a competent Court of law — BAWACHA V. IKENYA (citation supplied) and TUKUR V.UBA (citation suppplied).

Learned Counsel went on to challenge the affidavit supporting the originating summons as being inconsistent with the reliefs sought. He thereafter urged this Court to dismiss the Claimants suit entirely.

In response, the Claimants filed a counter affidavit of 15 paragraphs on 31/10/2018 and a written address. Learned Counsel for the Claimants raised two issues for determination thus:

Whether the Claimants exhausted the domestic remedies provided under the provisions of Rule 5 (v) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution before filing this suit?
Whether the judgment in suit no NICN/OW/66/2017 — PASTOR (DR.) RICHARD EZE AND ORS V. IBRAHIM KHALEEL AND ORS operate as estoppel against the Claimants thereby making this suit an abuse of Court process?

On issue 1 above, it was submitted that Rule 5 (v) of the NULGE 2016 Constitution enables the Claimants to initiate a Court action at their expense provided an appeal to the higher organs was made within 30 days and determined before such an action could be initiated. Again, the Claimants argued that they had indeed written to the NEC through its President of their complaint with respect to the tenure of office of the 1^st Defendant. The letter is dated 27/6/2018 which was exhibited as C3 to the originating summons. As far as they are concerned therefore, the fact that the Claimants made the appeal contemplated by Rule 5 (v) of the NULGE Constitution is not in dispute. That the only borne of contention by the 1^st Defendant is that the said letter was addressed to the National President and not the Secretary General of the Union. Accordingly, Rule 24 (1) (d) of the 2016 Constitution described the National President of the union as its political head with powers to “administer the union”. He presides over all NEC meetings (Rule 8 (xii)); determines the items to be considered in the agenda (Rule 8 (vi)); and endowed with the authority to consider any matter by NEC (Rule 8 (ix)). As far as the status of the Secretary General goes, he is neither an employee nor officer of the union but only functions to record meetings of the NEC. He is accordingly also answerable to the National President. As such, the National President as an alter ego, is the right person to whom letters of complaints by members can be written to.

Furthermore, that even though the letter was received by the President, the complaint was not addressed at the NEC meeting of 5/7/2018 and whereas the Claimants had to wait for another 45 days before filing this action, the 3^rd Defendant failed or refused to convene any meeting after 5/7/2018 for the purpose of determining their complaint. NEC instead sent out notices for the conduct of local government elections. That since their appeal was ignored, it amounted to a refusal and so they were justified to have filed this action in Court without further recourse to the NEC body. It was accordingly, inequitable and unjust for these Claimants’ right to access to Court to be tied down by the Defendants.

Counsel went on to state that there was no provision under Rule 5 (v) providing for a 30 day window from the occurrence of the action complained of to be appealed before the NEC. The learned 1^st Defendant’s Counsel therefore included words that were never made or intended into that Rule 5 (v). Nevertheless, their cause of complaint arose immediately upon the expiration of the 1^st Defendant’s tenure on 13/6/2018 and so their complaint which was dated 27/6/2018 was within reasonable time. In the same vein, the learned Counsel for the Claimants stated that there is no provision under Rule 5 (v) requiring a complainant to file his grievance within two weeks to the date of a NEC meeting. He wants this Court to so hold and relying on KAYILI V. YILBUK (citation supplied), find that where a person to whom an appeal is made in the course of exhausting domestic remedies fails to address such appeal, the aggrieved person is entitled to proceed to Court for redress. He urged this Court to uphold his submissions.

On issue 2, the learned Claimants’ Counsel said that this matter is not caught up by estoppel because it does not run foul of any of the ingredients which will make this Court refuse to consider it being that the parties here are not the same, nether is the issue or subject matter nor the fact that it was finally disposed of in suit no NICN/OW/66/2017. He wants this Court to find that it is the question of whether the 1^st Defendant should continue to remain in office after 4 years that is currently being challenged here. That besides, this question of 4 year tenure never arose in the suit filed as NICN/OW/66/2017. He quoted what the Court declared which was “an order dissolving the caretaker committee and reinstating the Claimants (this 1^st Defendant) back to their various offices” until the expiration of their tenure in line with the constitution. As such, this cause of action is different from that one and this suit can therefore not be held to be an abuse of Court process. He relied on relevant trite authorities and concluded that this Court must resist the temptation of dismissing this suit preliminarily.

By a 17 paragraph of further affidavit filed on 21/11/2018, the 1^st Defendant responded to the Claimants’ counter affidavit and filed a written address on points of law. An extra exhibit, Exhibit F, was annexed to the further affidavit. Exhibit F is the 2005 Constitution of NULGE which was revised in 2016. Learned Counsel referred to relevant provisions which were amended under the 2016 Constitution and stated thatby the resolution of the National Delegates’ Conference, the members decided to elongate the tenure of the existing National and States’ EXCO by another two years.

Although the above issue was never raised by the Claimants in their arguments in opposition to the 1^st Defendant’s preliminary objection such as to necessitate a response on points of law, but the 1^st Defendant’s Counsel felt it was necessary to give the history behind how the NDC arrived at granting a tenure elongation to the Imo State Officers and Members of NULGE for an additional two years.

However, on the question of estoppel and in obvious attempt to reply to the Claimants’ arguments on this issue, learned Counsel urged this Court to critical examine the decision in suit no. NICN/OW/66/2017 and find that these Claimants are estopped from bringing this action.

DECISION ON THE 1^ST DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION:

Having carefully perused the arguments on both sides with respect to this second preliminary objection, it is necessary to state that aside from the issues raised regarding the fact that the Claimants suit is purportedly an abuse of Court process being that it seeks to relitigate the action that had been previous determined, the other issue questioning whether this action is premature, had already been dealt with in my decision on the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants’ preliminary objection above. It will merely be repetitious to restate my opinion again on that question. I shall only add that supposing I had agreed to submit this suit for conciliation, I am still permitted to make a decision on the main substantive questions in the originating summons in the event I was wrong at arriving at that decision — KATTO V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1991) 9 NWLR (PT. 214) AT 126; (1991) 12 SCNJ 1 – PER AKPATA, JSC – i.e. it is always done in the alternative.ADEYELU II VS. OBA OYEWUNMI (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 1.

As far as the 1^st Defendant’s issues relate on the questions whether these Claimants lack locus standi to institute same; or that the matter is an abuse of Court process; or that they are estopped from bringing this suit in view of a previous decision by this Court, I hereby make the following opinions in dismissing the application. They are as follows:

The 1^st Defendant here along with others, had filed a suit on 17/11/2017as NICN/OW/66/2017 and when they did so, did not find it was foul of Rule 5 (v) of NULGE Constitution which they now complain against these Claimants. Equity should not now aid them since their hands are not so clean after all.

The decision made by my learned brother in that case was in respect of the interpretation of the 2005 NULGE Constitution vis a vis the rights of this 1^st Defendant to remain subdued under a caretaker committee supposedly appointed by this 3^rd Defendant to superintendent the affairs of Imo State NULGE for a definitive period of 3 months.

Neither the 2005 nor the 2016 Constitutions made any provisions for a time window to file an appeal by an aggrieved party before the NEC meeting is held or from the time an alleged action is complained of. The 1^st Defendant’s submissions on this were in truth, figments of his imagination without any bearing or support from the NULGE Constitution.

There is no contending with the 1^st Defendant Counsel’s submissions that these Claimants are estopped because the same issues had been dealt with by this Court previously in suit no NICN/OW/66/2018. This is because my learned brother, Arowosegbe J, had refused to rely on the 2016 NULGE Constitution there and even in one of his opinions described it as “a cooked up document that only exists inthe fabrication of the Defendants” — see page 23 of the judgment of 30^th April, 2018. In fact, on page 25 of his judgment, he had concluded that “it follows that all things purportedly done pursuant to NULGE 2016 must fail…I hold therefore that all the actions of the Defendants based on NULGE 2016 fails except if justifiable under NULGE 2005”. Whereas in this particular suit, the Claimants want this Court to interpret whether the 1^st Defendant can continue in office beyond 14/6/2018 when he should have stepped down according to the 2005 NULGE Constitution which was used in electing him and his members in office. My learned brother was never tasked to determine when the 1^st Defendant’s tenure in office shall expire and he did not make any obiter dictum in that respect.

The second question raised by the Claimants in the originating summons however, have already either wholly or partly been dealt with by my learned brother in his 30/4/2018 judgment. I shall come to this when dealing with the fate of the substantive originating summons.

On the issue of locus standi raised by the 1^st Defendant’s Counsel, I shall simply rely on the decision in ALEX OLADELE ELUFIOYE & ORS v. IBRAHIM HALILU & ORS. (1990) LPELR-20126(CA)where it was said that: “the position is that where the constitution of a Trade Union makes provisions for its members and/or a third party to take action and such members or such third party comply with those provisions of the Constitution they have clothed themselves with necessary locus standi and theRule in Foss v. Harbottle (supra) cannot apply.” These Claimants therefore possess the requisite locus standi to institute this action.

In effect, the decision per Arowosegbe, J reinstated the 1^st Defendant here (along with his members) and declared inter alia, that the appointment of a caretaker committee set up by the 3^rd Defendant here was illegal. The Court went on to ask the 1^st Defendant and his members to remain in office until the expiration of their tenure in line with the Constitution— read page 30 of the judgment where he granted reliefs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Claimants’ prayers. It will seem therefore, that since my learned brother expressly rejected the 2016 NULGE Constitution, he was therefore referring to the 2005 NULGE Constitution which in effect means that these Claimants’ right to be heard before me should not be impugned upon.

The preliminary objection is also hereby dismissed.

DETERMINATION OF THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS:

Having therefore survived the onslaught of these two objections, I must proceed to deal with the substantive questions raised in the originating summons. The originating summons as stated beforehand, was filed on the 15/8/2018 along with a 30 paragraph affidavit, four exhibits and a written address. Two questions and 8 reliefs were sought for determination from this Court. In their written address, their Counsel raised arguments and made submissions on each of the issues raised.

On the first question sought for determination, learned Counsel had argued on whether under the relevant provisions of the NULGE Constitution, the tenure of office of elected persons into the EXCO of the State Chapter of NULGE is not four years by stating the following:

Rule 5 (ii) 2016 Constitution provides that: “the Constitution shall be deemed to be the basis of the contract between the members to establish and operate the union”.
Rule 5 (iii) NULGE 2016 Constitution provides for the supremacy of the Constitution over its members.
Rule 5 (iv) NULGE 2016 Constitution provides that no person shall take over the affairs of the union at any level except in accordance with the Constitution.
Rule 21 (iv) (a) NULGE 2016 Constitution provides for the tenure of all officers of the EXCO both at State and National levels to be 4 years.
Rule 12 (vi) and Rule 13 NULGE Constitution provides for the composition of the officers and members of the union state EXCO who shall be be elected by the State Delegates Conference.
These Rules above referred to are the same as Rules 5 (ii); 10 (xiv); 10 (xv) and 13 (vi) (a) of the 2005 NULGE Constitution respectively.

Accordingly, it is trite that where the wordings of a statute, enactment or instrument are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their plain and natural interpretation. That this is the exclusive duty expected of the law courts. Thus, by the respective interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the 2005/2016 Constitutions of NULGE, the 1^st Defendant and his members who were elected on 14/6/2014 at the time the 2005 Constitution was operational, had until the 14/6/2018 to remain in office as State EXCO members. Counsel’s submission on this also is that the 2016 Constitution became operational on 21/3/2017 during the currency of the 1^st Defendant’s tenure in office and there is no suggestion that their tenure was in anyway, abrogated or altered by the 2016 Constitution. Learned Counsel wants the Court to find also that there is no provision in both Constitutions granting a six year tenure in office. If the Constitution must be construed as supreme over the union and her members as provided under its Rule 5 (ii), then it must accordingly be respected. He cited ELUFIOYE AND ORS V. HALILU AND ORS (citation supplied). Therefore, this court was urged to answer the 1^st question in the affirmative and hold that the NULGE Constitution provides for a four year tenure in office and not a six year tenure for the State EXCO.

On question number 2, Counsel wants this Court to determine whether under the relevant provisions of the Trade Union Act and the NULGE Constitution, any person (no matter his status in the union), has the powers to pass or issue any resolution or directive elongating the State EXCO’s tenure from four to six years. In determining this question, it shall be necessary to consider the following provisions:

Section 29 (1) of the Trade Union Act 2004 – alteration of union rules and its enforcement is subject to registration.
Section 29 (3) of the Trade Union Act 2004 – date of coming into force of altered but registered rules of a union to be determined by the date of registration or on such later date.
Rules 5 (ii); 5 (iii); and 5 (iv) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution are accordingly apposite in answering this second question.
Rule 5 (v) 2016 NULGE Constitution provides that no new rules of the Constitution shall be made or any rules altered, amended, or rescinded unless agreed by a majority vote of members in secret ballot or by any other democratically accepted method.
Rule 5 (vi) 2016 NULGE Constitution – alteration of the Constitution to be subject to due notification to the State and Local Branches of the Union.
Rule 6 (1) and 7 of the 2016 NULGE Constitution refers to the powers granted to the Delegates’ Conference.
Rule 6 (iii) provides for the period and the manner of conduct of elections before the expiration of the term of office of the incumbent, including provisions for the appointment of a caretaker committee where elections are impossible.
Counsel also referred to apposite provisions contained in the 2005 Constitution.

Learned Counsel submitted on all these provisions above referenced, that they are plain and unambiguous in text and as such, must be given their plain and literal meanings. He reiterated the provision of Rule 5 (iv) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution which expressly provides that “no person or group of persons shall take over the affairs of the union at any level for whatsoever reason except in accordance with the provisions of this constitution “ and suggests that the constitution cannot be altered or amended unless by the members of the union at a National Delegates Conference. He reemphasized the importance of registration of an altered rule of a union as provided under Section 29 of the Trade Union Act and stated that there is no provision for indiscriminate elongation of the tenure of office of the EXCO under any of the NULGE Constitutions. That the only elongation of tenure of an EXCO allowable by the 2016 Constitution is as contained under the new Rule 6 (iii) which stipulates an extension for three months for the purpose of being able to conduct fresh elections upon the expiration of the incumbent’s office. The Claimants are therefore aggrieved because before the 2016 Constitution became effective on 21/3/2017, the 2005 Constitution which was in force when the 1^st Defendant was elected, did not provide for any extension of tenure for three months like it’s done in the new Rule 6 (iii) as such, it was an unconstitutional usurpation of power for the 1^st Defendant to have remained on in office upon the expiration of his tenure on 14/6/2018.

In conclusion, learned Counsel wants this Court to answer the 2^nd question again in the affirmative and find that the Defendants acted ultra vires the NULGE Constitutions. He urged this Court to grant all their consequential executory and declarative reliefs.

1^ST DEFENDANT’S COUNTER AFFIDAVIT AND SUBMISSIONS:

The 1^st Defendant’s Counter Affidavit of 23/10/2018 has 39 paragraphs accompanied by 6 exhibits and a written address. Same too was adopted on the 4/7/2019 and in the written address, the 1^st Defendant’s learned Counsel argued and submitted two questions for determination thus:

Whether under the relevant provisions of 2016 NULGE Constitution as amended, the National Delegates’ Conference can by its resolution alter and or amend the provisions of the constitution which includes the tenure of office of persons elected as NULGE officers either at the State or National levels;

Whether under the relevant provisions of 2016 NULGE Constitution, the National Delegates’ Conference complied with relevant statutory and constitutional requirements in validating the alteration and or amendment of her constitution through her resolution.

On the first question, learned Counsel argued that the National Delegates’ Conference being the highest decision making body of NULGE and comprising of all the national officers, the State President, and 10 Delegates from each of the States of the Federation, can in line with the provision of her Constitution, by resolution amend same. The manner for ensuring this is by simple vote cast by each delegate in support or against a resolution. This was accordingly the procedure when the 2005 NULGE Constitution (which is now repealed), was replaced with the 2016 NULGE Constitution. Counsel therefore refers to Rule 5 (iv) of the 2005 NULGE Constitution; and Rules 5 (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), 6 (i), (ii), (vi) and 21 (iv) (a) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution. Accordingly, the resolution was made and passed by the delegates to repeal the 2005 Constitution and replace it with the 2016 NULGE Constitution. He said this is not denied by the Claimants. He asked certain questions in an attempt to establish that the Claimants knew that the Constitution was amended and the tenure of office of the 1^stDefendant elongated and wonders why they now complain of this. It was further suggested that the NDC held its conference on 13/10/2016 whereat the resolution by all the delegates there present, voted for the elongation of the tenure of the State and National officers of NULGE and a communique was subsequently sent to all the State branches as notification. He refers to the exhibits annexed to the Counter Affidavit and says that they affect all members of the union at Local, States, and National levels including Imo State. That there is no question of the supremacy of the Constitution over her members in the union as such, all that were done by the delegates in conference, was in accordance with the Constitution. That the 1^st Defendant is not in derision of the Constitution and he is accordingly acting within the letters of same. That Rule 21(iv) (a) which provides for the tenure of office, forms part of the 2016 NULGE Constitution which is subject to be amended by resolution of the NDC under the guidance of Rule 6 (vi) of the same Constitution. That where any provision of the constitution conflicts with the resolution or decision of the National Delegates’ Conference, the resolution or decision of the National Delegates’ Conference shall prevail. He urged the Court to so hold while giving the plain and literary interpretation to the cited provisions.

On issue two, it was submitted that the NDC duly complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements stipulated in the NULGE Constitution. Reference was made to Sections 29 (1) and (3) of the Trade Union Act 2004 and Rules 5 (iii), (v) and (vi) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution. It was argued further that consequent to the new provision of Rule 6 (vi) which purportedly makes the resolutions of the NDC supreme over the constitution,the NDC by resolution, amended the 2005 constitution and proceeded to register same with the Registrar of Trade Union’s pursuant to Section 29 (1) of the TUA 2004 on the 21/3/2017 as evidenced on the Constitution tendered as Exhibit C to this Counter affidavit. Said Counsel, the 1^st Defendant has established that NDC was held on the 12^th and 13^th of October, 2016. That the delegates nominated from Imo State were not selected by the 1^stDefendant and the selection was without protest. The document showing the list of names of the delegates was accordingly also annexed to this Counter affidavit. That the resolution elongating the tenure of office of the National and State Officers was done in the usual manner and was voted upon before it was passed as a resolution of the NDC. Accordingly also, that the notification sent to all the State Chapters indicated that the business of the conference was the amendment of the 2005 Constitution. He referred to exhibits A and B attached to this Counter Affidavit. This accordingly indicates that due notices were given to all members of the union. Mr. Nwankwo finally urged this Court to reject the Claimants’ contentions and dismiss their cause.

THE 2^ND AND 3^RD DEFENDANTS’ COUNTER AFFIDAVIT AND ARGUMENTS:

Their Counter affidavit was filed on the 27/12/2018 and it is a 15 paragraph affidavit accompanied by 3 exhibits and a written address. Exhibit 1 –SPECIAL NATIONAL DELEGATES CONFERENCE 2016 directive dated 13/10/2016; Exhibit 2 – REQUEST FOR CTC OF NULGE CONSTITUTION dated 19/12/2018; Exhibit 3 – Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette from the Registrar of a Trade Union dated 17/12/2018.

The sole issue raised by them is “whether the resolution adopted by the 2^nd Defendant’s Special Delegates’ Conference (SDC) held on 13^th October, 2016 at Akure, elongating the tenure of office of the elected officers of the 2^nd Defendant at the National, States and Local Branches from four to six years tenure, is constitutionally valid under and within the context of Rules 6 (1) (i), (vi), 5 (i) – (v) and 36 (i) of the 2^nd Defendant’s 2016 Constitution, Section 254 C (2) of he CFRN 1999 and Article 3 (1) and (2) of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention No. 87, 1948 of the ILO”.

In making arguments on this lone issue, their Counsel stated that the resolution reached on the 13/10/2016 in Akure by the SDC for the elongation of tenure of office, was done in accordance with the enabling laws. That it is not in dispute that the 2005 Constitution was amended which was admitted by the Claimants but their only grievance is that the tenure of office of EXCO was elongated by two years. He referred therefore to Rule 6 (1) (i) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution which provides that the supreme authority of the union shall be vested in the NDC. He argued on that the NDC May also take the form of the SDC such that the decision of the SDC acquires the same source of authority as the NDC by virtue of Rule 6 (1) (v) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution. He expounded on the literal meaning to be given to Rule 6 (1) (v) and went on to state that by Rule 5 (i) – (iv), the NDC has the power to amend or alter the 2005 Constitution or to even rescind any of its provisions. The only proviso there is that it must be done democratically by majority of vote casts of the members present. Said Counsel, if the resolution of the SDC can constitutionally lead to the dissolution of the entire union, the resolution of the same body can also be used to revise or rescind any provisions contained in the same constitution. As such, it is understandable that by the resolution of the SDC held on 13/10/2016, the tenure of office of all EXCO at the National, States and Local Branches were elongated constitutionally and democratically from four to six years tenure. He wants this Court to understand that the 2016 Constitution is like a contract that binds all its members and it must be enforced according to its letters without deviation. He cited several judicial authorities like DICKSON V. SYLVA (citation supplied) and OGUNDIMU AND ANOR V. OGUNSEYE (citation supplied) to buttress the above point. He equally enjoined this Court to invoke its power under Section 254 C (2) CFRN to apply international conventions, treaties or protocols which have been ratified in Nigeria in relation to specifically industrial relations and thereby admit Article 3 (1) and (2) of Convention No. 87 of 1948 which essentially guarantees workers in an organization, the right to draw up their Constitutions and Rules. He argued on that the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention No. 87 of 1948 was ratified by Nigeria since 17/10/1960. He quoted a hyperlink http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO::P11200COUNTRYID:103259 accessed on 17/7/2013. He also cited Kanyip J’s,decision in suit no. NICN/LA/120/2013 — AERO CONTRACTORS CO. OF NIGERIA LTD V. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AIRCRAFTS PILOTS AND ENGINEERS (NAAPE) AND ORS to strengthen his submission on this issue. He finally urged this Court to refuse the application by these Claimants and dismiss their cause.

CLAIMANTS’ FURTHER AFFIDAVIT AND REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW:

The Claimants deemed it necessary to file a further affidavit of 14 paragraphs dated 31/10/2018 as well as written address on points of law in reply to the Defendants’ addresses.

In the address, a Counsel stated the following:

That Exhibit B tendered by the 1^st Defendant and which is purportedly a resolution made on 13/10/2016, does not qualify as such within the context of this suit.
That the purported resolution of 13/10/2016 appears to have been made before the coming into effect of the 2016 Constitution which was in fact registered on the 21/3/2017.
That there is no valid elongation of tenure ever made to suggest that the 1^st Defendant was constitutionally allowed to stay in office beyond 14/2/2018.
When the purported resolution was made on 13/10/2016, the 2005 NULGE Constitution was still operational.
There is absolutely no where under the 2005 Constitution permitting any organ, to make any resolution to elongate the tenure of the 1^st
There was no such provision like Rule 6 (vi) of the 2016 Constitution under the hitherto 2005 Constitution as such it is impossible to even make any resolution supersede that Constitution.
A purported resolution cannot have effect over and above the provisions of a union constitution as this will be accordingly, a constitutional coup.

COURT DECISION:

Having perused and exhaustively outlined the issues raised by these parties in their respective affidavits and addresses above, there are a few remarks I believe I must make before I formulate what I consider are the issues for determination in answer to the questions asked in the originating summons.

Firstly, the 2005 NULGE Constitution clearly provides for a period of four years tenure for all officials of NULGE at the National, State and Local Branches of the Union. This is indisputable in view of the provisions under Rules 5, 10, 12 and 21. It means that at the time the 1^st Defendant and his members were elected into office as Chairman and members of the Imo State NULGE EXCO on 14/6/2014, their tenure was to have come to an end by 14/6/2018. I believe therefore the 1^st question asked in the originating summons filed by these Claimants is an easy one to answer.

Secondly, the issue of whether or not the 2016 NULGE Constitution effectively came into force on 21/3/2017 is one that does not seem to have been disputed by all the parties and so it supposedly should not be a contentious issue to resolve. This is because the Claimants do not challenge the instrument whatsoever and having admitted it, it is deemed to no longer be an issue. The variousarguments made by the Defendants with respect to the fact the National Delegates’ Conference had on 13/10/2016 decided to amend the 2005 Constitution and proceeded to have it registered with the Registrar of Unions in accordance with Section 29 of the Trade Union Act 2004, is thus considered indisputable.

However, the question which is germane and which seems to be the main grievance of the Claimants is whether or not the 2016 NULGE Constitution amended or altered the tenure of the EXCO from a period of four years to six years? The answer to this can be gleaned from the provisions of Rule 21 (iv) (a) and (b) which provide verbatim as follows:

iv. (a). All National, State and Local Officers shall be elected to serve for a period of four years at a time.

(b). No elected officer of the Union shall hold the same office for more than two terms.

In effect, the Union had decided to retain the provision with respect to the duration in office of its officials as was the case in the 2005 NULGE Constitution.

The Defendants however raised a new dimension to this which is that the National Delegates’ Conference resolved to elongate the tenure of all officials of the EXCO including the tenure of the 1^st Defendant, by an additional two year term. The argument further put forward is that the resolution made by the delegates at the Conference on13/10/2016 is superior to the NULGE Constitution and has the effect of subjecting what it declares or resolves over and above the provisions of the Constitution.

In answer to the questions put forward by the 1^st Defendant therefore which are:“Whether under the relevant provisions of 2016 NULGE Constitution as amended, the National Delegates’ Conference can by its resolution alter and or amend the provisions of the constitution which includes the tenure of office of persons elected as NULGE officers either at the State or National levels”; and “Whether under the relevant provisions of 2016 NULGE Constitution, the National Delegates’ Conference complied with relevant statutory and constitutional requirements in validating the alteration and or amendment of her constitution through her resolution”; I concede with ease that the 1^st question is in the affirmative. In fact, in keeping with their power to amend or alter the Constitution, the NDC had expressly added a new Rule 6 (vi) to the 2016 NULGE Constitution which was registered pursuant to Section 29 of the TUA 2004 but which came into effect on 21/3/2017.

However, whywasn’t a provision for elongation of the tenure of officials of the union specifically provided for in the 2016 Constitution if this was the resolution arrived at by the National Delegates’ Conference?

This is a question requiring a definite answer which none of the Defendants could give. Interestingly, the 1^st Defendant had asked as his second question, whether the NDC had complied with the statutory and constitutional requirement for validating her constitution? The 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants had equally asked “whether the resolution adopted by the 2^nd Defendant’s Special Delegates’ Conference (SDC) held on 13^th October, 2016 at Akure, elongating the tenure of office of the elected officers of the 2^nd Defendant at the National, States and Local Branches from four to six years tenure, is constitutionally valid under and within the context of the Rules?

To me, these are similar questions and since the matter has been narrowed down to this issue, the only question for this Court to determine therefore is “whether the National/Special Delegates’ Conference validly amended or altered the tenure of the 1^st Defendant and his members in EXCO, from four years to six years under the2016 NULGE Constitution?”

The Defendants are in unison in their argument that where any provision of the NULGE constitution conflicts with the resolution or decision of the National Delegates’ Conference, the resolution or decision of the National Delegates’ Conference shall prevail over the Constitution. They unanimously refer to Rule 6 (vi) which states that: “notwithstanding the provision of any rule of this Constitution, the decision or resolution reached at the National Delegates’ Conference shall superseded such provisions”.

This Court concedes with the fact that the Constitution is binding on all its members and is deemed to be the basis of the contract between the members, to establish and operate the union (Rule 5 (ii) 2016 NULGE Constitution). I also concede that no new rules shall be made or any rules altered, amended, or rescinded, unless agreed to by majority votes of members in secret ballot or by any democratically accepted method by members present at the National Delegates’ Conference (Rule 5 (v) 2016 NULGE Constitution.

Now, it must be supposed that in order for it to be believable, the members at the National Delegates’ Conference who had intended to amend or alter their Rules in order to elongate the tenure of office of her officials, would automatically want this written boldly in the Constitution which was amended in 2016. Again, it will seem logical that if the members present at the National Delegates’ Conference intended to elongate the tenure of her officials in office for an additional two years, there would be at least a written resolution, signed by all or most of the members in agreement which shall be forwarded along with a communique to all the branches in the federation in compliance with the union constitution and as due notification.

Frankly, I have double checked and I do not find where in the 2016 NULGE Constitution, any provisions were made for elongation of the tenure of office of officials to six from four years.In fact, in Exhibit 3 annexed to the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants’ Counter Affidavit of 27/12/2018 which is the official gazette by the Registrar of Trade Unions and which contains all the provisions of the 2005 Constitution that were unanimously altered or added, nothing therein indicates that the tenure of office was by resolution of the members at the NDC, elongated to six years.

It must mean that this fact is contained in a resolution in order for the Defendants’ contention to be believable that “theresolution reached at the National Delegates’ Conference”, supersedes the provisions of the Constitution.

What under this context,amounts to a resolution?Unfortunately, neither the NULGE Constitution nor the Trade Union Act interpreted this word. There is also no available judicial authority defining what a resolution is. However, in the ordinary English parlance,a resolution is defined as a formal expression of opinion or intention made, usually after voting, by a formal organization, a union, a legislature, a club, or other group. – See the Dictionary.com. In the Blacks Law Dictionary (10^th edition), a resolution is defined on page 1504 as “a highly formal kind of main motion, often containing a preamble, and one or more resolving clauses in the form “resolved. That…”

Giving therefore the ordinary and literal interpretation to Rule 6 (vi) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution, in order for a decision or resolution of the NDC to supersede any provision of the Constitution, it must have been made formally — that is in writing, and possibly signed by all the members present at the NDC and very importantly, registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions pursuant to Section 29 of the TUA 2004. This latter reasoning is because in order for the union not to run foul of Section 29 (1) TUA 2004, it is required that any resolutionfor the alteration or amendment of the rules of a trade union, be registered before it can be given any legal effect.

Is that the scenario in this case? The only exhibit indicating that there has been a tenure elongation of the officials of the Defendants is the one dated 13/10/2016. This letter is contained on a letter head of the 2^nd Defendant union and addressed to the National Officers, all State Presidents and all Local Branch Chairmen. It is titled “RE: SPECIAL NATIONAL DELEGATES CONFERENCE (SNDC) 2016”. For the purpose of this judgment, the said exhibit shall be reproduced here under:

I am directed to forward the resolutions reached at the last Special National Delegates Conference (SNDC) held on Thursday 13^th October, 2016 at Akure.

The Conference in session suspended Rule 13 vi (a) of the 2005 Constitution of NULGE until the expiration of tenure renewed.

Based on the above, the Conference in session resolved as follows:

Extension of tenure of the National, State and Local Branches Executives by two (2) years with effect from the expiration of their present tenure.
Special levy for a month to the displaced NULGE members in the North East as an assistance was adopted as:

Grade level 1 – 10 to pay three hundred Naira (N300.00) only.
Grade level 12 and above are to pay five hundred Naira (N500.00) only

You are advised to ensure the strict compliance to these directives.

Thanks.

Comrade Ayodele Ajewole,

For General Secretary.

Considering therefore the definition provided above, does this amount to a resolution made by a union? The answer is most definitely, in the negative. This is at best, a communique indicating that a decision was reached as contained in the body of the letter. A resolution should go beyond that to provide those who had signed same and that they have legitimately decided on the above stated matters. I don’t see how a directive made and signed by someone acting on behalf of the Secretary General can amount to a resolution of an entire body of a union or its national delegates. This document can be dismissed as a documentary hearsay in that it does notsuggest or establish how the resolution was reached and who were in deed, the persons who agreed to it in order to determine whether it was a resolution arrived democratically. I shall have no cause but to disregard this same document as a resolution of NULGE made in 2016.

Besides, like the Claimants’ Counsel correctly argued in his reply on points of law, when the said Exhibit B was purportedly made in 2016, the applicable NULGE Constitution was the 2005 Constitution. But, under the 2005 Constitution, neither didthese Defendants nor the NDC have the power to make any resolution to supersede the provisions of the 2005 Constitution. Meanwhile, 2016 NULGE Constitution became effective on 21/3/2017 when it was registered. So, if Rule 6 (vi) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution came in effect only on 21/3/2017, how can the Defendants justify the legality of a purported resolution made on 13/10/2016, to supersede a non existent Constitution? In other words, at the time of making the purported resolution to elongate the tenure of the 1^st Defendant in 2016, the 2005 Constitution (which was still in force as at 2016), had no provision granting the NDC power to make any resolutions to amend her provisions. Even this statement on its face alone, seems as illogical as the act supposedly undertaken by these Defendants.

Therefore, in answer to the Defendants’ question whether a resolution by the NDC of NULGE can supersede the provisions of the union Constitution, assuming the resolution were even produced at all, the answer will still be in the negative. See the decision in MOST REV. ALFRED A MARTINS AND ORS V. CATHERINE KOLAWOLE(2011) LPELR-4475(CA)where the Court of Appeal said that:

“…in agreement with appellants’ learned counsel that the first part of resolution A of Exhibit J cannot override the N.S.I.T.F Act. The latter is an Act of the National Assembly. Therefore, it is superior to a circular of or resolution made by a private entity such as appellants. In addition, Exhibit J was issued by appellants on 22.3.1979, before the N.S.I.T.F Act came into force on 1.1.1992. The subsequent N.S.I.T.F legislation on 1.1.1992, (supra), swept aside/away the resolution in Exhibit J on pensions, in my view.” Per IKYEGH, J.C.A. (P. 29, paras. D-G).

Therefore, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that Rule 6 (vi) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution ultra vires the 2016 NULGE Constitution since it ambitiously grants the NDC the power to decide or make resolutions which shall supersede the provisions of the same Constitution even prior to such resolution being registered by the Registrar of Trade Unions pursuant to Section 29 (1) of the TUA 2004. No resolution, prior to its registration or recognition by the Registrar of Trade Unions is in effect, a law.

Without wasting more thoughts, and for the benefit of clearly summarizing my above findings, it is hereby declared as follows:

With regards to the provisions of Rules 5 (ii); 5 (iii); 5 (iv); Rule 12 (vi); Rule 13; and Rule 21 (iv) (a) of the NULGE amended constitution and the provisions of Rule 5 (ii); Rules 10 (xiv); 10 (v) and Rule 13 (vi) (a) of the 2016 NULGE Constitution, the tenure of office of persons as elected State Officers and members of the State EXCO of the State Branch of NULGE including Imo State Branch, is a period of four (4) years and not six (6) years.

With regards to the provisions of S. 29 of the Trade Unions Act and Rules 5 (ii); 5 (iii); 5 (iv); 5 (v); 5 (vi); Rules 6 (i); 6 (iii); 6 (vi) and Rule 7 of 2016 NULGE Constitution, no person, body, or organ in the NULGE has the power or competence to enlarge, extend, or elongate the four year tenure of office of persons elected as State Officers and Members of the State EXCO including the Imo State Branch, to a period of six (6) yearsexcept in accordance with the NULGE constitution and upon such amendment being registered pursuant to Section 29 (1) of the TUA 2004.

Consequently, this Court grants the following declaratory and executory orders as sought by these Claimants thus:

A declaration that in accordance with the 2005 constitution of NULGE, the tenure of office of the State Officers and Members of the State EXCO of the Imo State Branch of NULGE who were elected on 14/6/2014, constitutionally expired by effusion of time on 14/6/2018.

A declaration that no person, officer, organ, or body in NULGE has the power or competence under the provisions of the 2016 Constitution of the union to elongate or extend to a period of six (6) years, the four year tenure prescribed in the Constitution of the union as the tenure of office of persons elected at the State Branch of NULGE (including Imo State Branch),unless upon a formal resolution duly registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions for the purpose of elongating the tenure of office of the EXCO.

A declaration that any decision, directive or resolution by any person, officer, organ or body in the NULGE purporting to elongate or extend to a period of six years, the four year constitutional tenure of office of the State Officers and members of the State EXCO of the union as prescribed in the union’s constitution, is illegal, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect.

A declaration that having exhausted their four year tenure of office on 14/6/2018, the 1^st Defendant and all other persons elected on 14/6/2014 as State Officers and members of the State EXCO of Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE, are no longer competent to administer, manage, or control the affairs of the Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE in any manner whatsoever.

An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^st Defendant and those he represents in this suit and their cohorts either by themselves or through their servants, agents, privies or Officers, committees, or other organs whatsoever from parading or holding themselves out as State EXCO of the Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE or administering, control, or manage the affairs and activities of the Imo State of NULGE.

An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants either by themselves or through their servants, agents, privies, officers, committees, or other organs whatsoever from according recognition to or in any manner whatsoever relating with the 1^st Defendant and all the other persons he represents in this suit, as State EXCO of Imo State NULGE.

An order of a Court nullifying and setting aside, for being illegal and unconstitutional, all steps, actions, decisions, resolutions or directives whatsoever taken or issued after 14/6/2018 by the 1^st Defendant and those he represents in this suit in their purported capacity as State Officers and members of the State EXCO of the Imo State NULGE.

An order of Court mandating the Defendants to conduct an election of the State officers of the Imo State Branch/Chapter of NULGE in accordance with the NULGE constitutionwithin one month from the date of this here judgment.

Cost of N300,000.00 awarded against the Defendants payable within 14 days of this judgment and which shall in default, attract 10% interest per annum until final liquidation.

The Claimants’ case succeeds in its entirety.

Delivered in Owerri, this 11^th day of July, 2019.

Hon. Justice Ibrahim Suleiman Galadima

Owerri Division

National Industrial Court of Nigeria.