CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA v. ABDULLAHI ABUBAKAR
(2019)LCN/13174(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 3rd day of May, 2019
CA/K/181/M/2018
RATIO
GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 251(1) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Let me start with the case of CBN V. Ubana & Ors (supra). Therein the Court held:
Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution is so clear, it is plain and its applicability to the situation at hand is to say the least inadequate; this is so because which ever way one looks at jurisdiction, garnishee proceedings though clearly a means of enforcement of judgments, it cannot be properly termed a substantive civil or criminal suit covered by the provisions of Section 251(1) of the Constitution.PER JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.
JUDGMENTS: WHEN DO JUDGMENTS TAKE EFFECT?
Judgments take effect immediately they are delivered and every Court has inherent power to proceed to enforce judgments at once. The enforcements on delivery can only be interrupted by a stay of execution. See Ngere & Anor V Okuruket & Ors (2014) LPELR 22883 (SC).PER JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.
GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: THE DUTY OF A GARNISHEE WHO IS ASKED TO SHOW CAUSE
A Garnishee who is asked to show cause has only one thing to do, and that is, to disclose the true account status of the judgment debtor in its custody. It can therefore be made to pay the debt of the judgment debtor if the Court has cause to believe that the failure or refusal to show cause is a deliberate attempt to evade a legal duty under the law, to disclose the true account of the judgment debtor in its custody. It is not the business of a Garnishee to undertake to play the role of an advocate for a judgment debtor by trying to shield and protect the money of the judgment debtor. See Oceanic Bank Plc V Olusegun Oladepo & Anor (2012) LPELR-19670 (CA); CBN V Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors (2017) LPELR-43940 (SC).PER JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.
GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: THE DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO GARNISHEE
The only defences that may therefore be open to a Garnishee is that, either the judgment debtor has no such monies in its custody, or that the money if there is, is encumbranced by a lawful obligation on it in respect of which it has no choice but to obey. Where a Garnishee, such as in the instant case undertakes to challenge the validity of the judgment debt, I believe it has gone out of its way and thus exposes itself to attendant legal consequences.PER JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: THE LIMITATIONS TO A COURT’S JURISDICTION
The limits of the jurisdiction of a Court are imposed by the statute, charter or commission under which the Court is constituted and may be extended or restricted by similar means. A Court cannot do more than this, it cannot confer on itself jurisdiction not granted it by statute. See Abubakar V Abubakar (2015) ALL FWLR (PT. 808) at page 693.PER JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: THE CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFF IS DETERMINED IN CONSIDERING WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION
In determining whether or not a Court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine a matter, what is considered is the claims of the plaintiff as outlined in the plaintiffs statement of claim. This is indeed the law. See Abia State Independent Electoral Commission V Kanu (2013) 13 NWLR (PT.1370) 713 Paras D-E.
I am of the solid view that the cases of George V FRN (2011) ALL FWLR (PT.587) 664 and Obiuweubi V CBN (2011) ALL FWLR (PT.575) 208 are no longer applicable to the instant situation in view of the decision in the case of CBN V. Ubana & Ors 2016) LPELR-40366 (CA). PER JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
OBIETONBARA O. DANIEL-KALIO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA – Appellant(s)
AND
ABDULLAHI ABUBAKAR – Respondent(s)
JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an interlocutory appeal against the ruling of the National Industrial Court, Kano, Kano Judicial Division in Suit No. NICN/KN/203/2013 delivered on the 16th day of February, 2017 by Hon. Justice Lawal Mani (of blessed memory).
The motion, which ruling is on appeal before us was filed on the 29th day of November, 2016. The following reliefs were prayed for therein:
1. An Order of this Honourable Court declaring that this Court has no jurisdiction and/or should not exercise any jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding.
2. An Order of this Honourable Court striking out and/or setting aside the order Nisi dated 5th October 2016.
3. And for such further or other order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
The grounds upon which the motion of preliminary objection is based are:
(i) This garnishee proceeding is brought against the Garnishee/Applicant in connection to or pertaining to banking.
(ii) The Garnishee/Applicant is a public officer.
(iii) It is in the interest of justice for the Respondent/Judgment Creditor
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to file the proceeding before a competent Court.
It is important to state at this juncture that the motion of preliminary objection is brought pursuant to Section 251 (1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 84(1) & (3) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap 56 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 and Order II Rule 16 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017.
The order nisi in respect to which the preliminary objection is brought, dated the 5th day of November, 2016 contains therein the orders hereunder stated:
1. A Garnishee Order Nisi attaching the monies of the judgment debtors in the Treasury Single Account in the hand of the Garnishee or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment sum of N33,853,824.62k (Thirty Three Million, Eight Hundred and Fifty three Thousand, Eight Hundred and Twenty four Naira, Sixty two Kobo).
2. An Order that the Garnishee appear before this Honourable Court to show cause why an order absolute should not be made for the payment to the judgment creditor the part of the judgment sum from them to the judgment creditor or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy
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the part of the judgment under the judgment.
The motion is supported with an affidavit of 5 paragraphs deposed by Victoria Okonkwo, a litigation secretary in the Law Firm of Messrs A.M. Abdulkadir & Co., counsel to the Garnishee/Applicant. The affidavit is accompanied with a written address of Applicants counsel.
In opposition to the motion of preliminary objection, the Respondent filed a counter affidavit of 3 paragraphs deposed by Onoja Esther, a litigation secretary in the Law Firm of Messrs Law Partners, counsel to the judgment creditor/respondent. The counter affidavit is accompanied with written address of the Judgment/Creditor/Respondents counsel.
The Garnishee/Applicants counsel reacted to the counter affidavit by filing a reply on points of law.
The National Industrial Court (hereinafter to be interchangeably referred to as the lower Court) took arguments on the motion of preliminary objection. In its ruling delivered on the 16th day of February, 2017, the motion of preliminary objection was dismissed, hence this appeal.
The Notice of Appeal filed on 12th March, 2018 contains two grounds of appeal,
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to wit, howbeit, without their particulars even though supplied:
1. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he exercised jurisdiction on the Appellant as filed by the judgment creditor.
2. The learned trial Judge erred in law for refusing to set aside and discharge the Order Nisi, dated 5th October 2016.
Subsequent to the compilation and transmission of record of appeal, briefs of argument were filed by the respective counsel.
The Appellants brief of argument settled by ABDULKADIR MUSTAPHA, ESQ was filed on 16th March, 2018. Therein the following issues were distilled for determination:-
1. Whether in the light of Section 251(1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution, the learned trial Judge erred in law when he refused the Appellants application by way of preliminary objection and is accordingly dismissed (distilled from ground one).
2. Whether by the provision of Section 84(1) and (3) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 the learned trial Judge erred in law for refusing to set aside and discharge its order nisi, dated 5th October, 2016 (ground two).
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In the Respondents brief of argument settled by MUKHTAR MUSA, ESQ, and filed on 2nd July, 2018, two issues were distilled for determination. The issues are:
1. Whether the trial Judge has jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
2. Whether by virtue of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap 56 LFN, 2004, the monies of the judgment debtor in the custody of the Appellant is in the custody of a public officer.
The issues formulated by the two learned counsel are the same in substance. They differ only in choice of language and details, for instance, the Appellants issue one is more specific than the Respondents issue one, while the Respondents issue two is more specific than the Appellants issue two.
I have chosen to marry the two in the sense that I adopt the Appellants issue one and the Respondents issue two as the issues for determination of this appeal.
For clarity, the issues formulated by the Court for determination thus:
1. Whether in the light of Section 251(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution the learned trial Judge erred in law when he refused the Appellants
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application by way of preliminary objection and is accordingly dismissed.
2. Whether by virtue of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap 56, LFN 2004, the monies of the judgment debtor in the custody of the Appellant is in the custody of a public officer.
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE ONE
Whether in the light of Section 251(1) (d) of the 1999 Constitution, the learned trial Judge erred in law when he refused the Applicants application by way of preliminary objection and is accordingly dismissed.
The ruling on appeal emanated from a garnishee proceedings commenced under Section 83(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, cap 56 LFN, 2004 (hereinafter to be called the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act), which is clearly and undoubtedly a process for the enforcement/execution of the judgment of the National Industrial Court, Kano which was entered by the lower Court. The jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court was not challenged, and the Applicant herein, has not, to my knowledge taken any steps to apply as an interested party to appeal the judgment of the Court based on the
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Courts lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, that the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the substantive suit is quite settled and binding. See Akere V The Governor, Oyo State & Ors (2012)50 NSCQR 345 at 394, 414-415. This point was not missed out by the Respondents counsel who took it up on pages 6-7 (paragraphs 4.8 4.14) of the Respondents brief of argument. The essence of counsels submission is that if the National Industrial Court of Nigeria has the jurisdiction to entertain the substantive suit, then the court certainly has the jurisdiction to execute its judgment. Counsel relied on Section 254 (c) (1)(1-6) and Order 49 Rule 20 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017.
It was further submitted that garnishee proceedings, though technically a separate proceedings does not fall within the civil causes and matters contemplated by Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution. Counsel relied on the case of CBN V. Ubana & Ors (2016) LPELR- 40366 (CA). He submitted that based on the doctrine of stare decisis, the cases of CBN V Okeb (2014)LPELR- 23162 (CA) and
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George V FRN (2011) ALL FWLR (PT. 587) 664, decided by the Court of Appeal in 2014 and 2011 respectively no longer represent the law on the issue, in view of the decision in CBN V. Ubana & Or (supra) decided in 2016, being the later in time to the earlier cases. He thus submitted that based on CBN V. Ubana & Ors (supra) the extant law is that the trial Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the garnishee proceedings of the Respondent.
This submission to my mind raises another angle to the submission of Appellants counsel which is based principally on his interpretation of Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution, 1999 (as amended) and the cases he cited on it, and which the Respondents counsel has met head on by reference to and reliance on Section 254(c) of the Constitution, 1999 (as amended) and the cases he cited in fortification of his position.
The submission evoked a reply from the Appellants counsel but he decided to proffer none. Is it that he did not construe the point as I did or he threw in the towel? Whatever may be counsels reason for remaining mute on the issue does
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not detract from the Court its duty of resolving an issue properly canvassed before it. I have not only read the cases and the other statutory provisions referred to by counsel but have also looked elsewhere for guide.
Let me start with the case of CBN V. Ubana & Ors (supra). Therein the Court held:
Section 251(1)(d) of the Constitution is so clear, it is plain and its applicability to the situation at hand is to say the least inadequate; this is so because which ever way one looks at jurisdiction, garnishee proceedings though clearly a means of enforcement of judgments, it cannot be properly termed a substantive civil or criminal suit covered by the provisions of Section 251(1) of the Constitution.?
Order 49 Rule 20 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, cited and relied on by the Respondents counsel provides:
Where the Court has delivered a monetary judgment in favour of any of the parties in the case before it, the winning party may apply to the Court for the enforcement of the judgment by filing a garnishee proceeding amongst other
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procedure as may be allowed under National Industrial Court Act, 2006 or any other Act or Rules of this Court. It is the law that the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction subsists until upset on appeal. While the judgment subsists every person affected by it or against whom an order is made must obey it even if it appears wrong. Judgments take effect immediately they are delivered and every Court has inherent power to proceed to enforce judgments at once. The enforcements on delivery can only be interrupted by a stay of execution. See Ngere & Anor V Okuruket & Ors (2014) LPELR 22883 (SC).
A Garnishee who is asked to show cause has only one thing to do, and that is, to disclose the true account status of the judgment debtor in its custody. It can therefore be made to pay the debt of the judgment debtor if the Court has cause to believe that the failure or refusal to show cause is a deliberate attempt to evade a legal duty under the law, to disclose the true account of the judgment debtor in its custody. It is not the business of a Garnishee to undertake to play the role of an advocate for a judgment debtor by trying to
10
shield and protect the money of the judgment debtor. See Oceanic Bank Plc V Olusegun Oladepo & Anor (2012) LPELR-19670 (CA); CBN V Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors (2017) LPELR-43940 (SC). The only defences that may therefore be open to a Garnishee is that, either the judgment debtor has no such monies in its custody, or that the money if there is, is encumbranced by a lawful obligation on it in respect of which it has no choice but to obey. Where a Garnishee, such as in the instant case undertakes to challenge the validity of the judgment debt, I believe it has gone out of its way and thus exposes itself to attendant legal consequences.
Assuming that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to entertain the Garnishee proceeding is properly challenged, I have no doubt that on a proper interpretation of Section 251(1)(d) and Section 254(c) (1)-(6) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the National Industrial Court (the lower Court) is the proper Court vested with jurisdiction to entertain the action instituted by the Respondent/Judgement Creditor against the Judgment/Debtor (the Police Service Commission and Inspector
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General of Police). This is because this suit falls within the employer-employee relationship, and therefore falls within the purview of Section 254(c) (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) which provides:
254(c)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters relating to or connected to labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from work place, the condition of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pension, gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee, worker, political or public officer, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the Federation and matters incidental thereto.
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The limits of the jurisdiction of a Court are imposed by the statute, charter or commission under which the Court is constituted and may be extended or restricted by similar means. A Court cannot do more than this, it cannot confer on itself jurisdiction not granted it by statute. See Abubakar V Abubakar (2015) ALL FWLR (PT. 808) at page 693.
In determining whether or not a Court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine a matter, what is considered is the claims of the plaintiff as outlined in the plaintiffs statement of claim. This is indeed the law. See Abia State Independent Electoral Commission V Kanu (2013) 13 NWLR (PT.1370) 713 Paras D-E.
I am of the solid view that the cases of George V FRN (2011) ALL FWLR (PT.587) 664 and Obiuweubi V CBN (2011) ALL FWLR (PT.575) 208 are no longer applicable to the instant situation in view of the decision in the case of CBN V. Ubana & Ors 2016) LPELR-40366 (CA). Issue one is hereby firmly resolved against the Appellant.
ISSUE TWO
Whether by virtue of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap 56 LFN, 2004, the monies of the
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judgment debtor in the custody of the Appellant is in the custody of a public officer.
The contention between the Appellant and the Respondent is centered on whether the Appellant (Central Bank of Nigeria) is a public officer, and hence an appropriate officer for the purpose of the application of Section 84(1), (2) and 3(a) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
The submission of Appellants counsel is that the Central Bank of Nigeria is a public officer, and has received judicial interpretation in the case of CBN V Shipping Company Sara B. & Ors (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt.1419) at 154 Paras D-E. He also referred to Section 1(2) of the Central Bank Act, cap 14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, and submitted that the Appellant is an artificial person that falls into the definition of a public officer contemplated by Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Also relied on by Appellants counsel is the case of CBN V Hydro Air Property Ltd (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt.1434) at page 482, specifically at page 552, paragraph B-D. It was thus submitted that the Appellant being a public officer under whose custody or control
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the money sought to be attached by the proceedings of the trial Court to satisfy the judgment sum is, the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation ought to have been first obtained before the trial Court made the order Nisi dated the 5th day of October, 2016 as provided by Section 84(1) and (3) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
Contrarily, it is the contention of the Respondents counsel that the Central Bank of Nigeria is not a public officer. He drew his strength from the decision in the case of Purification Tech (Nig) Ltd V A-G Lagos State (2004)4 NWLR (Pt.879) 655, P.68, Paras G-H which decision is to the effect that the customer of a bank does not have control or custody of the monies standing in his credit in the account with his banker. That what the customer has is a contractual right to demand payment of such monies. He also referred to S.318(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) which refers the interpretation of the phrase public officer to the interpretation Act, Section 18 of which provides:
Public officer means a member of
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the public service of the Federation within the meaning of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 or of the public service of a State. Cases cited on the point by the Respondents counsel include, CBN V Njemanze (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt.1449) 276; FGN V Interstella Communications Ltd (2015)9 NWLR (Pt.1463) 1 at 37-38, Paras H-A; A-G Rivers State V A-G Bayelsa State (2012)7 SCNJ 70 AT 88 lines 8-25. It is further contended by the Respondents counsel that based both on the facts and the principle of stare decisis, the case of Central Bank of Nigeria V Hydro Air Property (supra) cannot assist the Appellant in the light of the decision in the case of A-G Rivers State V A-G Bayelsa State (supra). That while the facts of CBN V Hydro Air Property (supra) are not the same with the facts in the instant appeal, it is a Court of Appeal decision which is subordinate to the case of A-G Rivers State V A-G Bayelsa State (supra) which is a Supreme Court decision.
Learned Respondents counsel submitted that the Garnishee/Appellant is not disputing the fact that the judgment debtors maintain an account with it or that the
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account is not funded which is all that the law requires from them. Also relied on is the case of Guaranty Trust Bank Plc V Innoson (Nig) Ltd (2017) LPELR-42368 (SC) which is to the effect that a decision of a Court not appealed against is deemed to be acceptable to the parties thereto and binds all of them and their privies, including garnishees. Counsel submitted that the law frowns at the action of the Appellant who refused to be joined as a defendant in the suit at the lower Court only to make itself a judgment debtor in the appellate Court, where it has decided to play the role of an advocate in a garnishee proceedings. He relied on Oceanic Bank Plc V Michael Olusegun Oladipo & Anor (2012) LPELR-19670.
From the arguments proffered by both counsel, the issues have been pronounced upon by the appellate Court. It will therefore do us no good to decide the issue based on statutory provisions in disregard to the decisions of the Court.
The case of CBN V Hydro Air Property (supra) and the case of CBN V Njemanze (2015) 4 NWLR (supra) are conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal on the question whether or not the Central Bank of Nigeria is a
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public officer. In CBN V Hydro Air Property Ltd (supra) decided on 27/3/2014 by Enugu Division, the term public officers was defined to include officials of the Central Bank of Nigeria and in that premise, the Court held that the prior consent of the Attorney General under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act is necessary and mandatory before the judgment of a Court can be properly enforced against a State, and that the prior consent is still required even where the Attorney General is a party in the Suit.
In the case of FGN V Interstella Communications & Ors (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt.1463)1 at 37-38 Paras 37-38, Paras H-A, it was held thus:
While officers of the Central Bank of Nigeria are public officers, it is unacceptable to classify Central Bank of Nigeria as a public officer, because it acts as a banker to the Federal Government in respect of credit balances in the accounts of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
The Court also significantly held:
The relationship of a banker to its customer is contractual, hence there is no basis for treating government
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bank accounts differently. Thus, for the purpose of garnishee proceedings, the CBN acts as a banker to the Federal Government as encapsulated in Sections 2(e), 36 and 39 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act. That is why the Central Bank of Nigeria also acts as a banker to other banks as provided in Section 41 of the Central Bank Act (Purification Tech (Nig) Ltd V A-G Lagos State (2004)9 NWLR (Pt.879)665 referred to) P.38, Paras A-C.
The case of CBN V Njemanze & Ors (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt.1449) 276 was decided by Owerri Division of the Court of Appeal on 2nd July, 2014. Therein it was held at pages 287, Paras C-D, 287-288, Paras H-G thus: The term public officer relates to the holder of the office as reflected in Section 318(1) of the Constitution (as amended). Equally, Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act also referred to a public officer as a holder, officer or person holding a public office. In the circumstance officers of CBN are public officers but CBN is not a public officer (Sharika & Sons Ltd V Governor of Kaduna State (2013) LPELR-20379 referred to).
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At page 286, Paras A-G, of the report, it was held that the definition of public service of the Federation in Section 318(1) of the Constitution clearly excludes artificial persons. Clearly, the decision in CBN V Hydro Air Property Ltd (supra) cannot represent the current or extant position of the law when it comes to the question, whether CBN is a public officer or not, or the prior consent of the Attorney General of the Federation is required to enforce the judgment of a Court against a Federal Government Agency vide a garnishee proceedings against the Central Bank of Nigeria. Therefore, as the law now stands, by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A-G Rivers State V A-G Bayelsa State (supra) the Central Bank of Nigeria cannot be classified as a public officer. To my mind, this is in tandem with what I believe is the correct definition given to public officer in Section 18 of the Interpretation Act which, amongst other things defines public officer thus:
Public Officer means a member of the public service of the Federation within the
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meaning of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 or of the service of a State. It was thus held inter alia, in that case:
the National Boundary Commission is an agency of the Federal Government, but not such a public officer under the definition of the real term public officer as defined in the case of Ibrahim V J.S.C. (supra).
To close on the issue under consideration, I hold that the Central Bank of Nigeria is not a public officer within the meaning of the extant law, and therefore the prior consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation is not required to enforce the judgment of a Court against an agency of the Federal Government through a garnishee proceeding initiated against the Central Bank of Nigeria.
Issue two therefore is resolved against the Appellant. In consequence, this appeal is devoid of merit. Accordingly it is dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court is hereby affirmed.
Costs is assessed at N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira only) in favour of the Respondent.
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MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.: I agree.
OBIETONBARA O. DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.: I have read the Judgment of my learned brother, James Gambo Abundaga JCA and I agree.
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Appearances:
Abubakar Mustapha, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Muktar Musa, Esq. For Respondent(s)
Appearances
Abubakar Mustapha, Esq. For Appellant
AND
Muktar Musa, Esq. For Respondent
