No. 78-752
Argued: April 23, 1979Decided: June 26, 1979
Held:
Respondent failed to satisfy 1983’s threshold requirement that the plaintiff be deprived of a right “secured by the Constitutions and laws,” and hence had no claim cognizable under 1983. Pp. 142-147.
- (a) Absent an attack on the validity of the warrant under which he was arrested, respondent’s complaint is simply that, despite his protests of mistaken identity, he was detained in jail for three days. Whatever claim this situation might give rise to under state tort law, it gives rise to no claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While respondent was deprived of his liberty for three days, it was pursuant to a warrant conforming to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. His detention, therefore, did not amount to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Pp. 142-145.
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- (b) Respondent’s innocence of the charge contained in the warrant, while relevant to a tort claim of false imprisonment, is largely irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
- Given the requirements that an arrest be made only on probable cause and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, a sheriff executing a valid arrest warrant is not required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent. Nor is the official maintaining custody of the person named in the warrant required by the Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such a claim. Pp. 145-146.
- (c) The tort of false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official. P. 146.
575 F.2d 509, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 147. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 149. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 149.
A. W. SoRelle III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kerry Knorpp and John L. Owen.
Douglas R. Larson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. *
[ Footnote * ] Leon Friedman, Alan H. Levine, and Harold C. Hirshman filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Last Term, in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), we granted certiorari to consider the question whether negligent conduct can form the basis of an award of damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The constitutional violation alleged in Procunier was interference on the part of prison officials with a prisoner’s outgoing mail. The complaint alleged that the prison officials had acted with every conceivable state of mind, from “knowingly” and in “bad faith” to “negligently and inadvertently.” We granted certiorari, however, only on the question “[w]hether negligent failure to mail certain of [443 U.S. 137, 139] a prisoner’s outgoing letters states a cause of action under 1983.” 434 U.S., at 559 n. 6.
Following oral argument and briefing on the merits, the Court held that since the constitutional right allegedly violated had not been authoritatively declared at the time the prison officials acted, the officials were entitled, as a matter of law, to prevail on their claim of qualified immunity. Quoting from Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975), we observed: “Because [the prison officials] could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a constitutional right that had not yet been declared, [they] did not act with such disregard for the established law that their conduct `cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.'” 434 U.S., at 565 . It was thus unnecessary to reach the question on which certiorari had been granted.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit saw the focal issue as whether petitioner Baker, the sheriff of Potter County, Tex., had negligently failed to establish certain identification procedures which would have revealed that respondent was not the man wanted in connection with the drug charges on which he was arrested. Accordingly, it withheld decision until our opinion in Procunier was handed down. Finding no guidance in Procunier on the question whether an allegation of “simple negligence” states a claim for relief under 1983, the Court of Appeals proceeded to answer that question affirmatively, holding that respondent was entitled to have his 1983 claim presented to the jury even though the evidence supported no more than a finding of negligence on the part of Sheriff Baker. We granted certiorari. 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
Having been around this track once before in Procunier, supra, we have come to the conclusion that the question whether an allegation of simple negligence is sufficient to state a cause of action under 1983 is more elusive than it appears at first blush. It may well not be susceptible of a uniform [443 U.S. 137, 140] answer across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might be the subject of a 1983 action. In any event, before the relationship between the defendant’s state of mind and his liability under 1983 can be meaningfully explored, it is necessary to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which he is charged. For 1983 imposes civil liability only upon one
- “who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .”
The first inquiry in any 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws.” If there has been no such deprivation, the state of mind of the defendant is wholly immaterial. 1 We think that respondent has failed to satisfy this threshold requirement of 1983 and thus defer once again consideration of the question whether simple negligence can give rise to 1983 liability.
I
Leonard McCollan and respondent Linnie Carl McCollan are brothers. Leonard somehow procured a duplicate of Linnie’s driver’s license, identical to the original in every respect except that, as the Court of Appeals put it, “Leonard’s picture graced it instead of Linnie’s.” McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509, 511 (CA5 1978). In October 1972, Leonard, masquerading as Linnie, was arrested in Potter County on narcotics [443 U.S. 137, 141] charges. He was booked as Linnie Carl McCollan, signed various documents as Linnie Carl McCollan, and was released on bail as Linnie Carl McCollan. Leonard’s bondsman sought and received an order allowing him to surrender his principal and a warrant was issued for the arrest of “Linnie Carl McCollan.”
On December 26, 1972, Linnie was stopped in Dallas for running a red light. A routine warrant check revealed that Linnie Carl McCollan was wanted in Potter County, and respondent was taken into custody over his protests of mistaken identification. The Dallas Police Department contacted the Potter County Sheriff’s Department, compared the identifying information on respondent’s driver’s license with that contained in the Potter County arrest records, and understandably concluded that they had their man. On December 30, Potter County deputies took custody of respondent and placed him in the Potter County Jail in Amarillo. He remained there until January 2, 1973, when officials compared his appearance against a file photograph of the wanted man and, recognizing their error, released him.
Respondent brought this damages action “pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and . . . [] 1983.” App. 6. After each party had rested his case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas directed a verdict in favor of Sheriff Baker and his surety, Transamerica Insurance Co., without articulating its reasons. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Characterizing respondent’s cause of action as a “[] 1983 false imprisonment action,” the Court of Appeals determined that respondent had made out a prima facie case by showing (1) intent to confine, (2) acts resulting in confinement, and (3) consciousness of the victim of confinement or resulting harm. The question in the court’s view thus became whether Sheriff Baker was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which in turn depended on the reasonableness [443 U.S. 137, 142] of his failure to institute an identification procedure that would have disclosed the error. Noting that the error would have been discovered if Potter County officials had sent identifying material to Dallas or had immediately upon respondent’s arrival in Amarillo compared him with the file photograph and fingerprints of the wanted man, the Court of Appeals determined that a jury could reasonably conclude that the sheriff had behaved unreasonably in failing to institute such measures. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the District Court for a new trial.
II
Respondent’s claim is that his detention in the Potter County jail was wrongful. Under a tort-law analysis it may well have been. The question here, however, is whether his detention was unconstitutional. For, as the Court of Appeals recognized, a public official is liable under 1983 only “if he causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his constitutional rights.” 575 F.2d, at 512 (emphasis in original). Despite this recognition, the Court of Appeals analyzed respondent’s so-called “[] 1983 false imprisonment action” exclusively in terms of traditional tort-law concepts, relying heavily on the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Indeed, nowhere in its opinion does the Court of Appeals specifically identify the constitutional right allegedly infringed in this case. Because respondent’s claim and the Court of Appeals’ decision focus exclusively on respondent’s prolonged detention caused by petitioner’s failure to institute adequate identification procedures, the constitutional provision allegedly violated by petitioner’s action is presumably the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
By virtue of its “incorporation” into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty. Gerstein [443 U.S. 137, 143] v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The probable-cause determination “must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.” Id., at 125. Since an adversary hearing is not required, and since the probable-cause standard for pretrial detention is the same as that for arrest, a person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate on a showing of probable cause is not constitutionally entitled to a separate judicial determination that there is probable cause to detain him pending trial. 2
In this case, respondent was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and the Court of Appeals made no suggestion that respondent’s arrest was constitutionally deficient. Indeed, respondent makes clear that his 1983 claim was based solely on Sheriff Baker’s actions after respondent was incarcerated:
- “McCollan’s 1983 claim against the sheriff is not for the wrong name being placed in the warrant or the failure to discover and change same or even the initial arrest of the respondent, but rather for the intentional failure to investigate and determine that the wrong man was imprisoned.” Brief for Respondent 12.
For purposes of analysis, then, this case can be parsed with relative ease. Absent an attack on the validity of the warrant under which he was arrested, respondent’s complaint is [443 U.S. 137, 144] simply that despite his protests of mistaken identity, he was detained in the Potter County jail from December 30, when Potter County deputies retrieved him from Dallas, until January 2, when the validity of his protests was ascertained. Whatever claims this situation might give rise to under state tort law, we think it gives rise to no claim under the United States Constitution. Respondent was indeed deprived of his liberty for a period of days, but it was pursuant to a warrant conforming, for purposes of our decision, to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, one in respondent’s position could not be detained indefinitely in the face of repeated protests of innocence even though the warrant under which he was arrested and detained met the standards of the Fourth Amendment. For the Constitution likewise guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial, and invocation of the speedy trial right need not await indictment or other formal charge; arrest pursuant to probable cause is itself sufficient. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). 3 [443 U.S. 137, 145] We may even assume, arguendo, that, depending on what procedures the State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of “liberty . . . without due process of law.” But we are quite certain that a detention of three days over a New Year’s weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation.
Respondent’s innocence of the charge contained in the warrant, while relevant to a tort claim of false imprisonment in most if not all jurisdictions, is largely irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 4 The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted – indeed, for every suspect released. Nor are the manifold procedural protections afforded criminal defendants under the Bill of Rights “without limits.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977). “Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.” Ibid.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of liberty. It protects only against deprivations of liberty accomplished “without due process of law.” A reasonable division of functions between law enforcement officers, committing magistrates, and judicial officers – all of whom may be potential defendants in a 1983 action – is entirely consistent with “due process of law.” Given the requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the constitution [443 U.S. 137, 146] to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent. Nor is the official charged with maintaining custody of the accused named in the warrant required by the Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such a claim. The ultimate determination of such claims of innocence is placed in the hands of the judge and the jury. 5
III
The Court of Appeals closed its opinion with the following summary of its holding:
- “We are saying that the sheriff or arresting officer has a duty to exercise due diligence in making sure that the person arrested and detained is actually the person sought under the warrant and not merely someone of the same or a similar name. See Restatement (2d) Torts 125, comment (d) (1965).” 575 F.2d, at 513.
Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles. Just as “[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.
Having been deprived of no rights secured under the United States Constitution, respondent had no claim cognizable under [443 U.S. 137, 147] 1983. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is therefore
