No. 78-625
Argued: April 18, 1979Decided: June 11, 1979
Held:
Section 102 (2) (C) does not require federal agencies to prepare EIS’s to accompany appropriation requests. Pp. 355-365.
-
- (a) Appropriation requests, even those which are the result of an agency’s “painstaking review” of an ongoing program, are not “proposals for legislation” within the meaning of 102 (2) (C). NEPA makes no distinction between “proposals for legislation” that are the result of “painstaking review,” and those that are merely “routine”; and the interpretation of NEPA by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) under its current mandatory regulations which specify that “legislation” does not include appropriation requests, is entitled to
- substantial deference even though the regulations reverse CEQ’s interpretation under earlier advisory guidelines that were in effect at the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Moreover, CEQ’s current interpretation is consistent with the traditional distinction which Congress has drawn between “legislation” and “appropriation,” the rules of both Houses prohibiting “legislation” from being added to an appropriation bill. Pp. 356-361.
- (b) Nor do appropriation requests constitute “proposals for . . . major Federal actions” for purposes of 102 (2) (C). Appropriation requests do not “propose” federal actions at all, but instead fund actions already proposed. Thus, 102 (2) (C) is best interpreted as applying to those recommendations or reports that actually propose programmatic actions, rather than to those which merely suggest how such actions may be funded. Even if changes in agency programs occur because of budgetary decisions, an EIS at the appropriation stage would only be repetitive of the EIS that must accompany any proposed changes in the agency’s programs that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. Pp. 361-364.
189 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 581 F.2d 895, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Assistant Attorney General Harmon argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Sagalkin, Deputy Solicitor General Barnett, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Raymond N. Zagone, and Dirk D. Snel.
James Hillson Cohen argued the cause and filed briefs for respondents. *
[ Footnote * ] Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robert K. Best, and Raymond M. Momboisse filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Roberts B. Owen and Charles H. Montange for the National Wildlife Federation et al.; and by Mitchell Rogovin and David R. Boyd for the Wilderness Society.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. [442 U.S. 347, 349] 853, 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2) (C), requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements (EIS’s) to accompany appropriation requests. We hold that it does not.
I
NEPA sets forth its purposes in bold strokes:
-
- “The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation . . . .” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 4321.
Congress recognized, however, that these desired goals could [442 U.S. 347, 350] be incorporated into the everyday functioning of the Federal Government only with great difficulty. See S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 19 (1969). NEPA therefore contains “action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the policies [of the Act] are implemented.” Ibid. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976). Section 102 (2) (C) of the Act sets out one of these procedures:
- “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall –
- . . . . .
- “(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on –
- “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
- “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
- “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
- “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
- “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2) (C) (emphasis supplied).
The thrust of 102 (2) (C) is thus that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decision-making. The “detailed statement” it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions. 2 If [442 U.S. 347, 351] environmental concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency planning, the “action-forcing” characteristics of 102 (2) (C) would be lost. “In the past, environmental factors have frequently been ignored and omitted from consideration in the early stages of planning . . . . As a result, unless the results of planning are radically revised at the policy level – and this often means the Congress – environmental enhancement opportunities may be foregone and unnecessary degradation incurred.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, supra, at 20. For this reason the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) require federal agencies to “integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values . . . .” 43 Fed. Reg. 55992 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR 1501.2). 3 [442 U.S. 347, 352]
In 1974, respondents, three organizations with interests in the preservation of the environment, 4 brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that 102 (2) (C) requires federal agencies to prepare EIS’s 5 to accompany their appropriation requests. Respondents named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and alleged that proposed curtailments in the budget of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS), 80 Stat. 927, 16 U.S.C. 668dd, would “cut back significantly the operations, maintenance, and staffing of units within the System.” 6 Complaint § 17. The System is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, and consists of more than 350 refuges encompassing more than 30 million acres in 49 States. The primary purpose of the NWRS is to provide a national program “for the restoration, preservation, development and management of wildlife and wildlands habitat; for the protection and preservation of endangered or threatened species and their habitat; and for the management of wildlife and wildlands to obtain the maximum benefits from these resources.” 50 CFR 25.11 (b) [442 U.S. 347, 353] (1978). 7 Respondents alleged that the proposed budget curtailments would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, 8 and hence should have been accompanied by an EIS prepared both by the Fish and Wildlife Service and by OMB. 9
The District Court agreed with respondents’ contentions. Relying on provisions of the then applicable CEQ guidelines, 10 [442 U.S. 347, 354] and on the Department of the Interior’s Manual, 11 the District Court held that “appropriation requests are `proposals for legislation’ within the meaning of NEPA,” and also that “annual proposals for financing the Refuge System are major Federal actions which clearly have a significant effect on the environment.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188, 1189 (1975). The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and provided declaratory and injunctive relief. It stated that the Department of the Interior and OMB were required “to prepare, consider, and disseminate environmental impact statements on annual proposals for financing the National Wildlife Refuge System.” 12 App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit modified the holding of the District Court. The Court of Appeals was apprehensive because “[a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 125, 581 F.2d 895, 903 (1978). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that 102 (2) (C) required [442 U.S. 347, 355] the preparation of an EIS only when an appropriation request accompanies “a `proposal’ for taking new action which significantly changes the status quo,” or when “the request for budget approval and appropriations is one that ushers in a considered programmatic course following a programmatic review.” 189 U.S. App. D.C., at 125, 581 F.2d, at 903. Section 102 (2) (C) would thus have no application to “a routine request for budget approval and appropriations for continuance and management of an ongoing program.” 189 U.S. App. D.C., at 125, 581 F.2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals held, however, that there was no need for injunctive relief because the Fish and Wildlife Service had completed during the pendency of the appeal a “Programmatic EIS” that adequately evaluated the environmental consequences for the NWRS of various budgetary alternatives. 13 Id., at 126, 581 F.2d, at 904. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976). 14
We granted certiorari, 439 U.S. 1065 (1979), and we now reverse.
II
NEPA requires EIS’s to be included in recommendations or reports on both “proposals for legislation . . . significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” and “proposals for . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2) (C). See CEQ regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 56001 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR 1506.8 (a)). Petitioners argue, however, that the requirements of 102 (2) (C) have no application to the budget process. The contrary holding of the [442 U.S. 347, 356] Court of Appeals rests on two alternative interpretations of 102 (2) (C). The first is that appropriation requests which are the result of “an agency’s painstaking review of an ongoing program,” 189 U.S. App. D.C., at 125, 581 F.2d, at 903, are “proposals for legislation” within the meaning of 102 (2) (C). The second is that appropriation requests which are the reflection of “new” agency initiatives constituting “major Federal actions” under NEPA, are themselves “proposals for . . . major Federal actions” for purposes of 102 (2) (C). We hold that neither interpretation is correct.
A
We note initially that NEPA makes no distinction between “proposals for legislation” that are the result of “painstaking review,” and those that are merely “routine.” When Congress has thus spoken “in the plainest of words,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978), we will ordinarily decline to fracture the clear language of a statute, even for the purpose of fashioning from the resulting fragments a rule that “accords with `common sense and the public weal.'” Id., at 195. Therefore, either all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation,” or none does.
There is no direct evidence in the legislative history of NEPA that enlightens whether Congress intended the phrase “proposals for legislation” to include requests for appropriations. At the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, however, CEQ guidelines provided that 102 (2) (C) applied to “[r]ecommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR 1500.5 (a) (1) (1977). 15 At that time CEQ’s guidelines were advisory [442 U.S. 347, 357] in nature, and were for the purpose of assisting federal agencies in complying with NEPA. 1500.1 (a).
In 1977, however, President Carter, in order to create a single set of uniform, mandatory regulations, ordered CEQ, “after consultation with affected agencies,” to “[i]ssue regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions” of NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 124 (1978). The President ordered the heads of federal agencies to “comply with the regulations issued by the Council . . . .” Ibid. CEQ has since issued these regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-56007 (1978), 16 and they reverse CEQ’s prior interpretation of 102 (2) (C). The regulations provide specifically that “`[l]egislation’ includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress . . . but does not include requests for appropriations.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR 1508.17). (Emphasis supplied.) CEQ explained this reversal by noting that, on the basis of “traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, considerations of timing and confidentiality, and other factors, . . . the Council in its experience found that preparation of EISs is ill-suited to the budget preparation process.” 17 43 Fed. Reg., at 55989. [442 U.S. 347, 358]
CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309 -1310 (1974) (Douglas, J., in chambers). The Council was created by NEPA, and charged in that statute with the responsibility “to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth in . . . this Act . . ., and to make recommendations to the President with respect thereto.” 83 Stat. 855, 42 U.S.C. 4344 (3).
It is true that in the past we have been somewhat less inclined to defer to “administrative guidelines” when they have “conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency.” General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976). But CEQ’s reversal of interpretation occurred during the detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the President, of transforming advisory guidelines into mandatory regulations applicable to all federal agencies. See American Trucking Assns. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967). A mandatory requirement that every federal agency submit EIS’s with its appropriation requests raises wholly different and more serious issues “of fair and prudent administration,” ibid., than does nonbinding advice. This is particularly true in light of the Court of Appeals’ correct observation that “[a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U.S. App. D.C., at 125, 581 F.2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals accurately noted that such an interpretation of NEPA would be a “reductio ad absurdum . . . . It would be absurd to require an EIS on every decision on the management of federal land, such as fluctuation in the number of forest fire spotters.” Id., at 124, 581 F.2d, at 902. Even respondents do not now contend that NEPA should be construed so [442 U.S. 347, 359] that all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation.” Brief for Respondents 13 n. 6, 55-61.
CEQ’s interpretation of the phrase “proposals for legislation” is consistent with the traditional distinction which Congress has drawn between “legislation” and “appropriation.” 18 The rules of both Houses “prohibit `legislation’ [442 U.S. 347, 360] from being added to an appropriation bill.” L. Fisher, Budget Concepts and Terminology: The Appropriations Phase, in 1 Studies in Taxation, Public Finance and Related Subjects – A Compendium 437 (Fund for Public Policy Research 1977). See Standing Rules of the United States Senate, Rule 16 (4) (“No amendment which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill . . .”); Rules of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., [442 U.S. 347, 361] Rule XXI (2) (1979); 19 7 C. Cannon, Precedents of the House of Representatives 1172, 1410, 1443, 1445, 1448, 1459, 1463, 1470, 1472 (1936). The distinction is maintained “to assure that program and financial matters are considered independently of one another. This division of labor is intended to enable the Appropriations Committees to concentrate on financial issues and to prevent them from trespassing on substantive legislation.” House Budget Committee, Congressional Control of Expenditures 19 (Comm. Print 1977). House and Senate rules thus require a “previous choice of policy . . . before any item of appropriations might be included in a general appropriations bill.” United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 164 n. 5 (1953). Since appropriations therefore “have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S., at 190 , and since the “action-forcing” provisions of NEPA are directed precisely at the processes of “planning and . . . decisionmaking,” 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2) (A), which are associated with underlying legislation, we conclude that the distinction made by CEQ’s regulations is correct and that “proposals for legislation” do not include appropriation requests.
B
The Court of Appeals’ alternative interpretation of NEPA is that appropriation requests constitute “proposals for . . . major Federal actions.” 20 But this interpretation distorts the [442 U.S. 347, 362] language of the Act, since appropriation requests do not “propose” federal actions at all; they instead fund actions already proposed. Section 102 (2) (C) is thus best interpreted as applying to those recommendations or reports that actually propose programmatic actions, rather than to those which merely suggest how such actions may be funded. Any other result would create unnecessary redundancy. For example, if the mere funding of otherwise unaltered agency programs were construed to constitute major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, the resulting EIS’s would merely recapitulate the EIS’s that should have accompanied the initial proposals of the programs. And if an agency program were to be expanded or revised in a manner that constituted major federal action [442 U.S. 347, 363] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, 21 an EIS would have been required to accompany the underlying programmatic decision. 22 An additional EIS at the appropriation stage would add nothing.
Even if changes in agency programs occur because of budgetary decisions, an EIS at the appropriation stage would only be repetitive. For example, respondents allege in their complaint that OMB required the Fish and Wildlife Service to decrease its appropriation request for the NWRS, and that this decrease would alter the operation of the NWRS in a manner that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. See n. 9, supra. But since the Fish and Wildlife Service could respond to OMB’s budgetary curtailments in a variety of ways, see United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976), it is impossible to predict whether or how any particular budget cut will in fact significantly affect the quality of the human environment. OMB’s determination to cut the Service’s budget is not a programmatic proposal, and therefore requiring OMB to include an EIS in its budgetary cuts would be premature. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975). And since an EIS must be prepared if any of the revisions the Fish and Wildlife Service proposes in its ongoing programs in response to OMB’s budget cuts would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, requiring the Fish and Wildlife Service to include an EIS with its revised appropriation request would merely be redundant. [442 U.S. 347, 364] Moreover, this redundancy would have the deleterious effect of circumventing and eliminating the careful distinction Congress has maintained between appropriation and legislation. It would flood House and Senate Appropriations Committees with EIS’s focused on the policy issues raised by underlying authorization legislation, 23 thereby dismantling the “division of labor” so deliberately created by congressional rules.
C
We conclude therefore, for the reasons given above, that appropriation requests constitute neither “proposals for legislation” [442 U.S. 347, 365] nor “proposals for . . . major Federal actions,” and that therefore the procedural requirements of 102 (2) (C) have no application to such requests. 24 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
