No. 75-1704
Argued: March 1, 1977Decided: April 4, 1977
- 1. Both the plain language of 1331 (c) and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended to deny benefits to those with pre-World War II service who did not also serve in wartime. Pp. 636-639.
- 2. Congress authorized retirement pay as an inducement to continued service in order to maintain a cadre of trained soldiers for use on active duty should the need arise; Congress had the constitutional power to decide not to offer the inducement to reservists less likely to perform such duty than others. Pp. 639-640.
409 F. Supp. 831, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except REHNQUIST, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Stephen L. Urbanczyk argued the cause for appellant pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and William Kanter.
David Goldfarb argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kalman Finkel, Helaine Barnett, Joan Mangones, and John E. Kirklin. *
[ Footnote * ] Penrose Lucas Albright filed a brief for the United States Merchant Marine Academy Alumni Assn. as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
After World War II Congress authorized retirement pay for nonregular military personnel with at least 20 years of service in the Reserves or National Guard. 1 However, under 10 U.S.C. 1331 (c), those who had been in the Reserves before World War II are not eligible for benefits unless they performed active duty during wartime. 2 Appellee had no such active duty. 3 He contends that he may not be denied benefits for which he is otherwise eligible simply because he had prewar service in the Guard. In the District Court he argued that the statute violates the equal protection principle inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In this Court he also argues that the statute should be construed as [430 U.S. 634, 636] merely providing that his years of prewar service must be ignored for the purpose of determining his eligibility. We reject both arguments.
The case is here on direct appeal from a summary judgment entered by a three-judge District Court sitting in the Eastern District of New York. 4 That court ordered the Secretary of the Army to pay retirement benefits to appellee and to place the members of the class he represents on the retirement rolls. 5 409 F. Supp. 831 (1976). Because the three-judge court was properly convened, 6 we have jurisdiction even though the decision of the District Court can be read as resting on its interpretation of the statute rather than squarely on constitutional grounds. 7
Section 1331 (c) plainly discriminates between persons who [430 U.S. 634, 637] were in the Reserves before August 16, 1945, and those who performed their first service after that date. The statute says that the members of the former group are not “eligible for retired pay” unless they performed active duty during specified dates when the country was engaged in hostilities.
Appellee acknowledges that the statute creates two distinct classes of reservists. He contends, however, that the members of his class are not ineligible for benefits, but merely are prevented from counting pre-World War II service as part of the 20 years of “satisfactory service” needed to qualify. 8 The argument is foreclosed by the plain language of the statute. Moreover, the legislative history reveals a congressional purpose inconsistent with appellee’s interpretation.
Section 1331 (c) is a description of persons who are not eligible for retirement pay. 9 It does not describe periods of service which may or may not be counted toward eligibility. Its text plainly disqualifies the persons it describes. Furthermore, 1331 (a), which defines the conditions of eligibility for retirement pay, states that a person meeting these conditions is entitled to retirement pay “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c).” It is difficult to believe that language this clear could be the product of a drafting error. We are persuaded that Congress meant what it so plainly said.
An explanation for excluding certain persons from benefits – as opposed to excluding part of their service – was given by [430 U.S. 634, 638] the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the hearings on the bill. He pointed out that the provision would “make certain that no one who drops out of the Reserves to avoid service in the war is qualified under the bill. This is concurred in by the services and the Reserves.” 10 The Senate Committee had been advised by the Army Chief of Staff that: “The purpose of reservists was to fight in the war. If he did not fight in the wars we did have, we feel he should not qualify.” 11
These comments describe a purpose to disqualify certain persons rather than merely a purpose to treat a part of their service as unsatisfactory.
In 1958 Congress amended 1331 (c) to remove the disqualification for persons who served in the Korean conflict. 12 The history of this amendment reflects an intent to make retirement pay available for otherwise “ineligible persons” rather than a desire to classify periods of service as satisfactory. 13 The statutory language and its legislative history [430 U.S. 634, 639] convincingly demonstrate that Congress made a deliberate decision to deny retirement pay to members of appellee’s class.
Appellee argues that the Constitution requires equal treatment for all reservists with 20 years of satisfactory service and that it is totally irrational to disqualify some of them simply because they had additional years of service before August 16, 1945. We disagree.
The retirement pay program was intended to provide an inducement to qualified personnel to remain active in the Reserves in order to maintain a cadre of trained soldiers for use in active duty if the need should arise. 14 Such an inducement would be unlikely to achieve its intended purpose if offered to persons who had dropped out of the Reserves to avoid service during the war. 15 Moreover, the decision not [430 U.S. 634, 640] to offer the inducement to reservists whose failure to serve was involuntary, reflects a predictive judgment that a past obstacle to active service may have a continuing effect on future availability.
When Congress enacted the statute in 1948, it did not penalize the members of appellee’s class; it merely made a judgment that they were somewhat less desirable prospects for future active duty than others, and therefore decided not to offer them a special inducement to remain in the Reserves. The statutory exclusion is unquestionably the product of a deliberate and rational choice which Congress had the constitutional power to make.
