No. 79-1943
Argued: March 4, 1981Decided: May 18, 1981
Held:
- 1. Congress contemplated and approved the kind of pension provisions challenged here. Pp. 509-521.
-
- (a) Pension plan provisions for offsets based on workers’ compensation awards do not contravene ERISA’s nonforfeiture provisions. While 1053 (a) prohibits forfeitures of vested rights, with specified exceptions that do not include workers’ compensation offsets, nevertheless other provisions make it clear that ERISA leaves to the private parties creating the pension plan the determination of the content or amount of benefits that, once vested, cannot be forfeited. The statutory definition of “nonforfeitable” pension benefits, 29 U.S.C. 1002 (19), assures that an employee’s claim to the protected benefit is legally enforceable, but it does not guarantee a particular amount or a method for calculating the benefit. Cf. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit
- Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359 . It is particularly pertinent that Congress did not prohibit “integration,” a calculation practice under which benefit levels are determined by combining pension funds with other public income streams available to the retired employee. Rather, Congress accepted the practice by expressly preserving the option of pension fund integration with benefits available under both the Social Security Act and the Railroad Retirement Act. Offsets against pension benefits for workers’ compensation awards work much like the integration of pension benefits with Social Security or Railroad Retirement payments, and thus the nonforfeiture provision of 1053 (a) has no more applicability to the former kind of integration than it does to the latter. Pp. 510-517.
- (b) Although neither ERISA nor its legislative history mentions integration with workers’ compensation, ERISA does not forbid the Treasury Regulation permitting reductions of pension benefits based on awards under state workers’ compensation laws, or Internal Revenue Service rulings to the same effect. There is no merit in the argument that integration of pension funds with workers’ compensation awards, which are based on work-related injuries, lacks the rationale behind ERISA’s permission of integration of pension funds with Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments, which supply payments for wages lost due to retirement. Both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement Acts also provide payments for disability, and ERISA permits pension integration with such benefits as well as with benefits for wages lost due to retirement. Moreover, when it enacted ERISA, Congress knew of the IRS rulings permitting integration with workers’ compensation benefits and left them in effect. Pp. 517-521.
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- 2. The New Jersey statute in question is pre-empted by federal law insofar as it eliminates a method for calculating pension benefits under plans governed by ERISA. The provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1144 (a), stating that the Act’s provisions shall supersede any state laws that “relate to any [covered] employee benefit plan,” demonstrates that Congress meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern. Regardless of whether the purpose of the New Jersey statute might have been to protect the employee’s right to workers’ compensation disability benefits rather than to regulate pension plans, the statute “relate[s] to pension plans” governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension benefits – integration – that is permitted by federal law, and the state provision thus is an impermissible intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme. It is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly, through a workers’ compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called “pension
- regulation,” since ERISA makes clear that even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern. Moreover, where, as here, pension plans emerge from collective bargaining, the additional federal interest in precluding state interference in labor-management negotiations calls for pre-emption of state efforts to regulate pension terms. Pp. 521-526.
616 F.2d 1238, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BRENNAN, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases.
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 80-193, Buczynski et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al., on certiorari to the same court.
Theodore Sachs argued the cause for appellants in No. 79-1943. With him on the briefs were Michael S. Scarola and I. Mark Steckloff. Marc C. Gettis argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in No. 80-193.
Warren John Casey argued the cause for appellees in No. 79-1943. With him on the brief was Sebastian J. Fortunato. Laurence Reich argued the cause for respondent in No. 80-193. With him on the brief were Otis M. Smith, Eugene L. Hartwig, and David M. Davis. John J. Degan, Attorney General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael S. Bokar, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as appellee in No. 79-1943, under this Court’s Rule 10.4, and as respondent in No. 80-193, under this Court’s Rule 19.6.Fn
Fn [451 U.S. 504, 506] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Alfred Miller for the American Association of Retired Persons et al.; by Gill Deford and Neal S. Dudovitz for the Gray Panthers; and by Leonard S. Zubrensky and Theodore Sachs for Merl D. Stong et al.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Murray, Stuart A. Smith, William A. Friedlander, and Michael J. Roach, for the United States; by Richard T. Wentley and Patrick W. Ritchey for Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.; by Stanley T. Kaleczyc for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by George J. Pantos for the ERISA Industry Committee; and by Charles R. Volk and William W. Scott, Jr., for the National Steel Corp. [451 U.S. 504, 507]
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Some private pension plans reduce a retiree’s pension benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation awards received subsequent to retirement. In these cases we consider whether two such offset provisions are lawful under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), and whether they may be prohibited by state law.
I
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and General Motors Corp. maintain employee pension plans that are subject to federal regulation under ERISA. Both plans provide that an employee’s retirement benefits shall be reduced, or offset, by an amount equal to workers’ compensation awards for which the individual is eligible. 1 In 1977, the New Jersey Legislature [451 U.S. 504, 508] amended its Workers’ Compensation Act to expressly prohibit such offsets. The amendment states that “[t]he right of compensation granted by this chapter may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees’ retirement pension benefits or payments.” N. J. Stat. Ann. 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980-1981) (as amended by 1977 N. J. Laws, ch. 156).
Alleging violations of this provision of state law, two suits were initiated in New Jersey state court. The plaintiffs in both suits were retired employees who had obtained workers’ compensation awards subject to offsets against their retirement benefits under their pension plans. 2 The defendant companies independently removed the suits to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. There, both District Court Judges ruled that the pension offset provisions were invalid under New Jersey law, and concluded that Congress had not intended ERISA to pre-empt state laws of this sort. The District Court Judges also held that the offsets were prohibited by 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1053 (a). This section prohibits forfeitures of vested pension rights except under four specific conditions inapplicable to these cases. 3 The judges concluded that offsets based on workers’ compensation awards would be forbidden forfeitures, [451 U.S. 504, 509] and struck down a contrary federal Treasury Regulation authorizing such offsets. 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit consolidated the appeals from these two decisions and reversed. 616 F.2d 1238 (1980). It rejected the District Court Judges’ view that the offset provisions caused a forfeiture of vested pension rights forbidden by 1053. Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned, such offsets merely reduce pension benefits in a fashion expressly approved by ERISA for employees receiving Social Security benefits. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found no conflict between ERISA and the Treasury Regulation approving reductions based on workers’ compensation awards and ERISA. Finally, the court concluded that the New Jersey statute forbidding offsets of pension benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation awards could not withstand ERISA’s general pre-emption provision, 29 U.S.C. 1144 (a). We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal taken by the former employees of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and granted certiorari on the petition of former employees of General Motors Corp. 449 U.S. 949 and 950 (1980). For convenience, we refer to the former employees in both cases as retirees. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
Retirees claim that the workers’ compensation offset provisions of their pension plans contravene ERISA’s nonforfeiture provisions and that the Treasury Regulation to the contrary is inconsistent with the Act. Both claims require examination of the relevant sections of ERISA. [451 U.S. 504, 510]
A
As we recently observed, ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute,” which Congress adopted after careful study of private retirement pension plans. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980). In Nachman, we observed that Congress through ERISA wanted to ensure that “if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement – and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit – . . . he actually receives it.” Id., at 375. 5 For this reason, the concepts of vested rights and nonforfeitable rights are critical to the ERISA scheme. See id., at 370, 378. ERISA prescribes vesting and accrual schedules, assuring that employees obtain rights to at least portions of their normal pension benefits even if they leave their positions prior to retirement. 6 Most critically, ERISA establishes that “[e]ach pension plan shall provide that an employee’s right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable [451 U.S. 504, 511] upon the attainment of normal retirement age.” 29 U.S.C. 1053 (a). 7
Retirees rely on this sweeping assurance that pension rights become nonforfeitable in claiming that offsetting those benefits with workers’ compensation awards violates ERISA. Retirees argue first that no vested benefits may be forfeited except as expressly provided in 1053. Second, retirees assert that offsets based on workers’ compensation fall into none of those express exceptions. Both claims are correct; 1053 (a) prohibits forfeitures of vested rights except as expressly provided in 1053 (a) (3), and the challenged workers’ compensation offsets are not among those permitted in that section. 8
Despite this facial accuracy, retirees’ argument overlooks a threshold issue: what defines the content of the benefit that, once vested, cannot be forfeited? ERISA leaves this question largely to the private parties creating the plan. That the private parties, not the Government, control the level of benefits is clear from the statutory language defining nonforfeitable rights as well as from other portions of ERISA. ERISA defines a “nonforfeitable” pension benefit or right as “a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant’s service, which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan.” [451 U.S. 504, 512] 29 U.S.C. 1002 (19). In construing this definition last Term, we observed:
- “[T]he term `forfeiture’ normally connotes a total loss in consequence of some event rather than a limit on the value of a person’s rights. Each of the examples of a plan provision that is expressly described as not causing a forfeiture listed in [ 1053 (a) (3)] describes an event – such as death or temporary re-employment – that might otherwise be construed as causing a forfeiture of the entire benefit. It is therefore surely consistent with the statutory definition of “nonforfeitable” to view it as describing the quality of the participant’s right to a pension rather than a limit on the amount he may collect.” Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S., at 372 -373.
Similarly, the statutory definition of “nonforfeitable” assures that an employee’s claim to the protected benefit is legally enforceable, but it does not guarantee a particular amount or a method for calculating the benefit. As we explained last Term, “it is the claim to the benefit, rather than the benefit itself, that must be `unconditional’ and `legally enforceable against the plan.'” Id., at 371.
Rather than imposing mandatory pension levels or methods for calculating benefits, Congress in ERISA set outer bounds on permissible accrual practices, 29 U.S.C. 1054 (b) (1), and specified three alternative schedules for the vesting of pension rights, 29 U.S.C. 1053 (a) (2). In so doing, Congress limited the variation permitted in accrual rates applicable across the entire period of an employee’s participation in the pension plan. 9 And Congress disapproved [451 U.S. 504, 513] pension practices unduly delaying an employee’s acquisition of a right to enforce payment of the portion of benefits already accrued, without further employment. 10 These provisions together assure at minimum a legally enforceable claim to 100% of the pension benefits created by a covered plan for those employees who have completed 15 years of service and for those employees aged 45 or older who have completed 10 years of service. 11 Other than these restrictions, ERISA permits the total benefit levels and formulas for determining their accrual before completion of 15 years of service to vary [451 U.S. 504, 514] from plan to plan. See 29 U.S.C. 1002 (22), (23) (benefits defined merely as those “under the plan”).
It is particularly pertinent for our purposes that Congress did not prohibit “integration,” a calculation practice under which benefit levels are determined by combining pension funds with other income streams available to the retired employees. Through integration, each income stream contributes for calculation purposes to the total benefit pool to be distributed to all the retired employees, even if the nonpension funds are available only to a subgroup of the employees. The pension funds are thus integrated with the funds from other income maintenance programs, such as Social Security, and the pension benefit level is determined on the basis of the entire pool of funds. Under this practice, an individual employee’s eligibility for Social Security would advantage all participants in his private pension plan, for the addition of his anticipated Social Security payments to the total benefit pool would permit a higher average pension payout for each participant. The employees as a group profit from that higher pension level, although an individual employee may reach that level by a combination of payments from the pension fund and payments from the other income maintenance source. In addition, integration allows the employer to attain the selected pension level by drawing on the other resources, which, like Social Security, also depend on employer contributions.
Following its extensive study of private pension plans before the adoption of ERISA, Congress expressly preserved the option of pension fund integration with benefits available under both the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), and the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. 231 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III); 29 U.S.C. 1054 (b) (1) (B) (iv), 1054 (b) (1) (C), 1054 (b) (1) (G). Congress was well aware that pooling of nonpension retirement benefits and pension funds would limit [451 U.S. 504, 515] the total income maintenance payments received by individual employees and reduce the cost of pension plans to employers. Indeed, in considering this integration option, the House Ways and Means Committee expressly acknowledged the tension between the primary goal of benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs. The Committee Report noted that the proposed bill would
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- “not affect the ability of plans to use the integration procedures to reduce the benefits that they pay to individuals who are currently covered when social security benefits are liberalized. Your committee, however, believes that such practices raise important issues. On the one hand, the objective of the Congress in increasing social security benefits might be considered to be frustrated to the extent that individuals with low and moderate incomes have their private retirement benefits reduced as a result of the integration procedures. On the other hand, your committee is very much aware that many present plans are fully or partly integrated and that elimination of the integration procedures could substantially increase the cost of financing private plans. Employees, as a whole, might be injured rather than aided if such cost increases resulted in slowing down the growth or perhaps even eliminat[ing] private retirement plans.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, p. 69 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare) 3189 (1976) (Leg. Hist.).
The Committee called for further study of the problem and recommended that Congress impose a restriction on integration of pension benefits with Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments. Congress adopted this recommendation and forbade any reductions in pension payments based on increases in Social Security or Railroad Retirement benefits authorized after ERISA took effect. 29 U.S.C. 1056 (b). See 29 U.S.C. 1054 (b)(1)(B)(iv), 1054 (b)(1)(C); H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 69, 2 Leg. Hist. 3189. See also 26 U.S.C. 401 (a)(15).
In setting this limitation on integration with Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits, Congress acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it. Moreover, in permitting integration at least with these federal benefits, Congress did not find it necessary to add an exemption for this purpose to its stringent nonforfeiture protections in 29 U.S.C. 1053 (a). Under these circumstances, we are unpersuaded by retirees’ claim that the nonforfeiture provisions by their own force prohibit any offset of pension benefits by workers’ compensation awards. Such offsets work much like the integration of pension benefits with Social Security or Railroad Retirement payments. The individual employee remains entitled to the established pension level, but the payments received from the pension fund are reduced by the amount received through workers’ compensation. The nonforfeiture provision of 1053 (a) has no more applicability to this kind of integration than it does to [451 U.S. 504, 517] the analogous reduction permitted for Social Security or Railroad Retirement payments. Indeed, the same congressional purpose – promoting a system of private pensions by giving employers avenues for cutting the cost of their pension obligations – underlies all such offset possibilities.
Nonetheless, ERISA does not mention integration with workers’ compensation, and the legislative history is equally silent on this point. An argument could be advanced that Congress approved integration of pension funds only with the federal benefits expressly mentioned in the Act. A current regulation issued by the Internal Revenue Service, however, goes further, and permits integration with other benefits provided by federal or state law. We now must consider whether this regulation is itself consistent with ERISA.
B
Codified at 26 CFR 1.411 (a)-(4)(a) (1980), the Treasury Regulation provides that “nonforfeitable rights are not considered to be forfeitable by reason of the fact that they may be reduced to take into account benefits which are provided under the Social Security Act or under any other Federal or State law and which are taken into account in determining plan benefits.” The Regulation interprets 26 U.S.C. 411, the section of the Internal Revenue Code which replicates for IRS purposes ERISA’s nonforfeiture provision, 29 U.S.C. 1053 (a). 13 The Regulation plainly encompasses [451 U.S. 504, 518] awards under state workers’ compensation laws. In addition, in Revenue Rulings issued prior to ERISA, the IRS expressly had approved reductions in pension benefits corresponding to workers’ compensation awards. See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4 (j), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157. 14
Retirees contend that the Treasury Regulation and IRS rulings to this effect contravene ERISA. They object first that ERISA’s approval of integration was limited to Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments. This objection is precluded by our conclusion that reduction of pension benefits based on the integration procedure are not per se prohibited by 1053 (a), for the level of pension benefits is not prescribed by ERISA. Retirees’ only remaining objection is that workers’ compensation awards are so different in kind from Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments that their integration could not be authorized under the same rubric.
Developing this argument, retirees claim that workers’ compensation provides payments for work-related injuries, while Social Security and Railroad Retirement supply payments solely for wages lost due to retirement. Because of this distinction, retirees conclude that integration of pension funds with workers’ compensation awards lacks the rationale [451 U.S. 504, 519] behind integration of pension funds with Social Security and Railroad Retirement. Retirees’ claim presumes that ERISA permits integration with Social Security or Railroad Retirement only where there is an identity between the purposes of pension payments and the purposes of the other integrated benefits. But not even the funds that the Congress clearly has approved for integration purposes share the identity of purpose ascribed to them by petitioners. Both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement Acts provide payments for disability as well as for wages lost due to retirement, and ERISA permits pension integration without distinguishing these different kinds of benefits.
Furthermore, when it enacted ERISA, Congress knew of the IRS rulings permitting integration and left them in effect. 15 These rulings do not draw the line between permissible [451 U.S. 504, 520] and impermissible integration where retirees would prefer them to, and instead they include workers’ compensation offsets within the ambit of permissible integration. The IRS rulings base their allowance of pension payment integration on three factors: the employer must contribute to the other benefit funds, these other funds must be designed for general public use, and the benefits they supply must correspond to benefits available under the pension plan. The IRS employed these considerations in approving integration with workers’ compensation benefits. E. g., Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4 (j), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157. In contrast, the IRS has disallowed offsets of pension benefits with damages recovered by an employee through a common-law action against the employer. Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4 (j) (4), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157-158. 16 The IRS also has not permitted [451 U.S. 504, 521] integration with reimbursement for medical expenses or with fixed sums made for bodily impairment because such payments do not match up with any benefits available under a pension plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. Rev. Rul. 78-178, 1978-1 Cum. Bull. 118. 17 Similarly, the IRS has disapproved integration with unemployment compensation, for, as payment for temporary layoffs, it too is a kind of benefit not comparable to any permitted in a qualified pension plan. Id., at 117-118.
Without speaking directly of its own rationale, Congress embraced such IRS rulings. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 277 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4544 (approving existing antidiscrimination rules). Congress thereby permitted integration along the lines already approved by the IRS, which had specifically allowed pension benefit offsets based on workers’ compensation. Our judicial function is not to second-guess the policy decisions of the legislature, no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales.
As a final argument, retirees claim that we should defer to the policy decisions of the state legislature. To this claim we now turn.
III
The New Jersey Legislature attempted to outlaw the offset clauses by providing that “[t]he right of compensation granted by [the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act] may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees’ retirement pension benefits or payments.” N. J. Stat. Ann. 34:15-29 (West [451 U.S. 504, 522] Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). 18 To resolve retirees’ claim that this state policy should govern, we must determine whether such state laws are pre-empted by ERISA. Our analysis of this problem must be guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system. Although the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . .,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824), the “`exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed,'” New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973), quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952). As we recently reiterated, “[p]reemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored `in the absence of persuasive reasons – either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.'” Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981), quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 -526 (1977); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 -62 (1941).
In this instance, we are assisted by an explicit congressional statement about the pre-emptive effect of its action. The same chapter of ERISA that defines the scope of federal protection of employee pension benefits provides that
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- “the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003 (a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003 (b) of this title.” 29 U.S.C. 1144 (a).
This provision demonstrates that Congress intended to depart from its previous legislation that “envisioned the exercise of state regulation power over pension funds,” Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 512 , 514 (1978) (plurality opinion), and meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern. 19 But for the pre-emption provision to apply here, the New Jersey law must be characterized as a state law “that relate[s] to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. 1144 (a). 20 That phrase gives rise to some confusion [451 U.S. 504, 524] where, as here, it is asserted to apply to a state law ostensibly regulating a matter quite different from pension plans. The New Jersey law governs the State’s workers’ compensation awards, which obviously are subject to the State’s police power. As a result, one of the District Court Judges below concluded that the New Jersey provision “is in no way concerned with pension plans qua pension plans. On the contrary, the New Jersey statute is solely concerned with protecting the employee’s right to worker’s compensation disability benefits.” Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867, 873 (NJ 1978). Similarly, the other District Court Judge below reasoned that the New Jersey law “only has a collateral effect on pension plans.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., Civ. No. 78-0434 (NJ, Feb. 15, 1979). The Court of Appeals rejected these analyses on two grounds. It read the “relate to pension plans” language in “its normal dictionary sense” as indicating a broad pre-emptive intent, and it also reasoned that the “only purpose and effect of the [New Jersey] statute is to set forth an additional statutory requirement for pension plans,” a purpose not permitted by ERISA. 616 F.2d, at 1250 (emphasis in original).
We agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals but arrive there by a different route. Whatever the purpose or purposes of the New Jersey statute, we conclude that it “relate[s] to pension plans” governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension benefits – integration – that is permitted by federal law. ERISA permits integration of pension funds with other public income maintenance moneys for the purpose of calculating benefits, and the IRS interpretation approves integration with the exact funds addressed by the New Jersey workers’ compensation law. New Jersey’s effort to ban pension benefit offsets based on workers’ compensation applies directly to this calculation [451 U.S. 504, 525] technique. We need not determine the outer bounds of ERISA’s pre-emptive language to find this New Jersey provision an impermissible intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme. 21
It is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly, through a workers’ compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called “pension regulation.” ERISA makes clear that even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern. For the purposes of the pre-emption provision, ERISA defines the term “State” to include: “a State, any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. 1144 (c) (2) (emphasis added). ERISA’s authors clearly meant to preclude the States from avoiding through form the substance of the preemption provision.
Another consideration bolsters our conclusion that the New Jersey provision is pre-empted insofar as it bears on pensions regulated by ERISA. ERISA leaves integration, along with other pension calculation techniques, subject to the discretion of pension plan designers. See supra, at 514-516. Where, as here, the pension plans emerge from collective bargaining, the additional federal interest in precluding state interference with labor-management negotiations calls for pre-emption of state efforts to regulate pension terms. See Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959); Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956). Cf. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San [451 U.S. 504, 526] Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 22 As a subject of collective bargaining, pension terms themselves become expressions of federal law, requiring pre-emption of intrusive state law. 23
IV
We conclude that N. J. Stat. Ann. 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980) is pre-empted by federal law insofar as it bears on pension plans governed by ERISA. We find further that Congress contemplated and approved the kind of pension provisions challenged here, which permit offsets of pension benefits based on workers’ compensation awards.
