ABDURRAFIU ADESINA BARUWA v. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS & ORS (2019)

ABDURRAFIU ADESINA BARUWA v. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS & ORS

(2019)LCN/13195(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 6th day of May, 2019

CA/A/269/2019

JUSTICES

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ABDURRAFIU ADESINA BARUWA Appellant(s)

AND

1. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS
2. ADEDAPO ABIODUN

3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A PARTY HAS THE COMPETENCE TO WAIVE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF A COURT OF LAW

The law is also elementary that a party cannot and has not the competence to waive lack of jurisdiction of a Court of law. Where a Court lacks jurisdiction, the entire proceedings however well conducted are a nullity and a party cannot in law resuscitate or revive a nullity by waiver. Jurisdiction being the forerunner of the judicial process cannot by acquiescence, collusion, compromise or waiver confer jurisdiction on a Court that lacks it. Because of its paramount importance, estoppel cannot drown the lack of jurisdiction of a Court of law. Estoppel lacks the legal capacity to revive an act which is a nullity ab initio. Being a threshold issue, jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of any proceedings even on appeal up to the apex Court. Time does not run against the raising of jurisdiction by a party. See generally MOBIL PRO. (NIG.) UNLTD VS. MONOKPO (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 852) 346; FRN VS. IFEGWU (2003) 15 NWLR (PT. 842) 113; ANISU VS. OSAYOMI (2008) 15 NWLR (PT. 1110) 246; GALADIMA VS. TAMBAI (2000) 11 NWLR (PT. 677) 1; Z. P. IND. LTD VS. SAMOTECH LTD (2007) 16 NWLR (PT. 1060) 315; OJO VS. INEC (2008) 13 NWLR (PT. 1105) 577. The issue of jurisdiction can be put in any manner whatsoever without insulting the law. See NUHU VS. OGELE (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 852) 251; RIRUWAI VS. SHEKARAU (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1100) 142.
There is no doubt that jurisdiction is fundamental and indispensible in the administration of justice. It is the hub of all judicial processes so much that the validity or otherwise of any proceeding turns on its existence or non-existence. It is the meat of any judicial proceeding. It is for its overriding importance that any proceeding conducted in its absence, however brilliantly and excellently, will end in nullity and will remain so for all purposes. See generally UTIH VS. ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 SCN3 25; OKORO VS. EGBUOH (2006) 15 NWLR (PT. 1001) 1; DAPIALONG VS. DARIYE (2007) 8 NWLR (PT. 1036) 332; ANPP VS. REC (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1090) 453; INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 427; NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VS. C. C. I. CO. LTD (2008) 5 NWLR (PT. 1081) 519; A. G. BENUE STATE VS. UMAR (2008) 1 NWLR (PT. 1068) 311; ELUGBE VS. OMOKHAFE (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) 319. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

FACTOR TO DETERMINE A COURT’S JURISDICTION

In determining jurisdiction, for matters such as this, begun by originating summons, the affidavit in support of the originating application is used to determine jurisdiction. A defendant’s counter affidavit serves no useful purpose in the arduous task of ascertaining if a Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate over a matter. See PDP VS. ABUBAKAR (2007) 3 NWLR (PT. 1022) 515; INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 427; NIMR VS. AKIN- OLUGBADE (2008) 5 NWLR (PT. 1079) 68; ACTION CONGRESS VS. INEC (2007) 18 NWLR (PT. 1065) 50; VEEPEE IND. LTD VS. COCOA IND. LTD (2008) 13 NWLR (PT. 1105) 486. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

TIME FOR FILING PRE-ELECTION MATTERS

Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (also known as the 4th Alteration) stipulates that:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.”
It is clear that the above quoted provision of the Constitution (hereinafter referred to as “the CFRN”) provides that all pre-election matters shall be filed not later than 14 (fourteen) clays from the date the cause of action arose, which is the date the event occurred or the decision/action complained of was made. The pertinent question at decision/action complained of was made. The pertinent question at this stage is whether or not the Appellant’s suit was statute barred. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

FACTOR TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A SUIT IS STATUTE BARRED

The Supreme Court has provided how to determine whether or not a suit is statute barred. The Supreme Court in the case of EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1 @ PG. 21 PARAS C ? D, per Oputa, JSC held:
“How does one determine the period of limitation? The answer is simple – by looking at the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the Writ is beyond the period allowed by the Limitation Laws, the action is statute barred.”
See also AMUSAN VS. OBIDEYI (2005) 14 NWLR (PT. 945) 322; AMEDE VS. UBA (2008) 8 NWLR (PT. 1090) 623; ADEKOYA VS. FHA (2008) 11 NWLR (PT. 1099) 539; AGBAI VS. INEC (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 1108) 417. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Judgment of Honourable Justice Olukayode A. Adeniyi sitting at the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, delivered on the 7th of March, 2019 by which the trial Court dismissed the respective Notices of Preliminary Objections filed by counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents, and equally proceeded to dismiss Appellant’s substantive Originating Summons which sought as reliefs from the trial Court the disqualification of the 2nd Respondent from contesting the 2019 Gubernatorial election for Ogun State, by virtue of the provision of Section 31 (5) and (6) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).

The grouse of the Appellant before the trial Court was that the 2nd Respondent who was duly nominated as the candidate of the 1st Respondent for the 2019 gubernatorial election in Ogun State made false declaration in his Form CF001 submitted to the 3rd Respondent. By his Originating Summons filed on 13th December, 2018 contained at pages 1 – 55 of the Record of Appeal the Appellant stated that the 2nd Respondent

graduated from the University of Ife and Kennesaw State University where he obtained a Bachelor degree in Accounting before the age of 30. That the 2nd Respondent did not participate in the mandatory National Youth Service Scheme and did not obtain an exemption from the NYSC. He alleged that the 2nd Respondent who contested the election for the Ogun East Senatorial District in the 2015 election, stated in his Form CF001 in 2015 that he attended the University of Ife and Kennesaw State University.

Appellant alleged that for the 2019 gubernatorial election for which the 2nd Respondent was nominated as the 1st Respondent’s candidate to contest for the office of Governor of Ogun State, the 2nd Respondent only mentioned WAEC Certificate in the Form CF001 submitted to the 3rd Respondent as his qualification to contest for the office of Governor of Ogun State. Appellant therefore alleged that the 2nd Respondent concealed the fact that he had obtained a university qualification. This, the Appellant stated amounted to the 2nd Respondent making false declaration in his Form CF001 and therefore should be disqualified by the trial Court in accordance with the

provision of Section 31 (6) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). Appellant alleged that the 2nd Respondent knowingly refused to disclose his university qualification because he failed to participate in the mandatory National Youth Service Scheme after graduation from university, ‘for the purpose of evading the consequences of the Act.”

It was Appellant’s case at the trial Court that the 2nd Respondent should be disqualified as the candidate of the 1st Respondent and one Jimi Lawal, the aspirant that scored the second highest vote at the 1st Respondent’s gubernatorial primary election for Ogun State held on the 3rd of October, 2018 be declared as the 1st Respondent’s Governorship candidate in the 2019 general election. Appellant’s reliefs in the Originating Summons are contained at pages 3 – 4 of the Record of Appeal.

Upon being served with the Originating Summons, the 1st Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 1st of February, 2019 by which they urged the trial Court to dismiss Appellant’s action for want of jurisdiction, on the basis that, the trial Court lacked the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the action. 1st

Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary Objection is at pages 161 ? 178 of the Record of Appeal. In response to the substantive Originating Summons, the 1st Respondent filed a Counter Affidavit and written address in opposition on 17th January, 2019, but same was deemed properly filed and served by the trial Court on 20th February, 2019. See pages 74 ? 95 of the Record of Appeal. By way of an amendment to reflect representation for only one party, the 1st Respondent filed a Further Counter Affidavit and Written Address to the Originating Summons on 11th of February, 2019 contained at pages 481 – 504 of the Record. 1st Respondent also filed a further, Further Counter Affidavit and Written Address in opposition to the Originating Summons on 12th February, 2019, contained at pages 512 – 523 of the Record of Appeal.

The case of the 1st Respondent at the trial Court is that the 2nd Respondent was its gubernatorial candidate for the 2019 Governorship election in Ogun State, who was duly screened, before he successfully contested and won its gubernatorial primary election for Ogun State held on 3rd October, 2018. That the 2nd

Respondent filed and gave accurate information in Form CF001 which he submitted to the 3rd Respondent, where he filled his WAEC Certificate as his educational qualification, being the minimum educational qualification for the position of Governor which he was contesting, as provided by Section 177 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The 3rd Respondent duly received Form CF001 submitted on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, accepted the 2nd Respondent’s nomination as the 1st Respondent’s candidate for the 2019 Governorship election for Ogun State and accordingly published the name and personal particulars of the 2nd Respondent in Ogun State where the said election was to hold.

The 1st Respondent maintained at the trial Court that the minimum educational qualification to contest for the office of Governor of a State in Nigeria is WAEC Certificate as provided by Section 177 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which was the educational qualification the 2nd Respondent filled in his Form CF001, and the 2nd Respondent did not make any false statement in his Form CF001 that would result to his disqualification under Section 31 (6) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), ?

neither did the 2nd Respondent fall foul of any of the provisions of Section 182 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to earn him a disqualification.

The 2nd Respondent had objected to the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the suit on several grounds, principal of which was that, in view of the 4th Alteration to the Constitution which limited the time frame for filing a suit to 14 (fourteen) days after which the act complained against occurred, the suit was statute barred having been filed on the 13th of December, 2018 when the Form CF001 was submitted by the 2nd Respondent to the 3rd Respondent since the 25th of October, 2018.

On the 1st of March, 2019 when the matter came up before the trial Court for hearing, Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents argued their respective Notices of Preliminary Objection, with response by the Appellant. The substantive Originating Summons was thereafter argued by the parties. In its judgment delivered on 7th of March, 2019, the trial Court dismissed all the grounds of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ respective Notices of Preliminary

Objections. The trial Court however dismissed the substantive Originating Summons for lacking in merit, holding that the 2nd Respondent did not make false information in his Form CF001 that would have earned him disqualification under the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). The trial Court’s judgment is at pages 565 ? 688 of Volume 2 of the Record of Appeal.

Being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court, the Appellant filed a 4 (four) ground Notice of Appeal on 15th of March, 2019 challenging the decision of the trial Court which dismissed his action. See pages 689 ? 694 of Volume 2 of the Record of Appeal.

The 1st Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging the competence of this appeal, on the grounds that the Appellant’s action at the trial Court was statute barred, as the Originating Summons was filed outside the time required by law after accrual of the cause of action.

The 1st and 2nd Respondents appealed against the judgment of the trial Court delivered on the 7th of March 2019 by way of a cross-appeal. The Crux of the Cross-appellants’ complaint before this Court

is the dismissal by the trial Court of their Notice of Preliminary Objections.

The Appellant and the 1st and 2nd Respondents exchanged briefs in respect of both appeals, and these were adopted at the hearing of the appeal.
At this stage, I shall deal first with the objection raised by the 1st Respondent against the main appeal.

OBJECTION TO MAIN APPEAL
The 1st Respondent formulated a sole issue for the determination of the preliminary objection thus:
“Whether the suit leading to this appeal was statute barred and liable to be dismissed thereby robbing the Court of its jurisdiction?”

It was argued that the date the cause of action arose with respect to the right of action established by Section 31 (5) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) was the date of the submission and receipt of the personal particulars of the candidate of a political party, submitted to the 3rd Respondent in compliance with Section 31(1) and (2) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). That having established that the 2nd Respondent’s particulars (Exhibit C1) were submitted and received by the 3rd Respondent on the 25th of October, 2018, the cause of action

of the Appellant arose on the 25th October, 2018, and that the suit that was filed on the 13th December, 2018, being a pre-election matter was at the time of filing same caught up by the time limited for filing pre-election matter under the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

The Court was urged to resolve this sole issue in favour of the 1st Respondent, dismiss the appeal and strike out the Originating Summons at the trial Court, same having been filed out of the time stipulated for thing same by the Constitution.

The Appellant adopted the sole issue formulated by the 1st Respondent and argued that the same objection was raised at the Court below and that the learned trial judge dismissed it and affirmed the appellant’s contention that the action was not statute barred. It was submitted that the 1st Respondent having not appealed against this decision was bound by that decision and was estopped from raising same issue by way of objection before this Court.
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In the alternative, it was argued that the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution that limited time within which pre-election action could be commenced was subject to

the provision of Section 285 (14) which limited the class of persons who are entitled to take benefit of the limitation provided in Section 285 (9), and that the Appellant was not one of those limited by the Constitution to present his action within 14 (fourteen) days.

I have read the arguments of the parties as regards this issue. I have also gone through the record of appeal, especially pages 159 – 178 of the said record and it is clear that the 1st Respondent never raised an objection at the trial Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that the suit of the Appellant was statute barred. The only point of jurisdiction raised by the 1st Respondent at the trial Court was a challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the suit. This point of jurisdiction is therefore validly raised by the 1st Respondent by way of preliminary objection, and for the first time.
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Let me state that it has now been settled that the issue of jurisdiction is never toyed with by any party else his action will inescapably be mired in the caustic consequences of lack of jurisdiction, nullity. The law is also elementary

that a party cannot and has not the competence to waive lack of jurisdiction of a Court of law. Where a Court lacks jurisdiction, the entire proceedings however well conducted are a nullity and a party cannot in law resuscitate or revive a nullity by waiver. Jurisdiction being the forerunner of the judicial process cannot by acquiescence, collusion, compromise or waiver confer jurisdiction on a Court that lacks it. Because of its paramount importance, estoppel cannot drown the lack of jurisdiction of a Court of law. Estoppel lacks the legal capacity to revive an act which is a nullity ab initio. Being a threshold issue, jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of any proceedings even on appeal up to the apex Court. Time does not run against the raising of jurisdiction by a party. See generally MOBIL PRO. (NIG.) UNLTD VS. MONOKPO (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 852) 346; FRN VS. IFEGWU (2003) 15 NWLR (PT. 842) 113; ANISU VS. OSAYOMI (2008) 15 NWLR (PT. 1110) 246; GALADIMA VS. TAMBAI (2000) 11 NWLR (PT. 677) 1; Z. P. IND. LTD VS. SAMOTECH LTD (2007) 16 NWLR (PT. 1060) 315; OJO VS. INEC (2008) 13 NWLR (PT. 1105) 577. The issue of jurisdiction can be put in any manner

whatsoever without insulting the law. See NUHU VS. OGELE (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 852) 251; RIRUWAI VS. SHEKARAU (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1100) 142.
There is no doubt that jurisdiction is fundamental and indispensible in the administration of justice. It is the hub of all judicial processes so much that the validity or otherwise of any proceeding turns on its existence or non-existence. It is the meat of any judicial proceeding. It is for its overriding importance that any proceeding conducted in its absence, however brilliantly and excellently, will end in nullity and will remain so for all purposes. See generally UTIH VS. ONOYIVWE (1991) 1 SCN3 25; OKORO VS. EGBUOH (2006) 15 NWLR (PT. 1001) 1; DAPIALONG VS. DARIYE (2007) 8 NWLR (PT. 1036) 332; ANPP VS. REC (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1090) 453; INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 427; NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VS. C. C. I. CO. LTD (2008) 5 NWLR (PT. 1081) 519; A. G. BENUE STATE VS. UMAR (2008) 1 NWLR (PT. 1068) 311; ELUGBE VS. OMOKHAFE (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) 319.

In determining jurisdiction, for matters such as this, begun by originating summons, the affidavit in support of the

originating application is used to determine jurisdiction. A defendant’s counter affidavit serves no useful purpose in the arduous task of ascertaining if a Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate over a matter. See PDP VS. ABUBAKAR (2007) 3 NWLR (PT. 1022) 515; INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 427; NIMR VS. AKIN- OLUGBADE (2008) 5 NWLR (PT. 1079) 68; ACTION CONGRESS VS. INEC (2007) 18 NWLR (PT. 1065) 50; VEEPEE IND. LTD VS. COCOA IND. LTD (2008) 13 NWLR (PT. 1105) 486.

decision/action complained of was made. The pertinent question at decision/action complained of was made. The pertinent question at this stage is whether or not the Appellant’s suit was statute barred?

I have to peruse the questions for

determination, reliefs sought as contained on the Originating Summons and paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 18, 19 and 20 of the supporting affidavit (which can be found at pages 1 – 57 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 1) to determine the wrong complained about in this suit.

In the affidavit filed in support of the action filed by the Appellant, the following declarations were made in paragraphs 1 ? 20:-
“IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
SUIT NO:
BETWEEN
ABDURRAFIU ADESINA BARUWA …. CLAIMANT
AND
1. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)
2. ADEDAPO ABIODUN
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC)
DEFENDANTS
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS
ABDURRAFIU ADESINA BARUWA, Male, Adult, Nigerian of 84A, Affin Street, Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State do hereby make oath and state as follows, that:
1. I am a Legal Practitioner, registered voter and member of the 1st Defendant and an indigene of Ogun State, Nigeria. A copy of my

voter’s card and Party membership card are attached as EXHIBITS A & A1.
2. By virtue of my position, I am conversant and familiar with the facts and circumstances of this case.
3. The 1st Defendant is a registered Political Party with it headquarters at 40, Blantyre Crescent, Wuse II, Abuja.
4. The 2nd Defendant is the Candidate of the 1st Defendant for Ogun State Governorship election in 2019, whose name was published in the Id Defendant’s headquarters in Abuja.
5. The 3rd Defendant is the body charged with the responsibility of conducting elections in Nigeria, register political parties, receive and keep particulars of candidates of political parties among other functions with its headquarters at Plot 436, Zambezi Crescent, Maitama District, Abuja,
6. I know as a fact that the 2nd Defendant attended University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University) and Kennesaw State University where he obtained a Bachelors Degree in Accounting.
7. I also know that the 2nd Defendant graduated from the University for his Bachelors degree before the age of 30 years.
8. The 2nd Defendant did not participate in the

mandatory National Youth Service Scheme nor did he obtain any exemption certificate from the NYSC
9. The 2nd Defendant was the candidate of the 1st Defendant for the Ogun East Senatorial District in the 2015 elections,
10. I know as a fact that all candidates in the election were obligated to state the educational institutions they attended with dates in the Form CF 001 issued by the Id Defendant.
11. The 2nd Defendant stated on oath in his CF 001 submitted to the 3rd Respondent in Abuja in respect of 2015 Senatorial election that he attended the University of Ife and Kennesaw State University respectively.
12. I know that the result of the primaries conducted by the 1st Defendant for the Ogun State 2019 Governorship election is as follows:
I. Dapo Abiodun – 102,305 votes
II Jimi Lawal – 51,153 votes
iii. Kunle Akinlade – 23,443 votes
iv. Bimbo Ashiru – 29,764 votes
v. Senator Adegbenga Kaka – 17,771 votes
vi. Abayomi Semko Koroto – 9,610 votes
13. I know as a fact that Jimi Lawal scored the second highest votes of 51,153 votes in the Governorship primaries conducted by the 1st Defendant.
14. The 2nd

Defendant filled Form CF 001 and submitted to the 3rd Defendant in its headquarters in Abuja.
15. I know as a fact that the Id Defendant has custody of the Form CF 001 filled by the 2nd Defendant in its Abuja office.
16. By an application received by the 3rd Defendant on the 28th of November, 2018, my Solicitors applied for the Certified True Copies (C.T.C) of the Forms CF 001 filled and submitted by the 2nd Defendant to the 3rd Defendant in Abuja. Copies of these applications are attached as EXHIBITS B & B1.
17. The 3rd Defendant certified these Forms CF001 and gave them to us on Tuesday, 11th of December, 2018. Certified True Copies (C.TC.) of these Forms CF 001 are attached herewith as EXHIBITS C & C1.
18. I found out upon receipt of these Forms CF 001 on Tuesday, 11th of December, 2018 that the 2nd Respondent willfully concealed and/or refused to disclose his University qualification in the Form CF 001 submitted to the 3rd Defendant’s headquarters in Abuja for the 2019 Governorship election.
19. I know as a fact that it is a mandatory requirement for a Candidate to attach evidence of ‘ALL’ his educational qualifications to the

Form CF 001 submitted to the 3rd Defendant.
20. The 2nd Defendant went before the Commissioner for Oaths of this Honourable Court (High Court of FCT, Abuja) to falsely claim that ALL his educational qualification is WAEC Certificate.”

It is clear that a perusal of the above cited paragraphs of the Appellant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, particularly paragraph 20, will show that the action the Appellant was complaining against was the alleged false claim by the 2nd Respondent contained in his affidavit of personal particulars sworn before the Commissioner for Oaths of the High Court of the FCT, Abuja that all his educational qualification is WAEC Certificate. This affidavit/Oath by the 2nd Respondent is statutorily provided for in Section 31 (2), (5) and (6) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) which read:
Section 31(2):
“The list or information submitted by each candidate shall be accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the candidate at the Federal High Court of a State or Federal Capital Territory; and indicating that he has fulfilled all the constitutional requirements for election into that office.”

Section 31(5):
“A person who has reasonable grounds to believe that any information given by a candidate in the affidavit or any document submitted by the candidate is false may file a suit at the Federal High Court, High Court of a State or FCT against such person seeking a declaration that the information contained in the affidavit is false.”
Section 31(6):
“If the Court determines that any of the information contained in the affidavit or any document submitted by that candidate is false, the Court shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election.”
The above quoted provisions of the Electoral Act reveal that the Appellant’s cause of action under Section 31 of the Electoral Act would accrue to him upon submission of the 2nd Respondent’s Form CF001 which contains the alleged false information to the 3rd Respondent. A perusal of Exhibit C1 (which can be found at page 32 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 1) reveal that the Form CF001 in issue was deposed to on the 15th October, 2018 and submitted to the 3rd Respondent on the 25th October, 2018. I have taken cognizance of the acknowledgement stamp of the 3rd Respondent on

Exhibit C1 showing that 3rd Respondent received the said document on the 25th October, 2018.
Going by the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (as amended) (also known as the 4th Alteration), the cause of action arose from “the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.”
It is clear that the 2nd Respondent deposed to and submitted his Form CF001 to the 3rd Respondent (INEC) on the 25th of October, 2018. This form was published by the 3rd Respondent on its website and notice board at its office in Ogun State on the 9th of November, 2018. The Appellant who swore in his affidavit in support of the Originating Summons that he is an indigene of Ogun State and resident in Ogun State, waited till the 13th of December, 2018 (nearly two months after the submission of the Form CF001 by the 2nd Respondent) to file this action.
On this issue, the lower Court held that the filing of this action nearly 2 (two) months after the cause of action arose did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction because the 4th Alteration was inapplicable to the case since it was not filed by an aspirant at

the primary election or a political party. At pages 607 – 608 of the Record of Appeal Volume II, the learned trial judge held as follows:
“The firm view of this Court is that the Claimant’s right of access to Court is not subject to the limitation provided in Section 285(9) of the Constitution for the simple reason that he is neither an aspirant or a political party to which the provision expressly apply. I so hold. In other words, the provision of Section 285(14), having expressly defined or mentioned the categories of suits to which the limitation in Section 285(9) is subject; and having not expressly included any person who is entitled to commence a pre-election action is mentioned in and pursuant to the provision of Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act; the suit of any such person, such as the claimant in the present suit, not being an aspirant or a political party, would not be caught or bound by the limitation clause provided in Section 285(9) of the Constitution. This Court is in agreement with Mr. Aladedoye’s submissions that this Court is bound by the definition of “pre-election matter” as provided for in Section 285(14) of the Constitution.

Indeed it would amount to judicial legislation for this Court to construe or expand the scope of the clear provision of Section 285(14) of the Constitution to bind the present action as filed pursuant to the provision of Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act. I so hold.”
I hold with all due respect that the lower Court was wrong. It is clear that the 4th alteration was promulgated in order to avoid the situation in the past where parties filed pre-election matters several days or weeks or months after the cause of action arose and caused distractions to the occupant of the office so much so that the occupant’s effectiveness and efficiency as an elected leader or representative is negatively affected. It is clear that to achieve the objective of the provisions of Sections 285 (9) and (14) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (4th Alteration) same ought to be interpreted broadly and purposively. A narrow interpretation of the said Sections of the Constitution will fail to achieve the goal set by the said Section.
In the unreported decision in CA/A/698/2018: ITANYI & ANOR VS. BAGUDU & 2 ORS

delivered on 17th December, 2018, this Court Comm Abubakar Datti Yahaya, Tinuade Akomolafe-Wilson and Peter Olabisi Ige JJCA had cause to determine the applicability of the 4th Alteration to matters filed by non-aspirants and non-parties under Section 31 of the Electoral Act. In finding that the lower Court’s reasoning was wrong and that the 4th Alteration applies to a matter filed under Section 31 of the Electoral Act, their Lordships held at pages 28 – 33 of the judgment as follows:
“To the Appellants, their appeal is not caught by the further amendments, that is the addition of new Sub-sections of 9 – 14 to Section 285 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. Their reason for so contending is that they are not an aspirant envisaged in definition of Section 285(14) of the said Constitution as amended.
The settled position of the law is that where the literal rule of interpretation of the provisions of a Constitution or a statute being construed or interpreted will defeat the real purpose of the Constitution, statute or the sections being construed and cause serious damage or injustice to the whole essence

of the said Constitution or statute as a whole, then, recourse must be had to the golden Rule or the mischief Rule of Interpretation of the Constitution or the law so as to curb the mischief the law is designed to nip in the bud or present and thus bring out clearly the real intention of the makers of the Constitution, Act or law and the amendments thereto such that it is not rendered nugatory or turn into an exercise in futility.
In such a situation, the Courts have been called upon to side with the intendment of the Constitution or the statute particularly where the provisions of the law or the Constitution being interpreted is ambiguous and not very clear. The Court must endeavour to eliminate absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the statute…
A conscious reading of Section 285(14) of the said Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration, No. 21) Act 2017, shows that it is capable of giving escape route to the litigants who decided to challenge the eligibility of a candidate to vie for an elective office created by the Constitution and the law if such litigants decide to utilize the window provided under

Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act. This would unwittingly mean that the amendment is only for a litigant who commences his action vide Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended. This really is not the purpose and intention of the said amendments. What is good for the goose should be equally convenient for the gander. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fourth Alteration, No. 21) Act 2017 cannot be construed or interpreted discriminately in favour of any of the litigants in pre-election matters just because the person decides to sue a candidate in an election pursuant to Section 31(5) of Electoral Act, 2010. The whole essence of the amendments in the Fourth Alteration will be stultified.
It will defeat the purpose of the amendments and the mischief the law makers set out to curb and terminate?
The intention of the lawmakers is to make the provisions of the amendments applicable to all classes of pre-election matters whether emanating from Section 31(5) or 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended?
The definition of Section 285(14)(a)(b)(c) of the aforesaid Constitution must not be allowed to throw spanner

into the wheel of a progress in administration of justice to circumvent the laudable objectives and intendment of the amendments to the Constitution aforesaid for the mutual benefits of stakeholders in the three arms of government and the general public. ” See further WATHARDA VS. USMAN (2015) 3 NWLR (PT. 1446) 253; HASSAN VS. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (PT. 1223) 547.
It is clear that before this clear and unambiguous provision was infused in the CFRN by way of Section 285 (9), the Court of Appeal had cause to decide when the cause of action accrues in cases arising from Section 31 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). See the decision in IKPEAZU VS. EKEAGBARA (2016) LPELR 40847 (CA) where, in determining when the cause of action arose in the case wherein it complained that the candidate (who was the PDP candidate for the office of governor of Abia State) deposed to false information in his Form CF001, after considering Section 31 of the Electoral Act 2010, their Lordships held as follows at pages 29 to 32 paragraphs F – B:
“In determining when the cause of action arose or accrued for the purpose of initiating Suit No.

FHC/ABJ/CS/1086/14, the affidavit filed in support of the suit is germane. In paragraphs 4(a) to (k), the 1st and 2nd respondents as plaintiffs deposed to the holding of the Primary Election of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 3rd Respondent. From the depositions in the aforesaid paragraphs of the affidavit in support of the suit filed by the 1st and 2nd respondents, when considered together with the documents contained in INEC FORM CF 001 which the appellant submitted to INEC, 4th respondent on 26/12/14, it is evident that the cause of action arose or accrual on 26/12/16, the date FORM CF 001 was submitted to INEC, 4th respondent, not on 8/12/16 when the appellant submitted same to the P.D.P. for purpose of holding primary election. This view is supported by the decision in the case of Ojukwu v. Yar’adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1150) P. 50 Cad 131, where it is stated that the accrual of a cause of action is the event whereby a cause of action becomes complete so that the aggrieved party can begin and maintain his cause of action. See also Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 30) P. 1 and Egbue v. Araka (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 840) P. 598.
The provisions of

Section 31(1), (2) and (3) of the Electoral Act, 2010 throw more light or reveal when the cause of action ought to accrued or arisen… All the foregoing acts cannot take place before the submission of the documents on the 26/12/16 to INEC, therefore, the cause of action accrued on that date.”
It is therefore evident from this decision as well that the accrual of the cause of action in this case must be fixed as 25th October, 2018 when the 2nd Respondent allegedly submitted the false information to the 3rd Respondent.
Even the lower Court agreed, in the alternative, that if the 4th Alteration was applicable, this suit would be statute barred. At pages 614 – 617 of volume 2 of the record of appeal to wit:
“Should the instant suit be otherwise held bound by the provision of Section 285(9) of the Constitution (as amended), it would have been statute barred as of 13/12/2018, when the same was commenced by the Claimant. This is so because in a claim of this nature, the cause of action arises from the date the 3rd Defendant acknowledged receipt of the 2nd Defendant’s FORM CF001, as correctly submitted by his learned senior counsel. See also the decision

of Ikpeazu vs. Ekeagbara (Supra), which decided the issue as to when cause of action arises in an action commenced under Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act.
In the instant case, as shown on the 2nd Defendant’s Form CF001, attached by the Claimant to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons as Exhibit C1, the 3rd Defendant acknowledged receipt of the 2nd Defendant’s FORM CF001 on 25/10/2018, the implication being that the Claimant or any other person seeking to challenge the validity of any information provided by the 1st Defendant in the Form must do so not later than 14 days post 25/10/2018,
The contentions of the Claimant’s learned counsel that the cause of action arose on 11/12/2018, the date the claimant obtained certified copies of the 2nd Defendant’s FORM CF 001, is with respect, erroneous.
The yardstick for determining the accrual of cause of action cannot be at the pleasure, whims and caprices of a party. As clearly provided in Section 31(3) of the Electoral Act, the 2nd Defendant is mandated, upon receipt of the FORM CF 001 from the candidate, to publish the same within 7 days thereafter. Once the 3rd Defendant receives the

Form, which, as shown by the Claimant in the present case to be 25/10/2018, the cause of action immediately arises on the same date and whoever desires to challenge the contents of the Form, can from that date activate the mandate contained in Section 31(4) of the Electoral Act.
On the basis of the foregoing therefore, the instant suit ought to be held dead on arrival, considering that, it is shown to have been filed outside the time limited by Section 285(9) for commencing a pre-election action.”
It is pertinent to appreciate cause of action before going further in this judgment. Here, the definition offered by Fatayi-Williams, JSC (as he then was) in SAVAGE VS. UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC 214 AT 221 is helpful:
“Cause of action is defined in the Strouds Judicial Dictionary as the set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim. To our mind it is, in effect the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements – the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint and consequent damage.”
See also DUNU VS. OLADEJO (2004) 17 NWLR (PT. 903) 621; ODUKO VS. GOVT. EBONYI STATE,

(2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 891) 487; ONADEKO VS. UBN PLC (2005) 4 NWLR (PT. 916) 440; UBN PLC VS. UMEODUAGU (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 390) 352; DAIRO VS. UBN PLC (2007) 16 NWLR (PT. 1059) 99; CHEVRON (NIG.) LTD VS. L. D. (NIG.) LTD (2007) 16 NWLR (PT. 1059) 168; BAKARE VS. N. R. C. (2007) 17 NWLR (PT. 1064) 606; IBETO CEMENT CO. LTD VS. A – G, FED. (2008) 1 NWLR (PT. 1069) 470; ABUBAKAR VS. B. O. & A. P. LTD (2007) 18 NWLR (PT. 1066) 319; SPDC, NIG VS. OKONEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (PT. 1091) 85; WILLIAMS VS. WILLIAMS (SUPRA); OMOMEJI VS. KOLAWOLE (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 1106) 180.
A cause of action accrues to a party from the time or date when a duty is breached or an act occurs which warrants the party injured thereby to take action in law to assert or protect his violated legal right. See WOHEREM VS. EMERUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (PT. 890) 398; MATANMI VS. GOV. OGUN STATE (2004) 5 NWLR (PT. 866) 255; OWIE VS. IGHIWI (2005) 5 NWLR (PT. 917) 184; UBN PLC VS. UMEODUAGU (SUPRA); ONADEKO VS. UBN (2005) 4 NWLR (PT. 916) 440; AMEDE VS. UBA (2008) 8 NWLR (PT. 1090) 623; ADEKOYA VS. FHA (2008) 11 NWLR (PT. 1099) 539.

In effect, the law is settled that cause of action accrues once all the facts and circumstances necessary to commence an action have occurred. The only fact which must have occurred before the valid commencement of the matter at the trial Court was the submission of the allegedly false information in Form CF001 by the 2nd Respondent. Immediately this happened, the Appellant’s cause of action had accrued. See the decision in KUMALIA VS. SHERIFF (2009) 9 NWLR (PT. 1146) 420.
Having established that the wrong complained of in this suit occurred on the 25th October, 2018, the pertinent question to ask is whether or not as at 13th December, 2018 when the Appellant instituted this action the period allowed by Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (as amended) (also known as the 4th Alteration) to complain against the alleged wrong had not expired. Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (as amended) (also known as the 4th Alteration) makes it mandatory that all pre-election matters must be filed not later than 14 (fourteen) days from the date the wrong complained of occurred. Going by simple arithmetic, the Appellant ought to have commenced the action at the trial

Court not later than 7th or 8th November, 2018. A perusal of the Originating Summons and its supporting affidavit (pages 1 – 57 of the Record of Appeal, Volume 1) reveal that the Appellant commenced this action at the trial Court on the 13th December, 2018, some 36 or 37 days outside the time stipulated under Section 285(9) of the CFRN (as amended) (also known as the 4th Alteration).
Since the suit was filed outside the time stipulated under Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (as amended) (also known as the 4th Alteration), it is my view that the action was already statute barred as at the time it was filed. The effect of the Appellant’s suit being statute barred is that the lower Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. See the case of OLAGUNJU & ANOR VS. PHCN (2011) 4 SC (PT. 1) 152 @ PG. 165, LINES 20 – 25. This issue is resolved in the 1st Respondent’s favour and I hold that the Appellant’s suit was statute barred at the time it was filed.

In the circumstances, this appeal lacks merit and it is dismissed. An order is hereby made striking out the Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/555/2018 filed at the trial Court.

Parties shall bear their respective costs.

CROSS APPEAL
The 1st Respondent/Cross Appellant submitted a sole question for the determination of its Cross appeal as follows:
“Whether in view of the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory sitting in Abuja was clothed with territorial jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit?”

The 2nd Respondent/Cross-Appellant submitted the following issues for the determination of its Cross-appeal:
1. Whether the 1st Cross Respondent’s suit was not statute barred having regard to the clear provisions of Section 285(9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (also known as 4th Alteration). Distilled from Ground 1 & 5.
II. Whether the trial Court possessed the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Distilled from Ground 2.

Having read the briefs filed by the parties in respect of the Cross-appeals, I will adopt the issues formulated by the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant as the issues that are relevant for the determination of both cross-appeals.

ISSUE ONE
This issue is whether the 1st Cross Respondent’s suit was

not statute barred having regard to the clear provisions of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (also known as 4th Alteration).
This issue has already been dealt with while dealing with the main appeal.
Having resolved that the trial Court had no vires to entertain the suit, this issue has become academic and of no moment. The jurisdiction of this Court is denuded when an action or issue becomes academic, without live or tangible issues to be determined. See generally A. G. ANAMBRA STATE VS. A. G. FED. (2005) 9 NWLR (PT. 931) 572; AMAECHI VS. INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1040) 54; UZOHO VS. NCP (2007) 10 NWLR (PT. 1042) 302; STATE VS. AZEEZ (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 1108) 439.
This issue is resolved in favour of the Cross Appellants against the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent.

ISSUE TWO
The 1st Respondent/Cross Appellant argued that the complaint of the Appellant/1St Cross Respondent before the lower Court arose in relation to the emergence of the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant as the candidate of the 1st. Respondent/Cross Appellant from the primary election conducted on 3rd October, 2018. That

the acts, events or decision giving rise to the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent’s suit at the lower Court being the events of the primary election occurred in Ogun State, and that the mandatory publication of the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant’s FORM CF 001 was made in Ogun State. It was submitted that the FCT High Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter, but the Federal High Court or High Court of Ogun State where the events leading to the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent’s action took place.

The 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant also argued that at the heart of the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent’s complaints was the emergence of the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant as the 2nd Cross Respondent’s candidate for the 2019 election into the office of Governor of Ogun State following the primary election held by the 2nd Cross Respondent in Ogun State on the 3rd October, 2018. Hence, it was submitted that the events that led to the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent’s instituting this action at the trial Court substantially took place in Ogun State. That the fact that the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent complained about the outcome of a

primary election that took place in Ogun State was a feature that deprived the trial Court of jurisdiction to entertain the case.

The Appellant/1st Cross Respondent on the other hand stated that the dispute related to the personal particulars and declarations made by the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant in his Form CF 001 declared at the High Court of the FCT and submitted to INEC, the 3rd Respondent/Cross Respondent in compliance with the requirement of Section 31(2) of the Electoral Act. That the Form CF 001 was submitted by the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant to the 3rd Respondent/Cross Respondent at its headquarters in Abuja and that the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent subsequently obtained certified copies of the said Form CF001 from the 3rd Respondent/Cross Respondent’s headquarters in Abuja. That the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant deposed to the Form CF001 at the Registry of the High Court of the FCT thereby conferring jurisdiction in the Court below.

There is no doubt that the learned trial judge held that it had territorial jurisdiction to hear this suit. What then is territorial jurisdiction? It is the jurisdiction over cases arising in or

involving persons residing within a defined territory. In the case of IBORI VS. OGBORU (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 920) 102, it was stated that territorial jurisdiction has to do with the area a matter arises or parties reside. A Court no doubt lacks the competence to adjudicate over matters and persons outside its territorial jurisdiction.
Oputa JSC (as he then was) in TUKUR VS. GOVT GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517 stated the importance of territorial jurisdiction in these words:
“… the first is the legal capacity, the power and authority of a Court to hear and determine a judicial proceeding – in the sense that it has the right and power to adjudicate concerning the particular subject-matter in controversy. The second is the geographical area in which and over which the legal jurisdiction of the Court can be exercised. This area of authority is called the area of geographical jurisdiction or venue. Both are important when one is considering the concept of jurisdiction. And both must co-exist in any particular case to complete the circuit ofj urisdiction.”
See also DAPIALONG VS. TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR (PT. 843) 310.

When it comes to pre-election matters, I am of the view that the issue has been settled by the decision in MAILANTARKI VS. TONGO (2018) 6 NWLR (PT. 1614) 69 @ 84 – 86 when the Apex Court stated as follows:
“The Constitution has never intended it to be a High Court at large with jurisdiction over matters outside its territory. In the instant case, the cause of action, pleaded in the originating summons, was the primary election of the All Progressive Congress (APC) conducted on the 8th December 2014 in Gombe-Kwami-Funakaye Federal Constituency at the constituency headquarters, Malam Sidi, in Gombe State. The protests and appeal emanating from the said primary election were merely incidental to or matters arising from the said primary election. The appeal committee of the APC heard the appeal on the 13th December 2014 and wrote its report on 15th December 2014. All these took place in Gombe, Gombe State. No aspect of the primary election and the appeal there took place in the Federal Capital Territory, except that the NWC or NEC of APC submitted the name of the 1st Respondent to INEC whose headquarters is in the FCI, Abuja. [Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR

(Pt. 843) 310; River State Government of Nigeria vs. Special Konsult (Swedish Group) (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 923) 145 referred to] (Pp. 83, paras F – G; 84, paras F – G; 86, paras. D – G; 88, paras. E – G)
At page 87, paragraphs A – C, the Court held further:
“The lower Court has, rightly in my view, held, relying on Dalhatu v. Turaki (supra), that the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, which is regarded as a State High Court by virtue of Section 299(a) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, does not extend to matters that arise outside the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. I also agree with their lordship of the lower Court that each State of the Federation is independent of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and vice versa and that the judicial powers of each state are vested in the Courts established for that state. Gombe State and the Federal capital Territory, Abuja are distinct and independent of each other. It follows, therefore, that this matter which arose in Gombe State and has to do with the parties in Gombe State should have been commenced in the High Court of Gombe State and

not in the FCT High Court. The FCT High Court has, in the circumstances, acted ultra vires in assuming jurisdiction over a cause of action that arose in Gombe State and outside its jurisdiction territory. The proceedings in the suit No.FC1/CV/934/2015 before the FCT High Court, being incompetent, deserved to be and correctly struck out by the lower Court. There is no substance in this appeal on this issue.
And at page 90 paragraphs C D, the Apex Court held thus:
“Where there is a division of the Federal High Court in a State as well as a State High Court, an aggrieved aspirant can institute his action in either Court. This is in recognition of the fact that by conferring jurisdiction on the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory, the intention of the lawmaker is to give an aspirant the flexibility of ventilating his grievance in any of the Courts listed therein depending on which location is most convenient to the parties. This cannot be taken to mean that a suit may be filed in any of the named Courts anywhere of the Federation in blatant disregard of the particular Court’s territorial jurisdiction. That

would be an absurd interpretation of the law and would no doubt lead to miscarriage of justice.”
The position of the law is clear and needs no further clarification from me. See further RIVERS STATE GOVT. VS. SPECIALIST KONSULT (SWEDISH GROUP) (2005) 7 NWLR (PT. 923) 145; IDEMUDIA VS. IGBINEDION UNIVERSITY OKADA (2015) LPELR – 24514; (UNREPORTED) APC VS. EMENIKE & 2 ORS with Appeal No. CA/A/39/2019 delivered on 28th January, 2019; UNREPORTED APPEAL NO. CA/A/18/2019: UBOH VS. ALI & 2 ORS delivered on 30th January, 2019.
Because in matters begun by originating summons, it is the affidavit in support of the application that is used to determine jurisdiction, I shall again refer to the said affidavit. See PDP VS. ABUBAKAR (2007) 5 NWLR (PT. 1022) 515; INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 427; NASHTEX INT. LTD VS. HABIB (NIG.) BANK LTD (2007) 17 NWLR (PT. 1063) 308; ACTION CONGRESS VS. INEC (2007) 18 NWLR (PT. 1065) 50; VEEPEE IND. LTD VS. COCOA IND. LTD (2008) 13 NWLR (PT. 1105) 486.
Relevant paragraphs of the affidavit in support of the originating summons has already been reproduced hereinabove.
In the instant case, after a

microscopic examination of the Originating processes, it is clear to me that the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent’s complaint before the trial Court arose in reaction to the emergence of the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant as the candidate of the 1st Respondent/Cross Appellant from the primary election conducted on the 3rd of October, 2018 in Ogun State. Put differently, at the heart of the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent’s complaints is the emergence of the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant as the 1st Respondent/Cross Appellants candidate for the 2019 election into the office of Governor of Ogun State following the primary election held by the 1st Respondent/Cross Appellant in Ogun State on the 3rd of October, 2018. It is clear that the events that led to the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent’s instituting this action at the trial Court substantially took place in Ogun State.
I agree with learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant that the fact that the Appellant/1st Cross Respondent is complaining about the outcome of a primary election that took place in Ogun State is a feature that deprived the trial Court of jurisdiction to entertain the case.<br< p=””

</br<

It should be made clear that the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of the FCT is limited to issues that relate to the Federal Capital Territory. The territory of the High Court of the FCT does not extend to Ogun State. The events that led to the action had to do with the Governorship of Ogun State. It is of course not debatable that Ogun State is totally distinct and different from the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. It seems to me that if an action was to be properly commenced, that action should have been initiated in the court in Ogun State. Let me add that the mere fact that the affidavit was deposed to at the Registry of the High Court of FCT does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court of the FCT to determine the governorship candidate for a party in Ogun State. See further DALHATU VS. TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR (PT. 843) 310.
Based on the foregoing, I hold that the lower Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain this case and ought to have struck out the matter. The Cross Appeal of the 1st Respondent/Cross Appellant and the 2nd Respondent/Cross Appellant succeed. The High Court of the FCT lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the

suit and same is hereby struck out.
No order as to cost.

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.: I read in advance, the leading Judgment of my learned brother IDRIS JCA just delivered and I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusions. I strike out the Suit before the FCT High Court as it had no jurisdiction to entertain it. I allow the cross appeals. No order as to costs.

TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON, J.C.A.: I read the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS. I am in full agreement with his reasoning and conclusion.

In respect of the preliminary objection filed by the 1st Respondent, it is not in doubt that the suit leading to this appeal, filed in the trial Court is a pre-election matter having been ignited under Section 31 (5) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) to challenge the emergence of the 2nd Respondent from the primary election as candidate of the 1st Respondent for the election to the officer of Governor of Ogun State. See Alhaji Abubakar Atiku Bagudu & 2 Ors, CA/A/698/2018

(unreported delivered on 17/12/18. By virtue of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration) Act No.21 of 2017, all pre-election matters must be filed within 14 days of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit. It is not in dispute that the Appellant’s suit was commenced outside the 14 days stipulated under Section 285 (9) of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (as amended). Unarguably therefore, the suit is statute barred, having been commenced after the limitation period. The action could be described as “dead on arrival.”
The law is trite that an action is statute barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in Court because the period prescribed by the Limitation Law Act has elapsed. The contention of the Appellant, which is along with the decision of the trial Court, that the fourth Alteration Act is inapplicable to the Appellant since he is neither an Aspirant nor Political Party having regard to the definition of “Pre-election” by Section 285 (14) (a), (b) and (c) is untenable. Let me now reproduce the relevant provisions pertaining to this

matter.
Section 285: (9) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit…..
(14) For the purpose of this section, “Pre-election” means any suit by-
(a) an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of the Election Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating the conduct or primaries of political parties and the provisions of the guidelines of a political party in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates for an election;
(b) an aspirant challenging the actions, decisions and activities of the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of his participation in an election or who complains that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating elections in Nigeria has not been complied with by the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates and participation in an election; and
(c) a political party challenging the actions, decisions or activities of the

Independent National Electoral Commission disqualifying its candidate from participating in an election or a complaint that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other applicable law has not been complied with by the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the nomination of candidates of political parties for an election, timetable for an election, registration of voters and other activities of the Commission in respect of preparation for an election.”
(underlinings for emphasis)
In my view, the operative phrase in Section 285 (9) of the Constitution is “every pre-election matter.” In that wise, it is immaterial who the complainant or claimant is. What is paramount is that the action complained about is in respect of a pre-election matter. Therefore, to hold, as found by the trial Court, and contended by the Appellant, that only an aspirant or a political party instituting an action that can be caught by the limitation period will lead to absurdity. By the canon rules of interpretation, a section of the Constitution or a Statute in general, should not be read in isolation, thereby rendering other relevant sections ineffective.

Rather they should be construed in conjunction with other provisions or sections of the Constitution or the statute so as to implement the intention of the legislature.
See Oke vs. Atoloye (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) SC 578, Wilson vs. A-G Bendel (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 572 SC.
I am aware that a Court is generally not at liberty to construe a statute by the motives which influenced its enactment. However, when the reason for its enactment is known, it is the duty of the Court to read the statute or section or sections of it in such a way as to fairly and accurately carry out that object of the enactment and not to curtail the implementation of the section or the statute to what it was not intended. Therefore, certain amount of common sense must be applied in construing statutes so that the object of the statute will be implemented. It is now common knowledge that the mischief which amendment to the 1999 Constitution by the Fourth Alteration Act; No. 21 of 2017 seeks to cure is to ensure, unlike before the amendment, that pre-election matters are determined, with utmost dispatch. The intention of the legislature in such circumstances as this case must also

be put into consideration. The essence or raison d’etre for the amendment limiting the period within which to institute actions in respect of election matters, pre-election matters inclusive will be defeated if a person, who is neither an aspirant nor a political party can file an action within unlimited period when the actual participants in the election have limited period under the law to ventilate their grievances in Court. This will be preposterous and will lead to nowhere else but to absurdity. The law is trite that the legislature never intends an absurdity in a statute. The legislator himself intends the interpreter of an enactment to construe an enactment in such a way as to implement, rather than defeat the legislative intention. The Maxim is “ut res magis valeat quam pereat” See FCSC v Laoye (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652. See also Mr. Anthony Itanyi & Anor vs. AIh. Abubakar Atiku Bagudu & 2 Ors. (supra).
This action is a pre-election matter, filed outside the 14 days prescribed by the Constitution, and therefore it is statute barred. No Court has jurisdiction to entertain the case.
?
For this reason and more detailed reason adumbrated by

my learned brother in the lead judgment, this appeal is hereby struck out.

Appearances:

L. Agabi SAN with him, P. Erivwode,Esq. and S. Agun, Esq.For Appellant(s)

F. Jumbo, Esq. with him, R. Kinya, Esq., Z. Farouk, Esq. and E. Addah, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.

K. Ogunwumiju, SAN with him, W. A. Ajayi, Esq. and O. Adekunle, Esq. for the 2nd RespondentFor Respondent(s)

Appearances

L. Agabi SAN with him, P. Erivwode,Esq. and S. Agun, Esq.For Appellant

AND

F. Jumbo, Esq. with him, R. Kinya, Esq., Z. Farouk, Esq. and E. Addah, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.

K. Ogunwumiju, SAN with him, W. A. Ajayi, Esq. and O. Adekunle, Esq. for the 2nd RespondentFor Respondent

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