MR. GODWIN F. NWACHUKWU -vs- FIRST BANK OF NIG. LTD

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ENUGU

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA

DATE: 1st March 2018 SUIT NO. NICN/EN/86/2015

BETWEEN

GODWIN F. NWACHUKWU … CLAIMANT

AND

FIRST BANK OF NIG. LTD … DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

Machebe Victor Chinwuba Ozioko Esq. for the Claimant with Obianuju Ngozi Enuka [Mrs.], Larry Chidozie Egbere Esq and Anthony Chinedu Onah Esq.

Ikeazor Akaraiwe Esq. for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

The Claimant by a Complaint filed on 21st July 2015 claimed against the Defendant as follows:

A declaration that the purported summary dismissal of the Claimant from his employment by the Defendant vide Defendant’s letter dated 27th March 2015 is wrongful and a breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment with the Defendant.

The sum of N150, 000,000 [one hundred and fifty million naira] general damages for wrongful dismissal and/or breach of contract of employment.

The Claimant filed alongside the Complaint a verifying affidavit, statement of claim, list of witness and witness’ deposition, list of documents and copies of the documents. The processes were served on the Defendant on 23rd July 2015. The Defendant, through its Counsel, entered an appearance and filed a statement of defence, list of witnesses, statement on oath of the witness, list of documents and copies of the documents on 14th September 2015. With the leave of Court granted on 5th November 2015, the Defendant filed additional list of witnesses and additional witness deposition of Mr. Uchay Onyibo dated 7th October 2015. The Claimant filed his reply to the statement of defence and additional witness statement on oath with leave of the court on 30th November 2015. By order of Court made on 17th October 2016, the Defendant was granted leave to amend its statement of defence, call additional witness and file additional list of witnesses, witness deposition of Mrs. Taiwo Abimbola-Ojo and additional list of documents. The Claimant also filed an amended Reply and additional statement on oath. By order of Court made on 27th April 2017, the Defendant filed a second amended statement of defence dated 16th November 2016, further witness statement on oath of Onyibo Uchay and Mrs. Taiwo Abimbola-Ojo. The Claimant also filed a reply to the second amended statement of defence and further statement on oath both dated 17th May 2017. Trial commenced in this suit on 26th April 2016 before my learned brother, Honourable Justice Waziri Abali. The case came up before me on 17th October 2017 and was adjourned to 10th November 2017 for trial de novo. Trial commenced on 10th November 2017 and was concluded on the same day. The Claimant adopted his statements on oath dated 21st July 2015, 1st July 2016 and 17th May 2017 as his evidence in proof of his claim. He tendered 12 exhibits, exhibits A to L. Exhibit A-A3 is the letter of appointment, exhibit B is confirmation of appointment, exhibit C-C1 is the redeployment memo, exhibit D is copy of the call-over certificate, exhibit E is query issued to the Claimant; exhibit F is the Claimant’s answer to the query, exhibit G-G1 is invitation to appear before Defendant’s Disciplinary Committee. Exhibit H is letter of summary dismissal, exhibit I is the Defendant’s Employee Handbook, exhibit J is Defendant’s memo to staff on call-over procedure, exhibit K-K2 is the Claimant’s letter of appeal and exhibit L is Claimant’s pay slip for February 2015. The Defendant’s witness, Mrs. Taiwo Abimbola-Ojo, adopted her two statements on oath dated 22nd June 2016 and 17th November 2016 as her evidence in defence of the suit and tendered 5 exhibits, exhibits DW1 – DW5. Exhibit DW1-DW1E is Defendant’s Chief Internal Auditor’s report dated 7th January 2015. Exhibit DW2-DW2B is the Disciplinary Committee report dated 5th March 2015, exhibit DW3 is Defendant’s second Employee Handbook dated March 2007; exhibit DW4 is petition to Police by the witness dated 25th April 2014 and exhibit DW5 is the Police investigation report dated 4th September 2014. The case was thereafter adjourned to 15th January 2018 for adoption of final written addresses. On 15th January 2018, learned Counsel for the Defendant, Mr. Akaraiwe, moved a motion for enlargement of time to file and serve his final written address and to deem the written address as having been properly filed and served. The prayer was granted and Mr. Akaraiwe adopted his written address dated 30th November 2017 and filed on 4th December 2017 as his arguments in support of the defence. Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Mr. Ozioko, referred to and adopted the Claimant’s final written address dated and filed on 11th January 2018 as his argument in support of the claim. The matter was consequently set down for judgment.

CLAIMANT’S CASE

The Claimant’s case, as manifest from the statement of facts and his statement on oath, is that he was at all material times a staff of the Defendant having been employed on 13th November 1989 as clerical staff and his appointment was confirmed on 14th June 1990. The Claimant rose through the ranks to Assistant Manager and was the Branch Services Manager Ovoko Branch before his dismissal on 27th March 2015. The Claimant, apart from his normal schedule as Head Local Services, also acted as a review officer of call-over transactions. He was the review officer on 24th March 2014 in respect of a transaction undertaken on 21st March 2014 involving a total sum of N7, 836,000.00 which was later discovered to be fraudulent. The fraudulent transaction took place at 7.21pm on Friday, 21st March 2014 through electronic transfers with the User Staff identity number of the Branch Services Manager, Mrs. Taiwo Abimbola-Ojo, the DW1. The fraudulent transaction involved the transfer of N1, 000,000 and N6, 836,000 from the accounts of Nigerian Breweries Plc and Stallion Nigeria Ltd respectively to the designated accounts of the fraudsters. The proceeds of the fraud were withdrawn by the fraudsters from the designated accounts using ATM and other electronic banking devices by 23rd March 2014. The call-over exercise took place on Monday, 24th March 2014 by which time the sum of N7, 836,000.00 had left the Defendant’s system. It is the Claimant’s case that Police investigation into the fraud did not indict him, but on 25th November 2014 he received a query, exhibit E, titled “FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS FROM A/C STALLION GROUP LTD & NIGERIAN BREWERIES PLC: INEFFECTIVE CALL OVER EXERCISE” and alleging negligent performance of his duty as call-over officer and asking him to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The Claimant answered the query, exhibit F, denying the allegation and continued his normal duty with the Defendant. On 5th January 2015, the Defendant paid its staff their usual upfront allowances for the new financial year but withheld that of the Claimant and on enquiry he was told that it was because of anticipated disciplinary proceedings against him. On 17th February 2015, the Claimant appeared before the Defendant’s Disciplinary Committee at its Head Office in Lagos. After making his presentation, he was allowed to go but the findings of the Disciplinary Committee were not communicated to him. He was summarily dismissed by letter dated 27th March 2015, exhibit H, which did not state the reason for his dismissal. The Claimant wrote a letter dated 20th April 2015, exhibit K-K2, appealing for a review of his dismissal. He did not receive a response from the Defendant whereupon he instituted this action.

DEFENDANT’S CASE

The Defendant’s case, as shown in its second amended statement of defence and DW1’s further statement on oath, is that the Claimant was its staff until he was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct on 27th March 2015. According to the Defendant, the Claimant was Head, Local Services [HLS], Head, Funds Transfer [HFT] and Review Officer when it lost the sum of N7, 836,000 belonging to two of its customers, Nigerian Breweries Plc and Stallion Nigeria Ltd. It is the Defendant’s case that the Claimant was negligent as a Review Officer of the transaction leading to the fraud on 24th March 2014 and was queried for deceiving the Management of the Defendant by signing the call-over certificate without reviewing/supervising the call-over done by the call-over officer. It is the Defendant’s case that the Claimant was given fair hearing before his dismissal which is in accordance with the Defendant’s Employee Handbook, exhibit DW3.

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

The Defendant’s final written address is dated 30th November 2017 and filed on 4th December 2017. The Defendant raised two issues for determination namely:

Whether the Claimant was lawfully dismissed from the Defendant’s employment?

Whether the Claimant is entitled to his claims having been lawfully and summarily dismissed from the Defendant’s employment?

On issue one, learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that section 11[5] of the Labour Act empowers an employer to dismiss an employee without notice for misconduct and relied on the cases of Emmanuel Nwobosi v. African Continental Bank Ltd. [1995] LPELR-SC.91/1991 and Samson Babatunde Olanrewaju v. Afribank [2001] LPELR-SC. 109/96. On what constitutes gross misconduct, learned Counsel cited the dictum of Iguh, J.S.C in Emmanuel Nwobosi v. African Continental Bank Ltd. [supra] where he posited that gross misconduct is a conduct of grave and weighty character as to undermine the confidence which should exist between an employee and the employer. He also said that working against the deep interest of the employer amounts to gross misconduct entitling an employer to summary dismissal of the employee. Relying on Oyedele v. L. U. T. H. [sic] [1990] 6 NWLR [pt. 155] 194 at 199 learned Counsel submitted that a misconduct is what an employer considers to be misconduct. He contended that Article 14.5 of the Employee Handbook, exhibit DW3, gives the Defendant the latitude to determine what amounts to any other acts of gross misconduct; and that in this case, the Defendant considered the acts of the Claimant to be acts of gross misconduct and the effect of same was his summary dismissal. Learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s employment was not one with statutory flavour for which reason the Defendant was not bound to give reason for his dismissal and relied on Ativie v. Kabelmetal [Nig.] Ltd. [2008] 10 NWLR [pt.1095] 399. It was also submitted that the case against the Claimant is gross misconduct bordering on negligence. He explained that by signing the call-over certificate without reviewing/supervising the transaction, the Claimant deceived the Management of the Defendant and that this act amounts to negligence, dishonesty and irregular practices in respect of cash, vouchers, records and customer’s account as provided in Article 14.5 of exhibit DW3. On fair hearing, learned Counsel contended that the Claimant was accorded fair hearing before his summary dismissal in that he was issued a query, he answered the query and appeared before the disciplinary committee. He therefore submitted that the dismissal is in accordance with the terms of the Claimant’s contract.

On issue two, learned Counsel argued that it is the duty of the Claimant to prove that his dismissal was wrongful and that proper procedure was not followed and relied on Daodu v. Uba [2004] 29 WRN 53 at 71. Continuing, learned Counsel contended that the onus is on the Claimant to plead and prove the aspects of the contract of employment violated by the Defendant and the burden does not shift and cited the cases of Orji v. Dorji Textile Mills [Nig.] Ltd. [2010] 5 WRN 32 at 50-51 and Amodu v. Amode [1990] 5 NWLR [pt. 150] 556 and concluded that the Claimant did not set out the relevant provisions of exhibit DW3 violated by the Defendant. He referred to Article 14.5 of exhibit DW3 and submitted that the Claimant having been lawfully dismissed is not entitled to his claims.

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT

The Claimant’s final written address is dated and filed on 11th January 2018. The Claimant raised two issues for determination which are similar to the issues raised by the Defendant; to wit:

Whether the Claimant was lawfully dismissed from his employment by the Defendant?

Whether the Claimant is entitled to judgment upon the reliefs claimed in the instant proceedings?

In his reply to issue one, learned Counsel to the Claimant began by underscoring some of the undisputed facts in this case and submitted that the purpose of a contract is to establish the agreement that the parties have made and to fix their rights and duties. Continuing, he submitted that parties are bound by the terms to which they have agreed provided the agreement does not result from fraud, mistake or undue influence and that a Court of law must enforce a valid contract and cited the case of Ogundepo v. Olumesan [2012] All FWLR [pt. 609] 1136. While agreeing with learned Counsel to the Defendant that under the Labour Act an employer may dismiss an employee for gross misconduct without notice, he submitted that “this position is not obtainable where there is a condition of service which prescribes a procedure for dismissal and which provides for conduct that could attract dismissal.” He argued that in such instances, any disciplinary measure by way of dismissal or termination must follow the laid down procedure and relied on UTC Nigeria Limited v. Peters [2009] LPELR-8426[CA], Edet v. Chief of Army Staff [1994] 2 NWLR [pt.324] 41 at 58, Calabar Cement Co. Ltd. v. Daniels [1991] 4 NWLR [pt.188] 750-760. Learned Counsel agreed that the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is regulated by exhibits I and DW3 which is a later version of exhibit I. He explained that the employee handbook lists various acts considered by the Defendant as misconduct and the punishment for each misconduct and argued that the Claimant’s case is that he was not negligent in the performance of his duty as a call-over review officer on 24th March 2014 in respect of the transaction in question and that, even if he was negligent, the punishment should be either a warning letter or compulsory resignation [depending on degree] but not summary dismissal. Relying on exhibit E he contended that the Claimant was queried for ‘ineffective call over exercise’ which falls under “Careless/Improper Performance of Duty” or “Negligent/Improper Performance of Duty” in exhibit DW3. Continuing, learned Counsel said the particulars of allegation against the Claimant was that he failed to escalate the dry-posted transactions as an exception to the relevant authority. He reviewed the evidence of the Claimant showing that the usual way for call over of dry-posted transactions is to verify that the entries in the journal were correct which the Claimant did in this circumstance and counter-signed. He contended that the Defendant did not adduce any evidence to show that all dry-posted transactions are exceptions which ought to be escalated and urged the Court to accept the evidence of the Claimant on this point as unchallenged and relied on Olohunde v. Adeyoju [2000] 10 NWLR [pt.676] 562 and Tella v. Usman [1997] 12 NWLR [pt.531] 168. Learned Counsel explained that there is ample evidence that the password of DW1, the Branch Services Manager, was used in posting the transaction and being a super password the transaction did not require further verification and on that basis he submitted that the Claimant was diligent in performing his duty as no amount of diligence could have exposed or prevented the transaction. He contended that the onus to prove otherwise was on the Defendant which it failed to discharge and cited section 131 of the Evidence Act. He submitted that the evidence of DW1 on the culpability of the Claimant was contradictory rendering it unreliable and relied on Nnajiofor v. Ukonu [1986] 4NWLR [pt.36] 505 where the Supreme Court held that a witness who testifies falsely on matters which ought to be within his personal knowledge ought not to be accorded a credit. He argued that the Claimant was not implicated in the fraud but that in the course of the proceedings the Defendant began to fish for justification for the wrongful dismissal of the Claimant by contending that the Claimant was negligent in signing the call-over certificate because DW1, whose name appeared as processor did not sign. Referring to paragraphs 4.24 to 4.30 of the Defendant’s final written address, he submitted that the argument is an afterthought which ought to be discountenanced by the Court. Learned Counsel contended that the onus was on the Defendant to prove that it is strict banking procedure that the processor must sign the call over certificate before it could be dispatched to the relevant officers for call over and that the relevant officers had no authority to proceed with the call over without the signature. He therefore argued that the mere ipse dixit assertion of DW1 did not suffice and relied on section 131 of the Evidence Act 2011. It was further submitted that this position contradicts the Defendant’s earlier position in exhibit E and confirmed in exhibits DW1-1E and DW2-2B. He capped his argument by stating that copies of exhibit D were sent to DW1 and Defendant’s Internal Audit Department and no complaint was raised until the customer made a report of the fraud several weeks after. Continuing, learned Counsel explained that the DW1 confirmed under cross examination that exhibit D was generated by one Oluchi Mbah who also distributed it to the call over officers. Flowing from the above learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant was not negligent in the performance of his duty as alleged to warrant summary dismissal. He, however, contended that even if the Claimant is held to be negligent, the punishment was not summary dismissal and relied on Article 14.5, item 34 page 59 of exhibit DW3. It was submitted that “where specific acts have been determined to amount to a misconduct and punishment for them already stipulated in the term of employment, the employer is bound by the terms as stated therein and would not be allowed to import punishment not expressly stated” and cited the case of Katto v. CBN [1999] 6NWLR [pt.607] 390.

Learned Counsel also submitted that the argument of learned Counsel to the Defendant in paragraph 4.9 of his written address that Article 14.5 of exhibit DW3 gave the Defendant latitude to determine what amounts to acts of gross misconduct is misconceived. He explained that the acts specified in Article 14.5 which entitles the Defendant to summarily dismiss its employee are conducts which reflect a total disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service and submitted that any other acts of gross misconduct must be interpreted ‘ejusdem generis the specific acts mentioned in the preceding items’ and relied on Ehuwa v. O. S. I. E. C. [2006] 10 NWLR [pt.1012] 544 and Fawehinmi v. IGP [2002] 7 NWLR [pt.767] 606. It was further argued that arising from the ejusdem generis rule, exhibit DW3 specified some acts which the Defendant does not intend to be treated as gross misconduct and prescribed specific punishment for them. Among such conducts, learned Counsel contended, is “improper/negligent performance of duty” under which category the negligent/improper performance of call over falls. Learned Counsel referred to exhibit J wherein the Defendant alluded to the fact that ‘improper call-over’ or ‘failure to perform call-over’ is an offence under the “Negligence/Improper Performance of Duty” category and would from the date of the memo incur the sanction of summary dismissal. The implication, he contended, is to bring to the fore that prior to 11th March 2015, improper or negligent call-over did not attract the punishment of summary dismissal. He therefore submitted that the Defendant is estopped from contending the contrary and relied on section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Learned Counsel conceded that generally an employer is not bound to give any reason for terminating the employment of its employee where the employment is not one with statutory flavour but submitted that since the Defendant cannot summarily dismiss the Claimant except on grounds of gross misconduct as contained in exhibit DW3, any purported dismissal which is not based on an allegation of gross misconduct expressly contained in exhibit DW3 is wrongful and urged the Court to so hold and relied on UTC Nigeria Ltd v. Peters [supra].

On issue two, learned Counsel submitted that where an employee is wrongfully dismissed, the remedy is damages and relied on Nongu v. Local Government Service Commission & Anor [2011] LPELR-4851[CA]. He contended that the Claimant has proved that the Defendant acted in breach of the contract of employment when it summarily dismissed him for an act which did not attract that punishment, and therefore submitted that the Claimant is entitled to his claim as contained in the statement of facts. On the issue of fair hearing, he explained that the Claimant was not informed of the verdict of the disciplinary committee before his dismissal and submitted that that amounted to a breach of fair hearing pursuant to section 3b [sic] of the 1999 Constitution [as amended] and urged to Court to so hold.

COURT’S DECISION

I have read and understood the pleadings and depositions of witnesses filed by learned Counsel for the parties and listened to the testimonies of the witnesses during cross examination and watched their demeanour. I have also read and carefully evaluated the 17 exhibits and the written addresses filed by both learned Counsel and their oral submissions in Court. Having done this, it is my considered opinion that the issue for determination in this case is whether the Claimant has proved his case on a balance of probabilities to entitle him to the reliefs sought or either of them. The law is now settled that in civil cases the burden of proof is on he who asserts same. See sections 131[1] and 132 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the cases of Ebute John Onogwu & 4Ors. v. Benue State Civil Service Commission & 3Ors. [2012] LPELR-8604 [CA] 1 at 26, Senator Chris Adighije v. Hon. Nkechi J. Nwaogu & Ors. [2010] LPELR-4941 [CA] 79-80 and Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd. v. Hope Offiong Ekpo [2003] LPELR-5627 [CA] 1 at 23-24, [2004] 2 NWLR [pt.856] 100. In Calabar Cement Co. Ltd v. Abiodun Daniel [1991] 4 NWLR [pt. 188] 750 at 760 -761, Niki Tobi, JCA [of blessed memory, as he then was] held that: “The onus is on the person alleging wrongful dismissal or termination of appointment to so prove. See College of Medicine v. Adegbite [1973] 5 SC 149. And he has to discharge the onus by relying on the contract of service and the notice of wrongful dismissal and termination. The law will not allow the party to vegetate on general common law provisions which are not contained in the contract or anticipated therein.” See also the case of Patrick Ziideeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2007] 1-2 SC 1. Thus, to succeed the Claimant must put forward cogent and credible evidence in support of the reliefs sought.
Before I continue, I would like to make a few clarifications. The first sentence in paragraph 9 of DW1’s further statement on oath dated 17th November 2016 is not supported by the Defendant’s pleading, and it is trite that evidence on a fact that is not pleaded goes to no issue. See Clara Olujobade & Anor. v. High Chief Jide Olalusi & 2 Ors. [2011] LPELR-8908[CA] at page 27. Secondly, I observe that the Defendant filed a second amended statement of defence and the Claimant also filed a reply to the second amended statement of defence. Both parties filed fresh witness depositions in support of the amended pleadings. Curiously, at the trial both parties adopted their depositions before and after the second amendment. This, to my mind, is irregular and inappropriate. It is the law that an amendment of a pleading relates back to the time such pleading was filed. The witness depositions filed along with the previous pleading is superseded by the witness depositions attached to the second amended pleading. See the case of Joseph Ebeilubhubi Oseyomon & Anor. v. S. D. Ojo [1993] 6 NWLR [pt.299] 344 at 361. Consequently, the Claimant’s further additional statement on oath dated 1st July 2016 and the Defendant’s witness statement on oath dated 22nd June 2016 having been superseded by the Claimant’s further statement on oath dated 17th May 2017 and the Defendant’s witness further statement on oath dated 17th November 2016 are hereby struck out.

Having regard to the facts of this case, it is plain to me that this is an ordinary master and servant relationship. The parties are agreed that exhibits I and DW3, the Defendant’s Employee Handbook, govern the employment relationship. For the purpose of this judgment, therefore, I shall use exhibit DW3 since it is later in time and learned Counsel to the Claimant agreed that it is in pari materia with exhibit I. Exhibit DW3 stipulates the conditions of service. It sets out on pages 5 and 6 to expose the employees to employees’ code of conduct; ethical and professional standards and terms and conditions of service. Exhibit DW3 is thus fundamental to the determination of this case. It is trite that the conditions of service are the bedrock of any contract of service. See O. Amodu v. Dr. J. O. Amode & Anor. [1990] 5 NWLR [pt. 150] 356 at 372-373. In Frank Jowan & 77 Ors. v. Delta Steel Company Ltd. [2013] 1 ACELR 18 at 25, it was held that where there is a document or series of documents incorporating the terms and conditions of an employment, a Court of law should not look outside those terms in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. It is therefore important to look at the salient provisions of exhibit DW3 and see the disciplinary procedure stipulated therein, the offences specified and punishment prescribed and the effect of exhibit J.

The disciplinary procedure is set out in Article 14 from page 49 of exhibit DW3. It provides that “Management reserves the prerogative to discipline erring staff in accordance with the Bank’s laid down rules and regulations” [emphasis supplied]. It is thus clear to me that any power of discipline wielded by the Defendant must be in accordance with its laid down rules and regulations. Article 14 then goes on to outline the disciplinary procedure beginning with a query, answer to the query, setting up of a disciplinary committee, invitation to the offender and his defence before the disciplinary committee and then appeal against the sanction. The parties are also agreed that this procedure was followed except that the Defendant did not consider the Claimant’s appeal. Although, it is in evidence that the Claimant’s appeal was not considered, learned Counsel to the Claimant did not urge it on the Court in his address, that point is therefore deemed abandoned. The point of dispute in this case is the punishment meted out to the Claimant. While the Claimant contended that summary dismissal for his alleged offence is excessive and contrary to exhibit DW3, the Defendant argued that it is justified and permissible under exhibit DW3. At the end of the day, the determination of whether the punishment of summary dismissal is justified or not will depend on the sanction provided in exhibit DW3 for the offence allegedly committed by the Claimant. In his statement on oath made on 21st July 2015, the Claimant testified as follows:

“9. Apart from my normal schedule of duties as Head Local Services at 2nd Okpara Avenue Branch of the defendant within the period of the incident in issue in this case, which is in or around March 2014, I equally acted from time to time as review officer of some call over partitions or transaction in the branch. One of such transactions was on 24/3/2014 regarding transaction undertaken on 21/3/2014 especially the one involving the sum of N7, 836,000.00. I can identify a copy of the said Call Over Certificate for the said sum of N7, 836,000.00 if I see it.”

“10. Sometime after the said 24/3/2014, it came to my knowledge that some fraudulent transactions were discovered to have been perpetrated at the said 2nd Okpara Avenue Branch on 21/3/2014 which said transactions were posted with the user or staff identity number [ID] of the Branch Services Manager, Mrs. Taiwo Abimbola-Ojo [SN 017144]. The transaction in question happened to be the one involving the sum of N7, 836,000.00 in respect of which I signed the Call Over Certificate as review officer on 24/3/2104.”

“11. The said transactions consisted of fund transfers of the total sum of N6, 836,000.00 [six million, eight hundred and thirty six thousand naira only] and N1, 000,000.00 [one million naira only] from the bank accounts of two customers of the defendant to wit: Stallion Group Ltd and Nigerian Breweries Plc respectively; to eight different beneficiaries vide First Bank account numbers as shown below:….”

“12. From the discoveries made, the proceeds of the said fraud were instantly withdrawn by the perpetrators from the aforesaid respective bank accounts vide ATM and other electronic banking devices before the evening of Sunday, 23/3/2014 making it practically impossible for the Call Over of the transaction on the next working day being Monday 24/3/2014 to detect or prevent the loss of the funds.”

There was no material dispute of these facts by the Defendant. In DW1’s statement on oath made on 17th November 2016, she deposed as follows:

“7. That the Claimant was in charge of monitoring/supervising the execution of call over exercise by staff.”

“8. That there were fraudulent transactions on the Defendant’s customers’ account totaling N7, 836,000.00 [Seven Million Eight Hundred and Thirty Six Thousand Naira] which accounts belong to Nigerian Breweries Plc and Stallion Nigeria Ltd.”

“9. That the Claimant generated the transaction journal/call over certificate for the call over exercise. The fraudulent transactions showed in the journal for call over, the Claimant failed to detect the fraud which he ought to have detected had he performed his duty diligently as the call-over Review Officer.”

However, the Defendant laboured to prove negligent performance of his duty as call over review officer. DW1 testified in her statement on oath of 17th November 2016 as follows:

“10. I shall lead evidence to show during the trial that the signatories to a call-over certificate are the Processor (for which space for Name, Staff Number and Signature is provided at the top right of the call-over certificate), the HLS Review Officer (for which space for Name, Staff Number and Signature is provided at the bottom) and the Call-over Officer (for which space for Name, Staff Number and Signature is provided at the bottom just above the provision for the HLS Review Officer’s signature). I consequently rely on the call over certificate signed by the Claimant on 24th March, 2014 frontloaded by the Claimant and sought to be relied on by him.”

“11. That it is strict banking practice, that all signatories must sign the call-over certificate/s as evidence of a duly conducted call-over exercise before they are forwarded or accepted by the Internal Audit. I also rely on the First Bank’s Memo to all staff dated March 11, 2015 relied on by the Claimant to buttress the seriousness of “improper call-over” which is an offence under the “Negligence/Improper Performance of Duty” which incurs the sanction of summary dismissal for any staff found culpable of such negligence.

“12. I shall lead evidence during the trial to show that it is also the strict banking procedure that the Processor being the initiator of any call-over exercise must sign the call-over certificate before they could be dispatched to the relevant officers for the call-over exercise and that the relevant officers being the HLS Review Officer and the Call-over Officer has [sic] no authority to proceed on any call-over exercise save the call-over certificate is initiated and signed by the Processor, a personal function which cannot be delegated.

“13. That the Claimant as the HLS Review Officer acted in flagrant breach of the banking practice by signing and purporting to authenticate an irregular call-over certificate which was not signed by the requisite authority and which embodied the fraudulent transfer of N7, 836,000.00 [Seven Million Eight Hundred and Thirty Six Thousand Naira] belonging to the Defendant Bank’s customers.

“14. That the Claimant as the HLS Review Officer in addition to his duty of supervising and inquiring into whether there is any irregularity in the called-over transactions by a Call-Over Officer, also has the responsibility to verify that the call-over exercise was duly authenticated and initiated by the Processor, a duty which he is fully aware of having been in constant compliance with the ethics until he ceased to do same, thus leading to his dismissal.”

“24. That the Claimant was queried for deceiving management by signing the call over certificate without properly reviewing the call-over transaction.

“25. That the Claimant ought not to have signed the call over certificate as Review Officer if he was not negligent. Claimant ought to have detected the fraudulent transaction if he had performed his duty diligently as a Review Officer. I rely on the call-over certificate signed by the Claimant without properly reviewing the call- over transaction.”

The Claimant successfully countered this piece of evidence in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of his further statement on oath made on 17th May 2017. It is clear to me from the evidence of DW1 that the Defendant was fishing for evidence to justify the summary dismissal of the Claimant. Under cross examination, DW1 confirmed that “The fraud had taken place before the call over exercise. The Claimant’s role as the review officer was the last. I don’t know who wrote and gave exhibit D to him. I know Oluchi Mba. She was responsible for distributing call over assignments. Exhibit D was sent to my head office. Yes, the customer discovered the fraud not the Bank. The Bank did not raise any questions of any irregularity on exhibit D until this case. I don’t know if exhibit D came with any physical voucher. I was in the office on Monday, 24/3/14. I don’t know if looking at exhibit D you can detect that it is fraudulent. Yes, the review officer is to review documents before him.” It is thus evident that DW1 was present when the call-over exercise was carried out and received a copy of exhibit D. It is equally true that if the Claimant breached any banking procedure in signing exhibit D, DW1 and the Internal Audit would have queried exhibit D upon receipt. Neither DW1 nor the Internal Audit queried exhibit D. Moreover, the Claimant disputed the existence of such banking practice or procedure as set out above and the Defendant did not lead any further evidence to prove the existence of the banking practice or procedure. A properly signed call over certificate was not tendered to prove the procedure contended by the Defendant. The existence of the banking practice or procedure is a question of fact that must be proved by evidence. See section 16 of the Evidence Act and the case of Okpowagha & Anor. v. Ewhedoma [1970] LPELR-2522[SC] at pages 9-11. Section 133[1] of the Evidence Act provides that in civil cases, the burden of first proving existence or non-existence of a fact lies on a party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side. As this alleged banking practice or procedure has not been judicially noticed, it can only be proved to exist by evidence; and the burden of proof is on the Defendant.. I find and hold that in these circumstances the Defendant has failed to discharge this evidential burden.

I must quickly observe here that paragraphs 15, 16 and 25 of DW1’s further statement on oath made on 17th November 2016 are not statements of facts. They are not the product of an investigation or the testimony of someone who witnessed the event; and there is no evidence before me to corroborate the assertion that the Claimant did not review the call over exercise before signing the certificate. These paragraphs are mere arguments and deductions aimed at justifying or arriving at a pre-determined conclusion and they are hereby struck out pursuant to section 115[2] of the Evidence Act 2011. See also Keystone Bank Limited v. A. O. S. Practice [2013] LPELR-20357[CA] at page 29. What is more, the DW1 received a copy of the call over certificate, exhibit D, but did not raise any issue with it. She had the opportunity of spot-checking exhibit D and querying the absence of her signature and other alleged errors as the Business Services Manager, but she did not and could not have because there was nothing irregular or suspicious on the face of exhibit D. As set forth above, DW1 under cross examination said “I don’t know if looking at exhibit D you can detect that it is fraudulent. Yes, the review officer is to review documents before him.” The Claimant’s evidence on this score was not challenged and I accept it as correct in view of what I have said above. In N. E. Okoye & Another v. Centre Point Merchant Bank Ltd. [2008] 7-12 SC 1 at 28, Niki Tobi, J.S.C. [of blessed memory] held:

“I should also say that affidavit evidence is not sacrosanct. It is not above the evaluation of the courts. Like oral evidence, a court of law is entitled to evaluate affidavit evidence in order to ensure its veracity and or authenticity. While uncontradicted affidavit evidence should be used by the court, there are instances when such affidavit evidence clearly tell a lie and the courts cannot be blind to such a lie.”

I dare to say that this is one of such affidavit evidence.

Also, learned Counsel to the Defendant on pages 2 and 3 of his written address referred to section 11[1] and [5] of the Labour Act and submitted that subsection 5 empowers an employer to dismiss an employee for misconduct. With due respect to learned Counsel, there is nothing in exhibit DW3 to draw such inference from. I have read through exhibit DW3 and there is no reference made to the Labour Act therein. Therefore, the Defendant cannot import the provisions of the Labour Act into the contract between the parties herein. In Frank Jowan & 77 Ors. v. Delta Steel Company Ltd. [supra] at 26, the Court of Appeal in a unanimous decision delivered by Gumel, JCA, had this to say: “Since exhibit C has made adequate provisions on redundancy and it has not in any manner whatsoever incorporated any other provisions of any law or regulations to be applicable to the staff of the defendant, there does not appear to be any room for the provisions of section 20 to be brought in as suggested and argued by learned Counsel to the appellants.” I therefore find and hold that the provisions of the Labour Act are not applicable to this case.

From the evidence before me, the following facts are established:

The Claimant was only a call-over review officer on 24th March 2014. He did not generate or distribute the call over certificate. The call over certificate was generated and distributed by Miss Oluchi Mba.

The transaction in respect of which the call-over was done on 24th March 2014 was executed around 7.21pm on Friday, 21st March 2014, outside the Defendant’s banking hours.

The transaction was dry-posted using DW1’s user identity number SN 017144. This is a super password which did not require verification.

The proceed of the fraud was utilized before the end of Sunday, 23rd March 2014.

At the time of the call-over review on 24th March 2014, the money had left the Defendant’s system and there was nothing the Claimant could have done in the circumstances to prevent the fraudulent transaction.

DW1 was in the office on 24th March 2014 when the call over exercise was undertaken and received a copy of exhibit D and did not raise any objection to the absence of her signature on it or as to any other irregularity.

The Claimant was not in any way implicated in the fraud. Consequently, the evidence of DW1 in paragraphs 15 and 26 of her further statement on oath made on 17th November 2016 is despicable and high condemnable. It is a bare-faced lie.

The Defendant did not suffer any loss on account of the performance or non-performance or improper performance of the Claimant’s duty as a call-over review officer on 24th March 2014.

The complaint against the Claimant was “FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS FROM A/C STALLION GROUP LTD & NIGERIAN BREWERIES PLC: INEFFECTIVE CALL OVER EXERCISE” arising from his failure to escalate the dry-posted transaction of 21st March 2014 as an exception.

Having said this, I will now look at the provision of exhibit DW3 dealing with sanctions and offences. Article 14.1 is captioned “Sanctions/Offences” and states that: ‘These are listed hereunder’. Article 14.3 captioned “Offences that Attract Warning Letter or Termination of Appointment” provides as follows:

“An employee may be given a written warning in respect of any of the following major cases of misconduct/negligence [emphasis supplied]:

Absence from the place proper and appointed for the performance of work without leave or legitimate cause;
Frequent late arrival at work;
Making himself/herself unfit for the proper performance of his/her work during working hours, for example, by becoming intoxicated;
Neglecting to perform any work, which it was his/her duty to have performed, or carelessly or improperly performing any work, which it was his/her duty to have performed [emphasis supplied];
Using any abusive or insulting language or becoming guilty of insulting behavior to any person placed in authority over him or her;
Borrowing money from third parties without a formal approval of management;
Refusing to obey any proper instruction from any person placed in authority over him/her whose instruction it was his/her duty to obey and
Any other act of misconduct/negligence as may be determined by management.

The query, exhibit E, given to the Claimant relates to ineffective call-over exercise arising from failure “to escalate the dry-posted transactions as an exception during call over exercise to relevant authority.…” This, in my humble view, falls within the particulars of offences set out in Article 14.3 item 4 above or item 34 on page 59 of exhibit DW3 and the maximum penalty should be termination. However, the Defendant contended in paragraphs 4.17 to 4.40 of its written final address that particulars of the misconduct stated above, and given the facts established in this case, amount to gross misconduct and the punishment is summary dismissal under Article 14.5 of exhibit DW3. Article 14.5 is captioned summary dismissal and provides as follows:

“An Employee may be summarily dismissed for certain acts of gross misconduct or negligence. Such acts include:

Proven cases of theft, fraud, dishonesty, defalcations, irregular practices in respect of cash, vouchers, records, returns, customer’s account or foreign exchange transaction.
Wilful disobedience of a lawful order or serious negligence;
Drunkenness or taking drugs, other than for medical reasons, thus becoming unfit to carry out duties;
Divulging confidential information in breach of Declaration of “Confidentiality”.
Conviction for a criminal offence;
Prolonged and/or frequent absence from work without leave or reasonable cause;
Fighting and assault or engaging in disorderly behavior during working hours, or on the office premises or within its immediate surroundings;
Deriving any benefit in the course of official duties, which places the employee in such a position that his/her personal interest and his/her duty to the employer or any customer of the Bank are in conflict.
Failure to report promptly any irregularity on the part of any other employee or non-employee after having knowledge of such irregularity;
Using abusive or insulting language or showing unruly behaviours to any client, which is prejudicial to the business interest of the Bank;
Any other acts of gross misconduct.”

While the word ‘include’ means the category of gross misconduct is not closed, there is nothing in DW1’s evidence and the exhibits tendered in this case that brings the particulars of misconduct alleged against the Claimant within the category of acts listed in Article 14.5 above. The finding of the Defendant’s Internal Audit, exhibit DW1-DW1E, page 3 paragraph 5 reads: “The Head of Local Services [HLS], Godwin Nwachukwu generated the transaction journal for call over exercise on the next working day (Monday, 24/03/2014) by 7.49am and the fraudulent transactions showed in the journal used for call over. However, the fraud was not detected during the call over until Stallion Group Ltd made a complaint through RM on the 7th April, 2014.” Even though this finding is inconsistent with the evidence as it relates to the generation of the journal [while Internal Audit claimed he generated the journal which was contradicted by DW1 and the Claimant, the Disciplinary Committee said he supervised the call over], the key phrase there is “the fraud was not detected”. The conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee on page 3 of exhibit DW2-DW2B is “Godwin Nwachukwu as the supervisor should have detected the fraud if he had called over the transaction.” Apart from the apparent contradiction in the findings of the Internal Audit and the Disciplinary Committee, DW1, under cross examination, said “I don’t know if looking at exhibit D you can detect that it is fraudulent. Yes, the review officer is to review documents before him.” This piece of evidence, taken together with the findings of the Internal Audit and Disciplinary Committee, in my considered opinion, brings the offence of the Claimant within Article 14.3 item 4 or item 34 on page 59 of exhibit DW3 and the maximum penalty is termination. I am also of the firm view that the Defendant understood this fact after the Disciplinary Committee sitting, but intent on achieving a pre-determined result, generated exhibit J on 11th March 2015 titled “Call Over Procedure”. Paragraph 3 of exhibit J is instructive. It states: “All members of staff are hereby notified that henceforth any staff who is found culpable of the infraction of “improper call-over” or “failure to perform call over” which are offences under the “Negligence/Improper Performance of Duty” category, will incur the sanction of “Summary Dismissal”. Evidently, the offence did not attract the penalty of summary dismissal at the time the offence was committed and the Claimant’s dismissal was pre-determined and exhibit J was issued to justify it. I so find and hold. By Article 14.3 item 4 and item 34 on page 59 of exhibit DW3 the maximum penalty for the offence alleged against the Claimant is termination. The timing of the release of exhibit J and its contents presuppose that it was targeted at the Claimant. Curiously, exhibit J was signed by Barbara A. Harper who was also the Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee and signed exhibit DW2-DW2B.

It is trite that justification of a particular dismissal is a question of fact that must be established in evidence; and the onus is on the Defendant to justify the dismissal when challenged by the Claimant. See pages 174 and 176 of Nigerian Employment and Labour Relations Law and Practice by Chioma Kanu Agomo. In T. C. Nigeria Ltd. v. Samuel Peters [2009] LPELR-8426[CA] at page 18-19, it was held that where conditions of service exist between the employer and the employee, the provisions are binding on them. Any disciplinary measure by way of dismissal or termination must follow the laid down procedure. Also, in Fiicharles Organ & 14 Ors. v. Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited & Anor. [2016] 8 ACELR 35 at 52, per Muhammad, JSC, held: “Again it is trite that he who hires can fire. It nevertheless remains the law that an employer must observe and adhere to the conditions under which the employee is hired before such employee can be fired otherwise the employer can ipso facto be held liable for unlawful termination of the services of the employee.” In P. C. Mike Eze v. Spring Bank Plc [2014] 3 ACELR 39 at 60, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, observed: “Now, to determine whether the dismissal of an employee was correct or wrong, the terms of employment of the aggrieved employee must be examined to see whether the correct procedure was followed. Where there is a departure from the prescribed procedure or a violation of the elementary rules of natural justice, then the dismissal is unlawful.” Learned Counsel to the Defendant, obviously intending to downplay or mitigate the effect of exhibit J in paragraph 4.48 page 9 of his written address said: “It is submitted that Exhibit J merely re-emphasised and clarified the importance of call-over exercise. What governs the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is Exhibit DW3 [Employee Handbook tendered by the Defendant] and same supersedes any memo whatsoever including Exhibit J.” Learned Counsel relied on Katto v. CBN [1999] 6 NWLR [pt.607] 390. While learned Counsel is spot-on on exhibit DW3, he ignored the effect of exhibit J on the decision of the disciplinary committee and reliance placed on it by the Defendant to justify inclusion of the Claimant’s misconduct in Article 14.5 and the damaging impact on the Claimant’s career. Moreover, a party should be consistent in stating his case and proving it. As Oputa, JSC [as he then was], puts it: “He will not be allowed to take one stance in his pleadings, then turn summersault during trial; then assume nonchalant attitude in the Court of Appeal; only to revert to his case as pleaded in the Supreme Court. Justice is much more than a game of hide and seek. It is an attempt, our human imperfections notwithstanding, to discover the truth. Justice will never decree anything in favour of so slippery a customer as the present Defendant/Applicant.” See the cases of Salawu Ajide v. Kadiri Kelani [1985] 3 NWLR [pt.12] 248 at 269 [1985] LPELR-302[SC] and Thompson Igweshi & 2 Ors. v. Benjamin N. Atu & 11 Ors. [1993] 6 NWLR [pt.300] 484 at 498-499. It is manifest from the evidence before this Court, and I find and so hold, that the dismissal of the Claimant was on the basis of exhibit J and did not comply with the Defendant’s conditions of service, exhibit DW3.

Learned Counsel to the Defendant in paragraph 4.9 page 4 of his written address argued that exhibit DW3, by virtue of Article 14.5 gave the Defendant latitude to determine what amounts to any other acts of gross misconduct and relied on Oyedele v. LUTH [sic] [supra]. He also argued in paragraph 4.18 page 5 of his written address that by signing the call-over certificate without reviewing/supervising the transaction, the Claimant deceived the Management of the Defendant and that this act amounts to negligence, dishonesty and irregular practices in respect of cash, vouchers, records and customer’s account as provided in Article 14.5 of exhibit DW3. In his response, learned Counsel to the Claimant, in paragraph 4.1.26 of his written address contended that this line of argument is misconceived. He explained that the acts specified in Article 14.5 which entitles the Defendant to summarily dismiss its employee are conducts which reflect a total disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service and submitted that any other acts of gross misconduct must be interpreted ‘ejusdem generis the specific acts mentioned in the preceding items’ and relied on Ehuwa v. O. S. I. E. C. [supra]. While the Defendant, as an employer, has the right to reclassify any act as gross misconduct like it did in exhibit J, it is my considered view that such reclassification should have been made prior to the occurrence of the incident giving rise to the query and subsequent dismissal of the Claimant. That is to say, the reclassification must be made and known to the affected staff before his appearance at the disciplinary committee but not after. Exhibit DW3 is the condition of service of the Defendant and contains detail provisions on offences and sanctions. Where the particular act of the Claimant was not classified in exhibit DW3 as gross misconduct prior to his appearance before the disciplinary committee, doing so after the proceeding is high-handed, oppressive and unjustifiable. Rules must be clear and specific and punishments defined and not couched in a manner as to ensnare or confuse the staff. On the ejusdem generis rule, in Chief [Mrs.] Olufunke Victoria Ehuwa v. Ondo State Independent Electoral Commission & 3 Ors. [supra] at page 568-569, Ogbuagu, JSC, held that “It is now firmly established that in the construction of a statutory provision, where a statute mentions specific things or persons, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. The latin maxim is “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius” – i.e. the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” In his contribution at page 595 of the report, Tabai, JSC, put it this way, “I think this is where the Ejusdem generis rule should apply. The rule simply means that in interpreting the provisions of a statute general words which follow particular and specific words of the same nature as themselves take their meaning from those specific words.” See also the case of Chief Theodore Ahamefule Orji & Anor. v. Onyema Ugochukwu & 3 Ors. [2009] 14 NWLR [pt.1161] 207 at 291. I agree entirely with their Lordships. Applying these decisions to this case, I hold that item 1 of Article 14.5 of exhibit DW3 cannot by any stretch of imagination be read to include improper call-over or failure to escalate the dry-posted transaction as an exception to relevant authority. This much was admitted by the Defendant in exhibit J. Learned Counsel’s argument that ‘by signing the call-over certificate without reviewing/supervising the transaction, the Claimant deceived the Management of the Defendant and that this act amounts to negligence, dishonesty and irregular practices in respect of cash, vouchers, records and customer’s account as provided in Article 14.5 of exhibit DW3’ is misconceived. Item 1 of Article 14.5 states: “Proven cases of theft, fraud, dishonesty, defalcations, irregular practices in respect of cash, vouchers, records, returns, customer’s account or foreign exchange transaction.” There was no evidence before this Court that the Claimant failed to escalate the dry-posted transaction because he wanted to cover up the fraud. The evidence before this Court tends to establish that the Claimant was careless in the performance of his duty as a call over review officer. I hold that exhibit DW3 means what it says and must be interpreted according to the strict, plain, clear and ordinary meaning of the words used. See Texaco Overseas [Nigeria] & Anor. v. Rangk Limited [2008] LPELR-9850[CA] at 19. There is no offence of ‘deceiving management’ in exhibit DW3 and at any rate, the Claimant could not have deceived management because exhibit D was forwarded to Internal Audit, which had the responsibility to verify it and raise relevant questions, and DW1, the Business Services Manager, who is the most senior officer in the Branch. Both of them did not detect the fraud or any irregularity in the call over. Moreover, the ineffective call over was not responsible for the loss of N7, 836,000. The money had already left the Defendant’s system before the call over exercise. It is, as the saying goes, ‘trying to call a dog a bad name in order to hang it’.
In the light of the foregoing, I find and hold that the dismissal of the Claimant was in breach of exhibit DW3, the Defendant’s Employee Handbook, and consequently wrongful.

Having so found, what is the remedy available to the Claimant? The law is firmly settled that the remedy is always an award of damages. See Philip Terwase Nongu v. Local Government Service Commission & Anor. [2011] LPELR-4851[CA] 1 at 30. Ordinarily, since the Claimant has served the Defendant for 25 years, he is entitled to his full terminal benefits including the unpaid upfront allowances for the period January to March 2015. Unfortunately, there is no claim for terminal benefits. The Claimant claimed the sum of N150, 000,000 [one hundred and fifty million naira] general damages for wrongful dismissal and/or breach of contract of employment. In Mobil Producing [Nig.] Unltd & Another v. Udo Tom Udo [2008] 36 WRN 53 at 103, it was held:

“General damages are the kind of damages which the law presumes to flow from the wrong complained of. They are such as the Court will award in the circumstance of a case…. It may be awarded to assuage such a loss which flows naturally from the defendant’s act. It need not be specifically pleaded because damages follow breach of contract. It arises from inference of law and need not be proved by evidence. It is sufficient if it is generally averred…. Now, the measure of general damages in terms of money is a matter for the Judge. It is always necessary for the Judge to make his own assessment of the quantum of such damage. General damages unlike special damages are generally incapable of substantially exact calculation. They are presumed by the law to be the direct and probable consequences of the act complained of.”

See also the case of Essien Ibok v. Spring Bank Plc [2012] LPELR-7856[CA] at page 19. Applying these decisions to this case, I find that the Claimant was entitled to a total remuneration of N9, 633,413.30 per annum and has put in 25 years in the service of the Defendant. If his employment was terminated, as provided in exhibit DW3, he would have been entitled to his full benefits but this is no longer possible since he did not claim it. In the circumstance, and in view of all that have been said above and taking into account his 25 years unblemished service to the Defendant; and sections 13 and 14 of National Industrial Court Act, 2006, I find and hold that the Claimant is entitled to general damages for wrongful dismissal. I accordingly award the Claimant the sum of N15, 000,000.00 [fifteen million naira] general damages for wrongful dismissal against the Defendant payable within 30 days from the date of this judgment, failing which the judgment sum shall attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 31st March 2018 until it is fully liquidated.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant’s case succeeds. Judgment is entered in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant as follows:

The purported summary dismissal of the Claimant from his employment by the Defendant vide Defendant’s letter dated 27th March 2015 is wrongful and in breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment with the Defendant.