AUGUSTINE NWODOM NWIBO VS JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION,

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABAKALIKI JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABAKALIKI

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA

Date: 26th September 2018

SUIT NO. NICN/EN/129/2013

BETWEEN

AUGUSTINE NWODOM NWIBO

CLAIMANT

AND

JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION, EBONYI STATE
HON. JUSTICE ALLOY NWANKWO
UNO NWEZE ESQ.

DEFENDANTS

REPRESENTATION:

Ejike Anwu Esq. with Joshua Friday Ezenyi Esq. and Fidelis Ajim Njoku Esq. for the Claimant

Chief Tagbo Ike with Ijeoma Eze Okereke Esq., Uju Ohale Esq. and Nnamdi Udu Esq. for the Defendants

JUDGMENT

The Claimant commenced this action by a Complaint on 5th June 2013 claiming against the Defendants as follows:

A declaration that the termination of his employment with the 1st Defendant by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is unlawful, unfair, unwarranted, unprovoked, unconstitutional, null and void.

A declaration that the termination of his appointment without affording him the opportunity to know the allegation against him and to be heard in defence amounted to gross violation of his fundamental right to fair hearing as protected under section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended.

An order reinstating the Claimant with immediate effect, with all his full entitlements and benefits inclusive of any arrears owed him.

Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from any further harassment or termination of his employment.

The Claimant filed with the complaint a statement of facts, list of witness and sworn statement of the Claimant and copies of the documents he wished to rely on at the trial. With the leave of Court granted on 4th December 2013, the Defendants filed their statement of defence together with a list of their witness and statement on oath of the witness. Trial commenced on 25th May 2018 and was concluded on the same day. The Claimant testified for himself and tendered 5 exhibits in proof of his claim. Exhibit A is the appointment letter, exhibit B is confirmation of appointment, exhibit C is promotion letter, exhibit D is termination letter and exhibit E is the Claimant’s letter of appeal. The Defendants called one witness and tendered no exhibits. The case was thereafter adjourned for adoption of final written addresses. Learned Counsel for the Defendants, Miss Ohale, adopted the Defendants’ final written address dated 8th June 2018 and reply on point of law dated 12th July 2018 as the Defendants’ argument in support of the defence. Learned Counsel for the Claimant, Mr. Anwu, also adopted the Claimant’s final written address dated 2nd July 2018 as his argument in support of the claim. The case was consequently set down for judgment.

CLAIMANT’S CASE

The Claimant’s case is that he was a staff of the 1st Defendant having been employed on 29th October 2001 as Clerical Assistant and deployed to Mbeke Ishieke Customary Court, exhibit A. His appointment was confirmed on 12th January 2004, exhibit B, and he was promoted on 24th May 2005 with effect from 1st January 2005 to Grade level 4 step 4, exhibit C and worked without blemish, caution, query or suspension until 13th March 2013 when his appointed was terminated without notice, exhibit D. He attributed his termination to disagreements between the Chairman of the Customary Court, Barrister Steve Nwankwo, and the Registrar, Mr. Modacai Nwuzor, leading to the transfer of Mr. Nwuzor to the Headquarters; subsequent petitions against the Chairman and setting up of a panel to investigate the complaints against him. He appealed to the 1st Defendant by letter dated 15th March 2013, exhibit E, for a review of his termination but did not receive any response from the 1st Defendant hence this action.

DEFENDANTS’ CASE

The Defendants admitted that the Claimant was a staff of the 1st Defendant but denied that his employment had statutory flavour. It is the Defendants’ case that the Claimant was a junior staff whose service was dispensable at the pleasure of the 1st Defendant without assigning any reason; and flowing from this, the 1st Defendant disengaged him when his services were no longer required and paid his entitlements.

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS

The Defendants raised a preliminary objection, pursuant to paragraph 10 of their joint statement of defence, to the joinder of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants who are agents of a disclosed principal and urged the Court to strike out their names. They relied on J & J Techno [Nig.] Ltd. v. Y. H. Q. S. Ltd [2015] 8 NWLR [pt. 1460] 1. The Defendants formulated one issue for determination namely, whether the manner the 1st Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimant is lawful?

Arguing this lone issue learned Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated. The Defendants contended that the Claimant’s employment was the ordinary master and servant contract and the 1st Defendant has the right to hire and fire. Referring to exhibit A it was contended that the letter of employment did not make reference to any Rules and the effect of “non reference to any body of rules governing the employment of the Claimant in the offer of appointment is that the Claimant’s employment was under the received common law and the manner of its determination shall be under the common law principles.”

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANT

The Claimant raised four issues for determination in his final written address, to wit:

Whether the 1st Defendant, a statutory body is a public service office, and its affairs governed by the Public Service Rules, 2009?

Whether the Claimant is a public officer and his appointment a statutory one which enjoys statutory flavours as governed by the Public Service Rules, 2009 or that of a mere master and servant relationship, whose appointment is at the pleasure of his master, 1st Defendant?

Whether or not in the discharge of his lawful duties, the 1st Defendant shall comply with the Public Service Rules vis-à-vis its practice and procedures and whether exhibit D is null and void having failed to comply with the provisions of the Public Service Rules, 2009?

Whether the Claimant is consequently entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit?

In response to the preliminary objection, learned Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant acted through the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and their joinder is necessary to enforce any order the Court may make against the 1st Defendant and relied on FMC Ido Ekiti v. Kolawole [2012] All FWLR [pt.635] 1999.

Arguing issue one, learned Counsel contended that the 1st Defendant is a creation of statute and as a result its affairs are regulated by the Public Service Rules. On issue two, he submitted that by virtue of Items 10, 14 and 16 Part II, Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, section 18 of the Interpretation Act and Rule 010103 of the Public Service Rules, the Claimant is a public officer and his employment is regulated by law and urged the Court to discountenance the Defendants’ argument that the appointment is one of master and servant and relied on Annam v. BJSC [2006] All FWLR [pt.296] 843 at 847.

Canvassing issue three learned Counsel argued that the 1st Defendant is bound to conduct its affairs in compliance with the Constitution and Public Service Rules. He contended that in terminating the Claimant’s appointment no recourse was made to the Civil Service Rules. He submitted that when a statute provides a procedure for termination of employment, it must be complied with, otherwise, the termination will be declared null and void and referred to Laoye v. FPSC [1989] 2 NWLR [pt.106] 652. While conceding that the 1st Defendant could terminate the Claimant’s appointment, learned Counsel submitted that the procedure specified in the Public Service Rules must be exhausted before his employment can be terminated. Finally, on issue four, learned Counsel submitted that on the authority of FMC Ido Ekiti v. Kolawole [supra] at 2003 and Yemisi v. FIRS [2013] All FWLR [pt.693] 1992 at 1999, and evidence before the Court, the Claimant has proved his case and entitled to judgment as claimed.

REPLY ON POINT OF LAW

By way of reply on point of law, the Defendants contended that the cases cited by the Claimant in response to the preliminary objection were not applicable to this case. In response to issue three, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant is the party in whom the law reposes the burden to prove the existence of the Rules governing his employment with the 1st Defendant and relied on section 131[1] Evidence Act. He submitted that exhibit A is bare and made no reference to any Public Service Rules. Relying on A. R. Momoh v. CBN [2012] 1 NILR 48 at 78, he submitted that the remedy of reinstatement attaches to an employment with statutory flavour and not to the Claimant.

COURT’S DECISION

I have considered the processes filed in this suit and submissions of learned Counsel for the parties. From the pleadings and evidence before the Court, it is my considered opinion that the issue for determination formulated by the Defendants is more apposite. Accordingly, I will adopt it with a slight modification, to wit: whether the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated by the 1st Defendant?

First, let me deal with the Defendants’ preliminary objection which is anchored on paragraph 10 of their statement of defence dated 2nd December 2013. Relying on J & J. Techno Nigeria Ltd. & Anor. v. Yubah H. Quality Services Ltd. & 2Ors. [supra], the Defendants submitted that an agent of a disclosed principal incurs no personal liability. The Claimant’s response is that the 1st Defendant acted through them and their joinder is necessary for enforcement of the Court’s orders. Order 13 rule 4 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria [Civil Procedure] Rules 2017 provides, inter alia:

“Any person may be joined as Defendant against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative.” [Underlining mine]

For a right to a relief to exist against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, there must be a reasonable cause of action against them. The law is settled that a reasonable cause of action means a cause of action with some chances of success. For a statement of facts to disclose a reasonable cause of action, it must set out the legal rights of the Claimant and the obligations of the Defendants; and show in what way the Defendants failed to fulfil their obligation so that if there is no proper defence, the Claimant will succeed in the remedy he seeks. Thus, a pleading can be said to disclose no reasonable cause of action where it is such that nobody can understand what claim the Defendants are required to meet. See Nokia West Africa [Nigeria] Limited v. Mr. Williams Orioha [2016] LPELR-40189[CA] at pages 18-19 and Oba Ilufemiloye Adesola & Anor. v. Oba Oludele Falade-Fatila & 2 Ors. [2014] LPELR-23800[CA] at page 38. Consequently, where no cause of action is disclosed against a Defendant, the Court may strike out the name of that party. See Veralam Holdings Limited v. Galba Limited & Anor. [2014] LPELR-22671[CA] at page 13 and Order 13 rule 6[2] of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria [Civil Procedure] Rules 2017. There is nothing in the 22 paragraphs statement of facts alleging any breach of duty against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants even though the Claimant joined them in relief a. Exhibit D clearly shows that the 3rd Defendant acted on behalf of the 1st Defendant. There is no mention of the 2nd Defendant in any of the exhibits. Their joinder is on the strength of their positions as Chairman and Secretary respectively of the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant is a juristic person capable of maintaining an action in its name. In J & J. Techno Nigeria Ltd. & Anor. v. Yubah H. Quality Services Ltd. & 2 Ors. [supra] at page 21, the Court of Appeal, per Orji-Abadua, J.C.A., held:

“It is the law that an agent acting on behalf of a known and disclosed principal incurs no personal liability. It is settled law that there must be a cause of action before an intending litigant can initiate any legitimate proceedings against a party. Further, an agent of a revealed principal is an unnecessary party to the action.”

See also Ikemefuna C. Amadiume & Anor. v. Mrs. Agnes Solomon Ibok & 2 Ors. [2006] 6 NWLR [pt.975] 158 at 176. I am of the firm view and I so hold that the joinder of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is unnecessary. Order 13 rule 6[2] of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria [Civil Procedure] Rules 2017, empowers this Court to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent the Defendants from being embarrassed or put to unnecessary expense. Although this preliminary objection is coming at this stage of the proceedings, I find merit in the objection and it is hereby sustained. I find and hold that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not proper parties to this suit and their names are consequently struck out from this suit. See Order 13 rule 14[2] of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria [Civil Procedure] Rules 2017.

This leads me to the main issue for determination in this suit which is, whether the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated by the 1st Defendant? The law is trite that the burden of proof is on the Claimant who alleges unlawful termination of his employment and he discharges this by setting out the terms and conditions of his contract of service and the manner in which it has been breached. See sections 131[1] and 133[1] of the Evidence Act 2011 andPatrick Ziideeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2016] 9 ACELR 22 at 31. It is also the law that the Claimant who seeks declaratory reliefs has the onerous burden of establishing his entitlement to the reliefs. Evidence which must support a legal right or claim must be overwhelming, total, convincing and credible. The Claimant must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence. See Isiyaku Musa Jikantoro & 6Ors. v. Alhaji Haliru Dantoro & 6Ors. [2004] 5 SC [pt.11] 1 at 15, Diamond Bank Plc v. Alhaji Usman Yahaya & Anor. [2011] LPELR-4036[CA] at page 27 and Yakubu Wondo & 2 Ors. v. Mal. Ibrahim Bello & 2 Ors. [2016] LPELR-40824[CA] at page 53. It must be noted, however, that the standard of proof remains the same, that is, proof on a balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence. The Claimant is only required to show that the law and facts of his case support his claim and cannot rely on the mere admission of the Defendants or absence of defence. The 1st Defendant argued that the Claimant’s employment is one of master and servant governed by common law principles; and that the employer could hire and fire at will. To buttress this fact, the 1st Defendant referred to exhibit A, the letter of appointment and explained that it did not refer to any conditions of service or rules or statutes. On his part, the Claimant contended that his employment enjoyed a statutory flavour because the 1st Defendant is a creation of statute and as a result its affairs are regulated by the Public Service Rules. It was also argued that by virtue of Items 10, 14 and 16 Part II, Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, section 18 of the Interpretation Act and Rule 010103 of the Public Service Rules, the Claimant is a public officer and his employment is regulated by law and not the common law principle of master and servant.

It is settled law that the character of an appointment and the status of the employee is determined by the legal character of the contract of employment. Contracts of employment are by and large determinable by the agreement of the parties. The fact that the other contracting party is a creation of a statute does not make any difference. SeeFakuade v. Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital Complex Management Board [1993] 5 NWLR [pt. 291] 47 at 63, Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd. v. D. A. Jattau [1996] 1 NWLR [pt.425] 392 at 406, A. F. Amos & 28Ors. v. University of Ibadan [2002] LPELR-12157 [CA] at page 13 and Federal Medical Centre, Ido Ekiti & 2Ors. v. Omidiora Kolawole O. [2012] All FWLR [pt. 653] 1999 at 2011. In ascertaining the nature of a contract of employment regard is had to the pleadings of the parties and supporting documents. It is no longer necessary to plead statutes or sections thereof before reliance can be placed on them. It is sufficient to plead material facts which will lead to a certain legal result. Chief P. D. C. Okenwa v. Military Governor Imo State & 3Ors. [1996] LPELR-2440 [SC] at page 21. The Court is required to take judicial notice of enactments and regulations derived from them. See section 122 [1] and [2][a] of the Evidence Act 2011, Peenok Investments Limited v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. [1982] NSCC 477 at 485-486 and Mr. C. N. Okocha v. Civil Service Commission [Edo State] & Anor. [2003] LPELR-7268[CA] at pages 19-20. The critical process in the determination of this case is the statement of facts. I have reviewed the statement of facts and the paragraphs dealing with the status of the Claimant’s employment are paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 are instructive:

“1. The claimant is a civil servant employed by the 1st defendant.”

“4. The claimant says that he was permanent staff of the 1st defendant having been employed by the 1st Defendant on the 30th day of October, 2001 as a court assistant on grade level 03. The appointment paper is hereby pleaded and will be relied upon during the trial.”

“5. The claimant’s appointment was confirmed on the 12th day of January, 2004 by the 1st defendant. The confirmation letter is hereby pleaded.”

“6. The claimant says that his appointment with the 1st defendant is a permanent employment and same enjoys statutory flavours.”

Interestingly, the 1st Defendant admitted paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of the statement of facts in paragraph 1 of the statement of defence. Although, the 1st Defendant denied paragraph 6 of the statement of facts in paragraph 2 of the statement of defence, paragraph 3 of the statement of defence appears to contradict paragraph 2 of the statement of defence. It is reproduced here:

“3. In expatiation to paragraph 2 above, Defendants aver that the Claimant was employed as a junior staff, and whose service is dispensable at the pleasure of his employer, the 1st Defendant, without assigning any reason.”

In one breath the 1st Defendant denies that the Claimant’s employment is a permanent employment with a statutory flavour, in another breath it avers that the Claimant is a junior officer whose employment is dispensable at the pleasure of his employer. Let me quickly say that the category or grade of an employee is not material in determining whether his employment is with statutory flavour or not. What determines the status of the employee is the legal character of the contract of employment. The Court of Appeal, per Danjuma, J.C.A., explained this in Mr. Adeleke Joseph Babatunde v. The Governing Council, Federal Polytechnic, Ede & Anor. [2014] LPELR – 24236 [CA] at page 17. He noted that:

“The question that determines whether an employment has a statutory flavour is not whether the status of the employee is on the higher echelon or low ladder of the service. It is also not determined by whether an employee is on probation or a permanent or a confirmed employee. It is rather whether his terms of engagement is [sic] controlled and determined by statute as relating engagement and termination. I am not unaware of the fact that the fixity of a term or tenure by a statute would appear to be a strong situation to infer the existence of an employment with statutory flavour, but I strongly hold the view that while it is one of the situations that may so determine, it is the protection of such a tenure and its requirement of an obligatory condition/procedure for the invocation of a right to terminate such consensual contract that cloths it with a statutory flavour.”

As observed earlier in this judgment, the 1st Defendant admitted that the Claimant was its staff. DW1 under cross examination confirmed that the Claimant was a staff of 1st Defendant and that his termination was in accordance with the Civil Service Rules. Paragraph 3 of the statement of defence states that the Claimant was employed as a junior staff. This fact was also corroborated by DW1 under cross examination. Exhibits A, B, C and D and paragraphs 1 and 3 of the statement of defence reinforce paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of the statement of facts and point irresistibly to the conclusion that the Claimant was an employee of the 1st Defendant. Exhibit C shows that the Claimant was on Grade level 04 Step 4. A note at the foot of exhibit C states: “Necessary Gazette action is being taken.” Although there is no evidence before me that the Claimant’s employment and promotion were gazetted, equity regards as done what ought to be done. SeeMallam Mala Gadzama & Anor. v. Colonel Garba Adamu & 2Ors. [2014] LPELR-24363[CA] at page 38. The summary of all I have been saying is that from the evidence before me, I find and hold that the Claimant was a staff of the 1st Defendant and from the documentary evidence a civil servant. As a civil servant he enjoys statutory protection. Also, the Claimant comes within the definition of public officer in section 18 of the Interpretation Act. In Iheukwumere Egesi v. Secondary Education Management Board & 2Ors. [2014] LPELR-24101 [CA] at page 27 the Court of Appeal, per Mbaba, J.C.A., held that:

“Appellant’s employment, being a Civil Servant, was regulated by the Civil Service Rules on issues of discipline/termination of his employment. See Section 1 paragraph 04102 and 04107[1][xviii] of the Imo State Civil Service Rules. It should be appreciated that being a Civil Servant, Appellant’s employment was insured with statutory flavour, and so his dismissal, or termination of his employment could not be at the whims and caprices of any mischievous, disgruntled officer of government or panel, without due compliance with the relevant laws/rules regulating his condition of service.”

It is for this reason that I respectfully disagree with the submission of learned Counsel for the Defendants in paragraph 3.1.1 of the reply on point of law that neither the Public Service Rules 2000 nor the Public Service Rules 2009 applies to the Claimant and that since Ebonyi State Public Service has not made any Rules for those in the public service it is the common law principles that will apply. The Ebonyi State Civil Service Commission by the Preface to the Guidelines for Appointments, Promotions and Discipline in the Civil Service adopted the Public Service Rules 2000 and consequently all subsequent revisions of the Public Service Rules. The Public Service Rules 2009 is a modification of the 2000 Rules and is applicable in the State. The Claimant being a civil servant is entitled to protection under the Public Service Rules 2009.

On whether there is sufficient pleading or evidence to make this inference, I refer to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the statement of facts. These paragraphs are reproduced in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Claimant’s statement on oath. In addition, exhibits A, B, C and D clearly show that the Claimant is a civil servant. This Court is enjoined in section 122 [1] and [2][a] of the Evidence Act 2011 to take judicial notice of statutes and subsidiary legislations and the Public Service Rules and the Guidelines for Appointments, Promotions and Discipline in the Civil Service being regulations made pursuant to the powers conferred on the Federal Civil Service Commission by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 come within this category. SeeKabo Air Limited v. The O’ Corporation Limited [2014] LPELR-23616[CA] at pages 21-22. DW1 under cross examination testified that the Civil Service Rules is applied in the State. Learned Counsel for the Defendants urged the Court to discountenance this evidence; while learned Counsel for the Claimant submitted in paragraph 12 of the Claimant’s final written address that the Civil Service Rules is one and the same as the Public Service Rules. As I said earlier, I am entitled to take judicial notice of the Public Civil Rules 2009 and the Guidelines for Appointments, Promotions and Discipline in the Civil Service and by virtue of the Preface to the Guidelines hold that the Public Service Rules 2009 is applicable to civil servants in Ebonyi State, of which the Claimant is one. The result is that the Claimant’s employment enjoys statutory flavour and cannot be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of the Public Service Rules 2009. It is trite that an employer of an employee whose appointment has statutory flavour has no right to terminate the appointment at will because he does not hold the appointment at the pleasure of such an employer. See National Electric Power Authority v. Joseph Ango [2001] LPELR-5933 [CA] 25-26. The difference between a statutory employee and the ordinary servant is security of tenure.

It is in evidence that the Claimant was summarily disengaged from the services of the 1st Defendant. The letter of termination, exhibit D, did not give any reason for the termination. It merely stated that his services were no longer required. Clearly, the termination was not on account of any misconduct. The document is reproduced here.

This is not the intendment of the Public Service Rules. Chapter three of the Public Service Rules 2009 lays down the procedure for termination of appointment of the Claimant and strict compliance is enjoined. Rule 030307 provides, inter alia, “Unless the method of dismissal is otherwise provided for in these Rules, an officer in the Federal Civil Service may be dismissed by the Federal Civil Service Commission only in accordance with this Rule” [underlining mine]. It is not discretionary. The 1st Defendant must act in consonance with the provisions of the Public Service Rules 2009. See Federal Medical Centre, Ido-Ekiti & 2Ors. v. Folorunso Kayode Michael [2012] LPELR-20406 [CA] 22, Federal Inland Revenue Service v. Lewu Sunday Michael [2014] All FWLR [pt.735] 362 at 378 and E. P. Iderima v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2005] All FWLR [pt. 285] 431 at 461.

I have looked at the Public Service Rules 2009 and there is no provision for summary termination of the appointment of the Claimant. The only provision relating to termination of appointment other than on disciplinary grounds is in Rules 020801 and 020803 dealing with an officer on probation. Even in that case, the officer is entitled to one month’s notice. In my view, there is no justification for the arbitrary termination of the Claimant’s appointment, albeit a junior officer. InFederal Medical Centre, Ido-Ekiti & 2Ors. v. Omidiora Kolawole O. [supra] at page 2014, Uwa, J.C.A., had this to say:

“The learned Counsel to the Appellants had argued that he who hires can fire, with or without any reason at all; in justifying the 1st Appellant’s termination of the Respondent’s appointment, this argument does not support the present case but, would apply in ordinary master and servant cases where the terms of the contract of employment would be specified.”

Salami, J.C.A, [as he then was] put it more pointedly in National Electric Power Authority v. Joseph Ango [2001] LPELR-5933[CA] at pages 25-26. He posited as follows:

“An employer of an employee whose appointment has statutory flavour has no right to terminate the appointment at will because he does not hold the appointment at the pleasure of such an employer.”

In paragraph 4 of the statement of defence, the 1st Defendant claimed that it is entitled to disengage the Claimant but did not show under what instrument it derived the power to summarily disengage the Claimant. In the circumstance, I find and hold that the termination of appointment of the Claimant with immediate effect is unlawful. Invariably, the appropriate order is one of reinstatement. In Shaidu Nda Maliki v. Michael Imodu Institute for Labour Studies [2008] LPELR-8467 [CA] at page 53, Nweze, J.C.A. [as he then was] quoting Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. in Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR [pt.9] 599, had this to say:

“The law has arrived at a stage where the principle should be adopted that the right to a job is analogous to property. Accordingly, where a man is entitled to a particular job, I cannot conceive of any juridical reason against the view that where the termination is invalid and consequently alters nothing, a reinstatement of the employee … is the only remedy.”

I entirely agree. See also Mrs. Akinyosoye Yemisi v. Federal Inland Revenue Services [2013] All FWLR [pt. 693] 1992 at 2016. This action succeeds in part.

Accordingly, I hold and order as follows:

It is hereby declared that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment by the 1st Defendant is unlawful, unwarranted, null and void.

The 1st Defendant is hereby ordered to reinstate the Claimant forthwith and pay all his salaries, allowances and other benefits from the date of his unlawful termination.

Reliefs 2 and 4 fail and are hereby dismissed. The Claimant’s employment was not terminated on grounds of misconduct so the issue of fair hearing does not arise. Also, the Court cannot restrain an employer from terminating the employment of his employee if that can be done within the bounds of the contract of employment.

Cost of N50, 000 [fifty thousand naira] is awarded in favour of the Claimant against the 1st Defendant payable within 7 days from the date of this judgment.