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National Industrial Court

MR. ALHAMDU DURAMI VS INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION DEFENDANT

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA.

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR.

Dated this 25th day of May, 2018        

SUIT NO:   NICN/ABJ/62/2018

 

BETWEEN:

  1. ALHAMDU DURAMI

CLAIMANT

AND

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

DEFENDANT

Representation

W.E. Ivara for the Claimant

P.E.  Ossai with J.O. Yakubu for the Defendant.

 

Ruling/Judgment

This matter was commenced via a general form of Complaint filed on the 12th of March, 2018. The compliant was accompanied by a statement of fact, witness statement on oath, list of witnesses, copies of the documents to be relied upon and certificate of pre-action counseling.

The Claimant is through the Complaint and statement of facts claiming against the Defendant the following claims:

  1. A DECLARATION by the Honourable Court that the interdiction and termination of appointment of the Claimant by the Defendant not being in compliance with the civil service Rules and the Defendant’s condition of service is wrongful, unlawful, ultra vires and of no effect whatsoever.
  2. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court setting aside of the interdiction and termination letters and grant the reinstatement of the Claimant to work with all rights, benefits, privileges, promotions and entitlement duly applicable..
  3. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N4,448,816.00 (Four Million Four Hundred and Forty Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixteen Naira) being the Claimant’s outstanding salary from January, 2003 to January, 2018 at the rate of N24,712,00 per month.
  4. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N24,712,00 per month (Twenty Four Thousand Seven Hundred and Twelve Naira) being the Claimant’s salary per month from the month of February, 2018 till judgment is delivered.
  5. The sum of N300,000,000.00 as General and Special Damages.
  6. 10 % as interest on the judgment sum per annum till liquidation.

 

ALTERNATIVE CLAIM TO RELIEFS (B), (C) AND (D)

  1. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N7,117,205.76 (Seven Million One Hundred and Seventeen Thousand, Two Hundred and Five Naira Seventy Six Kobo) being the Claimant’s outstanding salary at the rate of N24,712,00 per month from January, 2003 to January, 2027 when the Claimant would have retired from the Defendant on attaining the age of 60 years.
  2. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court directing the Defendant to immediately pay the Claimant all pensions and Gratuities due and payable to the Claimant.
  3. The sum of N300,000,000.00 as General and Special Damages.
  4. 10 % as interest on the judgment sum per annum till liquidation.

In reaction to the claims, the Defendant filed a memorandum of conditional appearance on the 23rd of March, 2018. Following this, the Defendant also filed a notice of preliminary objection on the same day. The notice of preliminary objection was supported by a 7 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by one Celine Amuzie A. and also a written address which was adopted as oral argument in support of the preliminary objection.

The Defendant is by the notice of preliminary objection seeking the following reliefs:

  1. An Order declaring that the Claimant has no cause of action.
  2. An Order of this Honourable Court dismissing this suit for lack of jurisdiction.
  3. An Order awarding substantial cost against the Claimant/Respondent.

The grounds upon which the preliminary objection was brought are:

  1. That the claimant by this suit is praying for a declaration that the interdiction and termination of his appointment by the defendant is wrongful and not incompliance with the civil service rules and the defendant’s condition of service.
  2. That the Claimant was terminated on 4th September, 2003 by the defendant.
  3. That the claimant instituted this suit on the 12th March, 2018, 15 years after he was terminated by the defendant.
  4. That the suit was instituted after the expiration of three months provided by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41 Laws of The Federation of Nigeria 2004.

Arising from the written address in support of the preliminary objection, learned Counsel to the Defendant, P.E. Ossai raised a lone issue for determination to wit:

Whether this action is statute barred?

In arguing the lone issue, learned counsel submitted that the suit is statute barred and referred this court to section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act.

Counsel submitted that by the said provision, the Claimant is entitled to ventilate his grievance within three months of the accrual of a cause of action i.e. the termination of appointment which occurred on the 4th of September, 2003. Counsel relied on the case of Christiana I. Yare Vs National Salaries Wages and Income Commission (2013) 12 NWLR (PART 1367) PAGE 173 and Ibrahim VS. JSC Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (PART 584) PAGE 1 at PAGES 31-32

Counsel added that time begins to run where there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. she cited the cases of Fadare v A-G Oyo state (1982) 4SC1 and Adimora v Ajufo (1988) 3NWLR (part 80) page 1.

Counsel concluded by urging this court to dismiss this suit for being incompetent and also hold that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit in line with the above cited judicial authorities.

In reaction to the preliminary objection, the Claimant filed an 8 paragraphs counter affidavit deposed to by one Philp Akpavie and also a written address which was adopted as the oral argument in opposition to the preliminary objection.

Arising from the said written address, learned counsel to the Claimant, W.E. Ivara formulated a lone issue similar to that of the Defendant to wit:

Whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred

Learned counsel answered in the negative that the Claimant’s Suit is not statute barred and that this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

Counsel further posited that the Claimant’s claims are principally against the actions of the Defendant which were outside the colours, scope of authority and outside statutory and constitutional powers of the Defendant. Counsel maintained that the Claimant had specifically set out the above particulars in paragraphs 16 (a) —(j) of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Paragraphs 17 (a)-(j) of the Claimants Witness Statement of Oath and that the Defendant has not challenged same as no Statement of Defence is filed.

Counsel argued that the Public Officers (Protection) Act relied upon by the Defendant is not an absolute bar to the institution of proceedings. That where a public officer fails to act in good faith, or acts in abuse of his office, or maliciously or with no semblance of legal justification the Act cannot protect him. Counsel cited the cases of LAGOS CITY COUNCIL V. OGUNBIBI (1969) 1 ALL NLR 279; CBN V. OKOGIE (2004) 10 NWLR PT( 882) 488 and OFFOBOCHE V. OGOJA LGA (2001) 16 NWLR (PT 739) 459.

Counsel reiterated that there are numerous exceptions to the application of Section 2 (a) of Public Officers Protection Act, citing the case of ENERGY MARINE AND INDUSTRIAL LIMITED V. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY & ANOR (2010) LPELR (CA) and submitted that the Claimant’s relief No. a and b are primarily against the actions of the Defendant’s being outside the colours, statutory and constitutional duties of the Defendant.

Counsel added that in cases of continuance of damage or injury, the Public Officers (Protection) Law permits actions to be brought on the cessation thereof outside the three month. He cited the cases of ATTORNEY GENERAL RIVERS STATE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL BAYELSA STATE & ANOR (2013) 3NWLR PT (1340) 123 AT PAGES 148-1 49 PAR GH-A and contended that from the Amended Statement of Claim and as equally deposed to in his Counter Affidavit the Claimant averred that he continues to be deprived of the allocation he is entitled to every month and the same has not ceased.

In this wise, counsel held the respective view that in such a situation of damage or injury which has not ceased, the defence is not available. Counsel referred the court to reliefs C and D and reliefs A and B of the alternative reliefs.

Counsel also argued that the court is not to pronounce on substantive matters of this case at interlocutory stage  and cited the case of HON. JIDDA TOM HASSAN & 177 ORS AND BORNO STATE GOVT & 11 ORS (2016) LPELR-40250 (CA).

Counsel added that it is the statement of claim that the court is to consider in determining whether or not the court has jurisdiction citing the case of ATTORNEY GENERAL KANO STATE V ATTORNEY GENERAL FEDERATION (2007) FWLR PT 364, 204 AT 258-259 Para D, INAKOJU V. ADELEKE (2007) 4NWLR PT 1020, 427 AT 588-589 and WAEC V. AKINKUMI (2008) 9NWLR PT 1091, PAGE 151 AT 169.

Counsel in the course of adoption of the address also cited the case of Ofoboche v Ogoja LGA (2001) 16 NWLR Pt.739 S.C at 458. To posit that the damage suffered by the Claimant is continuous having not been paid his salaries and gratuity.

 

By way of reply on point of law,  Learned Counsel to the Defendant, P.E.Ossai, addressed the exceptions pointed out by the Claimant’s Counsel.

With respect to the action of the Defendant being outside the colours, statutory or constitutional duties of a public officer, learned counsel argued that the case of LAGOS CITY COUNCIL V OGUNBIYI (1969) 1 ALL NLR 279 relied upon by the Claimant/Respondent is a case of negligence and therefore inapplicable in this instance since the Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimant within its power to hire and fire.

Counsel further added that the case of OFOBOCHE VS OGOJA LGA (2001)16 NWLR (PT.739) S.C.458 cited by the Claimant/Respondent is a suit where the appellant challenged the respondents on libel and defamation of his character through 5 publications made by the respondents. Counsel contended that the Public Officers Protection Act was fully operational in the said case making the case more in favour of the Defendant/Applicant and totally against the argument put forward by the claimant/respondent.

With regards to cases of continuance of damage or injury, Learned counsel contended that the case of CBN VS OKOGIE (2004) 10 NWLR (PT 882)488 cited by the claimant is a case of malicious prosecution by the Nigeria Police in 1992. The appellant in this matter sought to rely on section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, however, the respondent was discharged and acquitted on 2nd November, 1996 and he instituted a suit on 9th December, 1996, the court held that the action was filed within time as the action was filed within 3 months from the date of cessation of the cause of action where it is a continuous one.

Counsel then maintained that in this instant action, the cause of action which is the termination of the employment of the Claimant is not a continuous one. That the cause of action accrued on 4th  September, 2003 when the Letter of Termination was issued to the Claimant/Respondent and the Claimant instituted this action on 12th  March, 2018 and so the matter is statute barred.

Counsel further distinguished the cases of A.G RIVERS STATE VS A. G BAYELSA STATE & ANOR (2013) 3 NWLR (PT 1340) S.C. 123 and AREMO ii VS ADEKANYE (2004)13 NWLR (PT 891). and posited that they are not applicable to the instant suit; while maintaining that the case of ANOZIE VS AG. FEDERATION (2008)10 NWLR (PT 1095) 278- 290. which is a case of wrongful dismissal of a staff from his employment with the Federal College of Education, Anambra state on the 27th April, 1999 but filed his action on the 5th February 2003 which is period of 4 years interval, applies to the instant suit and in favour of the Defendant.

Counsel further distinguished cases of recovery of land and breach of contracts and argued that they are not applicable to the instant suit.

Counsel in conclusion urged the court to hold that there is nothing in the Claimant’s Counter Affidavit to show that the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004 does not apply to this suit and prayed the court to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

Upon a careful consideration of the foregoing, I have examined the grounds of the Preliminary Objection and painstakingly considered the submissions of both Counsel in their respective written addresses and the reply on point of law. Arising therefrom, the sole issue to be determined in this ruling is to wit:

“whether this suit is statute barred thereby denying this court of jurisdiction”.

To address this sole issue which is predicated on the application of a limitation law, it is imperative to reproduce the limitation law in question as referred to by the Defendant. The said limitation law is the provision of section 2 (a) Public officers Protection Act, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004 which provides thus:

  1. Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect –

 

(a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.”

It is instructive to state that the Supreme Court in the case of ALHAJI (DR.) ADO IBRAHIM v. ALHAJI MAIGIDA U. LAWAL & ORS (2015) LPELR-24736(SC) has restated the meaning, purpose and effect of the above provision when it held that:

“The above provision is quite clear and simple. Its general effect is that where a law provides for the institution of an action in a court of law within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period circumscribed by law. More often than not, the laws of this country and elsewhere prescribe certain periods of limitation for instituting certain actions in court. The statutes that prescribe such periods and regulate the subsistence of causes of action are known as statutes of limitation. It follows that where a statute of limitation prescribes the period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Where any action is statute barred, a plaintiff who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce it by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation for instituting such an action has elapsed. See Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor. (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at 21, Oba J. A. Aremo II v. Adekanye & 2 Ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572, Egbaigbe v. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649, Odubeko v. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 308) 637, Sanda v. Kukawa Local Government (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 379. One may wonder why a person’s right of access to court should be extinguished by law. The rationale for the existence of statute of limitation is that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them and that a defendant may have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim and that a person with a good cause of action should pursue it with reasonable diligence. See John Ekeogu v. Aliri (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 345. … Per OKORO, J.S.C.

 

There is no gainsaying that the said provision applies to public officers, but it is imperative to state that the Defendant in this suit is a public body established under section 153 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and its employees are public officers within the meaning and scope of section 18 of the Interpretation Act, Cap 123 LFN, 2004 which defines public officer as:

 A member of the public service of the Federation within the meaning of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, or the Public service of a state.

See the case of INEC & ORS V. ORJI & ORS (2009) LPELR-4320(CA); REGISTERED TRUSTEE PPFN V. SHOGHOLA (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt.883) 1 at 20 para C-E.

 

The question that then comes to mind is how does the provision of the Public Officers Protection Act apply to acts committed or omitted by public officers in this instance?

 

The Court in AJAYI V ADEBIYI (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt.1310) p.146 noted authoritatively that the yardsticks for determining whether an action is statute barred are:

  1. The date when the cause of action accrued;
  2. The date of commencement of the suit as indicated on the writ of summons (in this case the Complaint and statement of fact); and
  3. The period of time prescribed to bring an action to be ascertained from the statute in question.

To appropriately apply the above yardsticks, one has to determine the cause of action and when it arose.

In BANK OF THE NORTH V GEINA (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt.296) 862 at 881 it was held that:

A cause of action arises at the date or time when a breach or any act that will warrant the person who is adversely affected by the act to take action in court.

I must add also, that the learned counsel to the Claimant was right in contending that where the court is to determine whether it has jurisdiction or not, the appropriate process to look at is the statement of fact. In the case of WAEC V. AKINKUMI (2008) 9NWLR PT 1091, PAGE 151 AT 169, the court held that:

“it is settled law that in determining the competence of a suit, the determining factor is the plaintiffs statement of claim, the court has a duty to carefully examine the reliefs claimed to ascertain what the claim is all about”

In more precise terms, the court in GBADEHAN V KILADEJO (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt.1326) p.398 held that in order to determine whether or not an action is statute barred, the document to be considered are the writ of summons  and statement of claim. In this case, the Complaint and Statement of fact of the Claimant. See JSF INVESTMENT LTD V BRAWAL LINE LTD (2011) ALL FWLR (PT.578) 876 AT 902; JKK LTD V GOV. LAGOS STATE (2014) 5 NWLR (PT.1399) 151.

In the instance suit, the statement of fact as filed by the Claimant shall be considered to determine the cause of action and when same arose in line with the above yardstick.

The highlight of facts arising from the statement of fact is that Claimant was employed by the Defendant on 1st September, 1992 and his last position with the Claimant was Senior Personnel Officer, Grade level 10 effective from 1st January, 1999 with his last salary being N24,712.00 per month.

Sometime in the year 2002 the Claimant as electoral officer at Yamaltu/Deba Local Government Area, Gombe State, was charged with the training of Adhoc Staff on conduct of voters registration exercise. The Claimant at all material time was not assigned an official vehicle in the discharge of his assignment. As a result of the demand of work, the Claimant’s vehicle broke down and he obtained the consent of his colleague an Assistant Electoral Officer Abdullahi (Audu) to use part of the training money to fix his car, which the Claimant promptly repaid. The matter was investigated and the Claimant was pardoned though he was placed on alternative administrative duties.

The Claimant was surprised to receive a letter from the headquarters of the Defendant six (6) months later, dated 9th January, 2003, placing the Claimant on Interdiction on conduct during the last Registration of Voter Exercise. He subsequently got the full details of the earlier interdiction on the 25th of February, 2003.

The Claimant was then expecting a formal invitation by the Defendant to enable him defend himself before the Disciplinary Committee as provided by the Defendant’s staff Condition of Service and the Public Service Rules, but all to no avail, only to receive a letter of termination of appointment from the Defendant after a long wait. The pleaded letter of termination is dated 4th September 2003.

The Claimant also pleaded the particulars of statutory breach in failing to follow the provision of the staff condition of service and Public Service Rules in terminating his employment by first issuing query verbally before a written query.

To be particularly clear, I have also taken a look at the reliefs sought by the Claimant, there is no doubt that the Claimant wants this court to set aside the letters of interdiction and termination of employment issued to him.

Consequently, it is the finding of this court that the cause of action in this suit is the issuance of a letter of interdiction and termination of employment of the Claimant and same arose and climaxed when the letter of termination was served on the Claimant on the 4th of September, 2003.

I have also taken a look at the complaint filed by the Claimant and same was filed on the 12th of March, 2018 as evidenced by the stamp of this court.

The above clearly indicates that this suit was filed 14 years and 6 months after the said letter of termination of employment was issued to the Claimant.

This is without doubt far outside the three months within which actions against public officers are to be instituted in accordance with the section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. That notwithstanding, learned Counsel to the Claimant, W.E. Ivara, contended that this suit falls under the exceptions to the application of the said Act due to the fact that the action of the Defendant is outside the colours of the Defendant’s office and that the action is continuing owing to the failure to pay salaries and gratuities.

Learned Counsel to the Defendant, P.E.Ossai, argued against the contention that the cases cited are not applicable to the instant suit and that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was within the power of the Defendant to hire and fire.

In resolving these contentions, I must first state categorically clear that it is settled law that Statute of limitation applies to contract of employment as the court in UNIVERSITY OF JOS v DR. SANI MUHAMMAD ADAM (2015) 5 ACELR 106, held that section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act renders a cause of action based on termination of employment statute barred and unenforceable where brought outside the prescribed three months period and the Supreme Court has consistently applied the provision to employment in the public sector. See also FRIN v GOLD (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 1 and OLAGUNJU v PHCN  PLC (2011)  10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 113.

It is however noteworthy that where the labour rights are related to salaries and allowances for work done, it would be a good law to hold that same is not caught up by a limitation law as held in AG Rivers State v AG, Bayelsa State & Anor (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt.1340) 123 at 144-150. In such cases, the principle or exception that the cause of action is a continuous one would apply for every month that the salary is not paid as long as the employee is still in employment. See also the case of Ayemi & Ors v Total E & P Nigeria Ltd. (2016) 64 N.L.L.R (pt.226) at 314-315.

In the instant case, it is the finding of this court that the cause of action is not one of failure of payment of salary; it is one predicated on termination of employment which lead to loss of salary. This distinction should be clearly understood to avoid the blurred lines. The said termination occurred on the 4th of September, 2003 and upon such termination, it is axiomatic that the salary would stop. Unless the court finds that the termination was unlawful, null and void, then the court can order that such salary that ought to have been earned be paid. In order for the court to consider whether the termination was unlawful, the action ought to be instituted within three months. In this regard, the argument of the learned counsel to the Claimant that the action is a continuing one thereby forming an exception holds no water and same is overruled.

Furthermore, counsel to the Claimant contended that the action of the Defendant is outside the colours, scope of authority and outside statutory and constitutional powers of the Defendant. In this regard, I must acknowledge the effort of the Counsel to the Defendant in distinguishing the cases relied upon by the Counsel to the Claimant as they were predominantly tortuous cases where the public officers were rightly outside the colours of their offices. I must then add that, outside the scope of office presupposes that the act was not performed in the normal course of business as such officer. Perhaps an instance is where a police officer who went to shop in supermarket as a regular person commits an act outside the scope of his function as a police officer. The Defendant no doubt has the duty to hire and fire, where such is not done in accordance with the laid down procedure and the Claimant is affected, the suit against the Defendant ought to be instituted within three months.

This court had categorically held in this regard in DR. FAITH UWABHEL ROBERT v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & 3 Ors. (unreported) Suit No. NICN/ABJ/274/2016 delivered 10th January, 2018 that:

“there seem to be a wrong appreciation of the holding of the court in the A.G. RIVERS STATE v A.G. BAYELSA STATE (supra) and ANOZIE v A.G. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (supra). The effect of the holding of the court therein is that generally, public officers are protected from prosecution but they can be prosecuted when they act ultravires. To prosecute such erring public officer, section 2 (a) then stipulates a time within which the victim must prosecute the erring officer which is within three months save it’s a continuing damage or injury in which case I have concluded that it is not with regards to this suit. See generally the case of JIBO v MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & ORS (2016) LPELR-40616”

In addition, I must say that there are plethora of cases where the supposed wrongful termination of employment was brought after the prescribed three months against public institutions and the court held same to be statute barred. See A.I. Ibekwe v Imo State Education Management Board (2011) 24 N.L.L.R (Pt.68) 159. wherein the Appellant was dismissed from the employment of the Respondent on 5th January, 1982. He challenged the dismissal by filing his suit on the 11th of February, 1983 on the ground that the dismissal was illegal, null and void and of no effect. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge in dismissing the suit having been instituted 13 months after the cause of action accrued against the three months provided by section 64 (1) of the Imo State Education Law No.10 of 1980.

Therefore, the contention that the action of the Defendant is outside the colours, scope of authority and outside statutory and constitutional powers of the Defendant also holds no water and same is hereby overruled.

On the strength of the above authorities, the sole issue for determination is resolved in favour of the Defendant to the effect that this suit is statute barred and thereby robs this court of jurisdiction.

Consequent upon the resolution of the issue above, the court in OBA J.A. AREMO II v S.F. ADEKANYE & ORS (2004) LPELR S.C 139/2000, held that:

Where a statute of limitation prescribes period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Where an action is statute barred, a plaintiff who might otherwise have a cause of action loses the right to enforce it by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation for instituting such an action has elapsed.

See also EBOIGBE v NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649.

In even clearer terms, the court in CBN v UKPONG (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt.998) 555 at 568 G-H per Fabiyi J.C.A. (as he then was) stated as follows:

“A statute of limitation as the one reproduced above removes the right of action and leaves a plaintiff with a bare and empty cause of action which he cannot enforce if such is instituted outside the three months statutory period allowed by the law. The proceedings cannot be instituted outside the prescribed period. Any action instituted outside the prescribed period will be statute-barred”. See OBIEFUNA VS OKOYE (1961) 1 ALL NLR 357; FADARE VS A.G., FEDERATION (1961).

In view of these authorities, it must of necessity be said that the statute of limitation, once established and grounded would manifestly rob the court of jurisdiction and once that happens the court cannot do anything with regards to any claim sought before it. The Supreme Court in INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839(SC) held that:

“It is clear from the above judicial views on the basis of limitation law, once a defence of limitation of time is stated and grounded in the averments in support of the summons, (as in this case at hand) and it is established, this bars the plaintiff’s remedy and extinguishes the right of his action; then the Court will wash off its hands and decline to entertain the action. This in effect means that there is absolutely no basis for prying into the conduct of the Appellant howsoever which gave rise to the action…” See AMADI v. NNPC (2000) 6 SC (Pt.1) 66; INAKOJU v. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT.1025) 423.” Per GALADIMA, J.S.C.

Where the court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit, the proper order the court should make is an order striking out the matter. See A.G., LAGOS v A.G., FEDERATION (2014)9 NWLR (1412) 231.

 

Consequently, the preliminary objection as raised by the Defendant is hereby upheld and this suit is hereby struck out for lack of jurisdiction.

I make no order as to cost.

 

…………………………………………………………

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR

JUDGE.

 

 

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