IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
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Suit No: NICN/OW/49/2015 Petitioner: Okechukwu Osuji And Respondent: Skye Bank Plc Date Delivered: 2017-05-05 Judge(s): JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE Judgment Delivered Representation: I. C. Achara for the Claimant B. U. Ukachukwu, with him, D. O. Ogbu for the Defendant JUDGMENT This action was commenced by Complaint dated and filed the 10th day of July 2015 wherein the Claimant claimed against the Defendant as follows: a) A DECLARATION that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant from work on 12/12/2014 without pay and the subsequent purported termination of the Claimant’s employment on 8/5/2015 by the Defendant over mere fictitious allegations unestablished against the Claimant were wrongful, prejudicial, arbitrary, victimizing and amount to unfair labour practice that offend against international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relations. b) A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment on 8/5/2015 vide letter of termination dated 8/5/2013 but served on the Claimant on 12/5/2015 is substantially contrary to the Claimant’s express conditions of employment with the Defendant and thus wrongful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. c) AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N2,591,229.62 (Two Million, Five Hundred and Ninety One Thousand, Two Hundred and Twenty Nine Naira, Sixty Two Kobo), being the arrears of Claimant’s unpaid salaries and allowances from date of suspension till date of purported termination of his employment as follows: i. Monthly basic salary of N199,219.61 from January 2015 to June 2015 in the total cum of N1,195,317.66 (One Million, One Hundred and Ninety Five Thousand, Three Hundred and Seventeen Naira, Sixty Six Kobo). ii. Quarterly Allowance (less tax) of N233,725.10 for the quarters of December 2014, March 2015 and June 2015 in the total sum of N701,175.30 (Seven Hundred and One Thousand, One Hundred and Seventy Five Naira, Thirty Kobo). iii. Upfront Allowance (less tax) of N141,710.83 for the periods of January 2015 and April 2015 in the total sum of N283,421.66 (Two Hundred and Eighty Three Thousand, Four Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Sixty Six Kobo). iv. Cost of Passage (COP) Allowance of N159,547.50 for the periods of January 2015 and April 2015 in the total sum of N319,095.00 (Three Hundred and Nineteen Thousand, and Ninety Five Naira). v. Leave Allowance of N50,300.00 (Fifty Thousand and Three Hundred Naira). vi. Thirteenth Month Bonus of N41,920.00 (Forty One Thousand, Nine Hundred and Twenty Naira). d) Interest on (c) above at the rate of 15% from January 2015 until judgment is delivered, and 10% per annum until the compliance of the court’s judgment. e) AN ORDER declaring the Claimant’s contract of employment with the defendant as valid and subsisting, and mandating the Defendant therefore not to act upon or otherwise give effect to the aforementioned letter of termination of employment dated 8/6/2015. f) AN ORDER mandating the Defendant to continuously pay to the Claimant his salaries, allowances and full benefits until his contract of employment with the defendant is validly determined. g) In the alternative to reliefs (e) and (f) above, AN ORDER that the Defendant pays to the Claimant his full severance benefits, and an additional sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) as general damages for continued deprivation, Trauma, Inconveniences, undue hardship, psychological torture, financial losses suffered by the Claimant following the unfair and wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment and all other unfair labour practices by the Defendant against the Claimant in the course of employment. h) The sum of N250,000.00 (Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) being the cost of instituting this action. The Complaint was accompanied with the Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, Claimant’s Written Statement on Oath, List of Documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. The Defendant entered appearance and filed its Statement of Defence on the 10th day of November 2015. This was accompanied with the Written Statement on oath of the Defence Witness, List of Witnesses, List of Documents and copies of documents to be relied upon at the trial. These were duly regularized on 10/11/2015. On the 23rd day of November 2015, the Claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence. This was accompanied with an additional deposition of the Claimant, An additional list of documents and copies of documents. Hearing commenced on the 15th day of January 2016. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1, while Mr. Seun Orungbemi, an internal audit staff of the Defendant testified for the Defendant as DW1. Hearing was concluded on the 3rd day of November 2016 and parties were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the rules of court. The Defendant filed its final address on the 22nd day of December 2016. This was regularized vide a motion for extension of time filed on the 27th day of January 2017 and granted on the 23rd day of February 2017. The final written address of the Claimant was filed on the 22nd day of February 2017. The Defendant filed a reply on points of law on the 3rd day of March 2017. This was regularized by order of court on the 13th day of March 2017, on which day the parties also adopted their respective written addresses. The brief facts of the case as summarized by counsel for the Defendant in his final written address is that the Claimant was on December 5, 2013 employed as an Assistant Banking Officer at the Defendant’s Owerri Branch Office and by a letter dated August 25, 2014, the Defendant confirmed the Claimant’s employment. On December 11, 2014, the Defendant’s management placed the Claimant on indefinite suspension without pay after an Interim Report on Fraudulent Postings at the Owerri Branch where the Claimant worked came out. The Defendant expressed its dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Claimant performed his duties on the day in question and placed him on indefinite suspension without pay from December 12, 2014. The Claimant appeared before the Defendant’s Disciplinary Committee in March 2015 and on June 8, 2015, the Defendant’s Management terminated the Claimant’s employment for breach of the Defendant’s policy on Transaction Processing which amounted to gross negligence. Counsel for the Defendant proceeded to submit the following 4 issues for the court’s determination; (i) Whether from the totality of the facts and evidence adduced in this suit, the Claimant has been able to prove on a preponderance of evidence that his employment with the Defendant was wrongfully terminated. (ii) Whether from the totality of the facts and evidence adduced in this suit the Claimant has been able to prove that he was not given a fair hearing prior to the termination of his employment with the Defendant. (iii) Whether from the totality of the facts and evidence adduced in this suit, the Claimant has been able to prove that his employment with the Defendant is still subsisting and as such entitling him to the reliefs claimed in the alternative herein. (iv) Whether in the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant established his claims for damages against the Defendant. In arguing issues one and two together, Counsel for the Defendant submitted that by Exhibit C3, the Defendant clearly informed the Claimant that there was an interim report on fraudulent postings at the Owerri branch and that the role played by the Claimant specifically informing him that the management was dissatisfied with the manner in which he performed his duties during the period that he was being suspended indefinitely without pay. He submitted further that the action of the Defendant is in line with the Defendant’s Policies as provided in Exhibit CS, the Sanctions and Disciplinary grid which makes provisions for cases of fraud or attempted fraud. He went on that it goes on to categorize into those with direct staff involvement or collusion and those with no direct staff involvement but due to staff negligence, omission or error. For the latter category, the Sanctions Grid also provides under the Sanctions Column that the Defendant can suspend the staff without pay or terminate the appointment. Counsel submitted that upon becoming aware of the fraudulent activities at its Owerri Branch where the Claimant was the most senior staff at work on that day, the Defendant was quite in order to have suspended the Claimant from work indefinitely without pay in line with its Sanctions Grid. In the case of SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED vs. LAWSON JACK (1998) NWLR (Pt.545) at page 249, the Supreme Court observed that: “What it has done from the facts available was to set up an investigation panel to look into certain complaints bordering on alleged impropriety committed by one Mr. Ntuk Ntuk, a member of staff of the appellant company. In the process the respondent was suspended from duty on full pay pending the investigation. A suspension of an employee is not an unusual procedure taken in order to facilitate such an investigation. The person affected can hardly complain, in the process, of not having been given a fair hearing, nor can he demand that the rules of natural justice should apply. The interest of the business of the defendant becomes paramount and the Plaintiff is made to keep off the premises thereof until later.” Counsel for the Defendant went on to refer to the Supreme Court’s further elucidation on the issue of suspension of staff from work in the case of LONGE vs. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2010) 2-3 S.C. (Pt. III) page 61 at 95 where it was held that: “Admittedly, an employer suspending his employee may impose terms of the suspension but in a general sense suspension of an employee from work only means the suspension of the employee from performance of the ordinary duties assigned to him by virtue of his office. Counsel submitted on the authority of the above and the Defendant’s Sanctions and Disciplinary Grid that one of the terms imposed by the Defendant where there has been an allegation of fraud or attempted fraud against a staff in which the staff had no direct involvement but due to his negligence, omission or error, is suspension without pay. Under cross-examination, the Defendant’s witness stated that when the Defendant is confronted with a fraud incident as in this case, it doesn’t know who has done what and that it conducted an internal investigation which disclosed an infraction of the Defendant’s policy in which the Claimant featured. It is therefore procedural for the Defendant to place staff in such a position on suspension pending investigation. Counsel further referred the court to Page 6 of the Defendant’s Sanctions and Disciplinary Grid which provides under item 5 thereof that “Sanctions are of two types, depending on severity of the infraction: (1) With pay (2) Without Pay”. At article (iii) thereunder, it further provides that for “suspension without pay, during the period of suspension, staff will not be entitled to his/her total entitlements. Counsel submitted further that the Defendant’s witness also testified under oath that the Claimant was suspended to pave way for investigations to be conducted by the Defendant and that his employment was subsequently terminated for password infractions which he was found guilty to have committed on the same day that the fraudulent activities took place at the branch. He argued that the Claimant who avers that he was not given a fair hearing, stated in Paragraph 8 (xii) of his Statement of Facts that he was given the opportunity of appearing before the Defendant’s Disciplinary Committee though he alleges without proof that it was an accusatory session and an afterthought. Furthermore, under cross-examination on October 7, 2016, the Claimant also admitted the fact that he appeared before the Defendant’s Disciplinary Committee but continued to state without facts that he was not given a fair hearing. Counsel argued further that by virtue of the provisions of Sections 135 (1) and 137 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap E 14, Laws of the Federation, 2004, the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, stressing that the Supreme Court has held that “by virtue of the provisions of Section 135 of the Evidence Act, whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, has the burden of proving that those facts exists. The Plaintiff has the burden of proof of the assertion.” That the Supreme Court went on further to hold that “the reason why the burden of proof in a civil case is with the Plaintiff is that he is the person who is making the claim, and where he fails to discharge the burden, he must fail in his claim”. Counsel referred the court to the case of A.G. BAYELSA STATE vs. A.G, RIVERS STATE (2007) 1 F.W.L.R (Part 354) Pg. 977 at page 1003 paras D-H. It is the submission of Counsel for the Defendant that the Defendant gave a fair hearing to the Claimant by giving him the opportunity of appearing before the Disciplinary Committee and making representations on his own behalf and that the Disciplinary Committee of the Defendant after its deliberations and after having heard from the Claimant, did not find the Claimant guilty of the allegations of involvement in the fraudulent activities that led to his suspension but found him guilty of the allegation of gross negligence which led to the termination of his employment by the Defendant. Counsel further referred the court to Exhibit C3 where the Defendant stated clearly that it was dissatisfied with the manner in which the Claimant performed his duties on the date in question. He opined that under cross-examination on November 7, 2016, the Claimant admitted receiving the password of the Business Service Manager and using same to authorize two transactions. Furthermore, at Paragraph 2 (iii) of the Claimant’s Reply to Statement of Defence, the Claimant admitted that the Manager gave him his password to authorize transactions for that day. He also claimed that it was not an option open to him to turn down the instructions of the Acting BSM as that would have exposed him to defaulting on the Bank’s policy on service infraction which attracted more stringent sanctions. Counsel submitted that based on that alone, the Claimant was quite aware that the instructions he had been given to carry out and the manner in which he was to carry them out contravened the Defendant’s policy but he went ahead to do so believing that he was choosing the lesser of two evils. Counsel cited the case of SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED vs. OLAREWAJU (2008) 12 S. C. (Pt. III) Pg. 43, where the Supreme Court per Francis F. Tabai JSC held that: “The guiding principle which has been articulated in many cases …, is that an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. But where, as in this case, he gives a reason or cause for terminating the appointment, the law imposes on him a duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court. In this case, the appellant, having given gross misconduct as its reasons for the respondent’s dismissal, has the onus to establish that the respondent was indeed guilty of the alleged misconduct to warrant his dismissal. And in a case such as this, the court must be watchful to ensure that in the investigations or proceedings of the domestic panel culminating in the employee’s dismissal, the rules of natural justice were not breached.” However, in the case of IHEZUKWU vs UNIVERSITY OF JOS (1990) 7 S.C. (Pt. I) Pg. 136, the Supreme Court per Obaseki JSC (as he then was) held that: “Where there is a notice of dismissal or termination of appointment of an employee by the employer, it is not necessary for the employer to prove the reasons stated in the notice. The only obligation on him is to show that the contract was terminated in accordance with the express or implied terms of the contract, regardless of whether the appointment is on permanent or probationary basis”. Counsel submitted that the reason given by the Defendant for terminating the Claimant’s employment was for gross negligence which he was found guilty of by the Disciplinary Committee set up by the Defendant. According to counsel, the Claimant admitted both in his pleadings and under cross-examination that he appeared before the said committee but alleges without any proof whatsoever that he was not given a fair hearing. It is the submission of counsel that the claim by the Claimant that he was not given a fair hearing by the committee without placing any cogent facts before this Court should be disregarded as lacking in any merit and that there was nothing wrong or unfair in the way the Defendant handled the employment, indefinite suspension and termination of the Claimant’s employment contract with it, as it followed all its laid down guidelines in such cases. According to counsel, the Defendant was informed through the Internal Memo of December 11, 2014 and in his termination letter of June 08, 2015 that the management of the Defendant was dissatisfied with the way and manner in which he carried out his duties in the period leading up to the fraudulent activities at the Defendant’s Owerri Branch and that the Disciplinary Committee of the Defendant found him guilty of gross negligence in the discharge of his duties. The Defendant’s witness under cross examination stated that the Claimant received the Branch Service Manager’s password (which is restricted to one person) and used the same password to authorise transactions for those doing Saturday banking in clear breach of the Bank’s policy. The Defence also testified that the Claimant was also aware of the Bank’s policy that under no conditions should any staff give out or receive another’s password and that the same compromised password was used in authorizing transactions at the Bank on that day. Not only was there an offence of password compromise established against the Claimant but the same compromised password was also used to authorise transactions at the branch on that date, and even though the Disciplinary Committee found the Claimant innocent of involvement in the fraud that took place in the branch on that day, it found him guilty of the offence of password compromise and the use of the compromised password to authorise transactions at the branch. Finally, counsel submitted on these two issues that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was not wrongly terminated and that he was given a fair hearing by the Defendant when he appeared before its Disciplinary Committee prior to the termination of his appointment. Arguing issues 3 and 4 together, counsel referred to the averment of the Claimant in Paragraphs 11, 11(b) and 14(e) and (f) Statement of Facts that his contract of employment with the Defendant is still valid and subsisting having not been effectively determined in law and that the Defendant should continue to pay him all his salaries and allowances until his contract of employment is validly determined. Counsel submitted in response thereto, that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was validly determined on June 8, 2015 through Exhibit C4. He referred to the case of OSAKWE vs NIG. PAPER MILL LTD (1998) 7 S. C. (Pt. II) at Pg. 116-117, where the Supreme Court per Ogundare JSC (as he then was) held that: “Secondly, we must lose sight of the fact that the relationship between the parties was one of master and servant. And what determines the wrongfulness or otherwise of the plaintiff’s dismissal is the contract of service and not any notion of fair hearing. In my respectful view, the Board was not obliged to, and did not act quasi-judicially but rather administratively” His Lordship went on further to state that: “Even if I had found that the Plaintiff’s right to fair hearing was breached I would still not have granted the declaration sought by him. The effect of that declaration would be to order his reinstatement. The Plaintiff’s contract of employment with the defendant was not one with a statutory flavour in that it was not governed by any statutory provision as in OLANIYAN vs. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 and did not, therefore, enjoy any statutory flavour. It was simply a contract of personal service, that is, of master and servant. It is settled law that a servant will rarely be forced on a master and vice-versa. The remedy against any party in breach lies in damages.” In the case of CHUKWUMA vs. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 at 560, the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC (as he then was) held that: “It is a well-established principle of the common law, and of Nigerian law, that ordinarily a master is entitled to dismiss his servant from his employment for good or for bad reasons or for no reason at all. The common law recognises and respects the sanctity of contracts. The latin maxim pacta sunt sertvanda is a sacred doctrine for the preservation of contracts which is entitled to the greatest respect. Hence where parties have reduced the terms and conditions of service into an agreement, the conditions must be observed. In the ordinary case and following the common law principle, termination of a contract of service even if unlawful, brings to an end the relationship of master and servant, employer and employee. The rule is based on the principle of the confidential relationship between master and servant which cannot continue in the absence of mutuality”. Counsel referred the court to the case of GARUBA vs. KWARA INV. CO. LTD (2005) 1 S.C. (Pt. II) 80 at Pg 92, where the Supreme Court per Oguntade JSC (as he then was) held that: “It is in recognition of the common law principle which recognizes that a master cannot be compelled to retain in his employment a servant he no longer wants that it must be accepted that the letter, Exhibit 3, fully and finally brought the employment of the Plaintiff by the 1st Defendant to an end leaving the Plaintiff/Appellant with the option to pursue by an action the payment of the terminal benefits of damages.” According to counsel, in the absence of any proof by the Claimant that his employment with the Defendant had statutory flavour, then the termination of his employment by the Defendant through Exhibit C4 still subsists as this Court cannot foist the willing Claimant on the unwilling Defendant. It is submission of counsel that the Claimant is not entitled to the Damages claimed as the Defendant calculated and paid the Claimant his terminal benefits after the termination of his employment with the Defendant as shown on the Net Financial Position of the Claimant annexed to Exhibit C4, the termination letter showing that he’s only entitled to the sum of N40,432.94 (Forty Thousand, Four Hundred and Thirty Two Naira, Ninety Four Kobo). Counsel cited the case of SENNA SECURITY vs. AFROPAK (NIG.) LTD & ORS (2008) 4-5 S.C. (Pt. II) at page 149, where the Supreme Court per Mohammad JSC held that: “The damages recoverable usually in cases of wrongful dismissal/termination have been well pronounced upon by our courts in several decided cases. Such damages are said to be the losses reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of the contract as inevitably arising if one break faith with the other. Certainly, they do not include or take account of speculative or sentimental values. The court in awarding damages will certainly not include compensation for injured feelings or the loss that may have been sustained from the fact that the employee having been dismissed, makes it more difficult for him to obtain fresh employment.” The issue of damages recoverable in breach of contract of employment cases was more extensively treated by the Supreme Court in the case of ATIVIE vs. KABEL METAL NIG. LTD (2008) 5-6 S.C. (Pt. II) at pages 70-71 per W. Onoghen JSC when he held that: “From the reproduced reliefs, it is very clear that the appellant made no claim for any tortuous act of the respondent. From the three (3) reliefs, it is obvious that the appellant sought declarations to the effect that the termination of his appointment was wrongful etc and that he is still an employee of the respondent (i.e. reinstatement) and thirdly general and special damages of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) with interest of 21 % thereon obviously for the wrongful termination of the appointment of the appellant. There is no relief in respect of the alleged injuries sustained in the course of the employment with the respondent and it is settled law that parties and the courts are bound by the pleadings of the parties and that the court not being a Father Christmas cannot give to a party what he has not asked for. “ On the issue of damages, it is settled law that the principle of assessment of damages for breach of contract is restitution in integrum – that is, that in so far as the damages are not too remote, the plaintiff shall be restored, as far as money can do it into the position in which he would have been if the breach had not occurred. It is in line with the above principle that award of damages in breach of contract cases should be such as: (a) may fairly and reasonably be expected to arise naturally i.e. according to the usual course of things from such breach of contract itself; or (b) may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it – See OKONGWU vs NNPC (1985) 4 NWLR (Pt. 115) 290 @ 299. It is also settled that the term “general” and “special” damages are normally inapt in the categorization of damages for the purpose of awards in breach of contract cases; that apart from damages naturally arising or resulting from the breach, no other form of general damages can be contemplated. In other words, in an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff, where he succeeds, is not entitled to any award under the general damages head of claim in addition to the damages (special) fairly or reasonably expected to arise naturally from the breach which damages must have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of entering into the contract as the probable result of the breach of the same. In terms of breach of contract of employment therefore, the damages recoverable by the plaintiff are the losses reasonably foreseeable by the parties thereto at the time of entering into the contract.” Counsel submitted that Exhibit Cl which is the Claimant’s letter of employment contains all the terms of the employment contract between the Claimant and the Defendant in this suit and also clearly contemplate the damages to be paid by any party that may be in breach of the contract. The contract provides that any party to the contract may terminate the contract by giving one month’s notice of its intention to terminate the contract or may pay to the other party one month’s salary in lieu of such notice. Counsel went on that assuming without conceding that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant was wrongful for the non-issuance of the requisite notice, then the damages which ordinarily would accrue to the Claimant under the contract is the payment of one month’s salary and other benefits and allowances for one month and nothing more. He submitted further that the Claimant’s terminal benefits after the termination of his employment with the Defendant is as shown on Net Financial Position of the Claimant annexed to Exhibit C4, the termination letter showing that he’s only entitled to the sum of N40,432.94 (Forty Thousand, Four Hundred and Thirty Two Naira, Ninety Four Kobo). In the final written address of the Claimant filed on the 22nd day of February 2017, counsel for the Claimant submitted the following three issues for determination: a. Whether the indefinite suspension of claimant from work without pay, as per Exhibit C3, was not a punitive sanction and thus wrongful in the circumstances of the case; b. Whether from the facts of this case and evidence before the honourable court (Exhibits Cl and C5 respectively), the termination of the claimant’s employment is not wrongful. c. Whether the Claimant has proved his claims on a preponderance of evidence and entitled to judgment of this court. In arguing issue one, Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the indefinite suspension of claimant from work without pay, as per Exhibit C3, was a punitive sanction and not a precautionary measure; thus wrongful in the circumstances of this case. It is the Claimant’s case, as disclosed in his pleadings, that the Defendant placed him on an indefinite suspension without pay for alleged involvement in fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri Branch without giving the claimant any prior notice or availing him any fair opportunity to be heard on the alleged accusation of fraud. It is the Claimant’s further contention that for such punitive sanction (indefinite suspension without pay) meted on the Claimant without his being fairly heard on the alleged grounds constituted in itself an unfair labour practice contrary to the extant labour laws. See paragraphs 6 (b) & (c) of the statement of fact. According to counsel, in response to the Claimant’s above contention, the Defendant did not deny that the Claimant was not given notice or afforded any fair opportunity to be heard before the suspension, but attempted to avoid the consequences thereof when at paragraph 6 of the statement of defence it claimed that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay was merely a precautionary measure to pave way for investigations following the discovery of several irregular transactions in which the Claimant featured. In firm denial of the Defendant’s claim that the Claimant was suspended for purpose of investigation, the Claimant pleaded paragraphs 3(b) and 5(c) of the reply to statement of defence and averred specifically that the indefinite suspension without pay as conceived in Exhibit C3 was a punitive sanction for an offence as though same had been established against the Claimant, and not to aid any alleged investigation. From the above state of the pleadings of parties in this suit as regards the issue on the nature of the suspension meted on the Claimant by the Defendant, Counsel submitted that the material question of fact to be resolved by the court is whether the Claimant’s suspension on 12/12/2014 was a punitive sanction for an alleged involvement in fraudulent activities in the Defendant’s Owerri branch office or a precautionary measure pending investigation, as alleged by the Defendant. Counsel then invited the court to construe the exact wordings and letters of the said Suspension Notice of 12/12/2014 dated 11/12/2014 and admitted in evidence as Exhibit C3, to wit; “Interim Report on Fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri Branch INTERNAL MEMO Dear Okechukwu Osuji, We refer to the role played by you in the above incidence, which occurred in your branch and convey to you management’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which you performed your duties during this period. In view of the above, Management has directed that you be placed on indefinite suspension without pay with effect from 12/12/2014. It is hoped that going forward, you will discharge your duties diligently and with strong sense of accountability and respect for laid-down procedure of the Bank. Please be guided” It is the submission of counsel for the Claimant that the above wordings and letters of Exhibit C3 are clear and unambiguous and being a documentary evidence it excludes any oral evidence to be adduced either to add, alter or modify it. The Notice of Suspension speaks for itself. The law is settled that parole evidence cannot be used to alter such documentary evidence. Again it is the law that parties cannot read into a document what is not there or read out of it what is there. See Sections 125 & 128 (1) Evidence Act 2011, INTELS NIG LTD vs. WILLIAM BASSEY [2015] 5 ACELR 88 (CA), UBN LTD vs. PROF ALBERT OZIGI [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385. Furthermore, according to counsel, it is settled law that in construing documentary evidence, the court must confine itself to the plain words and ordinary meaning derivable from the provisions contained therein. See INTELS NIG LTD vs. WILLIAM BASSEY (supra), SULE vs. NIGERIAN COTTON BOARD (1985)2NWLR (Pt. 5) 17. Counsel submitted further that the ordinary and plain meaning of the wordings and letters of Exhibit C3 does not suggest the preposterous claim of the Defendant that it suspended the Claimant indefinitely without pay to pave way for investigation. More spurious is the fact that the Defendant’s witness under cross-examination claimed that the Claimant was suspended pending police investigation yet it is on record supported by uncontroverted evidence that the Claimant was detained and investigated for 10days by the Police and eventually released innocent of the allegation on 28/11/2014 whereas the Defendant proceeded to suspend Claimant indefinitely without pay on 12/12/2014 i.e. 14days (2weeks) after the police had investigated and released the Claimant unimplicated in the alleged fraud which was the same ground for which the Defendant proceeded most unfairly to suspended the Claimant. Counsel drew the Court’s attention to the concluding paragraph of Exhibit C3 which reads, “It is hoped that going forward, you will discharge your duties diligently and with strong sense of accountability and respect for laid-down procedure of the Bank”, and submitted that the Defendant consciously intended the suspension to be a punitive sanction, and not for purpose of any investigation as falsely claimed. Counsel raised the question whether it was right for the defendant to have taken such disciplinary stance against the Claimant without first hearing him or giving him the opportunity to be heard, and without first investigating same alleged fraud, more so when the subsequent internal investigation through the Disciplinary Committee did not eventually find the claimant guilty or involved in the alleged fraud. According to counsel, it is the trite position of the law that before an employer can undertake any disciplinary action against an employee in a master servant relationship he must first satisfy the requirements of fair hearing by bringing the allegation against the employee to his notice and affording him adequate time and opportunity to reply to same. See IMONIKHE vs. UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624 @ 648 para F where the Supreme court, per Rhodes Vivour JSC, stated thus; “Accusing an employee of misconduct, etc. by way of a query and allowing the employee to answer the query, and the employee answers it before a decision is taken satisfies the requirements of fair hearing or natural justice.” See also the unreported judgment of this court in Suit No. NICN/LA/29/2011 between MR. MASAGBOR CHRISTOPHER ALOAYE JACKSON vs. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA delivered on 2/10/2014. It is also the contention of the Claimant that the Defendant failed to give him prior notice of the alleged offence, or an opportunity to be heard on the allegation, before it arrived at its prejudicial conclusions and inferences in Exhibit C3 to wit; that the claimant played a role and or was involved in fraudulent FCUB postings, and therefore punitively sanctioned the Claimant based on the prejudicial conclusion by suspending the Claimant indefinitely without pay. Counsel referred the court to paragraphs 6 (b) & (c) of the statement of fact. According to the Claimant, the Defendant did not deny the fact that it did not give the Claimant prior notice of the alleged fraud or an opportunity to be heard on the allegation before it suspended the Claimant indefinitely without pay. The Defendant only loosely claimed under cross-examination of DWl that it issued query to the Claimant, which claim was vehemently denied by the Claimant, and the Defendant failed to substantiate its claim by producing the alleged query in court. Counsel urged the court not to countenance the Defendant’s spurious claim and to hold same as having not been proved. Thus, much as the onus of proof rested on the Defendant to show that it allegedly issued the Claimant any query, see section 131 (2) such evidential burden cannot be merely discharged by parole evidence without production of the said query as credible documentary evidence for the court to rely on. See the case of ABUBAKAR vs. WAZIRI (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 436) 2025 @ 2047 where the Supreme Court aptly held that where a party pleads and leads evidence as to the existence of a document in proof of his case, the original or, in an appropriate case, secondary evidence of it, should be tendered as the law does not allow oral evidence to be led in proof of such document. See also F.A.T.B LIMITED vs. PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT LIMITED (2004) FWLR (PT 192) 167 SC. Furthermore, there is on record the unchallenged contention of the Claimant supported by credible evidence before the court that in standard employment and industrial relations, the detention and investigation of the Claimant by the police at the instance of the Defendant does not constitute fair labour practice of giving the Claimant notice and or an opportunity to be heard on the allegation of fraud. On this, counsel referred to paragraph 3(c) of the Reply to statement of defence and paragraph 4(c) of the additional written statement on oath of the Claimant as CW1. It is also the contention of the Claimant that the Defendant, in realizing that it had prejudicially dealt with the Claimant by suspending him for the alleged fraud without giving him a fair hearing and particularly when same allegation was not established against the Claimant, sought to evade the consequences thereof by pretentiously and belatedly setting up a Disciplinary Committee (4months into the punitive suspension) to look into the issue and come up with the most preposterous “allegation of gross negligence” upon which it terminated the Claimant’s employment. Counsel referred to paragraph 8(xii) of the statement of fact. The Claimant also contended that the punitive sanction of suspending him indefinitely without pay for an unestablished allegation of fraud, without being given an opportunity to be heard first, and 6 months thereafter purport to terminate his employment upon same unjustified accusations amounted, in the circumstances, to an inexcusable double jeopardy and unfair labour practice by the Defendant against the Claimant. Counsel referred to paragraph 8(x) of the statement of fact. He went on that the Defendant in its defence to the claim of the Claimant insists that it afforded the Claimant fair hearing when it invited the Claimant to the Disciplinary Committee. And the Disciplinary committee investigated the matter and established an allegation of gross negligence against the Claimant, not the alleged fraud, and thus advised management to terminate the Claimant’s employment. According to counsel, it is the case of the Defendant that the said Disciplinary Committee constituted the internal investigation conducted by the Defendant in this matter. It is on record that the Defendant suspended the Claimant indefinitely without pay for alleged involvement in ‘fraudulent FCUB postings’ several months before he was even invited to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bank, which arguably was the first and only seeming opportunity the Claimant was to have been offered a fair hearing by the Defendant on the allegation of fraud. This fact was not denied by the Defendant though it craftily claimed that the suspension was for the purpose of investigation. Counsel submitted that by the admission of the Defendants that it only invited the Claimant to the Disciplinary committee for the matter to be looked into about 4 months after it had placed the Claimant on an indefinite suspension without pay; strongly underscores the crucial point of contention that the Claimant was punitively sanctioned for an alleged fraud before same was even investigated by the Defendant itself. Suffices to state that the Claimant was exonerated of the alleged fraud after the Defendant eventually investigated the matter internally. Consequently, it is counsel’s submission that the subsequent exoneration of the Claimant of the same allegation for which he was disciplinarily sanctioned renders the indefinite suspension without pay prejudicial and wrongful in the circumstances. Counsel reiterated the sacrosanct position of the law on demands of fair hearing as a fundamental prerequisite to any disciplinary action in employment matters, thus: In AIYETAN vs. NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR OIL PALM RESEARCH [1987] NWLR (Part 59) 48 @ 76-77 the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC posited thus: “The rule [of natural justice] is not only fundamental to the administration of justice but also seems invariably common to all known legal jurisprudence and is rooted in the minds of all fair minded person ….it has been held to be applicable to wherever a person or authority is concerned in the determination of the rights of another in such a manner that the version of the person against who the determination is to be made is an essential requirement of the process of determination. Hence the application of the principle is not confined to final determinations of a judicial nature. It is applicable even to those determinations referred to as administrative where no particular rules of procedure have been provided.― Also in OLATUNBOSUN vs. NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RESEARCH (1988) 3 NWLR (Part 80) 25 @ 52 the Supreme court per Oputa JSC asserted that the right to fair hearing arises where there is an allegation of misconduct, which may result and in fact did result in some form of punishment, deprivation of some right or loss of means of livelihood to the appellant Counsel urged the court to resolve issue one in favour of the Claimant by holding, that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant from work without pay on 12/12/2014 being a disciplinary sanction reached without giving the Claimant any fair hearing for the allegation that was eventually unestablished against the Claimant by the Defendant’s subsequent internal investigation (4 months thereafter) is prejudicial and thus wrongful in the circumstances. On issue two, counsel submitted that from the facts of this case and evidence before the court, particularly Exhibits C1 and C5 respectively, the termination of the Claimant’s employment is wrongful. He submitted further that from the pleadings of the Claimant, it is his contention that the termination of his employment by the Defendant on 8/6/2015 is both substantially and procedurally wrongful. Firstly, the Claimants contended that the Defendant wrongly terminated his employment upon a prejudicial and baseless ground of ‘allegation of gross negligence’ that does not constitute an offence for which the Claimant’s employment can be terminated. Counsel referred to paragraph 9 (b) of the statement of fact. To substantiate this contention, the Claimant tendered in evidence the Disciplinary and Sanction Grid of the Defendant as Exhibit C5; wherein the offences known to the Defendant’s policy and the sanctions for each offence are exhaustively listed. The Claimant gave credible evidence to the effect that of all the offences listed therein there is no such offence known to the Defendant’s policy as “allegation of gross negligence” needless to say if termination of employment was the sanction thereof. It is trite law settled on a plethora of authorities that an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. But where he gives a reason or cause for terminating the appointment, the law imposes on him a duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court, otherwise the termination will be held to be wrongful. See the cases of S.P.D.C. LTD vs. OLAREWAJU (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1 at 5 Para 1; OLATUNBOSUN vs. NISER COUNCIL (supra) @ 54 paras D-E; IMONIKHE vs. UNITY BANK PLC (supra) @ 637 A. Counsel submitted that having proffered “allegation of gross negligence” as the reason for the terminating the Claimant’s employment vide Exhibit C4, the legal duty rested squarely on the Defendant in this case to prove same. In a bid to discharge the legal burden placed on it to prove the reason given in terminating the Claimant’s employment, the Defendant through its witness DW1 admitted that the Claimant was not found guilty of any offence, either for fraud or attempted fraud however it spuriously alleged that the Claimant had obtained the password of another staff which was an infraction of the Defendant’s policy on password compromise (see paragraph 7(iv) of DW1 written deposition/evidence in chief on 3/11/2016]. Then under cross examination the said DW1 alleged in another radically different breath that it was one staff named Chukwuemeka that gave the Claimant his personal password to authorize transactions at the Owerri branch office. Counsel submitted that the court cannot pick and choose which of the contradictory versions of the DW1’s evidence on the alleged password compromise it should believe but must reject such evidence. See BASSEY vs. STATE (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 633) 1816 @ 1832 S.C; WACHUKWU vs. ONWUNWANNE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 589) 1044 and OGIDI vs. STATE (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 824) l S.C. According to counsel, it is on record that the Claimant vehemently denied both contradictory allegations of the Defendants witness (DW1) but stated categorically that the Acting BSM of the Defendant’s branch office in Owerri directed the Claimant to report to the office on 15/11/2014 to authorize two urgent transactions and therefore sent the Claimant a password, which to the best of the Claimant’s knowledge was within the official responsibility of the said acting BSM to create such user id/password for the said transactions. This piece of evidence from the Claimant was not impugned by the Defendant. Counsel urged the court to rely on same as credible evidence on the issue. See the cases of NADABO vs. DABAI (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1245) 155; NSITFMB vs. KLIFCO {NIG.} LTD (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 534) 73 SC; CBN vs. IGWILO (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1034) 393; BELLO vs EWEKA (1981) 1 SC 101 to the effect that where a piece of evidence is not challenged, controverted or impugned the court is bound to accept the evidence as good and credible evidence upon which the court can safely rely. Counsel however submitted that assuming without conceding that the Claimant was indeed found guilty of the alleged password compromise, the said infraction is expressly listed in Exhibit C5 and the sanctions thereof are warning or suspension with half pay and not termination of employment as the Defendant had wrongly proceeded against the Defendant on 8/6/2014. According to counsel, it is worthy of note that the Defendant, in trying to discharge the legal burden of proving the alleged “allegation of gross negligence” as reason for terminating Claimant’s employment, pleaded and led evidence on averments contained at paragraph 5 (i) to (vi). However, under cross- examination DW1 admitted that those averments were not made from his personal knowledge as they constituted in part, what he was allegedly told and partly what he claimed to have obtained from some records in the defendants keeping which included CCTV. Under further cross-examination DWl admitted that the alleged source/record were not brought before this court to ascertain. It is counsel’s submission that this court cannot be made to speculate or make conjectures on content of such alleged records not before it, more so in the face of a clear and direct rebuttal of those averments by the claimant. He urged the court to rightly reject any piece of evidence led at paragraph 7(i) to (vi) of the witness written deposition as constituting hearsay evidence. He urged the court to hold that the Claimant had failed to discharge the legal burden of proving the alleged reason for terminating the Claimant’s employment vide Exhibit C4. It is the further submission of counsel that the termination of Claimant’s employment is also wrongful having been made contrary to the express terms of his condition of employment with the Defendant and the extant labour laws that provided for a month’s notice or payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant tendered Exhibit C1 which is his letter of employment containing the terms and conditions of employment. The Claimant also tendered the said letter of termination of employment as Exhibit C4 dated 8/6/2015 wherein the Claimant’s employment was said to be effectively terminated on same 8/6/2015 without any provision for payment of a month’s salary in lieu thereof. It is on record that the Claimant pleaded and led credible unchallenged evidence that the said letter of termination of employment was served on him by the Defendant on 12/6/2014 i.e. 4 days after the Defendant had terminated the said employment. The Claimant also pleaded and led evidence in proof thereof by tendering Exhibits C7(A) & C7(B) respectively to establish that no payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice and or his entitlements following termination of his employment were paid to him, as falsely alleged by the Defendant. The Claimant had contended that, on the foregoing discrepancies in terminating his employment without notice or payment of salary in lieu, the termination of his employment was inherently wrongful. It is trite law that where there is a document or series of documents incorporating the terms and conditions of an employment, a Court should not look outside those terms in deciding the rights and obligations of parties to same. See JOWAN & ORS. vs. DELTA STEEL CO. LIMITED (2010) LPELR-4377. Counsel submitted that Exhibits C1 and C5 are part of the documents incorporating the terms and conditions of employment of the Claimant which this Court is bound to examine for the just determination of this case. It is certainly not the law that a party will be allowed to resile from such a document where one exists. The Court will also not add to or remove from the content of a clear and unambiguous document. See RANGAZA vs. MIEN PLASTIC CO. LIMITED (2013) LPELR-20303 (CA). It is also trite law to state that in order to determine whether or not the employment of the Claimant was wrongfully terminated, the law requires the Claimant to lay before the Court the terms and conditions regulating his employment and how the termination of same was not in compliance with the agreed terms and conditions. Counsel thus submitted that the Claimant has satisfied this requirement of the law having tendered Exhibit C1 and Exhibit C5 which are of very relevant consideration here, and also showing by his pleadings and evidence led how the termination of his employment did not comply with the agreed terms and condition. Counsel referred to the decision of this court in the unreported judgment of His Lordship HON JUSTICE J. D. PETERS delivered on 19/11/2015 in Suit No. NICN/LA/598/2013 between VINCENT IKE vs. FIDELITY BANK PLC, to urge the court to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant and hold that the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the Defendants on 8/6/2015 is wrongful. On issue three, counsel submitted that on the state of the pleadings of parties and evidence led in this suit and on the strength of counsel’s submissions under issues 1 & 2, the Claimant has proved his claims in this suit on a preponderance of evidence and balance of probability, and is therefore entitled to the judgment of this court. It is trite law that where a party desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of certain facts which he asserts, such a party shall prove that those facts exists and the burden of proof, in civil proceedings, shall be discharged on the balance of probabilities/preponderance of evidence. See Section 133 & 134 of the Evidence (supra). See also the cases of AGBOOLA vs. UBA PLC (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 574) 74 SC; EYA vs. OLOPADE (2011) All FWLR (Pt 584) 28 SC; IBIYEYE vs. FOJULE (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 302) 156 SC; NWANKPU vs. EWULU (1995) 7 SCNJ 197; MOGAJI vs. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC. It is basic law that civil suits are decided on the balance of probabilities or on the preponderance of evidence which connotes that the totality of the credible evidence of both parties is bound to be taken into account and appraised so as to determine which evidence has more weight and preponderates when placed on the imaginary judicial scale by the trial court. See OSUJI vs. EKEOCHA (2009) All FWLR (Pt 490) 614 SC. Counsel reiterated that the Claimant’s claim as encapsulated in the reliefs sought in this suit are principally for a declaration that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant without pay on 12/12/2014 and the subsequent termination of Claimant’s employment on 8/6/2015 are both wrongful, and for orders of the court that the Defendant compensates the Claimant in damages for both wrongful suspension and termination. He submitted that the Claimant has proved each and every fact relevant to establish his claims herein on a preponderance of credible evidence and on the balance of probability on each and every relief of his claim, and that the entire claims of the claimant in this suit, as encapsulated in the reliefs pleaded at paragraph 14 (a) to (h) of the statement of facts and predicated upon the above issues, have been by overwhelming credible evidence sufficiently proved by the claimant. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has proved his case as required by law and is entitled to the judgment of this court on all the reliefs sought. He urged the court to grant the Claimant’s claim in its entirety because the Claimant has, by credible evidence replete on the records before this court, proved on the preponderance of evidence and balance of probabilities that he is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the statement of facts. The Defendant filed a Reply on points of law on the 3rd day of March 2017 wherein counsel submitted in response to the Claimant’s legal argument 5.1.11, that the said argument is misconceived as the Supreme Court did not lay down any rule in that matter to the effect that to satisfy the requirements of fair hearing in any master/servant relationship, the master must bring any allegation it may have against the servant through a query. According to counsel, the important thing is that the allegation against him is made known to him and he is given adequate time to respond to same. To counsel for the defendant, the “decision― being spoken of by the apex court in the case of IMONIKHE vs. UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 5 SC (Pt. 1) cited by the Claimant, is the decision of the Respondent in that case to terminate the appointment of the Appellant after its disciplinary committee had found him guilty of the offences alleged against him. In reaction to the Claimant’s paragraph 5.1.12, it is the submission of counsel that the Claimant has not placed before the court, any provisions of Exhibits C1 and C5 which makes it mandatory that the Defendant must issue a query to the Claimant before suspending him from duty. Neither has he brought any extant labour laws applicable in Nigeria which makes it mandatory that a query must be issued to the Claimant before his suspension in order satisfy the rules of fair hearing. In response to the Claimant’s legal argument 5.1.18, counsel submitted that the facts of the case of AIYETAN vs. NIFOR (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) are radically different from the facts of this case. According to counsel, in that case, the appellant was invited among others to testify at an inquiry without being told he was an accused and without any charges brought against him. The Claimant in this case however had ample knowledge of the allegations against him through Exhibit C5 and he was afforded ample time and opportunity to correct and counter those allegations by the Defendant at the disciplinary committee hearings. Counsel submitted further that in the case of OLATUNBOSUN vs. NISER COUNCIL (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80), the Appellant had earlier on appeared before a different council over several allegations against him. After the reconstitution of the council and at the meeting of the new council, the issue of the allegations against the Appellant surfaced again. He was not invited to the subsequent meeting and three new members took place in the latter meeting. And he was not given another opportunity to be heard. According to counsel, the facts and the judgment delivered in the above case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. Counsel went further that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs he has claimed in this action. The courts have long laid down the quantum of damages recoverable by the Claimant where his claim is sustained by the court. See ATIVIE vs. KABEL METAL NIG. LTD. (SUPRA). The unreported case of VINCENT EKE vs. FIDELITY BANK PLC relied upon by the Claimant is at best persuasive and not binding on this court, as the circumstances are clearly distinguishable. Counsel cited the case of NITEL PLC vs. OCHOLI (2001) FWLR (Pt. 74) 254 at 285 where it was held that a plaintiff in an action for wrongful dismissal is not entitled to general damages because general damages belong to a claim in tort. COURT’s DECISION Having examined the submissions of the counsels to the parties in their final written addresses, I will now consider this case. Let me start by reviewing the facts and evidence presented by both parties before the court. The Claimant’s case is that he was employed by the Defendant as assistant banking officer by a letter dated 5/12/2013. The Claimant’s employment was confirmed subsequently by the Defendant by a letter dated 25/8/2014. As assistant banking officer, the Claimant functioned as the Transaction Officer (TO) in the Owerri branch of the Defendant. Because of his excellent performance, his annual gross salary was reviewed from N4,550,000.00 to N5,372,460.00 in September 2014. While in the employment of the Defendant, he has never been cautioned or queried either for incompetence, fraud or breach of the bank’s policies. But sometimes on 12/12/2014, the Defendant relied on an interim report on fraudulent FCUB postings in Owerri branch to unfairly suspend him from work indefinitely and without pay through an internal memo of 11/12/2014. He was not given prior notice nor was he given any opportunity to be heard on the allegation of fraud before the Defendant arrived at its conclusion in the said interim report and suspended him as a result. According to the Claimant, the duration of the suspension and withdrawal of pay was punitive and constituted unfair labour practice. Six months after his suspension, the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment on 8/6/2015 in a letter of the same date but which was served on him on 12/6/2015. The termination of his employment by the Defendant on a baseless allegation of gross negligence for which he was not given an opportunity to be heard is wrongful and constitutes an unfair labour practice. The termination of his employment is also wrongful for being contrary to the express terms his condition of employment. The Claimant relied on the conditions of employment attached to his letter of employment. To the Claimant, he was not given one month’s notice nor paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice before his employment was terminated. As such, his employment has not been validly terminated in law. Hence, his employment is still subsisting. The Claimant averred that his indefinite suspension without pay and the eventual termination of his employment over allegations which were not established was wrongful and amounted to unfair labour practice. The Claimant gave particulars of the unfair labour practice to include his allegations that notice of the alleged fraud was not given to him and he was not given reasonable opportunity to be heard on the allegation before he was suspended indefinitely without pay. Instead of informing him of the allegation, the Defendant moved him to Lagos on 18/11/2014 where he was detained by the police at Criminal Investigation Department, Alagbon, Lagos for 10 days without charging him to court. After his release from detention, the Defendant gave him indefinite suspension without pay notwithstanding that the police did not find or implicate him in the alleged fraud. There was no valid justification for the suspension or the termination of his employment. Furthermore, the disciplinary committee was an accusatory session and the committee failed to establish fraud against him. The subsequent allegation of gross negligence for which his employment was terminated is not an infraction in the Defendant’s Sanctions and Disciplinary Grid. The Claimant averred that he has suffered unjustly as a result of the unfair suspension and termination of his employment. He is entitled to special damages comprising arrears of salaries, allowances and other benefits from the Defendant which he particularized in his statement of facts. The Claimant also averred that his contract of employment with the Defendant is still subsisting as it has not been effectively terminated in law. He is entitled to be given one month’s notice or be paid one month’s salary in lieu. The Defendant is thus bound to pay him his salaries and allowances or compensate him in damages for wrongful termination of his employment and he is also entitled to recover the sum of N750,000.00 he paid to institute this suit from the Defendant. The Claimant made further averments in his reply to the statement of defence and in his additional evidence. I will make use of the relevant areas of the Claimant’s reply and additional evidence in the course of determining issues in this judgment. The Defendant admitted that it employed the Claimant on 5/12/2013 and confirmed his employment on 25/8/2014. According to the Defendant, the Claimant formerly worked in the Owerri branch of the Defendant which branch offers Saturday banking. On Saturday 15/11/2014, the Claimant was the most senior officer on duty and he had the responsibility of coordinating the branch activities. He was also in possession of the branch keys and was responsible for opening and closing the branch doors on that day. In the course of that day, the Claimant committed a serious breach of duty when he abdicated his responsibility by handing over the keys to someone else when he was leaving the banking hall without prior authorization to do so. The Claimant also failed to follow the bank’s process for obtaining the user authorisation profile for authorising higher value tickets. The Claimant obtained the password of another staff who was attending a training program on that day in an act of password compromise and also allowed some other persons access into the IT system when he did not have authority to do so. The compromised password was used in activating the unauthorised high value transactions tickets at the branch on the same date. On 18/11/2014, the Claimant, the officer that compromised his password by giving it out to the Claimant, the transaction officer whose password was used to impute the fraudulent transaction and the IT staff who was granted access to the IT system, were invited to Lagos to explain their roles in the unauthorised transaction at Owerri branch. Following the discovery of several irregular transactions at its Owerri branch and the role suspected to have been played by the Claimant in the incident, the Defendant placed the Claimant on indefinite suspension to pave way for investigation. The indefinite suspension was based on management’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Claimant performed his duty during the period as communicated to the Claimant in an internal memo dated 11/12/2014. The Defendant’s disciplinar
