IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT CALABAR
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE E. N. AGBAKOBA
DATED 3RD MARCH, 2017 SUIT NO: NICN/CA/59/2015
BETWEEN:
COMFORT EKPENYONG EDET CLAIMANT
AND:
UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL DEFENDANT
REPRESENTATION:
- ONYEKWELU for the claimant
CHIEF OROK IRONBAR for the defendant with IMMCULATA IRONBAR
J U D G E M E N T
The claimant, by a General Form of Complaint filed on 24th November, 2015 accompanied by the Statement of Facts, Claimant’ Written Statement on Oath, List of Witnesses and List of Documents, approached the Court for the following reliefs:
- A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s appointment with the defendant is grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process.
- An Order of this Honorable Court reinstating the claimant and restoring her to her position (i.e.) Grade Level 7 step 5) prior to the issuance of letter of termination to her employment.
- An Order of Court directing the defendant to pay to the claimant her salary arrears from the date of purported termination of her appointment to the determination of this suit at the rate of Ninety Five Thousand. Eight Hundred and Fifty Seven Naira, Thirty Three Kobo (#95,857.33) per month.
- An Order directing the defendant to pay the claimant the cost of Five Hundred Thousand naira (#500,000.00) only.
- An Order of General Damages to the tune of Ten Million (#10,000,000.00) only for the trauma and hardship caused her by the unlawful termination of her employment.
The Claimant’s Case
The Claimant was an employee of the defendant since October, 2011 when she was offered an appointment through a letter of Appointment dated 10th October, 2011 and that following her employment she worked in several units before December, 2012 when she was transferred/posted to Obstetrics and Gynecology revenue Unit.
The Claimant averred that her employment has a statutory flavor and as such, the termination of her employment must follow laid down rules as provided by extant laws establishing the defendant. Furthermore, that being a senior staff of the defendant, a proper constituted Board of the defendant has the power to approve the termination of her appointment. But that there has not been any such Board in place in the defendant’s hospital since May, 2015. She averred that the defendant invited her variously on 2nd October, 2013 and 14th July, 2015 to an Investigative Panel set up by the defendant on an allegation of financial impropriety alongside other members of staff and that till date, nothing was communicated to her either verbally or in writing as to the outcome of the Panel’s report.
The Claimant stated that the termination of her employment is grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process, stating that it will service the cause of justice for the Court to order her reinstatement and payment of arrears of salaries from the dated of termination of her appointment to her reinstatement.
The defendant filed a STATEMENT OF DEFENCE filed on 11th March, 2016.
The defendant averred that claimant cannot assert that her services to the defendant had been without blemish when sometime in 2013, she was indicted for financial impropriety.
The Defendant also averred that claimant cannot require the defendant to produce the copy of a query issued her in 2015, receipted and replied to by here on 6th April, 2015.
Defendant admitted that the claimant was served a letter of invitation for a chat with a panel of investigation dated 14th July, 2015 but denied the averment that copies of the relevant documents in issue were not shown to her. And stated that the Internal Audit Report of July, 2013 and recommendations of the two separate panels all indicted the claimant.
The Claimant in reaction filed a REPLY TO STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 30th September, 2016.
The Claimant averred that the termination of her appointment did not follow due process that her employment is regulated by an Act of the National Assembly which was not followed as laid down by the said Act and therefore irregular. She stated that she was not indicted for any financial impropriety either in 2013 or any time whatsoever. And that no single reorganization took place in the defendant’s organization except that they are even employing new hands to show that the termination of the claimant’s appointment was done mala-fide, for reasons best known to the isolated management staff who carried out the termination without Board approval.
The claimant averred that the termination of her appointment apart from being irregular and unlawful has caused her so much trauma and ridicule.
At the trial the claimant testified as CW, adopted her written statement on oath which was marked Exhibit C1 and proceeded to tender six (6) other exhibits. During cross examination the claimant testified that she was a holder and that her contract can be terminated as per Exhibit C2, by either side given one month notice she further testified that her appointment could only be terminated by the Board and that the Board of Management could terminate her appointment, the one set up by the Federal Government to see to Senior Staff, she further testified that she was paid her monthly salary up until October 2015 even though there Boards had stopped sitting since 2015. She further testified that she was a Federal Government staff and that her salary was paid by IPPIS and that she had not sued IPPIS because they did not employ her, relying on her C2. She testified that she was issued two queries both on financial impropriety and that she appeared before two panels
The defendants called one witness Ededet Eyoma Bassey, the Human Resources Director / Legal Adviser with the defendants, who testified as DW, adopted his written statement on oath which was marked as Exhibit D1 and tendered four (4) other exhibits. During cross examination. During cross examination DW testified that he was the head of Human Resources employed in November 2014, very familiar with the claimants records, familiar with the issues of procedure of the defendant and that his evidence was not based on first hand evidence. He further testified that the defendants had one Board, to which the Management reported and in the absence of the Board it would report to the Ministry. He also testified that by Exhibit C2, it was the Board of Management that was empowered to terminate the claimant and if there were no board the Ministry could terminate through its agents. And at the time of issuing Exhibit C3 there was no board in place and that the Ministry of Health as directed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He answered in the negative the question that the Federal Ministry of Health takes over the function of the Board and that the Ministry oversees and that it could only direct the defendants. And that anyone working under the defendants employment was a Public servant and issues of effecting discipline are governed by the Public Service and where there is an absence of a Board the letter of termination are signed by the implementing person;- the Head of Human Resource Management. He also testified that he claimant was indicted by two panels tendering Exhibit D3-D3(31) and Exhibit D4- D4(51). In response to the question that DW signed C4 as Deputy Director, and that he issued the queries and the demand that he present his authorization to terminate the claimant he tendered Exhibit D5.
At the close of trial the parties were directed to file their final written address,
The DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS was filed on 28th October, 2016 and dated same day. Wherein the defendants raised the following ISSUES
- Whether the claimant has presented a case strong enough to entitle her to judgment.
- Whether claimant’s employment was properly terminated.
Learned Defence Counsel Chief Orok Ironbar submitted that having known the state of the evidence, the procedural law is that – he who alleges proves. SEC. 131 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT, 2011; YAHAYA DANKWABO (2016) 7 NWLR (PT. 1511) 284. He submitted that it is also known that pleadings do not constitute evidence as decided in the case of WAZIRI & ANOR. V. GEIDAM & ORS. (2016) 2 MJSC (PT. 111) 83 @ 124, PARAS. F-G Coram, Peter-Odili, JSC. The Defence Counsel argued that claimant only alleged that her termination did not come from the proper authority, posing the question: “what is the proper authority”. He contended that if it is only the Board that can terminate her employment, where was that proved on record? as he who alleges proves. OJU v. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1157) 83 @ 136, PARAS. F-H; ZIIDEEH v. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2007) 4 MJSC 150. The Counsel submitted that being a contract of employment, it is the only contract before the Court that must be complied with i.e. Exhibit C2. IDONIBOYE OBU v. NNPC (2003) 2 NWLR (PT. 805) 589; (2003) 4 MJSC 131. He submitted that whether the reports of investigation were communicated to claimant or not does not stop the defendant from terminating her employment. AJAYI v. TEXACO NIG. LTD. & 2 ORS. (1987) 9-11 SC 1 @ 6.
It is defence counsel’s contention that the fact that claimant responded to the queries means that she was afforded fair hearing. IMONIKHE v. UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 12 NWLR (PT. 1262) 624 @ 648, PARA. F, Coram Rhodes-Vivour, JSC; OLATUNBOSUN v. NISER COUNCIL (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 80) 25. The Counsel submitted that by Public Service Rules under Paragraph 030402 and Chapter 3 Sec. 4 Paragraph 030407 (a), “claimant was even lucky not to have been dismissed outrightly”. He submitted that it is not necessary nor a requirement under the extant laws that before an employer summarily dismisses his employee from his service, the employee must be tried before a court of law where the accusation against the employee is for gross misconduct involving honesty bordering on criminality. S.B. OLANREWAJU v. AFRIBANK PLC (2001) FWLR (PT. 72) 2008.
Counsel argued that the claimant as part of the failure of her case provided no proof or reference to the law allowing her to be reinstated when the law is that an employee cannot be forced upon an unwilling employer. OYEDELE v. IFE U.T.H. (1990) 6 NWLR (PT. 155) 194 C.A.; IWUCHUKWU v. NWOSU (1994) 7 NWLR (PT. 357) 379.
The CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS was filed on 22nd November, 2016 and dated same day. Wherein the claimant raised the following issues:
- Whether the termination of claimant’s appointment followed due process as laid down by Sec. 9 (1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010.
- Whether by the provision of extent law governing the removal and discipline of senior staff of the defendant (i.e.) Sec. 9 (1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010, it is not established that the claimant’s employment has a statutory flavor.
ON ISSUE 1
Whether the termination of claimant’s appointment followed due process as laid down by Sec. 9 (1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010.
Learned Counsel to the Claimant Rueben Onyekwelu Esq. submitted that Sec. 10 (3) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, provides a dividing line between the discipline of an erring senior staff who can only be dismissed or terminated on the direction of the Board and his/her junior counterpart who may be disciplined (dismissed or terminated) by the Chief Medical Director (Management) without recourse to the Board. He submitted that Sec. 9 (1) of the Act is the statutory laid down procedure to discipline the claimant and that facts admitted need no further proof. ODUNZE v. NWOSU (2007) 31 NSCQR 378; NASI v. UBA (2005) 23 NSCQR 127 @ 130; ADUSEI v. ADEBAYO (2012) 49.3 NSCQR 1492 @ 1494; JOLASUN v. BAMGBOYE (2010) 44 NSCQR 94. It is Claimant counsel’s contention that the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010 is not a piece of evidence in the mold of what the defendant is trying to categorize as requiring tendering in open court, but a statutory provision which the court should take judicial notice of as provided by Sec. 122 (1) of Evidence Act, 2011. AG. FED. V. ABIA STATE (2002) FWLR (PT. 102) 1, per Uwais, CJN. He further submitted that all that is required is to plead that the party is relying on a statute as the claimant has done in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Statement of Facts. BENDEL NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION v. OKAFOR (1993) 4 NWLR (PT. 289) 617; MAKANJUOLA v. BALOGUN (1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 108) 192; A.G BENDEL STATE v. A.G. FEDERATION (2001) FWLR (PT. 65) 448.
ON ISSUE 2
Whether by the provision of extent law governing the removal and discipline of senior staff of the defendant (i.e.) Sec. 9 1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15, LFN, 2010, it is not established that the claimant’s employment has a statutory flavor.
Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that termination of any employment enjoying statutory flavor must follow the process as prescribed by statute. LAGOS UNIVERSITY TEACHING (HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD) v. MRS. OLANIKE BETTY ONI (2007) 4 FWLR 6987 @ 7028. He urged the Court to hold that this clause reinforces and is a strong reminder to the Board and Management that there are laid down procedure as provided by the Act in discipline of employees. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA v. IGWILO (2007) 5 KLR (PT. 235-236) 2275 @ 2277. Claimant’s Counsel submitted that where an employee’s service is protected by statute (as in the present case) and his employment is wrongfully terminated, he would be entitled to reinstatement to his office and in addition, damages representing his salaries during the period of his purported dismissal. SHITTA BAY v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (1981) 1 S.C. 40; UDO v. CROSS RIVER NEWSPAPAER CORPORATION (2001) 14 NWLR (PT. 732) 116; OLANIYAN v. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 599; Galinje, JCA in REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF C & S v. IJAODOLA (2007) FWLR (PT. 389) 5921 @ 5925. He submitted that the defendant has not discharged the burden placed on her by reason of the provision of Sec. 133 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and that the defendant has also failed to show that even the alternative route provided by the so called presidential directive was communicated to the management through circular or memo, or that any directives was received from the mother Ministry by positive evidence as required in the presidential directive. ALAO v. KURE (2000) FWLR (PT. 6) 889; OYOVBIARE v. OMAMURHONU (2001) FWLR (PT. 68) 1129.
It is counsel’s submission that where a public servant is accused of a misconduct bothering on criminality, the law is that he must first be charged before a regular court to prove his or her guilt or innocence as the case may be. NIGERIAN TELECOMMUNICATION LIMITED v. AWALA (2001) 45 WRN 146; LAOYE v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 106) 652; GEIDAM v. NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY (2001) 2 NWLR (PT. 696) 45.He urged the Court to hold that any indictment flowing or contained in Exhibit D12 is a travesty and lacking in substance. SOKEFUN v. AKINYEMI (1980) FEDERATION OF NLR 184.
Claimant’s Counsel submitted that a successful party in a litigation is entitled to costs unless there are special reasons why he should be deprived of his entitlements as held in the case of NNPC v. CLIFCO (2011) 46 NCQR 114 @ 120; SHENA SECURITY LIMITED v. AFRO PAK (2008) 34.2 NSCQR 1287 @ 1291; REYNOLDS CO. LTD. V. ROCKONOH CO. LTD. (2005) 22 NSCQR 1005 @ 1010, per G.A. Oguntade, JSC.
The defendants in reaction filed a REPLY TO CLAIMANT’S FINAL ADDRESS on 25th November, 2016 and dated 24th November, 2016.
ON ISSUE 1
Learned Defence Counsel argued that Sec. 9 (1) of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, Cap. U15 relied on by claimant refers to the removal and discipline of clinical, administrative and technical staff, which does not include claimant who was employed by her own letter of appointment tendered as Exhibit C3 as Higher Executive Officer. Furthermore, that she led no evidence to prove that she fell into any of the 3 categories and that the Court cannot be left to decide on conjecture.
ON ISSUE 2
Learned Counsel for the defendant submitted that it is not true as argued by claimant in paragraph 5.6 – lines 7-8, that “The Minister however exercises control (sic) of parastatal at policy level through the Board of the parastatal only”. This is so because, by Sec. 17 of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Boards, etc.) Act, the Minister is empowered to give to the Board directors of a general character…, etc., that the Minister is not restricted strictly to matters on policy.
On the 5th December parties adopted their final written addresses and adumbrated their respective positions accordingly and this matter was adjourned and reserved for judgment
The Court’s Decision
I have carefully summarized the evidence of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this Judgement and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issue for determination in this suit to my mind is whether the claimant in this suit is entitled to the reliefs sought.
Before I delve into the merits of this issue I shall address the objection raised by the claimant during trial that Exhibit D2 did not conform with Section 83 of the evidence Act.
The procedure in this court made possible by the case of KURT SEVERINSEN V. EMERGING MARKETS TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES LIMITED [2012] 27 NLLR (PT. 78) 374, and Section 12(2) to the effect that this court is flexible and informal and with the result that all frontloaded documents are deemed admitted unless expressly objected to and when the objection is raised the party is at liberty to argue his objection in his final address.
In the instant case the claimant did not raise this objection in his further address depriving the court from addressing the particulars of his objection be that as it may; Section 83 of the Evidence Act 2011, provides that;
83(1) In a proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document which seems to establish that fact shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact if the following conditions are satisfied-
(a) If the maker of the statement either
(i) Had personal knowledge of the mailers dealt with by the statement,
or
(ii) where the document in question is or forms part of a record purporting to be a continuous record, made the statement (in so far as the matters dealt with by it are not within his personal knowledge) in the performance of a duty to record information supplied to him by a person who had, or might reasonably be supposed to have personal knowledge of those matters: and
(b) If the maker of the statement is called as a witness in the proceeding: Provided that the condition that the maker of the statement shall be called as a witness need not be satisfied if he is dead, or unfit by reason of his bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness, or if he is outside Nigeria and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance, or if all reasonable efforts to find him have been made without success.
(2) In any proceeding, the court may at any stage of the proceeding, if having regard to all the circumstances of the case it is satisfied that undue delay or expense would otherwise be caused order that such a statement as is mentioned in subsection
(I) of this section shall be admissible as evidence or may without any such order having been made admit such a statement in evidence notwithstanding that –
(a) The maker of the statement is available but is
not called as a witness: and
(b) The original document is not produced, if in lieu of it there is produced a copy of the original document or of the material part of it certified to be a true copy in such manner as may be specified in the order or as the court may approve, as the case may be.
(3) Nothing in this section shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a statement in a document shall not be deemed to have been made by a person unless the document or the material part of it was written made or produced by him with his own hand or was signed or initialed by him or otherwise recognized by him in writing as one for the accuracy of which he is responsible
5) For the purpose of deciding whether or not a statement is admissible as evidence by virtue of this section, the court may draw any reasonable inference from the form or contents of the document in which the statement is contained, or from any other circumstances and may in deciding whether or not a person is fit to attend as a witness, act on a certificate purporting to tie the certificate of a registered medical practitioner.
Exhibit D2 is an internal memo of the defendant dated 17th August 2015 with the subject “Report of Panel of Investigation of Financial Impropriety by Staff of the Account Department” from the Secretary House Committee to the Director of Administration informing the addressee that management had considered the panel’s recommendation and has directed termination of appointment in respect of the six listed members of staff, of which the claimant is No. 2, and went on to mention the other members of staff whose names were not listed for demotion and loss of increment. The memo concludes with the phrase “Please implement the decision of Management” and was signed by Frances I. Otu Esq.
The document also contained one minute; ‘DD (HR) Pls implement decisions (1) and (2)’, referring to the respective recommendation in respect of the two sets of staff.
As I stated above the claimant did not raise his objection in his address to enable the court identify the thrust of his objection and address same but looking exhibit D2, I find that it although the maker was not called as a witness DW testified that he was familiar with the procedure of the defendant as head of HR and formerly Deputy Director HR, and that he was very familiar with the claimants record
Similarly the document was not made in the contemplation of this suit considering it was made before /Exhibit C3 was issued; the fulcrum of this case.
All in all I find that the Exhibit D2 was rightly admitted.
Now to the merit of this suit.
The reliefs of the claimant are thus;
- A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s appointment with the defendant is grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process.
- An Order of this Honorable Court reinstating the claimant and restoring her to her position (i.e.) Grade Level 7 step 5) prior to the issuance of letter of termination to her employment.
- An Order of Court directing the defendant to pay to the claimant her salary arrears from the date of purported termination of her appointment to the determination of this suit at the rate of Ninety Five Thousand. Eight Hundred and Fifty Seven Naira, Thirty Three Kobo (#95,857.33) per month.
- An Order directing the defendant to pay the claimant the cost of Five Hundred Thousand naira (#500,000.00) only.
- An Order of General Damages to the tune of Ten Million (#10,000,000.00) only for the trauma and hardship caused her by the unlawful termination of her employment.
Reliefs 1- 3 are for a declaration that the claimants termination and was grossly irregular, callous, unlawful, null and void same not having followed due process and an order reinstating the to her appointment with all due salaries and allowances from the date of the purported termination until the date of this judgment/
While reliefs 4 and 5 are for reimbursement of legal cost incurred by the claimant and damages for trauma and hardship following an unlawful termination.
In determining these reliefs the Court is required to ascertain the employment status of the claimant so as to ensure she received her due under the law.
The Supreme Court in the case of LONGE Vs. FBN LTS [2010] LPELR 1793 SC held that “….there are three categories of employment
(a) Purely Master and Servant relationship
(b) Servants who hold their office at the pleasure of the employer
(c) Employment with statutory flavour….”
The defendants have argued that the claimant’s appointment was unconfirmed and the relationship, purely a master and servant one devoid of any special characterizations. While it is the claimants Counsel’s contention that the claimant is a senior staff of the defendants and that her employment has statutory flavour, the Claimant went further to invite the court to hold on the admission of DW that the claimant was a senior staff relieves them, the claimant of any legal requirement to prove that fact: that the claimant is a senior staff.
To accept such an admission has its own ramifications in the circumstances of this case. The claimant had pleaded that she was employed on Level 07, she had put forward no evidence to the effect that she had been promoted or confirmed .See the unreported case of NICN /121/AK/2013 ABODURIN MOSES OLA & 31 ORS Vs. GOVERNING BOARD RUFUS GIWA POLYTECHNIC OWO & ANORS (unreported) delivered 29th September 2014 where this court held that failure to present evidence of advancement in employment left the court no alternative than to treat the claimant as if he were still at his entry level. In the instant case the claimant did not even prove that level 07 was a senior service post in the defendant. This court has held that in a situation when an employee is allowed to continue in employment beyond the period of confirmation without a letter from the employer such an employer is precluded from continuing to treat such an employee as an unconfirmed staff, see the cases of TOTAL (NIG.) PLC V. ONUOHA [2001] 11 NWLR (PT. 725) 634 and OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY V. ONABANJO [1991] 5 NWLR (PT. 193) 549 CA. This is not one of the reliefs sought by the claimant albeit and by SUIT NO: NICN/IB/88/2013 DR. OLADELE OSOSANYA Vs. GOVERNING COUNCIL OF FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, ABEOKUTA & 3 ORS. DATED: 13th NOVEMBER, 2014 “An unconfirmed staff cannot claim the benefits that inure in a statutory employment” see also MOHAMMED M. ALHASSAN V. AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA & ORS [2009] LPELR 8138 CA, IGWILO VS. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2007) 14 NWLR (PT. 1054) 393.
Be that as it may be the law requires the court to determine the nature of the claimant’s employment. The position of the law is “that an employment is said to have statutory flavour if the employment is directly governed or regulated by statute or a section(s) of a statute delegates power to an authority or body to make regulations or conditions of service as the case may be”, UJAM V. IMT [2007] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1019) 470 at 492 B – C. Or where a set of prescribed “Rules govern the service” see Uwa JCA in FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE IDO EKITI & ANOR Vs. ISAAC OLUKAYIDE OLAJIDE [2011] LPELR 4150 CA para C
In SULIEMAN ADAMU Vs. MOLAMMMAD SANI TAKORI & ORS [2009] LPELR 3593 CA Jega JCA held that it is clear that the sole determining factor in determining a public servant is the mode of appointment referring to DADA Vs. ADEYEYE [2006] 6 NWLR (Pt. 920) 1 at p 19-20.
In determining whether the respondent’s appointment is statutorily flavoured or not …..the courts have held that recourse should be had to the contends of the letter of appointment FEDERAL MEDICAL CENTRE IDO EKITI & ORS. Vs. OMIDIORA KOLAWOLE O. [2011] LPELR 4149 CA page 15 para B.
In the instant case the claimant has tendered Exhibit C2 reproduced below:
UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL
P.M.B. 1278
CALBAR, NIGERIA
EDET, COMFORT EKPENYONG 10th October 2011
Dear Sir/ Madam
OFFER OF APPOINTMENT
I am please on Behalf of the Board of Management of the above Teaching Hospital to offer you the post of HIGHEER ECXECUTIVE OFFICER at the Hospital on a commencement salary of N891712.00 per annum in the salary CONHESS?CONMESS 7/2 with effect from the date of your assumption of duty.
- This offer of appointment is subject to your being passed mentally fit for service with the Teaching Hospital.
- It is a condition of employment that members of the Medical Profession employed by the Board should be members of a recognized Medical Defence of protection organization.
- This appointment will except where your services are transferred after a previous confirmation, be on probation for two years or for longer period as may be deemed advisable after which it will be confirmed on pensionable grounds.
- The duties of the post shall include the usual duties of this office in which you are engaged and any other suitable duty the Board may call upon you to perform. You shall not either directly or indirectly engage in or be concerned with any other service or business whatsoever or receive commissions or profit of any kind but shall devote the whole of your time and attention to the service of the Board and shall use your utmost exertion to promote the interest of the Teaching Hospital. You shall conform to the rules and regulations of the Board in so far as the same are applicable.
- You shall be entitled to 30/21 days annual leave to be taken by arrangement with your Head of Department and the written approval of the Director of Administration on the recommendation of your Head of Department.
- Unless you are dismissed and provided you are not on any bond to serve the Hospital for a stipulated period you may terminate your employment by a month’s notice in writing o
