EDUNG BASSEY ETIM -VS- UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT CALABAR

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE M.N. ESOWE

DATED: 15^TH NOVEMBER, 2017 SUIT NO: NICN/CA/55/2015

BETWEEN

EDUNG BASSEY ETIM

CLAIMANT

AND

UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL,

CALABAR

THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT,

UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING

HOSPITAL, CALABAR

DR. THOMAS U AGAN (CHIEF MEDICAL DIRECTOR)
ELD PROF. ARCHIBONG EDEM ARCHIBONG

(DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION)

DEFENDANTS

REPRESENTATION

EFFIOM NYONG for the claimant

DEBORA UNDIE with NKOYO IROMBA for the defendant

JUDGEMENT

The Claimant instituted this suit against the defendant vide a complaint dated the 19^th day of November 2016, whereof she claims against the Defendants as follows:

A declaration that the Claimant was longer on probation and hadbecome a permanent and pensionable staff and was no longer on probation having regards to the effect that her appointment was confirmed with effect from 8^th June 1990.

A declaration that the Claimant not being any longer on probation, her
appointment cannot be validly terminated pursuant to clause 4 of the
contract of employment dated 30^thMay 1988

Adeclaration that the Claimant did not apply to terminate her
appointment with the 1^st Defendant pursuant to clause 5 of the letter of
appointment as alluded to in the Defendants’ letter dated 24^:” August
2015.

A declaration that the defendants failed to give theclaimant fairhearing having regards to the grave criminal allegations leveled against her.

Adeclaration that the purported termination of the claimant’s appointment on grounds stated in the letter dated 24^th August was unfair, irregular, unlawful and a breach of the terms of the Federal
Civil Service Rules and the University Teaching Hospitals
(Reconstitution of Boards etc.) Act, Cap U15 Laws of re Federation
2004 and therefore null, void and of no effect whatsoever.

An order reinstating the Claimant into service of the 1^5:Defendant with
effect from the date the Claimant’s appointment was purportedly

terminated by re Defendants

An order of this honorable court that the defendants pay to the claimant all her accumulated salaries and allowances from the date of the purported termination of her appointment.

The sum of N5,000.000. (Five Million Naira) only as general damages for wrongful termination of the claimant’s appointment.
The sum N500.000. (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only being cost of this litigation.

20 per centum interest on the judgment sum until full payment.

SUMARRY OF FACTS

The Claimant is a public servant with the University of Calabar
Teaching Hospital, Calabar. She was employed by the 1^st Defendant vide
a letter dated 30^th May 1988 on the salary of N1.752.00 (One
Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Two Naira) only and on
conditions stated therein.

She was posted to the Accounts Department and deployed as a
Revenue Clerk. After two (2) years probationary period, the claimant’s appointment with the 1^st defendant was confirmed with effect from 8^th June, 1990 as a clerical officer.

While working with the defendants, she earned several promotions up to the rank of Senior Executive Officer on salary grade level 08 step 4 vide letter dated 2^nd October, 2012.

The Claimant was until 30^th April. 2013 deployed in the Maternity Section (Revenue), Moore Road, Calabar Office of the1^st Defendant. However, on the said date, she was unceremoniously posted out of the section along with all other staff of the unit vide an Internal Memo dated the same date.

Sequel to the posting, the Claimant complied as directed and
had nothing to do with that section and had no access to any document or file there.

Sometimes in the month of July 2013, the Claimant was surprisingly accused to have been involved in financial impropriety to the tune of N240,400 (Two Hundred and Forty Thousand, Four Hundred Naira) only contrary to the public service rules. This was conveyed in a letter dated 4^th July 2013.

This, the Defendant did without attaching the purported audit report mentioned therein to the Claimant. However the Claimant timeously replied to the query and denied knowledge of the audit report and the amount involved.

Rather than avail the Claimant with the alleged audit report, the
Defendants set up an investigation panel to investigate a case of
alleged financial impropriety and the Claimant was invited as any
other person for a chat with the panel. This was conveyed in an
Internal Memo dated 2^nd October, 2013.

At the panel she was accused of forging some receipts and fraudulently posting same into a cash book. She was also accused of conversion of the proceeds for her personal use.

The Claimant vehemently denied the allegations and she has asked to leave. Throughout the sitting of the panel, she was never shown any receipts said to have been forged by her or witness who testified against her and no opportunity was given to her to cross-examine any either. Similarly, no audit report was made available to her. Nor was she ever been reported to the police charged and or convicted by any court of law for any financial impropriety bordering on forgery, stealing or fraudulent false accounting while in that office or at all.

14.Again sometime in the month of March, 2015 the Claimant was served with another query letter signed by the 4^thDefendant on the same subject matter which had been investigated against her in the year 2013. The Claimant also denied knowledge of the allegations in her letter dated 31^st March 2015.

The Claimant averred that although she was queried for alleged
negligence to keep proper records between January – March 2013,
the 3^rd and 4^th Defendants set up another investigation panel and
as usual the Claimant was invited for a chat with the panel to
investigate allegation of financial impropriety against some staff of the
accounts department.

She averred further that the panel went into an inquisition and
constituted itself into a court of law. It subjected the Claimant to
unwarranted intimidation and harassment and was asked to write her
name, year of service, two (2) specimen signatures – one used by
the Claimant to collect money from the Bank and another used by her
generally She was compelled to and she signed her signature along
with her hand-writing for the panel.

The defendants, eventually terminated the appointment of the claimant, without giving the claimant the opportunity to peruse the documents or receipts to which she was accused of stealing the sum of N240,000.00 from the defendants.

Her appointment was however terminated on the grounds that her services was no longer required pursuant to clauses 4 and 5 of the claimant’s appointment letter and thus denying her of her pension rights and entitlements, even though she had ceased to be on probation within the intendment of the clauses.

At the time her appointment was terminated she had served the 1^st Defendant as a public servant for 28years, and was left with only seven years to retire from service.

The claimant argued that only the 2^nd Defendant had disciplinary power over her. At the time her appointment was purportedly terminated the board of the 1^st Defendant (the 2^nd Defendant) like all other similar boards, had been dissolved by the Federal Government of Nigeria and was therefore no longer extant. That Board did not at any time give the Claimant any opportunity to be heard prior to its dissolution.

Following the purported termination of her employment the Claimant
promptly wrote appeals for review of the management’s decision on
termination of her appointment, but the Defendants failed to reply

DEFENCE

The defendants while denying the facts above stated that the claimant as at filing this claim was not a public servant with the University of Calabar Teaching Hospital, Calabar.

They contended that the Claimant was posted to the Account Department and deployed as a Revenue Clerk and the claimant’s appointment confirmed with effect from 8^th June, 1990, as Clerical Officer.

After confirmation of her appointment, she ceased to be on probation, and she was last promoted to rank of the Higher Executive Officer, CONTT SS 7, Step 1, vide letter of promotion dated April, 2009. The purported computer printout of the claimant’s pay slip for the month of August 2015, carried the designation “Engineer” with a handwritten designation “SEO” none of which was the claimant’s designation while in the employ of the 1^st defendant.

They denied that the claimant was always diligent in the discharge of her duties, and stated that the claimant was posted out of the revenue point at the maternity and to the accounts headquarters on the 30^thof April, 2013.

The defendants held the view that it is not their duty to furnish the claimant with the audit report which she was at liberty to request for and which content she knew. The claimant’s attention was needed to explain to the investigative panels why receipts issued when she was on duty were duplicated with the same serial numbers and dates, but with different names and amount. She had no explanations for the discrepancies, and that they are not bound to report the claimant her conviction before terminating her appointment.

The defendant admited paragraph 14, of the claimants statement of facts to the extent that a letter with Ref; No UCTH/PF/2621 dated 26^th March, 2015, was written and issued to her as a result of the unacceptable practices in the Accounts Department involving her and same is hereby pleaded. A second in station query to claimant was clear message that her earlier response was unsatisfactory and she was given opportunity to defend a second time. An opportunity which she blew.

In response to paragraph 15, the defendants stated that they at liberty to set up another investigative panel to continue investigation at the expiration of the former. They are not limited in their investigation as long as it is to unravel the truth.

The defendants denied paragraph 17, of the statement of facts and stated that the claimant’s appointment was not maliciously terminated but rather the claimant was first issued a query on the 4^th July, 2013 and later another query was issued on the claimant on the 26^th March, 20015, respectively. When it was noted with dismay by management of the 1^st defendant that the claimant neglected to keep proper records of monies collected in the days she was on duty from January – March, 2013, and this observation was confirmed by Audit Department, during routine inspection within the period under review.

They held the view that the claimant’s appointment was terminated because her services were no longer required. Furthermore, financial impropriety is one of the serious misconduct that could lead to dismissal in accordance with the Public Service Rules. Whether as senior or junior staff all employees are expected to be diligent and professional in the discharge
of their duties.

It was also the view of the defendants that Whether the 2^nd defendant is
constituted or not does not mean the 1^st defendant must cease to function. It must continue to treat patients, buy medicines for its pharmacy, pay salaries and discipline staff, etc, and that the defendant was not bound to respond to the letters of appeal having made clear to claimant that her services were no longer needed. The 1^st defendant had to undergo reorganization to ensure better and more professional service to the public.

The defendants, equally contended that an officer like the claimant whose appointment is terminated from service forfeits all claims to retiring benefits, leave or transport
grant, etc. The defendants have not exposed the claimant to untold and serve hardship or any hardship at all in the performance of their duty.

Conclusively, they stated that the claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs therein, and urged upon this court to dismiss her claim in entirety.

CLAIMANT’S REPLY TO THE DEFENDANTS’ STATEMENT OF DEFENCE

The Claimant stated that the computer printout of the Claimant’s pay slip was issued by the Defendants who at all material times were and are still in custody of the Claimant’s personal file and records. The hand written correction of the Claimant’s rank on the pay slip was effected by the Defendants who prepared the slip before releasing same to the Claimant.

The claimant stated that in her reply to query dated 11^th July 2013 already
pleaded, the claimant denied having any idea of the Audit Report and
the amount stated in the query. The defendant refused and or neglected to
avail the Claimant with the Audit Report as well as the receipts alleged to have been forged by her.

The Claimant averred that she was invited by the Panel set up by the Hospital Management as a witness only. Sometime in the month of July 2015, another Panel was again set up by the Hospital Management headed by the 3^rd Defendant to victimize her, Until the Claimant’s appointment was purportedly terminated, the Board of Management which has disciplinary control over the Claimant did not query her or afford her the opportunity of making any representation to the Board. The Board was dissolved before the Claimant’s appointment was purportedly terminated.

According to the claimant, she was purportedly queried for failure to keep proper records and negligence of duties contrary to Section 3, Rule 030301 € and (h) of the public service rule 2004 vide letter dated 26^th March 2015 but the defendants surprising set a panel to investigate allegation of financial impropriety against some staff of Accounts Department and the claimant was invited for a chat with the panel. Neither the panel nor the Board gave the claimant an opportunity to be heard or to cross-examine any witness (es) who testified against the claimant or show any receipts alleged to have been forged by the claimant. Also, the action of the Hospital Management headed by the 3^rd defendant as averred in paragraph 19 of the Statement of Defence was clear violation of the directive by the presidency and published nationwide to the effect that all matters requiring the attention of the dissolved Board shall be referred to the President and Commander-in-chief through their supervisory ministry for action.

The Claimant averred that being a public servant, permanent and pensionable staff, her appointment can only be legally, constitutionally and validly terminated by appropriate authority, namely, the Board of Management and for good cause shown and not at the whims and caprices of the Hospital Management and the Defendants, and that under the civil service rules only dismissed Officers forfeit all claims to retiring benefits, leave or transport grant etc. but subject to the Pension Act 2004, that she was never a dismissed staff. Despite this fact to the knowledge of the Defendants, she was maliciously treated as a dismissed staff.

CLAIMANT’S FINAL ADDRESSES

Learned counsel to the claimant was the first to address the court. In his written address he raised 2 issues for determination, to wit:-

1)Whether the claimant was still on probation when the defendants purportedly terminated her appointment pursuant to claves 4 and 5 of Exhibits C3.

Whether the claimant her proved her case, having regards to all facts and reliefs sought by her?

ON ISSUE 1

Learned counsel submitted that by claves 4 and 5 of exhibit C3, in terminating the claimant’s appointment despite the fact that the claimant was no longer on probation as alluded there to by the defendant’s. An employers who gives reason for terminating appointment of an employee must prove same. He referred the court to the case of SHELL VS OLANREWAJU [2008] 36 NSCQR 1187 held 1at 1207, per F.F Tabai JSC.

He argued that the claimant has established without doubt that she had been confirmed on pensionable establishment, not only as a permanent staff but also pensionable. He referred the court to exhibit C5, C8 and C19. He also argued that the claimant is a compulsory contributor to the National Pension as shown in exhibit C8 and C19.

Despite these facts and to the knowledge of the defendants, the claimant’s appointment was maliciously terminated even without references to her pension entitlement as is she was a temporary staff pursuant to clauses 4 and 5 of exhibit C3.

Counsel submitted that assuming, but without conceding that, the claimant was still on probation, the public service rule demands that such officers could only be removed from service after receiving 3 queries and advice on account of general inefficiency as provided for in rule 030203 of the Public Service Rules 2009. The defendants did not lead any evidence nor front load or tendered any queries or advice as stated above. The inference is that the was no such warning or advise in the case, therefore even if the claimant was still on probation, the termination of her appointment was not in compliance with the rules. He urged this court to so find and hold.

ON ISSUE 2

Learned counsel submitted that the claimant having become a permanent and pensionable staff she had ceased to be on probation and that consequently, being a senior staff, her appointment could only be terminated by appropriate authority, namely the board and management, and for a ”good case ”shown, and not at the whims and caprice of the 3^rd and 4^th defendants.

Submitted further that it is the board of management that is vested with the statutory powers to discipline her as a senior staff in the employ of the 1^st defendant. This is pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 Rules 160501 and 160502 RSP, as well as Section 1 of the University Teaching Hospital (Reconstitution of Board e.t.c) Act Cap U 15 LFN 2004

Counsel contended that at the time her appointment was purportedly terminated, the Board of Management like all other similar Federal Boards had been dissolved by the Federal Government and that the said board did not at any time give her opportunity to be heard prior to its dissolution.

He referred the court to paragraph 19 of the statement of defence and exhibits C1 and C2 respectively.

To counsel, the action of the Hospital Management committee headed by the 3^rd defendant as chairmen and the 4^th defendant as secretary was in clear violation of the directive by the presidency that all matter requiring the attention of all dissolved boards be referred to the president and Commander in Chief through their supervisory Ministers for action. He referred to exhibit C20.

He referred the court to the under listed cares which to him are sister cases with that of the claimant and the judgment applies with equal force to their case.

Learned counsel went further to submit that exhibits D1 – D6 was held by this court as mere excerpts, summaries and annexes of documents front loaded or tendered by the parties without showing the court the fuller documents from which they were extracted and as such lacked evidential value and should be discountenanced.

He also referred this court to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of AKIN BISADE VS THE STATE.[2006] LPELLR 342 SC.

He further submitted that the position of the defendants has been further worsened than before on the above named case in that the audit report and the earlier panel report have not been tendered in this case, as provided for in section 167 (d) Evidence Act. It invariably means that if the documents were tendered, they would have been against the defendants. He referred the court to the case of LASISI ARERU VS ALH LAWAL ADETORS [2007] 31 NSCQR 62 Held 5.

He submitted that what is tendered in this case is a report of a panel to re-address terms of Reference of earlier panel of investigation and not the report of the panel to investigate allegations of financial impropriety against some staff of the accounts department which the claimant was limited for a chat on Wednesday 15^th July 2015. The said evidence lacks any evidential value and should be disregarded.

Counsel referred the court to exhibit D6 which according to him the panel turned itself to a court of law and subjected the claimant to unwarranted latinidation and harassment and was compelled to write her name, hear of service, 2 specium signatures which she used to collect money in the bank and the other used generally.

He further submitted that due process was not followed in terminating the appointment of the claimant and in the strengthen of the case of FCSC and 2 Ors. VS LAOYE [1989] ALL NLR 350. Held 6, It was not the 2^nd defendant that ordered the query and none was shown to have been issued at the directive of the 2^nd defendant, it was not the 2^nd defendant that set up the panel that investigated the claimant.

Rather, it was the claimant’s answers, the 3^rd and 4^th defendant contrary to the express provision of Section 9 (1) of the Act. This to him was therefore a violent breach of the rules of Natural Justice guaranteed under Section 36 (1) LFRN 1999 as Amended.

He submitted that it is ultra vires the powers of the 3^rd and 4^th defendant to deal with the claimant, a senior officer outside the provisions of Section 9 of CAP U15 Supra

In conclusion, learned counsel urged this court to grant the reliefs as prayed.

DEFENDANTS

On part, learned counsel to the defendants in his written address, adopted the 2 issues for determination raised by the claimant and argued as follows:-

ON ISSUE 1

Learned counsel submitted that the defendants denied terminating the claimants appointment despite the fact that she was no longer on probation. He stated that the claimants’ services were no longer required. He however reproduced the provision of paragraph 4, line 4 and paragraph 5 of exhibit C3, and argued that none of those paragraphs restricted the termination of the claimants’ appointment based on it to probation.

To counsel lone 1-3 of paras. 4 in exhibit C3 only outlines conditions to be fulfilled by the claimant during her probationary period with the defendants before confirmation as a permanent staff.

He argued that there is no where in exhibit C15 and D5 which is the termination letter that it was stated that the claimant is on probation or terminated as a probation staff.

He submitted that the master has unfiltered right and liberty to terminate his servant’s employment or dismiss his servant from employment at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all, provided the terms of contract of service between them are complied with. He relived on the case of DUDUOSOLA VS NG CO LTD [2013] 10 NWLR (PT. 1363) PG 427 H5.

He submitted that it is not mandatory that the defendants must give reason for the termination of the claimant’s employment, and that it satisfied all the rules before her termination.

Learned counsel submitted further that the claimant failed to avert her mind to the fact that financial impropriety is an offence punishable with outright dismissal. He referred the court to rule 030402 and chapter 3.Section 4, Rule 030407 of the Public Service Rules.

He argued further that the defendant never treated the claimant as a probation staff, but she was given all privileges of a confirmed staff. She was issued queries which she responded to, a panel was set up, which she appeared before.

In conclusion, he submitted that the claimant’s termination was therefore in accordance with the rules and he urged this court to so hold.

ON ISSUE 2

Learned counsel submitted contrary to the argument of the claimant that the Managing Board has the powers to discipline her but that in the absence of the Managing Board, the Hospital Management takes over the affairs of the Hospital, until such a time when the board is reconstituted, as required by the Public Service Rules which the claimant relives on.

He submitted that the claimant never protested about the composition of the panel or that the hospital could not query her because the board had been dissolved. Having willingly submitted to the panel of investigation, the claimant cannot now fault her termination of appointment because the board of Management of the hospital was not constituted.

Counsel submitted that the court should not rely on its earlier decision in similar matters cited by the claimant, but to treat it in accordance with the facts and issues raised herein.

He submitted that there is no law mandating that the defendants should show their audit report to the claimant, as that is an internal affair of the hospital management.

He contended that the evidence provided in total, by the claimant, does not show that her employment enjoys statutory flavor, nor that because there was no board, she could not be dismissed after admitting that without it she continued to receive her salaries for months and the hospital was running.

The claimant also provided no proof of reference to the law allowing her to be reinstated, when the law as that an employee cannot be forced on an unwilling employer whether senior or junior staff.

In conclusion, counsel submitted that the claimant’s case cannot entitle her to judgment as evidence shows that she was properly terminated. He, however urged this court to dismiss the claimant’s claim in it entirely.

REPLY ON POINT OF LAW

COURT

Having gone through the case of both parties, evidence adduced by both parties and the written addresses of learned counsel to both parties, I shall follow the trend and adopt the 2 issues formulated by the learned counsel to the claimant, which are:-

1)Whether the claimant was still on probation when the defendants purportedly terminated her appointment pursuant to claves 4 and 5 of Exhibits C3.

Whether the claimant her proved her case, having regards to all facts and reliefs sought by her?

ON ISSUE 1

Both parties, relying on exhibit C3 and C5 made argument on the type of employment of the claimant, which is whether the employment is one with statutory flavor or a master servant relationship, and whether the claimant was dismissed as a probation staff or not?

A cursory look at exhibit C3, which is the letter of appointment of the claimant particularly paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 clearly indicates as follows:-

3.”The appointment will except where your services are transferred after a previous confirmation be on probation for 2 years or for such longer period as may be advisable, after which it will be confirmed on pensionable terms”

4.”Within the probationary period, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Head of Department, in which you are serving, that you are not qualified for efficient service, or unsuitable in other ways, your appointment may be terminated at any time by a month’s notice …”

5.”You will be subject in all respects to all conditions of service stipulated from time to time by the board of Management. These conditions are usually those applicable posts in the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria”

(Underling mine for emphasis)

Giving further, exhibit C5 which is the confirmation of appointment of the claimant, after the probation pursuant to exhibit C3 provides as follows:-

“Following the completion of your probationary period of two years, I am pleased to confirm.

Your appointment with ……………. As …….. With effect from ……. All conditions of your service remain unchanged.”

Flowing from the above, the question that readily comes to mind is “what are the conditions of service of the claimant”

The answer can be found in paragraph 6 of exhibit C3, the conditions of service of the claimant, to me is as stipulated from time to time by the board of management.

On the conditions usually applicable to those post in the civil service and I so hold.

Furthermore, the employer of the claimant no doubt is a body created by statute, therefore recourse must be made to the statute creating them, in terms of the provision/procedure 4 employment and discipline termination of staff and I so hold.

Also, exhibit C3 on its own made reference to the Federal Civil Service Rules as part of the conditions of service of the claimant. It also follows that recourse should also be made to the Rules on terms of procedure for dismissing an employee, and I so hold.

Having reproduced the above, can one still validly contemplate that the employment of the claimant is one of master servant relationship. The answer is no.

Going back to the main issue raised herein, exhibit C5 clearly indicated that the claimant was no longer on probation when her employment was terminated. Theia a fact admitted already by the defendant and I need not further dwell on that.

Consequently, I resolve issue 1 in the negative and in favor of the claimant, while I move over to issue 2.

ON ISSUE 2

Having found that the employment of the employment of the claimant is one with statutory flavor and not a master servant relationship. It is however pertinent to state that once an employment enjoys statutory flavor, procedure for the termination of such employment must be in line with the relevant statute governing such employment or any other rules made there under.

That said, Section 9(1) of the University Teaching Hospital Act Provides for the procedure to terminating the employment of an employee by the Board of Management who derives its powers from Section 1 of the said Act. Those procedure includes:-

a) Give notice of those reasons to the person in question

b) Afford him an opportunity of making representations in person on the matter to the Board, and

c) If theperson in question so requests, within a period of one month, beginning with the date of the notice, make arrangements:-

For a committee to investigate the matter and report on it to the board; and

For the person in question to be afforded an opportunity of appearing and being heard by the investigating committee. ….

By the above provisions of the Act before the employment of the claimant can be terminated, the board must have been informed, the accused must have had an opportunity to be heard by the board, and if the accused elects, an investigative committee can now be set up, to which the said committee must also invite the accused to defend himself.

There is no evidence which points to the fact that the procedure above was followed although it was never denied that at the time when the claimant’s employment was terminated, the Federal Government had dissolved the board. However the regulation left by the Federal Government was to the effect that all matters which relates to the board should be forwarded to the president through the supervising ministries. The defendants does not have the right to use the parties of the board or the president of this contrary of his representative which is the Minister of Health, by going ahead to try the case of the claimant through the hospital management committee and such dismissed the claimant without first obeying the Act or the regulation passed by the president. To me, the defendants acted ultra vires their powers, and I so hold.

Coming to the reason behind the termination of the employment of the claimant, it is not for the court at this stage to consider whether or not the reason is right. Had it been the appropriate procedure was followed, the court would have being ceased of the jurisdiction to determine whether the reason was sufficient enough to have dismissed the claimant. Rather what the court can do at this stage is to order the defendants to reinstate the claimant and review the termination process in accordance with the relevant rules/laws governing the employment of the claimant.

Flowing from the above issue 2 is answered in the affirmative and in favor of the claimant.

Consequently, the judgment of the court is as follows:-

Claims 1-4 succeeds

Claim 5 fails for the reason that the court cannot determine at this stage whether or not the grounds for dismissing the claimant was unfair, irregular e.t.c

Claims 6 and 7 Succeeds.

Claim 8 fails same was not adequately proved.

Claim 9 succeeds in part. The court awards the sum of N200.000.00 as cost of litigation.

Claim 10 succeeds

The defendant is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate the claimant and may review her dismissal in accordance with the relevant laws governing her employment.

All other claims which have succeeded are so declared and or ordered by this court.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

………………………………

HON. JUSTICE M. N. ESOWE

PRESIDING JUDGE CALABAR DIVISION.