JOY RAJI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2019)

JOY RAJI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2019)LCN/13038(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 5th day of April, 2019

CA/B/460C/2017

RATIO

EVIDENCE: HOW MANY WITNESSES IS THE PROSECUTION UNDER THE OBLIGATION TO CALL
As long as the witnesses proferred by the prosecution have been able to prove the ingredients of the offence charged, the prosecution is not obliged to call all manner of witnesses. Simon v. State (2017) LPELR-41988 (SC); Haruna v. AG-Federation (2012) LPELR-7821 (SC); Oduneye v. State (2001) LPELR-2245 (SC); Ibrahim v. State (2015) LPELR-40833 (SC).PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.

JUSTICE

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

JOY RAJIAppellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIARespondent(s)

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Edo State, delivered by Honourable justice A. Edodo-Eruaga on 3/5/2017 wherein the learned trial judge convicted and sentenced the Appellant on the charges brought against her.

On 10/2/2016, the Appellant was arraigned before the High Court of Edo State on a three-count charge of deceitful inducement to move a person from any place, forced labour and slave dealing to wit:
COUNT 1
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Deceitful inducement to go from any place contrary to Section 19(b) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 as amended.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
That you, JOY RAJI, (f) 57 yrs of No. 1 Ororo Str. Off Evbotubu Quarters B/C. on or about the month of January 2015 in Benin City, within Benin Judicial Division deceitfully induced one Philldela Ailele Arala (Osula) F 18 years of No. 34 Lagos street, Off Ring Road, Benin City to go from Nigeria to Kuwait.

COUNT 2
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Requiring a person to be used for forced labour contrary to Section 22(1)(a) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 as amended.
Permission of a person to be used for forced labour contrary to Section 22(1)(a) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 as amended.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
That you, JOY RAJI, (f) 57 yrs of No. 1 Ororo Str. Off Evbotubu Quarters B/C. on or about the month of May 2015, within the Benin Judicial Division required Philldela Ailele Arala (Osula) F 18 years of No. 34 Lagos street, Off Ring Road, Benin City, Edo State to be used for forced labour in Kuwait.
COUNT 3
STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
Slave dealing contrary to Section 24(a) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 as amended.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
That you, JOY RAJI, (f) 57 yrs of No. 1 Ororo Str. Off Evbotubu Quarters B/C. on or about the month of May 2015, within the Benin Judicial Division did transfer Philldela Ailele Arala (Osula) F 18 years of No. 34 Lagos street, Off Ring Road, Benin City, Edo State to be held as a slave in Kuwait.

The facts leading up to this appeal are as follows:
The Appellant and one Evans Aghahowa who is at large was said to have approached P.W.1(who is the P.W.2s mother) and P.W.2- the victim in order to sponsor the P.W 2 off to Kuwait to work as an artist there. However, upon getting to Kuwait, P.W.2 was placed in the custody of two women who engaged her in forced labour and sold her from one person to the other.

Upon failing to hear from the P.W.2 after being sent off to Kuwait, the P.W.1 made a report to the police who got the Appellant arrested. Thereafter, the P.W.1 made a report to the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other Related Matters. The P.W.2 then escaped from her custodians in Kuwait and with the help of the Nigerian Embassy in Kuwait, the P.W.2 was returned back to Nigeria.

In proof of its case, the Prosecution now Respondent called three witnesses as follows:
1. Evelyn Aigbe (P.W.1)- The victims mother
2. Philldela Ailele Arala (P.W.2)- The victim
3. Eteng Etang (P.W.3)-The Investigating Police Officer from the

National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other Related Matters
The Appellant testified in her own defence to the charge against her.

At the end of trial, the Appellant was convicted and sentenced on count 1 and 2 but was discharged and acquitted on count 3.

Dissatisfied with the judgment, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 5/5/17 and an amended Notice of Appeal was deemed filed on 5/2/19. Record was transmitted on 17/10/17. The Appellant filed his brief of argument on 18/10/17. The Respondents brief was filed on 14/11/17.

The Appellant in the brief settled by Olayiwola Afolabi Esq., D.A. Uhunmwangho Esq., Simon Ezeh Ezenwa Esq., P.E. Chukwu, A.I. Tsado, A.U. Osunde Esq, A.D. Yusuf, Uloho Esther, E.C. Abednego Esq, E.D. Oribhabor, Efosa Odiase Esq, M.O. Asuma, A.O. Osula Esq and A.O Kilani identified two issues for the determination of the appeal to wit:
1. Having regard to the golden principle of law regarding conviction in a criminal trial coupled with the absence of Evans Aghahowa whose name featured prominently in the case and the documentary evidence of tellers used to pay money to the

said Evans Aghahowa bank account, whether the conviction of the Appellant can be sustained legally from ground two of the Amended Notice of Appeal.
2. Having regards to the crucial finding of the trial Court that the Appellant was not guilty in count three, which still borders on human trafficking whether the trial Court can still convict the Appellant in count No 1-2 when the said offences are similar in nature to one another from ground three of the Amended Notice of Appeal.

Jude C. Ajaegbu who settled the Respondents brief identified two issue for the determination of this appeal to wit:
1. Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the Appellant.
2. Whether discharging the appellant on count 3 and convicting her on counts 1 & 2 goes to any issue, considering that there are different elements to prove each of the ingredients of the offence in the charge.

In the determination of this appeal, after reading the Record and the briefs of counsel, I am persuaded that the complaint raised by the Appellant can be determined by considering the following sole issue: <br< p=””>

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Whether in the circumstances of this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the Appellant on counts 1&2 of the charge.

SOLE ISSUE
The Appellants Counsel argued that throughout a criminal trial, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution and it never shifts. He noted that the prosecution is not relieved of this burden even where an accused person admitted to committing the offence in a statement made to the police. And the failure to discharge this burden ensures that the benefit of doubt enures in favour of the accused person. Counsel cited Onyirimba v. State (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt 777) 83, Pg. 97-98; Adisa v. State (1991) 1 NWLR, (Pt. 168) Pg. 490 at 492. Counsel argued that the evidence required to convict an accused person must be cogent and believable. Counsel cited Ojo v. F.R.N (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt.1099) Pg. 467 at 513. Counsel argued that there are certain unchallenged facts which the learned trial judge ignored and which in this case, are favourable to the Appellant.

Counsel argued that P.W.2 agreed that the plan was executed between her and the said Evans Aghahowa which later consummated into the payment of a certain amount of money into the bank account of the said Evans Aghahowa.

Counsel argued that the prosecution who had the burden of proving the Appellants guilt failed to call Evans Aghahowa to show the circumstances under which the said money was paid.

Counsel argued that P.W.3 gave evidence which contradicted that of P.W.2 when he stated that it is true that money was paid into the account of the Appellant. And contrary to what was alleged by P.W.3, there is no documentary evidence to show that some money was paid into the Appellants account.

Counsel further argued that the legal deduction and inference that can be drawn from the cold unchallenged facts is that documentary evidence is the yardstick to measure the veracity of an oral evidence. Counsel cited Summit Finance Co. Ltd v. Iron Baba & Sons Ltd (2004) FWLR Pt. 188 Pg. 996 at 1022-1023; UBA Plc v. J.M & Co (Nig) Ltd (2016) 5 NWLR Pt.1504 Pg. 171 at 199.

Counsel argued that there is nowhere in the judgment of the lower Court where consideration was given to the effect of the teller tendered by the prosecution.

Counsel argued that the judgment of the learned trial judge was wrong particularly where the Court relied on the demeanour of P.W.1 and P.W.2. He opined that because of the existence of a documentary evidence, the issue of demeanour cannot arise. This is because all evidence, even if tendered by the prosecution will now be measured in light of the documentary evidence tendered and accepted as exhibits by the Court.

Counsel argued that the effect of not evaluating a documentary evidence is fatal. Counsel cited Saidu v. Abubakar (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100) Pg. 201 at 301.

Counsel submitted that also arising from the cold unchallenged facts is the issue of the absence of a vital witness whose evidence would have cleared every doubt as to the Appellants participation in the transaction. Counsel cited Ochiba v. State (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 609) Pg. 894 at 855; State v. Azeez 14 NWLR (Pt. 1108) Pg. 439 at 451.

Counsel further argued that the evidence of the said Evans Aghahowa would have been able to clear the lingering doubts as to the Appellants guilt

since his name featured prominently in the evidence of the Prosecution and Appellant. Counsel cited Omotayo v. State (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1338) Pg. 235 at 256-257.

Counsel argued that the sister of P.W.2 whom she claimed went with her and the Appellant to Lagos was not called to give evidence. He further opined that if the sister of P.W.2 had testified, that would have nailed the Appellant to the charge.

Counsel submitted that the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 as that of mother and daughter should be weighed carefully as the only evidence that separated their oral evidence from that of the Appellants is the documentary evidence which the Court has always urged on the trial Court to prefer since it is more reliable and cannot tell a lie of itself. Counsel cited U.B.A Plc v. J.M & Co (Nig) Ltd (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt.1504) Pg.171.

Counsel submitted that in a criminal charge, if one suggested inference from an evidence leads to a conclusion of guilt and another inference leads to a conclusion of innocence, a Court could not on that piece of the former evidence alone be satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel cited Oghor v. State (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 139) Pg. 484 at 494.

Learned Counsel to the Appellant further submitted that the learned trial judge erred as he gave two conflicting judgments in respect of the Appellants case.

Counsel submitted that a Court cannot approbate and reprobate its findings in respect of the same facts. Counsel cited Kayode v. Odutola (2001) 11 NWLR Pt. 725, Pg. 619 at 675-676; Ushae v. COP (2005) 2 NWLR Pt. 937, Pg. 499 at 135, Para. A-B.

Counsel argued that the evidence the learned trial judge used to discharge the Appellant is the same evidence that was used to convict her and so the learned trial judge erred in convicting the Appellant.

Counsel further argued that if the trial Court had agreed from the totality of the evidence that there is no evidence to prove count 3, then it flows logically from sound reasoning that there is no evidence to prove counts 1 and 2. Counsel cited Barrister Princess Pat A. Aguda & Anor v. INEC & 2 Ors Appeal no: CA/B/EPT/208/2011 (Unreported).

Counsel submitted that if the learned trial judge agreed that the appellant did not transfer P.W.2 to be held as a slave in Kuwait, then it

is wrong to have held in another breadth that the appellant engaged the P.W.2 to be used for forced labour.

Counsel further submitted that certainty, which is an essential element of criminal responsibility is lacking in the instant case in view of the absence of Evans Aghahowa. Counsel cited Felix Nwosu v. The State (1986) 7 S.C Pt. 11 Pg. 1 at 5

Counsel submitted that the appellate Court has the right to set aside the judgment where the trial Court chooses to believe an improbable or impossible story. Counsel cited Emine v. State (1991) 2 NWLR Pt. 204, Pg. 480 at 494.

Learned Counsel to the Respondent contended that in a criminal proceeding, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and not beyond every shadow or iota of doubt. Counsel cited Ajayi v. The State (2013) Vol 2-3 MJSC Pt. 1, Pg. 59 at 64; Shurumo v. The State (2012) Vol. 10 LRCN CC.

Counsel submitted that with the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3, the documentary evidence, Exhibits A-F, and other corroborative and circumstantial evidence, the Prosecution discharged the burden placed on it to sustain the Appellants conviction.

Counsel argued that in respect of the 1st count, the Prosecution was able to prove that the overt action of the appellant constituted deception as envisaged under Section 19(b) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act of 2003.

Counsel opined that in proof of the said count, it is irrelevant whether or not the victim reached her destination as what is relevant to the former is that the Appellant directly or indirectly induced P.W.2 and that P.W.2 moved from her home in Benin on the strength of the inducement offered by the Appellant.

Counsel argued that the Appellant assured P.W.1 that P.W.2 was going to Kuwait to continue her job as an artist. And based on the assurance and trust given by the Appellant to P.W.1, P.W.2 embarked on the journey to Kuwait.

Counsel further argued that in respect of the 2nd count, the prosecution was able to prove that the Appellant required the P.W.2 to be used for forced labour in Kuwait.

Counsel argued that P.W.1 and P.W.2 emphasized that the Appellant assured them that P.W.2 was travelling to Kuwait to continue her job as an artist. And it was based on

that assurance that P.W.2 left for Kuwait and was subjected to forced labour without her consent and sold from one person to another.

Counsel argued that the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 regarding the circumstances of the agreement by P.W.1 and P.W.2 to allow P.W.2 to travel was unchallenged.

Counsel further argued that P.W.2 gave testimony that although it was the said Evans that introduced the idea of travelling to Kuwait to her, it was not until the Appellant was brought in by the said Evans Aghahowa that P.W.1 allowed P.W.2 to travel to Kuwait.

Counsel further submitted that the whereabouts of the said Evans is within the reach and knowledge of the Appellant who should have called him as a witness as all efforts to get him arrested proved abortive.

Counsel submitted that the P.W.1 and P.W.2 stated how series of monies were paid to the Appellant for the purpose of the trip. Also, that it was the Appellant that brought the account number of the said Evans for payment to be made into. Hence, this forms part of the transaction between the Appellant, the said Evans, P.W.1 and P.W.2.

Counsel submitted that there are no contradictions in the testimony of P.W.3 and P.W.2. And even if they are, they are minor ones that does not affect the essential ingredient of the offence charged. Counsel cited Nwankwoala v. The State (2005) 12 NWLR Pt. 940 Pg. 643 at 6.

Counsel further argued that the prosecution is at liberty to call as many witnesses as it so desires and is under no obligation to call a particular number of witnesses as all that is required of the prosecution is to call sufficient evidence in discharge of the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel cited Ekpenyong v. State (1991) 6 NWLR Pt. 200 Pg. 683 at 700; Afolalu v. The State (2012) Vol. 10 LRCNCC, Pg. 30 at 40.

Counsel submitted that the documentary evidence has nothing to do with the offence for which the Appellant was charged and so urged the Court to discountenance all the argument made by the Appellants Counsel on that point.

Counsel argued that due to the nature of the charge of deceitful inducement, it is immaterial whether or not the sister of PW2 was called as a witness and so cannot be considered a vital witness. Counsel cited Ekpenyong v. State (Supra).

Counsel further submitted that there are material inconsistencies in the statement of the Appellant tendered as Exhibit E and the testimony she gave at the lower Court. Counsel cited Mohammed v. The State (1997) 11 NWLR Pt. 528, Pg. 351.

Learned Respondent Counsel submitted that different elements are required to be proved in order to sustain a conviction in each of the counts.

Counsel argued that the Prosecution successfully proved count 1 as it was shown that the Appellant either directly or indirectly by means of misrepresentation of facts or by deceit induced the P.W.2 and on the strength of the inducement, the P.W.2 acted by moving from her usual place of abode to another place.

Counsel further argued that in addition to the testimony of PW2, the elements required to be proved under count 2 that PW2 was used for forced labour without her consent was met. This is because her testimony laid credence to the fact that she was subjected to force labour in Kuwait without her consent.

Counsel submitted that the trial Court ruled that the Prosecution has not proved count 3 against the Appellant and found her not guilty. This is because the

elements required to be proved in order to sustain a conviction on count 3 is that the prosecution must prove that the Appellant deals or trades, purchases or sell or held a person so that such a person should be treated as a slave.

Counsel further submitted that this Court should affirm the finding that the Prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to justify the conviction and sentence of the Appellant.

OPINION
One of the main complaints raised by the Appellants Counsel to the conviction of the Appellant is that the real culprit in this case is Evans Aghahowa, the alleged brother of the Appellant. It was indeed into the bank account of the said Evans Aghahowa that the sum of N200,000 was paid by P.W.2- The victim. This is evidenced by Exhibit A. The defence of the Appellant of complete denial of the charge because she did not collect money from P.W.1 and P.W.2 cannot be sustained in view of the evidence on record.

The agreed sum of N500,000 was paid in instalments to Evans through the Appellant according to the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2. In fact, on page 33 of the record, it is clear from the evidence of P.W.1 that the

chief protagonist in the drama was the Appellant who came after 25 days to put pressure on P.W.1 to source for the money. The initial sum of N100,000 cash was given by P.W.1 to the Appellant who handed it over to Evans in her presence. The subsequent cash sums of N50,000 each was also given to the Appellant who then gave it to Evans. It was only the money ostensibly to purchase the ticket to Kuwait that was paid directly into the bank account of Evans. I cannot agree with the argument of the Learned Appellants counsel that because the sum of N200,000 out of N500,000 agreed was paid into the Bank account of Evans, it means that the Court is bound to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that several sums of money was paid in cash directly to the Appellant who apparently passed them on to Evans. The evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that P.W.1 gave cash several times to the Appellant was not successfully challenged under cross-examination. Thus, the fact of the existence of Exhibit A in itself cannot be used to arrive at the conclusion that only Evans was involved in the transaction between the Appellant and P.W.1 and P.W.2.

The Appellant also complained that the absence of Evans either as an accused or a prosecution witness and the absence of the elder sister of P.W.2 to give evidence regarding the journey of the P.W.2 with the Appellant to Lagos enroute Kuwait is fatal to the case of the prosecution. It is clear that the Appellant and Evans had a common purpose to agree that her daughter- the victim P.W.2 be trafficked to Kuwait. It is immaterial that the police could not arrest or prosecute Evans, the co-perpetrator of the crime. See Akinlolu v. The State (2017) LPELR-42670 (SC); Asimi v. State (2016) LPELR-40436 (SC); Alao v. State (2015) LPELR-24686(SC); Mbang v. State (2009) LPELR-1852 (SC).
As long as the witnesses proferred by the prosecution have been able to prove the ingredients of the offence charged, the prosecution is not obliged to call all manner of witnesses. Simon v. State (2017) LPELR-41988 (SC); Haruna v. AG-Federation (2012) LPELR-7821 (SC); Oduneye v. State (2001) LPELR-2245 (SC); Ibrahim v. State (2015) LPELR-40833 (SC).

The main event that led to the trafficking of P.W.2 had taken place between the Appellant and Evans on one hand and the victim, P.W.2 and her mother,

P.W.1 on the other hand. The evidence of the elder sister of P.W.2 who followed her to Lagos was not essential to prove any of the ingredients of the offence.

The last complaint of the Appellant is that since she was not convicted of the charge in count 3, she should not have been convicted in counts 1 and 2. Let us consider the ingredients of each of the counts.

In count 1, the Appellant was charged with deceitful inducement of P.W.2 to go from place to place contrary to Section 19(b) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 (hereinafter called the NAPTIP Act). To prove this count, the prosecution must prove:
1. That the Appellant directly or indirectly by means of representation of fact, or by deceit induced the P.W.2.
2. The P.W.2 moved from her home in Benin on the strength of the inducement offered by the Appellant.
The ingredients of the aforesaid offence would be (1) The deceit and (2) The inducement. There must be proof that the accused deliberately lied to the victim in order to persuade he or she to leave his/her place of abode for another place. There must also be

the element of persuasion in the lie which is the inducement. I have read the statement of the Appellant Exhibit E and the evidence of the Appellant on oath wherein she gave the full names of Evans as Evans Osarobo Aghahowa and admitted that the said Evans is her blood brother being her mothers last born. As I observed earlier, the defence of the Appellant is an absolute denial of the charge, so it is a case of oath against oath. I agree with the findings of the learned trial judge that the evidence of the principal prosecution witnesses are credible and were not shaken under cross-examination.

Count 1 as I stated earlier must be proved by the prosecution showing the victim was both deceived and persuaded to leave her/his place of abode for another. Both P.W.1 and P.W.2 gave copious uncontradicted evidence that when Evans was unable to persuade the victim and P.W.1 regarding his good intention towards P.W.2 in persuading her to go on the journey, he brought in the Appellant, a woman to further induce and encourage the P.W.1 in the enterprise.

P.W.1 on oath stated that it was the persuasion by the Appellant that made her agree to

her daughter going to Kuwait to work as an artist. The Appellant told her that she and the said Evans Aghahowa just facilitated the travel of four women abroad. It is notable that P.W.1, the mother of the victim (P.W.2) had initially driven the Evans away when he tried to approach her about the issue. It was after the intervention of the Appellant who was previously known to her and who gave her several and consistent undertaking that the victim would not be used as a prostitute that P.W.1 agreed to the arrangement. I believe that Count 1 has been proved.

In count 2, the Appellant was charged under Section 22(1)(a) of the NAPTIP Act with trafficking in Person. The section provides:
Any Person who requires any other person, or permits any place within or outside Nigeria to be used for forced labour commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding N100,000 or imprisonment for a term of five years or both such fine and imprisonment.
To succeed in this count, the prosecution must prove that the P.W.2 was used for forced or compulsory labour in Kuwait against her will or without her consent.

In respect of count 2, the count envisages requiring a person to be used for forced labour. The prosecution must prove that the Appellant knew the kind of labour the victim would be subjected to. I am persuaded from the evidence of P.W.2 that the Appellant is part of a criminal ring persuading young people mostly girls to go to Kuwait to further their careers whereas they would be sold. No doubt the man who received her in Kuwait and the women who trafficked her had an agreement with the Appellant and Evans regarding the type of work the victim would do in Kuwait. The Appellant had promised P.W.1 that P.W.2 would not be made a prostitute but would be engaged as an artist. That assurance was given several times to P.W.1 and P.W.2. The evidence of P.W.2 which I believe is that the Kuwaiti women traffickers refused to release her passport to the Nigerian Embassy because of their insistence that they had a contract between the people who trafficked her to Kuwait which contract had not been fully performed by her. Her mother had to pay the sum of N180,000.000 (Apart from her airfare back to Nigeria) to the Kuwaiti women and the Saudi Arabia madam before she was able to retrieve her passport and

come back home. The reasonable inference is that the Appellant knew before P.W.2 left Nigeria that P.W.2 was to be trafficked into Kuwait and not for gainful employment for her own benefit but into forced labour.

In count 3, the Appellant was charged with slave dealing under Section 24 of the NAPTIP Act. To succeed in this count, the prosecution must prove that the Appellant:
1. Deals or trades, purchases, sells or holds a person, so such person should be held or treated as a slave.
Thus, count 3 envisages proof that the Appellant was dealing, trading, purchasing or holding a person for forced labour or as a slave.

The appellant did not hold or treat the P.W.2 as a slave. The only portion of the charge from the facts proved by evidence is the dealing, purchasing and selling.

On this count, the learned trial judge held as follows:
I have no evidence that this accused person knew or was part of these persons who sold a human being like a commodity. She might have known but there is no evidence to support that. The law provides that the prosecution who alleges a crime must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt with

strong and credible evidence. See Afolabi v. State (2012) 10 LRCNCC 30. This the prosecution has not done in this count. If thus fails.

I beg to depart from the reasoning of the learned trial judge which the Appellant is now capitalizing on. Probably, the learned trial Court only adverted its mind to the words purchase, hold or treat as a slave but did not consider the words deals or trades which Later words in my humble view apply to the transaction between the Appellant and Evans on one hand and the Kuwait/Saudi madams on the other hand who insisted on recovering part of the money they had paid in purchasing P.W.2 before they released her passport. In any event, the fact that the Learned trial judge did not agree that count 3 was proved in my humble view did not adversely affect the case of the prosecution in counts 1 and 2. I do not agree that counts 1 and 2 must fail because count 3 failed.

In the circumstances, I find no merit in this appeal. The judgment of the Edo State High Court delivered by Honourable justice A. Edodo Eruaga on 3/5/17 in Charge No. B/1C/2016 is hereby affirmed. Appeal dismissed.

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.: My learned brother HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JCA has afforded me the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment just delivered.

My Lord has typically and exhaustively dealt with the issue that arose for consideration vis-a-vis the relevant facts and applicable statutory provisions and I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein.

With particular reference to count 3 of the charge, wherein the Appellant was discharged and acquitted by the lower Court. I align myself with the stance of my learned brother that it ought not to be so, if the learned trial Judge had taken a proper look at the requirement for proof under Section 24 of the NAPTIP Act. The words Deals or Trades as contained therein ropes in the Appellant under count 3.

However, given that the Respondent did not appeal against the discharge and acquittal under the said count 3, this Court cannot now descent into the arena.
Albeit, the fact that the Appellant was not found guilty in count 3 does not

preclude the trial Court from convicting her on the other counts if the evidence adduced satisfies the requirements thereof.

For this and the fuller reason given in the lead judgment, I also hold that this appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.

I also affirm the judgment of the High Court of Edo State delivered on the 3 day of May, 2017.

TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JCA.

I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein which I consider unassailable.
I have nothing useful to add.
I agree that this appeal lacks merit and affirm the judgment of the lower Court delivered on 3/5/17 in Charge No. B/C/2016. I also agree that this appeal should be dismissed.

Appearances:

Olayiwola Afolabi, Esq. with him, D.A. Uhunmwangho, Esq., Simon Ezeh Ezenwa, Esq., P.E. Chukwu, A.I. Tsado, Esq., A.U. Osunde, Esq., A.D. Yusuf, Esq., Uloho Esther, Esq., E.C. Abednego, Esq., E.D. Oribhabor Esq., Efosa Odiase, Esq., M.O. Asuma, Esq., A.O. Osula, Esq. and A.O. KilaniFor Appellant(s)

Jude C. AjaegbuFor Respondent(s)

Appearances

AND

Jude C. AjaegbuFor Respondent