ZIMIRO EMEJURU & ANOR v. OBEDIAH ABRAHAM & ORS
(2018) LCN/4674(SC)
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 14th day of December, 2018
SC.120/2009
RATIO
CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE SATISFIED BY A RESPONDENT WHO SEEKS TO RAISE AN ISSUE NOT RELATED TO OR ARISING FROM THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL FILED BY THE APPELLANT
The Law is settled that any issue formulated for determination of an appeal by a respondent must relate to the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant. For a respondent in an appeal who wishes to raise any issue not related to or arising from the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant, such respondent must file a cross appeal. In the instant case the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents having not filed a cross appeal, have no business formulating issues outside the ground of appeal filed by the Appellants. See Momodu v Momoh (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.169) 608, Ossai v Wakwah (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt.969) 208. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C
ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TO ISSUES NOT DISTILLED FROM A GROUND OF APPEAL
In Wachukwu v Owunwanne (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt.1266) 1 at 30 paragraph D, this Court held: – “Besides, the Court can, where it deems an issue formulated for determination of an appeal is not distilled from a ground of appeal, suo motu strike out the said issue, where it so finds in the course of writing his judgment.” PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C
WHETHER A COURT OF LAW HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DETERMINE AN ANCILLARY CLAIM ARISING FROM A MAIN CLAIM IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN
In a further argument, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellants’ claims at the trial Court has nothing to do with Section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution and that the claim for damages for trespass by the 3rd Respondent in this case is an ancillary relief and that a Court cannot adjudicate over an ancillary claim if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim. In aid Learned Counsel cited, Co-operative Bank Plc v Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (2004) 31 WNR 55 at 63 para 25, Zangina v Commissioner of Works and Housing, Borno State (2001) FWLR (Pt.79) 368, Alphonsus Nkuma v Joseph Otunuya Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.977) 587. The lower Court in its judgment made reference to the definition of the phrase, “pertaining to as defined in SPDC v Mavon (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.719) 541 and SPDC v Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723) 168 and came to conclusion that, by these pronouncements, the claims of the Appellants “pertain to” and concern or arise from “the laying of Gas pipelines”, an area of adjudication reserved for the Federal High Court. With due respect to the learned justices of the lower Court, the words “pertain” or “connected with as used under S.7(1) of the Federal High Court Decree No. 60 of 1991 which was the reference point in SPDC v Maxon (Supra) and SPDC v Isaiah (Supra) are clearly absent in Section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 3rd respondent was joined in 2001 when the 1999 Constitution had come into operation. Also, the claim in SPDC v Isaiah (Supra) was purely for damages arising from oil spill. There was no claim for declaration of title to land. The main claim in this case is for declaration of title to land. The Appellant sought for and got an order to join the 3rd Respondent in the suit, because the 3rd Respondent, whose oil pipeline ran through the disputed land, went to negotiate for payment of compensation with his opponents whom he believed were not the owners of the land. The question now is whether the Federal High Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the Appellants’ claim for declaration of title to the disputed land. Unlike the State High Court which is a Court of unlimited jurisdiction, the Federal High Court is a special Court with limited but exclusive jurisdiction clearly specified under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I have reproduced elsewhere in this judgment the claims of the Appellants herein. The provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 are very clear and unambiguous. It is the section that confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, which jurisdiction clearly does not include a claim for declaration of title to land. This Court has in a myriad of decided cases held that the jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the plaintiffs claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and statement of claim. See Onuorah v K.R.P.C. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.921) 393, (2005) 2 SCNJ 179, Tukur v Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517, Orthopedic Hospital Management v Garba (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.788) 538, Adeyemi v Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31, Akin Folarin v. Akinola (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.335) 659, Okoroma v Uba (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt.587) 359. Since it is very clear that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the Appellants’ claim for declaration of title, can it assume jurisdiction over a claim that is incidental to the main claim of declaration of title. I do not think so. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that a Court cannot adjudicate over an ancillary claim if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim if the ancillary claim will inevitably involve a discussion of the main claim. I agree with this position. The decision of the trial Court which was upheld by the lower Court is an attempt to divest both the state High Court and the Federal High Court of their jurisdiction to hear this case. The State High Court according to the lower Court has jurisdiction to hear the main claim and not the ancillary claim, while the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to hear the ancillary claim, but cannot hear the main claim. Clearly this is a dangerous path to follow, as the appellants will have no forum to ventilate their grievances. This position will undoubtedly give rise to anarchy. The Rivers State High Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C
JUSTICES
MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AMIRU SANUSI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
EJEMBI EKO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
PAUL ADAMU GALUMJE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
- ZIMIRO EMEJURU
2. OGBONNA JOSIAH
(For themselves and as representing other members of Odegrou family of Ubarama) Appellant(s)
AND
- OBEDIAH ABRAHAM
2. OPARA MONDAY
(For themselves and as representing other members of Umuakpa family of Ubarama)
3. NIGERIAN LIQUIFIED NATURALGAS LIMITED (LNG) Respondent(s)
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellants herein, who were the plaintiffs at the High Court of Rivers State in their writ of summons dated 22nd of January, 1992 and their statement of claim dated 23rd day of November, 2001, claimed against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, who were 1st and 2nd defendants at the trial Court, the following reliefs: –
1. A declaration that the land called and known as Ugbate land, the subject matter of this suit, situate at Ubarama in the Ekpeye District of the Ahoada Local Government Area of Rivers State is the bona fide property and owned by the plaintiffs without any encumbrance.
2. A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd set of defendants, their agents, servants and privies from alienating, further entering, allotting, partitioning or sharing for farming or any other purpose or putting into any group or individual use the land called and known as Ugbate situate at Ubarama in the Ekpeye District of the Ahoada Local Government Area of Rivers State.
3. The sum of N13,380,000:00 as damages for trespass by the third defendant.
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Before the case was heard, the Appellants, by a motion dated 31st of August, 2000 sought for and were granted an order to join Nigerian Liquified Natural Gas Limited as a defendant.
The Nigerian liquefied Natural Gas Limited was accordingly joined to the suit as the 3rd defendant. It is now the 3rd Respondent in this appeal. As a result of the joinder of the 3rd Respondent, Learned Counsel for the 3rd Respondent issued a preliminary objection to the competence of the suit dated 29th November, 2001, in the following words: –
“An order of Court striking out this suit on the ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same.”
The ground upon which the preliminary objection is based is as follows: –
“Section 251 (n) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confers exclusive jurisdiction on Federal High Court to entertain civil cases and matters relating to mines and minerals (including oil field, oil mining, geographical surveys and natural gas).”
The preliminary objection was heard by the trial Court. In a reserved and considered ruling delivered on the 6th day of May 2002, Obie Daniel-Kalio J. (as he then was) upheld the objection and struck out the suit.
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The Appellants appeal to the Court of appeal Port-Harcourt Division was dismissed on the 15th day of January, 2007. The appeal herein is against the decision of the Court of Appeal Port-Harcourt Division. The Appellants notice of appeal filed on the 5th of March, 2007 contains only one ground of appeal and it reads as follows: –
“The Learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in Law when they upheld the ruling of the trial Court that the State High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the plaintiffs”.
Particulars of Error.
(i) The claim was for declaration of title to land, trespass and injunction.
(ii) The addition of another claim for trespass against the 3rd Defendant who broke and entered the land during the pendency of the suit did not alter the nature of the claim.
(iii) The Court below admittedly did not understand or appreciate that the phrase “Connected with” or “pertaining to” does not form part of the provision of Section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but was introduced by the trial Court.
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(iv) The Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain claims for declaration of title and the judgment of the Court of Appeal had the effect of shutting out the Appellants from both the High Court and the Federal High Court.
Parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. Mr. Chidozie Ogunji who settled the Appellants amended brief of argument filed on the 2nd October, 2018, but deemed filed on the 9/10/2018, formulated one issue for determination of this appeal. The sole issue reads as follows: –
“Whether the Court below was right when it held that the Federal High Court was the appropriate forum for the plaintiffs in a claim for declaration of title to land, perpetual injunction and damages for trespass.”
Mr. V.N. Ihua – Meduenyi, Learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents also formulated one issue for determination of this appeal as follows: –
“Whether the insistence of the Appellant to prosecute their claim against the 3rd Defendant operated to oust the jurisdiction of the lower Court.”
The 3rd Respondent’s brief of argument settled by Mr. Oluseyi Sowemimo SAN, is dated 8th March, 2010 and filed
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on the 9th of March, 2010, but deemed filed on 9th October, 2018. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted one issue only for determination of this appeal and it reads as follows: –
“Whether the claims as recited in the statement of claim is connected with or pertains to the subject of mining and natural gas as envisaged by Section 251 (1) (n) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.”
The sole issue formulated by learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents as well as the sole issue formulated by the learned senior counsel for the 3rd Respondent do not seem to arise from the sole ground of appeal filed by the Appellant. The sole ground of appeal couched by the Appellants complained that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in Law when they upheld the ruling of the trial Court. Learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents and the Learned silk did not in their respective issue formulated by them make reference to whether the Court of Appeal committed any error or not. They rather formulated issues that touched on the claims at the trial Court. The Law is settled that any issue formulated for determination of an
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appeal by a respondent must relate to the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant. For a respondent in an appeal who wishes to raise any issue not related to or arising from the grounds of appeal filed by the Appellant, such respondent must file a cross appeal.
In the instant case the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents having not filed a cross appeal, have no business formulating issues outside the ground of appeal filed by the Appellants. See Momodu v Momoh (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.169) 608, Ossai v Wakwah (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt.969) 208. In Wachukwu v Owunwanne (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt.1266) 1 at 30 paragraph D, this Court held: –
“Besides, the Court can, where it deems an issue formulated for determination of an appeal is not distilled from a ground of appeal, suo motu strike out the said issue, where it so finds in the course of writing his judgment.”
The issue formulated for the 1st and 2nd Respondent and the one formulated for the 3rd respondent clearly attack the decision of the trial High Court. By the provision of Section 233 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to the exclusion
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of any other Court of Law in Nigeria, to hear and determine appeals from the Court of appeal. It is very clear that the Apex Court has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the High Court. Any issue formulated for determination of an appeal before this Court that attacks the decision of the High Court is clearly incompetent and liable to be struck out. On this basis I find the issues formulated for determination of this appeal on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents as well as the 3rd respondent incompetent and accordingly I strike them out. All the arguments canvassed in support of the issues aforesaid are also incompetent. I accordingly strike them out as well.
With the striking out of the issues formulated by the Respondents, I am left with the sole issue formulated by the Appellant for the determination of this appeal. In arguing the appeal, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that, by the nature of the Appellants’ claims, the lower Court was wrong when it upheld the decision of the trial Court that the appropriate Court clothed with the jurisdiction to hear this case is the Federal High Court.
Learned Counsel contended that Court’s jurisdiction is
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determined by the plaintiff’s claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and the statement of claim. In aid Learned Counsel cited Felix Onuorah v K.R.P.C (2005) 2 SCNJ 179 at 185 paras 30-35, (2005) 6, NWLR (Pt.921) 393.
In a further argument, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellants’ claims at the trial Court has nothing to do with Section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution and that the claim for damages for trespass by the 3rd Respondent in this case is an ancillary relief and that a Court cannot adjudicate over an ancillary claim if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim. In aid Learned Counsel cited, Co-operative Bank Plc v Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (2004) 31 WNR 55 at 63 para 25, Zangina v Commissioner of Works and Housing, Borno State (2001) FWLR (Pt.79) 368, Alphonsus Nkuma v Joseph Otunuya Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.977) 587.
The lower Court in its judgment made reference to the definition of the phrase, “pertaining to as defined in SPDC v Mavon (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.719) 541 and SPDC v Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723) 168 and came to conclusion that, by these pronouncements, the claims of the Appellants
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“pertain to” and concern or arise from “the laying of Gas pipelines”, an area of adjudication reserved for the Federal High Court. With due respect to the learned justices of the lower Court, the words “pertain” or “connected with as used under S.7(1) of the Federal High Court Decree No. 60 of 1991 which was the reference point in SPDC v Maxon (Supra) and SPDC v Isaiah (Supra) are clearly absent in Section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 3rd respondent was joined in 2001 when the 1999 Constitution had come into operation. Also, the claim in SPDC v Isaiah (Supra) was purely for damages arising from oil spill. There was no claim for declaration of title to land. The main claim in this case is for declaration of title to land. The Appellant sought for and got an order to join the 3rd Respondent in the suit, because the 3rd Respondent, whose oil pipeline ran through the disputed land, went to negotiate for payment of compensation with his opponents whom he believed were not the owners of the land.
The question now is whether the Federal High Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the
9
Appellants’ claim for declaration of title to the disputed land. Unlike the State High Court which is a Court of unlimited jurisdiction, the Federal High Court is a special Court with limited but exclusive jurisdiction clearly specified under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I have reproduced elsewhere in this judgment the claims of the Appellants herein. The provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 are very clear and unambiguous. It is the section that confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, which jurisdiction clearly does not include a claim for declaration of title to land.
This Court has in a myriad of decided cases held that the jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the plaintiffs claim as endorsed in the writ of summons and statement of claim. See Onuorah v K.R.P.C. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.921) 393, (2005) 2 SCNJ 179, Tukur v Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517, Orthopedic Hospital Management v Garba (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.788) 538, Adeyemi v Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31, Akin Folarin v. Akinola (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.335) 659, Okoroma v Uba (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt.587) 359.
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Since it is very clear that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the Appellants’ claim for declaration of title, can it assume jurisdiction over a claim that is incidental to the main claim of declaration of title. I do not think so. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that a Court cannot adjudicate over an ancillary claim if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim if the ancillary claim will inevitably involve a discussion of the main claim. I agree with this position. The decision of the trial Court which was upheld by the lower Court is an attempt to divest both the state High Court and the Federal High Court of their jurisdiction to hear this case. The State High Court according to the lower Court has jurisdiction to hear the main claim and not the ancillary claim, while the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to hear the ancillary claim, but cannot hear the main claim. Clearly this is a dangerous path to follow, as the appellants will have no forum to ventilate their grievances. This position will undoubtedly give rise to anarchy. The Rivers State High Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine this case.
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The sole issue formulated by learned counsel for the Appellants for the determination of this appeal is resolved in favour of the Appellants and against the Respondents. I find merit in this appeal, which I allow. The concurrent findings by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal are hereby set aside. It is hereby ordered that the Appellants case shall be heard by the Rivers State High Court on the merit. There shall be cost of prosecuting this appeal which I assess at N500,000 in favour of the Appellants and against the 3rd Respondent.
MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I am in total agreement with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Paul Adamu Galinje, JSC and to register my support, I shall make some remarks.
This appeal is brought by the appellants who were plaintiffs at the High Court of Rivers State holden at Ahoada per Obie Daniel-Kalio J. (as he then was). It is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Court below or Lower Court, Port Harcourt Division, Coram: Musa Dattijo Muhammad JCA (as he then was), Istifanus Thomas, Monica B. Dongban –
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Mensem JJCA, delivered on the 15th day of January, 2007 which dismissed the appeal of the appellants against the ruling of the said trial High Court on 6th day of May,2002.
The facts leading to this appeal are well captured in the lead judgment and so there is no need to repeat them unless the occasion warrants a reference to any part of those facts.
On the 9th day of October, 2018 date of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, Chidozie Ogunji Esq. adopted the amended brief of argument of the appellant filed on 1/10/18 and deemed filed on 9/10/18. He identified a single issue stated as follows: –
Whether the Court below was right when it held that the Federal High Court was the appropriate forum for the plaintiffs in a claim for declaration of title to land, perpetual injunction and damages for trespass.
V. N. Ihua-Maduenyi of counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents adopted their brief filed on 15/2/2016 and deemed filed on 9/10/18 and in it, he crafted a sole issue, viz:-
Whether the insistence of the appellant to prosecute their claim against the 3rd defendant operated to oust the jurisdiction of the Lower Court.
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Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, Oluseyi Sowemimo SAN adopted the brief of argument of the 3rd respondent filed on 9/3/2010 and he drafted a single issue as follows: –
Whether the claims as recited in the Statement of Claim is connected with or pertains to the subject of mining and natural gas as envisaged by Section 251 (i) (n) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 1999.
The issue as crafted by the appellant is apt in answering the question raised in this appeal and I shall utilise it.
SOLE ISSUE:
Whether the Court below was right when it held that the Federal High Court was the appropriate forum for the plaintiff in a claim for declaration of title to land, perpetual injunction and damages for trespass.
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Court below was wrong in law when it held that the appropriate forum for the plaintiffs (now appellants) in a claim for declaration of title to land, perpetual injunction and damages for trespass was the Federal High Court. He cited Felix Onuorah v Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co Ltd (2005) 2 SCNJ 179 at 185; Oduko v Ebonyi State & 3 Ors
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(2009) 4 NWLR 76 at 85; Adisa v Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.674) 116.
He stated further that the claim of the appellants before the trial Court has nothing to do with Section 251 (i)(n) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as altered and the section was wrongly applied in the case.
That it is trite that a Court cannot adjudicate over an ancillary claim if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim if the ancillary claim will inevitably involve a discussion of the main claim. He cited Co-operative Bank Plc v Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (2004) 3 WEN 55 at 63; Zangina v Commissioner of Works and Housing, Borno State (2001) FWLN (Pt.79) 1368; Alphonus Nkuma v Joseph Otunuya Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.977) page 587.
For the appellant, it was put forward that the circumstances in this matter shows that the proper Court with jurisdiction over it is the State High Court not the Federal High Court. He referred toOmotesho & Ors v Abdullahi & Ors (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt.1072) 526 at 536 etc.
Responding, Mr. Ihua-Maduenyi of counsel for 1st and 2nd respondents contended that the cause of action against the
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3rd respondent arose from the laying of gas pipelines for the evacuation, transportation or distribution of natural gas the proper forum was the Federal High Court in line with Section 251 (1)(n) CFRN 1999. He cited Shell Petroleum Development Company Limited v Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723) 168 at 178-179.
That there is no basis for the interference of this Court in the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Lower Courts. He cited Agbabiaka v Saibu (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt.571) 534 at 549; Tukur v Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517 at 549.
Learned Senior Advocate, Oluseyi-Sowemimo for the 3rd respondent urged the Court to uphold the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Courts below as the matter was squarely within the provisions of Section 251 (i) (n) CFRN. He cited Nafiu Rabiu v The State (1981) 2 NCLR 293.
That it is a narrow or simplistic approach to contend as appellant did that the matter had to do with “land” and only the provisions of the Land Use Act should apply.
The appellants point of view is that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit in the first instance as by
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the claims of the plaintiff/appellants, it is the State High Court that has jurisdiction.
1st and 2nd respondents disagreed with that position of the appellants stating that the two Courts below were right in holding that the matter was for the Federal High Court to adjudicate on.
The 3rd respondent of the same frame of mind as 1st and 2nd stated that the claim in contention in this suit involves other considerations outside a mere dispute over ownership of land and the activities carried out on the land now relevant and crucial for consideration have brought the matter within the purview of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for which the Federal High Court is the proper forum for adjudication at first instance.
A refreshing of the memory to the Writ of Summons show thus:
By a statement of claim dated 23rd November, 2001, the plaintiffs claimed against the defendants as follows: –
“1st and 2nd set of defendants jointly and severally as follows:
1. A declaration that the land called and known as UGBATE LAND, the subject matter of this suit, situate at Ubarama in Ekpeye District of the Ahoada Local
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Government Area of Rivers State is the bonafide property and owned by the plaintiff without any encumbrance.
2. A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd set of defendants, the agents, servants, and privies from alienating, further entering, allotting, partitioning or sharing for farming or putting into any group or individual use the land called and known as UGBATE situate at Ubarama in Ekpeye District of the Ahoada Local Government Area of Rivers State.
3. The sum of N13,380,000.00 as damages for trespass by the defendant”.
The statement of claim of the plaintiffs is at pages 5-8 of the Record of Appeal.
From that claim and the Statement of Claim of the plaintiffs, the jurisdiction of the Court is determined. Clearly what came before the Court of first instance is a dispute to land as to whom the title enures which is an area within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State High Court by virtue of Section 39 (1) of the Land Use Act and it is not lost sight of that when the occasion warrants that exclusivity is shed to give way for the concurrent jurisdiction with the customary or
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other Court of equivalent jurisdiction by virtue of both its entrenched unlimited jurisdiction under Section 236 (i) of the Constitution and the jurisdiction conferred on the said customary Court or other Court by Section 41 of the Land Use Act. To be added to what I am trying to say is that the Federal High Court is not so endowed with the right or privilege of coming into the ambit of the dispute so covered by the Land Use Act. See Felix Onuorah v Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co Ltd (2005) 2 SCNJ 179 at 185; Oduko v Ebonyi State & 3 Ors (2009) 4 NWLR 76 at 85; Adisa v Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.674) 116.
At the State High Court of Ahoada, Rivers State the 3rd defendant now respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection seeking a striking out of the suit on the ground that only the Federal High Court could entertain claims concerning mining and natural gas, pursuant to Section 251 (i) (n) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Daniel-Kalio J. (as he then was) upholding the Preliminary Objection and striking out the suit for want of jurisdiction stated thus: –
by the decided cases therefore it cannot be
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disputed that the entry by the 3rd defendant into the plaintiff land for the purpose of laying gas pipelines is a matter connected with and pertaining to the mining of natural gas since it is inconceivable to lay pipelines without traversing land”.
A foray into the background of the matter before Court shows that during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff/appellant obtained leave of Court to join the 3rd defendant/respondent as a party to the suit and a fresh statement of claim was filed which paragraphs 5, 39 and 44 contain thus: –
“(3) Among other things, the major activity of the 2nd defendant includes commercial distribution of liquefied natural gases which involves laying of Gas Pipelines through long distance areas thereby encroaching on people’s lands with its adverse effects.
(39) Not minding the pendency of this suit at the appeal Court, the 3rd defendant, that was joined in this suit by the order of this Honourable Court on the 15th day of January 2001 on the application of the plaintiff in or about the year 1997 entered into the plaintiff’s property or land in dispute and commenced laying Gas pipelines and that without the plaintiffs consent and
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authority caused massive destruction to their cash crops, farmland, ancestral landmarks and building in the process.
(44) The damage done by the third defendant in laying their gas pipelines to the plaintiffs property without the plaintiffs consent and authority are as follows…”
It was those newly brought in claims that persuaded the learned trial judge into his decision and the Court of Appeal per Dongban-Mensem JCA towed a similar line when she held thus: –
“Laying of gas pipelines no doubt relates to mining activities.”
After referring to the provisions of Section 251 (1) (n), His Lordship added:
“By these provisions, mining is clearly an area of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, all the parties are ad idem that had the head of claim against the 3rd respondent as defendant not been added to the claim of the plaintiffs, their suit would clearly have been determinable by the State High Court. With the additional of the claim for damages against the 3rd respondents, a dichotomy was thereby created. In such a situation, the Supreme Court has directed that the suit is better heard and determined by the Court with
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the requisite jurisdiction to try all the heads of claim in the suit”.
I shall cite and quote the provisions of Section 251 (i) (n) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as altered, which the two Courts below invoked and came to their decision. It provides thus: –
“251 Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters;
(n) Mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas)”.
In my humble view the two Lower Courts clothed the ancillary reliefs over laying of pipelines to a position of paramount status and left the route that led to the appropriate main or principal claim before the court which is title to land and impending compensation thereto. See Co-operative Bank Plc v Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (2004) 31 WRN 55 at 63; Zangina v Commissioner of Works and Housing, Borno State (2001) FWLR (Pt.79) 1368.
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In fact, a similar presentation as in the case in hand had come before this Court in Nkuma v Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.977) P.587 and this Court held thus: –
“Whether in the absence of a claim for declaration of title to or ownership of the land in contest, the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the award of the sum of N25.180.32 to the respondent which sum is an ancillary, incidental and consequential claim to title or ownership of land”.
This Honourable Court resolved the said issue two per Oguntade JSC thus at Page 602:
“The plaintiffs suit was filed in 1977 and the defendant’s in 1978. It seems to me however that a simple claim concerning entitlement to compensation for land as in this case cannot be seen as one “connected with or pertaining to mines and minerals including oil fields”.
It cannot be disputed that if the case is connected with or pertaining to land and minerals including oil fields, it would abate by virtue of Section 7 of Decree 60 of 1991 which came into force on 30/12/91. I think that the appellant’s counsel has stretched beyond reasonable limit the meaning to be ascribed to the expression
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“connected with or retaining to mines and minerals including oil fields”. All the cases in which the Court of Appeal and this Court had decided that the provisions of both Decrees ousted the jurisdiction of a State High Court clearly touched on issues of compensation for pollution and damages resulting from mining operations and related matters and one was on compensation for owners of the land. This case is simply a land dispute. It could well have been a land dispute as to who was entitled to the compensation for a land to be used for farming, golfing or a football field”.
OGBUAGU JSC in his own concurrent judgment in this case at page 608 held thus:
“In other words, the nature of the claim by the parties themselves is for compensation. There is no how, in my respectful but firm view this claim, could have been determined, without the trial Court, finding and determining the ownership of the land, the subject matter of the compensation. Afterwards, it is now settled that it is the plaintiff’s claim, that determines the jurisdiction of a trial Court”.
In Omotesho & Ors v Abdullahi & Ors (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt.1072) page 526 particularly at page 536, the Court of
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Appeal, per OGUNBIYI JCA (as she then was) declared thus:
By virtue of Section 39 (1) (a) of the Land Use Act, the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings in respect of any land subject of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to have been granted by him under the Act and for the purpose of the paragraph, proceedings including proceedings for a declaration of title to a statutory right of occupancy. Thus, the Federal High Court is not empowered with the jurisdiction to entertain actions over land matters. In other words, the Federal High Court is not one of the Courts vested with jurisdiction by virtue of Sections 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act to entertain actions over land matters not being a State High Court or an Area or Customary Court or Court of equivalent cadre. And the jurisdiction would not lie in the Court by the mere fact that one of the parties is a Federal Government agency”.
Similarly, in Co-operative Bank Plc v Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation & Anor (supra) the Court held that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction over land matters.
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I also refer to the cases of Okoroma v UBA (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.587) 359 and Achebe v Nwosu (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt.818) 103.
In Oloruntoba-Oju v Abdul-Raheem (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt.1157 at 83 this honourable Court, per ADEKEYE JSC at page 126n held that:-
“In the determination of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in respect of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Court must carefully examine the facts of the case to see whether they justify the application of that section”.
The situation has to be said as it is and that is that before a Court allows itself to be sucked into the application of Section 251 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, it has to examine fully the facts to see if they fall into the category for such an application of the said statutory provision.
In conclusion, from the foregoing and the better articulated lead Ruling, this appeal has merit and I allow it as I abide by the consequential orders made.
AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C.: His lordship Hon. Justice Paul Adamu Galumje, JSC graciously supplied me with a copy of the lead Judgment prepared by him before now. Having
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perused same, I find myself at one with his reasoning and the conclusion he arrived at that this appeal is meritorious and deserves to be allowed. While allowing the appeal, I shall also chip in a word or two in support of the leading Judgment
The facts culminating into the present appeal have been adequately summarised in the lead Judgment, as well as the submissions by learned counsel to the parties which largely posed the question as to the appropriate Court that had jurisdiction in the matter between the Federal High Court (the trial Court) and the Rivers State High Court. The appellants learned counsel holds the view that the trial Federal High Court is bereft of Jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter and opined that it is the River State High Court that has Jurisdiction, since the subject-matter of the claim before the trial Court relates to declaration of title to land.
Conversely, on their part, the 1st and 2nd respondents’ hold a different view and stated that it is the Federal High Court that had jurisdiction, as rightly held by the two lower Courts. Also the 3rd respondent agreed with the stance of the 1st
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and 2nd respondents and the two Courts below and added that the claim involves other considerations beyond mere dispute of ownership of the land in dispute as it extends to the activities carried out on the land which is worth being considered in crucially determining the matter and in doing so, Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution which had thereupon given the Federal High Court the required Jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.
It must be stressed here, that issue of Jurisdiction is fundamental as the law even settled it, that it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal before the apex Court. See Frances Durwode v State (2000) 15 NWLR (pt 691) 467; Otukpo vs John (2000) 8 NWLR (pt 669) 507. When issue of jurisdiction is raised in proceedings, the Court must carefully refer to the writ of summons and the statement of claim in order to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine the claim filed before it. See Adeyemi vs Opeyori (1976) 10 SC 31 and Aremoti v Adekaiye (2004) 13 NWLR (pt 891) 572.
The statement of claim filed by the plaintiffs/Appellants against the defendants i.e. 1st and 2nd respondents, relate
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to claim of title to the land. The reliefs read thus:
“1. A declaration that the land called and known as UGBATE LAND, the subject matter of this suit, situate at Ubarama in Ekpaye District of the Ahoada Local Government Area of Rivers State is the bona fide property and owned by the plaintiff without any encumbrance
2. A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd set of defendants/agents, servants and privies from alienating, further entering allotting, partitioning or sharing, for farming or putting into any group or individual use the land called and known as UGBATE situate at Ubarama in Ekpeye District of the Ahoada Local Government Area of Rivers State.
3. The sum of N13,380,000.00 as damages for trespass by the defendant”.
Now, closely looking at the aforementioned reliefs, there is no gain saying that the first relief is the main rather than ancillary relief, claimed by the plaintiffs which the trial Court should have focused its attention to first and foremost in determining whether or not it has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter or suit.
It can be clearly said that the jurisdiction of the trial Court
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was invoked to simply determine to which of the parties before its title to the land inures. That question or issue to my mind, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Rivers State High Court by virtue of Section 39(1) of Land Use Act which gives it exclusive jurisdictional power to determine the matter to the exclusion of any Court, the Federal High Court included. See Onuorah vs Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Co. Ltd (2005)25 SCNJ 175; Adisa vs Oyinwola (2000)10 NWLR (pt.674)116.
It appears to me from the antecedents of this case, that during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial Court the plaintiff now appellant sought and obtained leave to join the 3rd defendant now respondent and due to such joinder, the latter filed statement of claim which inter alia, introduced the issue of “laying of gas pipelines” which relates to the issue of mining activities. The two lower Courts thereupon fell into the trap that such newly introduced activities led to them to opine that since the issue of mining was introduced as fresh claim, then the Federal High Court thereupon became clothed with jurisdiction in the entire matter as opposed to
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the State High Court, notwithstanding the fact, that the new or fresh claim/relief is simply ancillary to the main claim of title to the land in question which such subject matter clearly came within the jurisdiction of the State High/Court by virtue of the provisions of Section 39 of the Land Use Act. The two lower Courts in reaching their decisions relied on the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution which provides that the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction on matters relating to “mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas)”.
It is my candid view, that the issue of laying of pipelines etc is what simply led to the main claim or principal claim which is basically on or relates to title to the land justifying the claim of compensation thereto. See Zangina Vs Commissioner of Works and Housing, Borno State (2001) FWLR (pt.79)1368. It needs to be added here, that all other ancillary claims or reliefs can not be granted or determined by the Court without first of all determining to whom the main claim of title to the land in dispute inures or to whom amongst the parties the title to the land in dispute
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belongs, or to whom compensation would be paid. It should be borne in mind and it is even a trite law, that plaintiffs claim is always what determines the jurisdiction of a trial Court.
In the result, from my discourse above, and for the fuller and more detailed reasoning and conclusion marshaled by my learned brother Paul Adamu Galinje JSC, in his leading Judgment which I am in total agreement with, I also see merit in the appeal. I accordingly allow the appeal and abide by the consequential order(s) made therein, including one on costs.
EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.: The Appellants, as the Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of other members of the Odegrou family of Ubarama, had on 22nd January, 1992 taken out of the Rivers State High Court a Writ of Summons against the 1st and 2nd Defendants.
They had endorsed on the said Writ of Summons the following claims against the said two Defendants (for themselves and as representing other members of Umuakpa Family of Ubarama). That is –
1. A declaration that the land called and known as Ugbate land, subject matter of this suit, situate at
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Ubarama in Ekeye District of the Ahoada Local Government Area of Rivers is the bona fide property (of) and owned by the Plaintiffs without any encumbrance.
2. A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants, their agents, servants and privies from alienating, further entering, allotting, partitioning or sharing for family or any other purpose or putting into any group or individual use the land called and known as Ugbate situate at Ubarama in the Ekpeye District of the Ahoada Local Government Area of Rivers State.
The suit was before Daniel-Kalio, J (as he then was) of the Rivers State High Court. Title to land being the only issue in the matter, it is indubitable that the said Rivers State High Court had jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of the Federal High Court. The jurisdiction of the State High Court was not disputed by the Defendants on the Writ of Summons.
During the pendency of the suit it was alleged that the Nigerian Liquified Natural Gas Limited (NLNG) had entered the disputed Ugbate land in 1997, and caused massive destruction of cash crops, buildings and other valuables and commenced laying gas pipelines. The Plaintiffs alleged,
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also, that the trespass was without their previous knowledge and approval. This development prompted or necessitated the Plaintiffs amending the Writ of Summons. They applied to join NLNG as the 3rd Defendant. A third relief to writ – damages for trespass was proposed in the amendment. The proposed amendments were granted by the trial Court. Paragraphs 39 and 41 of the Amended Statement of Claim pleaded against the 3rd Defendant, NLNG, the following facts as the cause of action.
That is: that in or about the year 1997 the 3rd Defendant entered into the Plaintiffs disputed Ugbate land and commenced the laying of gas pipelines without the consent and authority of the Plaintiffs; that without the consent of the Plaintiffs the 3rd Defendant, NLNG, had caused massive destruction of Plaintiffs’ cash crops, buildings and ancestral land marks. The Plaintiffs further pleaded that the NLNG, 3rd Defendant, had entered into negotiations with the 1st and 2nd Defendants and had indeed/fact paid them compensation for the damages done to the Plaintiffs property. The claim of N3, 380,000.00 in paragraph 44 of the Amended Statement of Claim appears to be special
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damages in form of compensation. The Claim of N10,000,000.00 general damages is for trespass generally.
Upon the joinder of NLNG, the 3rd Defendant, it raised Preliminary Objection, alleging that by virtue of Section 7 (1) (n) of the Federal High Court Act and Section 251(1)(n) of the 1999 Constitution the entering into the Plaintiffs’ land for the purpose of laying Gas Pipelines is a matter connected with and pertaining to the mining of natural gas; and accordingly, exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit vested only in the Federal High Court. In other words: that the Rivers State High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Daniel-Kalio, J (as he then was), sustained the Preliminary Objection and struck out the suit. His lordship, on 6th May, 2012, reasoned that the entry by the 3rd Defendant, NLNG, into the Plaintiffs’ land had the purpose of laying gas pipelines and that it was therefore a matter “connected with and pertaining to the mining of natural gas since it is inconceivable to lay gas pipelines without traversing the land.” His lordship, in this ruling, purportedly, was interpreting Section 7 (1) (n) of the Federal High Court
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Act, impari materia (somehow) with Section 251(i)(n) of the 1999 Constitution that provides –
251.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other in causes and matters –
(n) mines and minerals (including oilfields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas).
The 1999 Constitution, by dint of the Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria (Promulgation) Act No. 24, 1999 came into operation “with effect from 29th May, 1999.” The cause of action had arisen much earlier in 1997.
Section 230 (1) (o) of the 1979 Constitution introduced by the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107, 1993 came into operation on 17th November, 1993. The provisions of Section 230 (1) (o) of the 1979 Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 107, 1993, and the extant Section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution are not totally impari materia. In respect of the matters expressly listed in Section
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251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution one cannot find words or phrases like “connected with or pertaining to”, or “relating to”, “arising from or ancillary to” prefacing or preceding the words “mines and minerals” in Section 251(1)(n) of the Constitution. These words or phrases were included in Section 230 (1) (o) of the 1979 Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993. These prefatory words or phrases are clearly not intended, or any longer intended, by the extant Constitution to define, extensively, the exclusive jurisdiction the Constitution has vested or conferred on the Federal High Court.
The lower Court in its judgment, delivered on 15th January, 2007 in the appeal of the present Appellant against the Ruling of the trial Court, affirmed the opinion of the trial High Court. Both Courts below relied heavily on this Court’s decision in SHELL PETROELEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. ISAIAH (2001) 11 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 723) 168. I find, from reading the decision painstakingly, particularly pages 182 – 184 of the report (the opinion of Ogwuegwu, JSC) that the decision was based largely on Section 7 (1) (p) of the Federal High Court (Amendment) Act 60, 1991 and
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Section 230 (1) of the 1979 Constitution, as amended). Section 7 (1) of the Federal High Court Act, as amended by Decree No. 60, 1991 provided:
7.(1) The Court shall, to the exclusion of any other Court, have original jurisdiction to try civil causes and matters connected with or pertaining to –
(p) Mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas.
Section 230(1)(o) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 107, 1993 provided –
230 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred by an Act of National Assembly or Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters arising from-
(o) Mines and minerals (including oil fields, mining, geological surveys and natural gas).
The cause of action in S.P.D.C. v. ISAIAH (supra) arose in 1988. The decision was predicated on the ouster of the jurisdiction of State High Courts brought about by Section 230 (1) (o) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended by Decree
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No. 107, 1993; and Section 7 (i), (3) & (5) of the Federal High Court Act, as amended by Decree 60, 1991. The latter provided:
7(1) The Court shall, to the exclusion of any other Court, have original jurisdiction to try civil causes and matters connected with and pertaining to –
(p) Mines and minerals including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas
3. Where jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court under Subsections (1) and (2) of this Section of this Section, such jurisdiction shall be construed to include jurisdiction to hear and determine all issues relating to, arising from or ancillary to such subject matter.
5. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other enactment or rule of law, including the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, any power conferred on a State High Court or any other Court of similar jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil matter or proceedings shall not extend to any civil matter in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court under the provisions of this Section.
The extant Federal High Court Act is subordinate to the 1999
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Constitution and is subject to the supremacy of the said Constitution. By dint of Section 1(3) of the Constitution if any provisions of the Federal High Court Act are or should be inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution, those provisions of the Federal High Court Act, to the extent of the inconsistency, shall be void.
I find in Section 7 of the Federal High Court Act Subsections (3) and (5) thereof provisions that appear to be drousy military hang-over provisions. Subsection (3) lays no claim to ousting the jurisdiction of the State High Court.
Subsection (3) to Section 7 of the Federal High Court seems to me to say, for instance, that where trespass to land is incidental or ancillary to mines and minerals the Federal High Court is empowered to hear and determine such ancillary issue of trespass.
“Any enactment”, mentioned in Section 7(5) of the Federal High Court Act, includes the Constitution. I do not think, in view of Section 1 of the Constitution, that Section 7 (5) of the Federal High Court Act is intended to be such an audacious provision enacted to rival the Constitution or any of its provisions. It cannot.
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The sum total of all I have been labouring to say is that when the two Courts below, purporting to be construing Section 251(1)(n) of the Constitution and finding support in SPDC v. ISAIAH (supra) for their interpretation, imported into the provisions of the said Section 251(1)(n) the words “connected with” and “pertaining to” as prefix to “mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas)”, they had thereby strayed into fields forbidden to the judex. The Court, in any guise of exercising its interpretative jurisdiction, is not permitted to play the role of the legislature. It is not permitted to place a gloss on the provisions by reading or importing into the provisions extraneous matters or words not used by the legislature in enacting the provisions in the first place.
In UNIPETROL v. E. S. B. l. R (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 317) 413 at page 423 the point was made, without any iota of doubt, that the cardinal principle of the law of interpretation is that a Court, when interpreting a provision of a statute, must give words and language used therein, their simple and ordinary meaning. The Court cannot venture outside the
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provisions of the statute by introducing there into extraneous matters that may lead to circumventing or giving the provisions an entirely different meaning from what the law maker intended them to be. Nothing must be added to or taken out of the provisions of the statute. Tobi, JSC, in OBUSEZ v. OBUSEZ (2007) 30 NSCQR 329, concurring in the declared principle of interpretation added, at page 349 of the report, that “a Court has no jurisdiction to import or impute”, into the constitution words which are not used there in.
The two Courts below, by importing or imputing into Section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution the words: “connected with and pertaining to” and prefixing them to “mining of natural gas since it is inconceivable to lay gas pipelines without traversing the land”, have usurped the legislative powers the national Assembly has to amend the Constitution. That is clearly ultra vires the powers and jurisdiction vested in them as the judex by the Constitution.
Mr. Ihua-Maduenyi, of Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondent adopted a rather ambivalent, completely less than bold, stance on the issue. At page 3 paragraph 4.2 of the Brief of 1st and 2nd Respondent, Counsel opines that
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the concurrent opinion of the two Courts below was questionable. I agree.
My Lords, from foregoing stance I am clearly in concurrence with the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Paul Adamu Galinje, JSC. I also find merit in the appeal, and I allow it. The decision of the Court of Appeal affirming the ruling of the trial Court is hereby set aside.
All consequential orders, including order as to costs, made in the lead judgment are hereby adopted by me.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.S.C.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead Judgment of my learned brother Paul Adamu Galinje, JSC, just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add. The appeal is meritorious and it is accordingly allowed, judgment of the lower Court is hereby set aside.
I abide by all the orders contained in the lead Judgment.
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Appearances:
Mr. Chidozie Ogunji with him, Mr. C. Okafor For Appellant(s)
Mr. V. N. Ihua-Maduanyi for 1st and 2nd Respondents.
Mr. Oluseyi Sowemimo, SAN with him, Remi Coker, Esq, for 3rd Respondent. For Respondent(s)
Appearances
Mr. Chidozie Ogunji with him, Mr. C. Okafor For Appellant
AND
Mr. V. N. Ihua-Maduanyi for 1st and 2nd Respondents.
Mr. Oluseyi Sowemimo, SAN with him, Remi Coker, Esq, for 3rd Respondent. For Respondent
