ZERIBE EZEANUNA & ANOR v. AFAM VICTOR OGENE & ORS (2012)

ZERIBE EZEANUNA & ANOR v. AFAM VICTOR OGENE & ORS

(2012)LCN/5604(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 23rd day of January, 2012

CA/E/EPT/72/2011

RATIO

INTERPRETATION: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

Recently, the Supreme Court while considering the interpretation to accord the provision of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended (hereafter simply referred to as “the amended Constitution”), also averted its mind to the provision of Section 285(6) thereof. This was in the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) V.CONGRESS FOR PROGRESSIVE CHANGE (CPC) & ORS (2011) LPELR – SC.272/2011 (CON). At pages 4 – 5 of the Report, Onnoghen, JSC; delivering the lead ruling stated thus: –

“It is settled law that in interpreting a constitutional provision the court should adopt a broad approach to the process. Also settled is the principle that where the words of the constitution or statute are plain,

clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural, ordinary meanings as there is nothing, in effect to be interpreted. In that case, the words must be given their plain/natural meanings, as there is nothing to interpret.

It is also settled law that the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are supreme and have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that any other law which is inconsistent with its provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency as the constitutional provision must prevail over such Act/Law.

I have read over the provisions of Section 285(7) of the l999 Constitution (as amended) and have found the words used therein to be clear, unambiguous and simple and straight forward. I therefore hold that the words used herein are not subject to any interpretation at all they are to be given their natural meanings; that the natural meanings of the words are that appeal from a decision of an election tribunal or the Court of Appeal in an election matter shall be heard and determined within sixty (60) days from the date the judgment/decision appealed against was delivered, by the tribunal or Court of Appeal. PER AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, JCA

INTERPRETATION: INTERPRETATION OF FROM AS USED IN STATUTES

the settled position of the law as this Court has consistently pronounced in recent times; concerning computation of time when the word “from” is used in a statutory provision against the backdrop of the fundamental canon of interpretation that clear and unambiguous provisions of a statute should be given their literal grammatical meanings. In this regard see: –

OLANIYI V. SOJI (2010) All FWLR (PT.551) 1576 where this Court stated that the meaning to be accorded the word “from” is “starting at a particular time and also indicates starting from a point in place or time”.
KUMALIA V. SHERIFF (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 521) 1497, where this court having stated to the effect that the courts must adopt the literal and plain ordinary meaning, where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous and that the courts in such situations are precluded from resorting to any aid or other canon of interpretation, held that time within which to present an election petition (as stipulated by Section 141 of the 2000 Electoral Act) started to run on the day the result was declared and not the following day.
UMARU & ANOR. V. ALIYU & ORS. (2010) All FWLR (Pt.508) 329 where this Court in interpreting Section 141 of the 2006 Electoral Act, against the backdrop of the clear and unambiguous words of the said Section held amongst others to the effect that there was no need of resorting to the Interpretation Act or the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. PER AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, JCA

Before Their Lordships

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPEJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ADAMU JAUROJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJIJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. ZERIBE EZEANUNA
2. ACCORDAppellant(s)

AND

1. AFAM VICTOR OGENE
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES GRAND ALLIANCE
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
4. DIVISIONAL POLICE OFFICER, OKPOKO
5. SUPERVISORY PRESIDING OFFICER FOR OCHUCHE/OGBAKUBA WARD
6. RESIDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER ANAMBRA STATE, PROF. C. ONUKOGURespondent(s)

AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, JCA (delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the ruling delivered on 25/11/2011 by the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal, Awka, Anambra State, (hereafter simply referred to as “the Tribunal”) in petition No. EPT/AN/NAE/HR/67/2011 (hereafter simply referred to as “the Petition”). In the ruling, the Tribunal on 25/11/2011 declined proceeding further with the hearing of all applications that were pending in the Petition (which was filed on 27/5/2011) on the ground that the Petition had lapsed and died since 23/11/2011. Consequently, the Tribunal on the aforesaid 25/11/2011, not only struck out all applications that were pending in the Petition, but also the Petition itself.
The Appellants on 27/5/2011 instituted the Petition which relates to the election held on 26/4/2011 to the House of Representatives of the National Assembly for the Ogbaru Federal Constituency of Anambra State. The 1st Appellant contested the election on the platform of the 2nd Appellant; while the 1st Respondent who was declared and returned as the winner of the election in question, contested the same on the platform of the 2nd Respondent. The Appellants are by the Petition challenging the declaration and return of the 1st Respondent as the winner of the election. The reliefs which the Appellants prayed of the Tribunal, as set out in paragraph 57 of the Petition are re-produced hereunder: –
“a. DETERMINATION that no election for Ogbaru Federal Constituency was conducted in the following Wards of Ogbaru 1 constituency Okpoko wards 1, Okpoko wards 2, Okpoko wards 3, Okpoko wards 4, Okpoko wards 5, Okpoko wards 6, Ochuche/Ogbakuba ward, Ogwu-Ikpele ward and Umunankwo ward in compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2010.
b. DETERMINATION that the 1st Respondent was not duly elected or duly returned and that his election was invalid, null and void.
c. AN ORDER setting aside the result of the said election.
d. AN ORDER directing the 3rd Respondent to conduct election for the Federal House of Representatives seat in Ogbaru Federal Constituency in the following wards: Okpoko Wards 1, Okpoko wards 2, Okpoko wards 3, Okpoko wards 4, Okpoko wards 5, Okpoko Wards 6, Ochuche/Ogbakuba ward, Ogwu-Ikpele ward and Umunankwo ward in compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2010;
The Respondents in the Petition (save the 4th) duly filed their respective Replies. Also, the Appellants duly applied for the issuance of pre-hearing notices as in Forms TF 007 and TF 008 on 22/7/2011 and parties duly filled, filed and exchanged their respective pre-hearing information sheets. Prehearing commenced in the Petition on 26/7/2011 before the Tribunal as constituted by Hon. Justices U.B. Bwala (Chairman); and I.T. Cocodia and M.A. Adeigbe (members). The Petition last came up before the Tribunal as constituted by the aforementioned Justices on 3/8/2011. After 3/8/2011, the Petition next came up on 13/9/2011 before the Tribunal as constituted by Hon. Justices Onajite-Kuejubola (Chairman); and Udu-Eze and Y. Mukhtar (members). On the said 13/9/2011, the Tribunal adjourned the Petition till 29/9/2011 (12 noon) for “pre-conference” (sic). (See pages 521 and 522 of the record). The Tribunal was yet to dispose of all the motions pending in the Petition when in the course of the proceeding on 25/11/2011, T.U. Oguji learned lead counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents was recorded to have said thus: “that the matter has not been determine (sic) as enshrined order (sic) section 265(6) (sic) of the CFRN as amended which he submission (sic) no fault of the tribunal”. (See page 539 of the record). The Tribunal thereafter heard from learned counsel for the Appellants; and 3rd and 5th – 7th Respondents respectively, on the issue raised by learned lead counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents. In the ruling delivered on the same date, i.e. 25/11/2011, the Tribunal stated to the effect that it was faced with a petition that died as at 23/11/2011 and in the circumstance it had only one duty placed on it by Section 285(6) of the CFRN 2011 as amended and is not allowed to extend time within which to give life to a dead or dying petition. The Tribunal consequently struck out all the motions that were still pending in the Petition and the Petition itself.
The Petitioners (now Appellants) being dissatisfied with the striking out of the Petition lodged an appeal against the ruling of the Tribunal in that regard. The Notice of Appeal filed by the Appellants is dated 5/12/2011 and filed on 10/12/2011. The Notice of Appeal contains one ground of appeal.
The ground of appeal and its particulars read thus: –
“1) ERROR IN LAW
The Lower Tribunal erred in law in holding that in computing 180 days, the days the Tribunal was not in existence at all will not be discounted and proceeded to strike out the Petition.
PARTICULARS OF EROR
a) The Lower Tribunal was re-constituted in September 2011 following the dissolution of an earlier Tribunal by the President of the Court of Appeal.
b) The present Tribunal started sitting in September 2o11, after over 30 days of vacuum in the Tribunal.
c) By failing to take into consideration the period the Tribunal was not in existence, the Lower Tribunal came to a wrong judgment which brought about a substantial miscarriage of justice.”
In accordance with the Rules of this Court, parties filed and exchanged Briefs of Argument. Appellants’ Brief of Argument is dated 28/12/2011 and filed on the same date. Appellants filed Reply Briefs to the respective Briefs of Argument of the 1st and 2nd Respondents; and 3rd and 5th -7th Respondents. The two Reply Briefs are dated 13/1/2011 and filed on the same date. All the Briefs filed in the appeal by the Appellants were settled by B.S. Nwankwo. The Brief of Argument of the 1st and 2nd Respondents dated 6/1/2012 and filed on the same date was settled by O.A. Obianwu, Esq. SAN; A.C. Anaenugwu, Esq.; H.C. Onwuegbuke, Esq.; G.B. obi, Esq.; Uzoamaka Ilobi Esq.; and Chidozie Ogunji, Esq. That of the 3rd and 5th 7th Respondents dated 6/1/2012 and filed on the same date was settled by Ozonma N.C. Nobis-Elendu; KSJ. The appeal was entertained on 23/1/2012 and parties through their respective counsel duly adopted and relied on their Briefs of Argument as hereinbefore identified as their arguments in respect of their positions in the appeal.
The lone Issue formulated for determination in the appeal, in the Appellants’ Brief of Argument reads thus: –
“Whether the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation and application of the provisions of section 285 (b) (sic) 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as amended in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this matter.”
The lone Issue formulated for determination in the appeal in the Brief of Argument of the 1st and 2nd Respondents reads:-
“Whether the decision of the Tribunal that the 180 days provided under section 285(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended for the determination of the petition elapsed on 23/11/2011 is right.”
The 3rd and 5th – 7th Respondents equally formulated a lone Issue for the determination of the appeal in their Brief of Argument. The Issue reads thus: –
“Whether the Lower Tribunal still has the jurisdiction to proceed to hear, determine and deliver judgment in the petition after 180 days from the date of filing of the petition has lapsed.”
The appeal will be determined upon the Issue formulated by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. This is because the Issue clearly covers the complaint or grouse the Appellants have against the decision of the Tribunal having regard to their only ground of appeal.
In their Brief of Argument, the Appellants said that the 180 days for the determination of their Petition which was filed on 27/5/2011, began to run from 28/5/2011 and expired on 27/11/2011, as the date of filing “is statutorily by operation of the interpretation (sic) Act traditionally discounted.” That by holding that the Petition expired on 23/11/2011 the Tribunal, donated “to injustice, four precious judicial working days sufficient to dispose of the said petition on the merit”. Aside from this, the Appellants accused the Tribunal of coming to an erroneous and unacceptable decision on25/11/2011 by holding that the Petition had lapsed and abated, since 180 days had expired from 27/5/2011 when the same was filed. In this regard the Appellants stated to the effect that the Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration the period of over 30 working days during which there was a complete void in the personnel of the Tribunal sequel to the dissolution on 3/8/2011 of the Tribunal as led by Hon. Justice U.B. Bwala and the re-constitution on 13/9/201 1 of the Tribunal as led by Hon. Justice Onajite-Kuejubola, by the President of the Court of Appeal. The Appellants cited the case of Senator A.A. Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1981) 1 SC 1 (in which the dictum of Sir Udo Udoma JSC in Nafiu v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 130 at pages 148 – 149 relating to the proper approach to accord interpretation of constitutional provisions) was quoted with approval. The Appellants submitted to the effect that the Tribunal glaringly adopted a construction that defeated the object and end of the Constitution by failing to take into account the over 30 working days lost in the business of the Tribunal as a result of the dissolution of the first panel, by the President of the Court of Appeal and its wrongful computation of 180 days from 20/5/2011 (sic). It is further submitted by the Appellants that the substantial error into which the Tribunal fell has occasioned a fundamental breach of the end and objective of the makers of the Constitution.
In their Brief of Argument, the 1st and 2nd Respondents (hereafter simply referred to as “the 1st Set of Respondents”) stated to the effect that the date the Tribunal that will hear a Petition is constituted, ought not to be taken into reckoning in calculating the 180 days prescribed for the determination of petitions under Section 285(6) CFRN 1999 as amended. In this regard, the 1st Set of Respondents submitted to the effect that the provision of Section 285(6) (supra) being clear and unambiguous ought to be given its literal meaning. The cases of Awuse v. Odili 16 NSCQR 218 at 263 and FRN v. Oshaon & Ors 25 NSCQR 512 at 547 were cited in aid. The 1st Set of Respondents further submitted that the contention of the Appellants would have been plausible, if the Constitution had either prescribed the date of commencement of the hearing of a petition or constitution of the Tribunal that is to hear a petition, as the date from which the 180 days shall be reckoned. The 1st Set of Respondents also cited the case of Ladoja v. INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 19 in aid of their stance.
Dwelling on the Appellants’ contention in their Brief of Argument, the 3rd and 5th – 7th Respondents (hereafter simply referred to as “the 2nd Set of Respondents”) pointed it out that the Petition at all material times was lying in the bowels of the Tribunal without its having been terminated at any point in time throughout the 180 days the Petition had for its determination from the date it was filed. The contention of the Appellants according to the 2nd Set of Respondents was nothing more than an appeal to sentiments. The 2nd Set of Respondents cited in support of their stance, the decision (unreported) of the Supreme Court in Suit Nos. SC. 272/2011 and SC.276/2011 – PDP v. CPC in which they claimed that it was held amongst others that the provision of Section 285(6) of the Constitution is sacrosanct and that no tribunal can extend the time limited for a petition to be heard. The 2nd Set of Respondents further submitted that it is only by an amendment of the constitutional provision in question that the Tribunal could have gone along the route charted by the Appellants by their contention. It is also the submission of the 2nd Set of Respondents that the Adesanya case (supra) cited by the Appellants on its peculiar facts, was inapplicable to the instant case and that the Tribunal was right in relying on the case of PDP v. CPC (supra) in declining to further proceed with the Petition having discovered that the 180 days within which it must dispose of the Petition had expired.
As already stated in this judgment, the Appellants filed Reply Briefs to the respective Briefs of Argument of the two Sets of Respondents. The Reply Briefs filed by the Appellants are ipsissima verba. It is however glaring from a perusal of the Appellants’ Reply Brief to the Brief of Argument of the 1st Set of Respondents that the said Appellants’ Reply Brief definitely is not in answer to any new issue raised by the said 1st Set of Respondents. Indeed, in the Reply Brief in question, the Appellants stated that: “The Respondents (meaning the 1st and 2nd Respondents) placed heavy reliance on the unreported judgement of the Supreme Court in CPC VS PDP SC.272/2011 …” I must however say that there is no portion in the Brief of Argument of the 1st Set of Respondents wherein they cited the case of CPC v. PDP (supra) and/or stated that they placed any reliance on the case, talk less of placing heavy reliance on the said case. The Appellants apparently filed their Reply Brief to the Brief of Argument of the 1st Set of Respondents for the fun of it without paying due attention to the said Respondents’ Brief. This is not good enough and is strongly condemned.
In their Reply Brief to the Brief of Argument of the 2nd Set of Respondents, the Appellants submitted to the effect that the instant case is totally different from the case of PDP v. CPC (supra) relied upon by the 2nd Set of Respondents in aid of their stance that the Tribunal was right in its ruling appealed against. It is the submission of the Appellants that when the word “shall” is used in a piece of legislation, it is necessary that the court should determine whether or not the word was used in a permissive, directory or obligatory sense. That having regard to the intention of the law makers as it relates to election petitions (and which is that they are to be speedily disposed of), the literal interpretation of the provision of Section 285(6) (supra) would result in injustice when the days of vacancy occasioned by the disbandment midstream of a Tribunal entertaining a Petition, (as was done in the instant case) was not taken into reckoning, in calculating the days stipulated for the determination of a Petition by the Tribunal. The Appellants said that if the literal principle of interpretation were to be applied to the provision of Section 285(6) (supra), it would mean that if there is a state of emergency in a State due to huge breakdown of law and order and proceedings before a Tribunal are suspended for one year, then all the pending Petitions would abate. The Appellants submitted that this is clearly not the intention of the lawmakers. Aside from this, the Appellants submitted to the effect that applying the literal principle of interpretation to the provision of Section 285(6) (supra) would mean that where the Court of Appeal orders a retrial before the Tribunal the retrial would have to abate after 180 days of filing of the Petition, a situation which is certainly absurd.
Recently, the Supreme Court while considering the interpretation to accord the provision of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended (hereafter simply referred to as “the amended Constitution”), also averted its mind to the provision of Section 285(6) thereof. This was in the case of PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) V.CONGRESS FOR PROGRESSIVE CHANGE (CPC) & ORS (2011) LPELR – SC.272/2011 (CON). At pages 4 – 5 of the Report, Onnoghen, JSC; delivering the lead ruling stated thus: –
“It is settled law that in interpreting a constitutional provision the court should adopt a broad approach to the process. Also settled is the principle that where the words of the constitution or statute are plain,
clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural, ordinary meanings as there is nothing, in effect to be interpreted. In that case, the words must be given their plain/natural meanings, as there is nothing to interpret.
It is also settled law that the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are supreme and have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that any other law which is inconsistent with its provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency as the constitutional provision must prevail over such Act/Law.
I have read over the provisions of Section 285(7) of the l999 Constitution (as amended) and have found the words used therein to be clear, unambiguous and simple and straight forward. I therefore hold that the words used herein are not subject to any interpretation at all they are to be given their natural meanings; that the natural meanings of the words are that appeal from a decision of an election tribunal or the Court of Appeal in an election matter shall be heard and determined within sixty (60) days from the date the judgment/decision appealed against was delivered, by the tribunal or Court of Appeal.
It is clear that by the use of the word “shall” in Section 285(7) in section of the 1999 constitution the framers of the constitution meant to make and did make the provision mandatory as it admits of no discretion whatsoever. It means that the sixty (60) days allotted in Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) cannot be extended even for one second as the decision of the appellate court must be rendered “within” sixty (60) days of the delivery of the judgment on appeal.
It is my further opinion that the sixty (60) days allotted in section 285(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) includes Saturdays, Sundays and Public holidays as well as court vacations because if it was the intention of the framers of the constitution to exclude these days they would have so stated in clear and unambiguous terms. The only exception may be where the last day of the sixty (60) days happens to be Sunday or a public holiday then the action contemplated in section 285(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) can be completed on the next working day as settled by a long line of authorities.
XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
On the aspect concerning application of court rules in computation of time with regards to periods of court vacation, I must say that rules of court have the status of subsidiary legislation far below constitutional provisions which sit at the apex of the hierarchy and consequently supreme.
Secondly, no court rules which are contrary to section 285(5), (6) and (7) can apply to election matters or be valid.
The sections enact as follows-
“(5) an election petition shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after the declaration of result of the elections;
(6) an election tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within one-hundred and eighty (180) days from the date of the filing of the petition;
(7) an appeal from a decision of an election tribunal or Court of Appeal in an election matter shall be heard and disposed (sic) date of the delivery of judgment of the tribunal or Court of Appeal”.
I hold the considered view that in terms of time to do anything relating to an election petition or judgment thereon or arising therefrom, it is the above provisions that apply and that no court has the power to extend the times as constitutionally provided in section 285(5) – (7) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), by interpretation of the sections or otherwise.”Suffice it to also say that all the other four learned Justices of the Supreme Court in the panel that decided the case under consideration were ad idem that the words of the provision of Section 285(7) being plain, clear and unambiguous are to be accorded their plain, and/or natural meanings.
In the light of the case of PDP V. CPC (supra) and particularly the portion set out above, it is my considered view that the words of Section 285(6) of the amended Constitution being plain, clear and unambiguous like those of Section 285(7) (supra) must equally be accorded their ordinary or natural meanings. The stance of the Appellants that the provision of Section 285(6) ought to be accorded a broad approach in order that the period when the Tribunal was disbanded should be accommodated in the computation of the 180 days stipulated for the determination of the Petition from the date it was filed, has no legal basis inasmuch as the said stance runs contrary to the position taken by the Supreme Court in the PDP V CPC case (supra) that no court has the power to extend the times as constitutionally provided in Section 285(5) (7) of the amended Constitution by interpretation or otherwise. Indeed, it is unimaginable that the period when the Tribunal was disbanded can properly be taken into consideration in calculating or discounted from the 180 days stipulated for the determination of the Petition from the date it was filed, when the Supreme Court had made it clear that the period when courts are on vacation cannot be discounted from the terms of time to do anything relating to an election petition or judgment thereon or arising therefrom.
It is clear from page 565 of the record of proceedings that the Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court case of PDP V. CPC (supra) in striking out the Petition on 25/11/2011 on the ground that it had lapsed since 23/11/2011. In this regard the Tribunal stated thus: –
“The cases from S.C. recently, CPC VS PDP, for which has become notorious ground, and direct in the issues presented by this very petition and for which we state that from the date of filing of this petition 27/5/2011, to 25/11/2011, it is over 180 days at as (sic) today. The petition lapsed since 23/11/2011;
The Tribunal given the portion of the ruling quoted above clearly portrayed itself as having calculated the 180 days stipulated by Section 285(6) (supra) for the determination of the Petition from the actual date it was filed. The Appellants from their submissions that had been highlighted hereinbefore, are however of the view that the Tribunal ought to have computed the 180 days constitutionally stipulated for the determination of the Petition which was filed on 27/5/2011 from 28/5/2011 as the date of filing the Petition is traditionally discounted by the operation of the Interpretation Act. I cannot but say that the submission of the Appellants in this regard clearly runs contrary to the settled position of the law as this Court has consistently pronounced in recent times; concerning computation of time when the word “from” is used in a statutory provision against the backdrop of the fundamental canon of interpretation that clear and unambiguous provisions of a statute should be given their literal grammatical meanings. In this regard see: –
1. OLANIYI V. SOJI (2010) All FWLR (PT.551) 1576 where this Court stated that the meaning to be accorded the word “from” is “starting at a particular time and also indicates starting from a point in place or time”.
2. KUMALIA V. SHERIFF (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 521) 1497, where this court having stated to the effect that the courts must adopt the literal and plain ordinary meaning, where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous and that the courts in such situations are precluded from resorting to any aid or other canon of interpretation, held that time within which to present an election petition (as stipulated by Section 141 of the 2000 Electoral Act) started to run on the day the result was declared and not the following day.
3. UMARU & ANOR. V. ALIYU & ORS. (2010) All FWLR (Pt.508) 329 where this Court in interpreting Section 141 of the 2006 Electoral Act, against the backdrop of the clear and unambiguous words of the said Section held amongst others to the effect that there was no need of resorting to the Interpretation Act or the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules.To the extent that the words of Section 285(6) (supra) as hereinbefore stated are plain, clear and unambiguous, it is therefore my considered view that the calculation or computation of the 180 days stipulated for the determination of the Petition having regard to the words “from the date of the filing of the petition” used therein (i.e. Section 285(6), commenced on 27/5/2011 and not 28/5/2011 as contended by the Appellants. This being the case, the time within which the Tribunal ought to have disposed of the Petition actually ended on Tuesday, the 22nd day of November, 2011 and not 27/11/2011 as contended by the Appellants in their Brief of Argument. It must always be borne in mind that it is when the date the period ends falls on a public holiday or a Sunday that the Petition could be disposed of on the next working day.
22/11/2011 was not a Sunday, but it may be that it was a public holiday, hence the conclusion of the Tribunal that the 180 days lapsed or expired on 23/11/2011. Parties did not address this issue in their respective Briefs of Argument. In the circumstance, the conclusion of the Tribunal that the Petition lapsed or expired on 23/11/2011 cannot properly be disturbed.
In any event, whether the Petition actually lapsed or expired on 22/11/2011 or 23/11/2011 as found by the Tribunal, it is incontrovertible that as at 25/11/2011 when the Tribunal struck out the Petition, the constitutionally stipulated time or period of 180 days for its determination from 27/5/2011 when it was filed had expired or lapsed. This being the case, there was actually nothing left for the Tribunal to have done on 25/11/2011 except to have struck out the Petition.
I am aware of the submissions made by the Appellants concerning the injustice that could attend a Petition if the literal approach of interpretation is accorded the provision of Section 285(6) (supra). All I can say is that the illustrations presented by the Appellants are nothing more than hypothetical situations that do not call for consideration having regard to the peculiar facts of the instant case. Courts are enjoined to dwell on live issues in dispute in matters before them. Courts are not to engage in dwelling on speculations or offering legal advice/opinion on topical issues.
From all that has been said above, the Issue for determination in this appeal is accordingly resolved in the affirmative inasmuch as the decision of the Tribunal that the Petition which was filed on 27/5/2011 had expired as at 25/11/2011 when it was struck out is right. The Issue for determination having been resolved in the affirmative, the appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.
The decision of the Tribunal in its ruling on 25/11/2011 in not proceeding further with the hearing of the Petition as the same had expired since 23/11/2011 is upheld.
I make no order as to costs.