LawCare Nigeria

Nigeria Legal Information & Law Reports

ZENITH BANK v. IYAMU (2021)

ZENITH BANK v. IYAMU

(2021)LCN/15852(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(BENIN JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, May 05, 2021

CA/B/284/2013

Before Our Lordships:

Joseph Eyo Ekanem Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abimbola Osarugue Obaseki-Adejumo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Balkisu Bello Aliyu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

NOSA DAVIS IYAMU RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO:

WHAT IS FALSE IMPRISONMENT?

The complaint of appellant boils down to this; that the learned trial Judge did not use the phrase “false imprisonment” in awarding damages but used the phrase “unlawful arrest and detention”. I think, with all due respect, that appellant’s counsel, as rightly argued by respondent’s counsel, is engaged in semantics which have no utilitarian value in a Court room. In Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 13th Ed. P.681, it is stated that:
“A false imprisonment is complete deprivation of liberty for any time, however short, without lawful excuse. “Imprisonment” is no other thing but the restraint of a man’s liberty… “
​In Kodilinye and Aluko’s, The Nigerian Law of Torts (1999) 2nd Ed. Page 14, it is opined that:
“False normally means “fallacious” or “Untrue” but in this tort it means merely “wrongful” or “Unlawful.”
It is clear from the foregoing that in the context of the tort of false imprisonment, “false” means “wrongful” or “unlawful” while “imprisonment” is the restraint of a man’s liberty. Thus if one is “falsely imprisoned” it can be said that he is “Unlawfully detained” and as in “unlawful detention”. Again once a man is arrested, he is by that act imprisoned though it be in an open field. Therefore the term “false imprisonment” can for all practical purposes be used interchangeably with “unlawful arrest and detention.” PER JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A.

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Edo State, holden at Benin City (the trial Court) delivered on 29/1/2010 in Suit No. B/451/03 by M. O. IGHODALO, J. In the judgment, the trial Court found the appellant liable to the respondent for unlawful arrest and detention, for which it awarded the sum of N300,000.00 as damages in respondent’s favour. It dismissed the respondent’s claim for slander.

Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant appealed against the same to this Court by means of a notice of appeal filed on 2/2/2012. With leave of Court granted on 25/2/2019, the appellant finally filed a further amended notice of appeal. The respondent on his part filed a notice of appeal complaining against the dismissal of his claim for defamation and the quantum of damages awarded.

The facts of the case leading to this appeal are that sometime in June, 2003, one Aigbe Nosa Michael made a fraudulent withdrawal of N63,000.00 from the account of Benpet Petroleum Ltd with the Ikpoba Hill, Benin City Branch of the appellant, a bank. Upon the discovery of the fraud, the matter was reported to the Police and the identification particulars of the culprit were forwarded to the Police. The address that he wrote down was No. 74 Ogiso Street, Off Murtala Mohammed Way, Benin City.

On 18/6/2003, on the direction of the Manager of the said branch of the appellant, Mr. Isaac Osai (the Chief Security Officer of the branch) along with Mr. Patrick Ozodobi (the Cash Officer) drove two Policemen assigned by the Police to 74 Ogiso Street, Benin City. They stopped at a point and Mr. Osai proceeded to the gate of the house which he knocked and out came the respondent. According to the respondent, the visitor told him that he was looking for “Nosa”, and he answered that he was Nosa. He again inquired if that was No. 74 to which he (respondent) said “Yes”. The case of the appellant was that, Mr. Osai told the respondent that he was looking for “Aigbe Nosa Michael” for whom he had a parcel and the respondent identified himself as Aigbe Nosa Michael. Mr. Osai left and returned with the Policemen whom he asked to arrest the respondent. He was arrested, handcuffed and walked down to the car while he was in his boxers (inner pants) only and was taken to the Police station.

At the Police station, the respondent, on being told why he was arrested, stated that he is not Nosa Michael Aigbe but Nosa Davies Iyamu. The real Nosa Michael Aigbe who fraudulently withdrew the money was brought to the Police Station and he narrated how he did the deed. The respondent was released the next day. It was the case of the respondent that he demanded, inter alia, for apology from the appellant but to no avail. The respondent therefore took out a writ of summons at the trial Court endorsed with a statement of claim, claiming:
“Twenty million naira general damages for false imprisonment against the appellant and defamation”

The appellant filed a statement of defence, denying the claim of the respondent.
The matter proceeded to trial, at which the respondent testified through five witnesses while the appellant testified through two witnesses and tendered one exhibit, Exhibit “A”, the cheque by which the withdrawal was done. The trial Court took addresses and in a considered judgment found in favour of the respondent as I have already stated.

The appellant filed an amended brief of argument on 2/11/2018 which was deemed duly filed and served on 25/2/2019. It also filed a reply brief of argument on 3/6/2019 which was deemed duly filed and served on 17/2/2021. The respondent filed his brief of argument on 4/3/2019.

It needs be mentioned that pursuant to his notice of appeal which I had earlier mentioned, the respondent filed a cross-appellant’s brief on 2/5/2018. The appellant, in turn filed a cross-respondent’s brief of argument on 2/11/2018. The same was deemed duly filed and served on 25/2/2019. I intend to treat the cross-appeal after dealing with the appeal.

At the hearing of the appeal on 17/2/2021, Mrs. I. C. Okpara for appellant/cross-respondent adopted and relied on the briefs of argument filed on its behalf in urging the Court to allow the appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal.

O. I. Osarenkhoe, Esq for respondent/cross-appellant adopted and relied on the brief of argument filed on his behalf in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal and allow the cross-appeal.

In the appellant’s amended brief of argument, the following issues have been distilled for the determination of the appeal:
“1. Whether the trail (sic) Judge was right in awarding the sum of N300,000.00 (Three hundred thousand naira) only, against the Appellant as damages for a relief not specifically asked for by the Respondent.
2. Whether the learned trail (sic) Judge was right in awarding damages against the Appellant for reporting a crime to Police.
3. Whether the learned trail (sic) Judge properly evaluated the evidence in this suit warranting him to enter judgment in favour of the Respondent at all.”

Respondent’s counsel by implication adopted the said issues for determination.

Let me pause here to look closely at issue 2 above. It is formulated from grounds (ii) of the further amended notice of appeal. It questions whether the learned trial Judge was right in awarding damages against the appellant “for reporting a crime to Police”. I have read the judgment of the learned trial Judge. I have not found any part of the judgment in which his lordship held the appellant liable and awarded damages against it for reporting a crime to the Police. That by itself would not ground a case of false imprisonment. Rather it is clear from the said judgment that the learned trial Judge held the appellant vicariously liable for the acts of its servant in being actively instrumental in setting the law in motion leading to the arrest and detention of the respondent. It was not the report of the crime that informed the judgment of the learned trial Judge but the part that a servant of the appellant played in the arrest and detention of the respondent. There is a world of difference between the two. While every citizen has a civic duty to report a crime to the Police (see FAJEMIROKUN v. COMMERCIAL BANK (CREDIT LYONNAIS) NIG LTD (2009) 5 NWLR (PT. 1135) 588) no citizen is allowed by the law to instigate the unlawful arrest of another person by being actively instrumental in setting the law in motion against the person. See OKONKWO v. OGBOGU (1996) 37 LRCN 580.

What I am trying to say is that the ground of appeal and issue 2 distilled therefrom do not arise from the decision of the trial Court the subject of this appeal. There cannot be an appeal against what was not decided by a trial Court. Where the factual basis for attacking a judgment is false or non-existent, the ground of appeal founded on the fictitious or misleading premise is incompetent and so also is the issue distilled therefrom. To put it in another way, a ground of appeal that is not founded on the judgment appealed against but which is based on an erroneous impression of the judgment is incompetent. An issue distilled therefrom is also incompetent. See IKARE COMMUNITY BANK (NIG) LTD v. ADEMUWAGUN (2005) 7 NWLR (PT. 924) 275, 288 and SPLINTERS NIGERIA LTD v. OASIS FINANCE LTD (2013) 18 NWLR (PT. 1385) 188, 272.
The reason is that a ground of appeal must flow, arise from or relate to the judgment appealed against and in particular the ratio of the judgment. Where that is not the case, the ground and any issue raised therefrom cannot be legitimately entertained by the Court – ORGAN v. NLNG LTD (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1381) 506, 532 – 533, OLONADE v. SOWEMIMO (2014) 4 NWLR (PT. 1428) 472, 491 and JIBRIN v. FRN (2020) 4 NWLR (PT. 1714) 315.

Consequent upon the foregoing, I hereby strike out ground (ii) of the amended notice of appeal and issue 2 distilled from it for being incompetent.

What is left now are issues 1 and 3 upon which this appeal shall be determined.
ISSUE 1
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in awarding the sum of N300,000.00 (Three hundred thousand naira) only, against the appellant as damages for a relief not specifically asked for by the respondent.

Appellant’s counsel stated that the respondent claimed only as damages for false imprisonment and defamation, but the learned trial Judge entered judgment in the sum of N300,000.00 for unlawful arrest and detention. He argued that the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction to award to the respondent damages for a claim that he did not ask for. He went on to argue that the trial Court lacked the power to make an award for damages in respect of a claim that is incurably defective. He noted that the respondent claimed N20,000,000.00 for false imprisonment and detention which are two tortious acts which cannot be united in one claim. He added that the quantum of damages for false imprisonment is not the same as that of defamation.

Let me pause at this point to state that issue 1 as crafted by appellant’s counsel does not cover the argument of counsel as to lumping two tortious acts under one claim. The issue focuses on award of damages for a relief not specifically claimed and does not cover the argument on lumping two different heads of tort together in one claim. In ZABUSKY v. ISRAELI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (2008) 2 NWLR (PT. 1070) 109, 131, it was held that any point which is outside the scope of the issue that is being argued is incompetent and is liable to be struck out. On this account I hereby strike out the argument of appellant’s counsel on the lumping together of two heads of tort.

Respondent’s counsel contended that appellant’s counsel is only seeing a semantic or terminological difference between “Unlawful arrest and detention” and “false imprisonment” without pointing out the differentiating features between the two. He referred to Clerk and Lindsell on Tort, 13th Ed, Page 681, Kodilinye and Aluko’s, The Nigerian Law of Tort, the Black’s Law Dictionary and Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary and noted that at the trial Court both parties used the phrase “false imprisonment” almost interchangeably with “Unlawful arrest and detention”. He referred to issue 1 raised by appellant’s counsel at the trial Court and submitted that the test of false imprisonment is Unlawful arrest. He added that if the arrest is found to be unlawful, then it is false imprisonment. He posited that there is no fundamental legal difference between “false imprisonment” and “unlawful arrest and detention”

RESOLUTION
The respondent claimed:
“Twenty million naira for False Imprisonment and Detention”

The learned trial Judge after analyzing evidence on both sides stated that:
“I hold the defendant liable to the plaintiff for the unlawful arrest and detention and for which I award the sum of N300,000.00 (Three hundred thousand naira).”

The complaint of appellant boils down to this; that the learned trial Judge did not use the phrase “false imprisonment” in awarding damages but used the phrase “unlawful arrest and detention”. I think, with all due respect, that appellant’s counsel, as rightly argued by respondent’s counsel, is engaged in semantics which have no utilitarian value in a Court room. In Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 13th Ed. P.681, it is stated that:
“A false imprisonment is complete deprivation of liberty for any time, however short, without lawful excuse. “Imprisonment” is no other thing but the restraint of a man’s liberty… ”
​In Kodilinye and Aluko’s, The Nigerian Law of Torts (1999) 2nd Ed. Page 14, it is opined that:
“False normally means “fallacious” or “Untrue” but in this tort it means merely “wrongful” or “Unlawful.”
It is clear from the foregoing that in the context of the tort of false imprisonment, “false” means “wrongful” or “unlawful” while “imprisonment” is the restraint of a man’s liberty. Thus if one is “falsely imprisoned” it can be said that he is “Unlawfully detained” and as in “unlawful detention”. Again once a man is arrested, he is by that act imprisoned though it be in an open field. Therefore the term “false imprisonment” can for all practical purposes be used interchangeably with “unlawful arrest and detention.”

Appellant’s counsel was fully aware of the position above when in his address at the trial Court, he formulated as his issue (1) the following:-
“(1) Whether the arrest of the Plaintiff by the Police upon the report made by the Defendant was unlawful and therefore amounted to false imprisonment.”

His contention in this Court seems to be a volte-face from the above.
I therefore resolve issue 1 against the appellant.

ISSUE 3
Whether the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence in this suit warranting him to enter judgment in favour of the respondent at all.

Appellant’s counsel referred to a portion of the judgment of the trial Court and submitted that the basis upon which it chose to prefer the evidence of the respondent rather than that of the appellant is speculative and is based on sentiment.

Respondent’s counsel argued that the contention of appellant’s counsel is oblivious of the evidence of the respondent. It was further argued that the reasons given by the trial Court for preferring the evidence of the respondent is cogent, logical, convincing and is supported by evidence on record.

RESOLUTION
The responsibility of evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value to it is primarily within the province of the trial Court. Where the trial Court has not only assessed and given value to the evidence at its disposal, leaving no one in doubt as to how and why in arriving at its conclusion, it preferred the evidence of the respondent to that of the appellant, it is not the function of an appellate Court to set in and re-evaluate the evidence as evaluation has already been properly done. An appellate Court will however interfere where a finding of the trial Court is perverse. See MOGAJI v. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SCI and OKALA v. UDEH (2019) 9 NWLR (PT. 1678) 562.

The parties were on common ground in respect of the arrest and detention of the appellant including the circumstances of his arrest. The only point of fundamental difference as I have already stated in this judgment is that the respondent’s case was that Mr. Osai, a servant of the appellant stated that he was looking for “Nosa”. On the other hand the case of the appellant was that Mr. Osai said he was looking for “Aigbe Nosa Michael”.

The trial Court preferred the case of the respondent stating at pages 95 – 96 of the record of appeal as follows:
“I however prefer the version as pleaded and proved in evidence by the plaintiff for the following reasons: There is evidence that the plaintiff is a graduate who was waiting for his call up letter for the National Youth Service to the country at the time of this incident and so it can be safely presumed that plaintiff is an enlightened person. The DW1 sought in his evidence to convince the Court to believe that it was the lie he told the plaintiff about a certain parcel waiting to be collected by the said Nosa Aigbe Michael that lured the plaintiff to claim that he was Nosa Aigbe Michael but I do not believe him because the Plaintiff was in a position to know that he would be required to properly identify himself by producing his passport, driving licence or national identity card or other document authenticating his true identity before the courier company would release any parcel to him. And not merely by his verbally saying that he is Nosa Aigbe Michael and the parcel would be delivered to him”

The respondent had indeed testified that he had just completed his HIV (sic) programme and was waiting for his call up letter for NYSC (National Youth Service Corps). Section 167 of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides that:
“The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relationship to the facts of the particular case…”

The trial Court was therefore entitled to arrive at the conclusion that it did based on the provision above.

Furthermore, the trial Court gave a second reason for preferring the evidence of the respondent to that of the appellant at pages 96 — 97 of the record of appeal. The appellant has not complained about the reason and so even if the first reason given by the trial Court were to be reversed, the second reason would still sustain the finding.

The point that arose for determination, as rightly pointed out by the learned trial Judge, threw up a case of oath against oath. The Supreme Court stated the position of the law in such a situation thus in CHITRA KNITTING AND WEAVING MANUFACTURING COMPANY LTD v. AKINGBADE (2016) 15 NWLR (PT. 1533) 487, 510:
“It is a case of the oath of the plaintiff against that of the defendant and the Court must of necessity believe one against the other. In the circumstance, the law is settled that it is the duty of the trial Court which heard the witnesses testify that is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies and assign probative value thereto”

I see no reason to interfere with the trial Court’s evaluation. The only finding of the trial Court which the appellant attacked in his argument of issue 3 is what I have just dealt with. There is no complaint therein about other findings. I shall stop where the appellant has stopped. This is because it is the duty of an appellant who relies on improper evaluation of evidence to set aside a decision of the lower Court to identify the improperly evaluated evidence and to show that if the error he alleges is corrected, the conclusion reached by the lower Court will not only be different but also in his favour – OKPA v. STATE (2017) 5 NWLR (PT. 1587) 1, 27.

In the light of the foregoing, I enter an affirmative answer to issue 3 and resolve it against the appellant.

On the whole, I come to the conclusion that the appeal has no merit. It fails and I accordingly dismiss it. I affirm the judgment of the trial Court.
I assess the costs of this appeal at N200,000.00 in favour of the respondent.

CROSS-APPEAL
The issues that arise for determination in the cross-appeal are:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing cross-appellant’s claim for defamation.
2. Whether having regard to the evidence and circumstances of this appeal, including the remorseless conduct of the cross-respondent, the sum of N300,000.00 as general damages for the false imprisonment of the cross-appellant at the instance of the appellant, was not inadequate.

Cross-appellant’s counsel submitted that the claim of the cross-appellant was for defamation and not for slander simpliciter. He added that he (cross-appellant) relied on both slander and libel, to wit: the spoken words of DW1 and DW2 and the handcuffs which cross-respondent caused PW 2 to put on the hands of the cross-appellant. He referred to the evidence of PW4 as to seeing cross-appellant in handcuff. He referred to Clerk and Lindsell on Torts and Kodilinye and Aluko’s The Nigerian Law of Torts as well as Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Bendel State as applicable to Edo State. He stated that the handcuff of the respondent (sic: cross-appellant) by the cross-appellant (sic: cross-respondent) was not with the order of Court, Magistrate or Justice of the Peace, neither was it justifiable on any of the grounds prescribed by the relevant laws.

Counsel contended that the view of the trial Court that conduct alone without spoken words cannot constitute slander is erroneous. He referred to several authorities including JEFFERIES v. DUNCOMBE (1809) 11 EAST 227. Counsel argued that contrary to the holding of the trial Court, the PW4 formed the opinion that the cross-appellant was an armed robber when he saw him in handcuffs. He went on to argue that since the defence of bare denial and justification raised by the cross-respondent had failed, the trial Court ought to have held it liable for defamation.

In respect of issue 2 counsel argued that the trial Court did not demonstrate in its judgment how it arrived at the sum of N300,000.00 awarded by it. He contended that where a trial Court fails to make assessment of damages on very clear principles predicated on evidence before it, an appellate Court can do so if evidence exists on record for it to do so. He noted, inter alia, that the cross-respondent refused to offer apology though demanded. He therefore urged the Court to interfere with the damages awarded.

Cross-respondent’s counsel argued that there was no evidence on record to warrant the trial Court making a finding of defamation, whether slander or libel in favour of the cross-appellant. He submitted that for an act to be held as libelous, it must be in printed form. He referred to Clerk and Lindsell on Tort 13th Ed Page 1661. He submitted that the fact that cross-appellant was seen in handcuffs by the PW4 is not publication as envisaged in the law of defamation. He stated that there was no evidence that the cross-respondent told PW4 that the cross-appellant was an armed robber.

In respect of issue 2, counsel submitted that the trial Court painstakingly evaluated evidence before reaching a conclusion on the quantum of damages. He urged the Court not to interfere with the award.

RESOLUTION
The learned trial Judge dismissed the case of the cross-appellant in respect of defamation on the basis that:
(1) No matter how a particular action or behaviour may appear, the conduct alone (in this instance parading the cross-appellant in handcuffs and pants down his street to the waiting car) without words cannot constitute slander.
(2) The station officer in whose presence slanderous words relating to the cross-appellant were spoken or any other person present at the Police Station was not called as a witness.

In respect of the first reason, it is correct, as rightly argued by cross-appellant’s counsel, that the case of the cross-appellant was for defamation. Defamation has been defined as:
“Any imputation which may tend “to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally”. – LORD ATKIN in SIM v. STRETCH (1936) 52 T. L. R. 761 and ORUWARI v. OSLER (2013) 5 NWLR (PT. 1348) 535, 556.
Defamation encompasses libel and slander. The difference between the two was explained in ORUWARI v. OSLER supra by Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC, as follows:
“It is trite that slander on the other hand has been defined as a false and defamatory statement (i.e of a transient nature) made or conveyed by spoken words, sounds, looks, signs and gestures or in some other non-permanent form (as against libel which is required to be in some permanent form) published of and concerning the plaintiff, that is to a person other than the plaintiff without any legal justification or excuse whereby the plaintiff has suffered special damages”
​In other words, if the publication is made in a permanent form or is broadcast or is part of a theatrical performance, the matter published is a libel; if in some fugitive form (i.e. fleeting or lasting only for a short time), it is slander. See Gatley’s Libel and Slander 7th Edition Page 4 Par. 3. From the facts of this matter, it is clear that the publication was in fugitive form and therefore was slander as the trial Court rightly held.

I do not however agree with the trial Court that conduct alone without words cannot constitute slander. In Gatley on Libel and Slander supra. Page 42 par. 85, it is stated thus:
“Sometimes a mere act may convey a defamatory imputation, if it would be so understood by reason of a conventional meaning, e.g. hissing at a theatre, or by reason of the inference to be drawn from it, whether by the ordinary man, or by some person with special knowledge to whom it was published. Thus it has been held defamatory to place a lamp in front of a person’s house, to signify that it was a brothel, or to burn him in effigy.”
Section 2 (1) of the Defamation Law of Bendel State, now applicable to Edo State defines “Words” as:
“Any reference in this Law to Words shall be construed as including a reference to pictures, visual images, gestures and other methods of signifying meaning.”
Thus there could be defamation without words.

It is common ground that the cross-appellant was arrested by the Police, handcuffed and walked the distance of 100 meters in his pants to the Police car in the sight of his neighbours including the PW4. Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 49, Vol. 11, Laws of Bendel State 1976, now applicable in Edo State provides that:
“A person arrested shall not be handcuffed, otherwise bound or be subjected to unnecessary restraint except by order of Court, a magistrate or justice of the peace or unless there is reasonable apprehension of violence or of an attempt to escape or unless the restraint is considered necessary for the safety of the person arrested.”

This provision, perhaps, is in recognition of the humiliation in the Nigerian Context of being handcuffed and the imputation of Criminality that it carries. The PW4 testified on this and his evidence was not discredited in this regard.

There seems to be a hitch, however, in the case of the cross-appellant. The act of handcuffing the cross-appellant and parading him down his street in pants was the act of the Police. It was not pleaded nor given in evidence by the cross-appellant that it was the cross-respondent’s servant who instructed or instigated the Police to hand-cuff the appellant though cross-appellant’s counsel said so in his argument. His submission cannot take the place of evidence. Certainly, the DW1 acting as the agent of the cross-respondent instigated the arrest of the cross-appellant; but there is no evidence that he caused the Police to treat the cross-appellant as they did. There is no direct evidence on this point and there is also no evidence from which it could be inferred that he instigated the Police to do so. The cross-respondent cannot be held liable for the decision of the Police in this regard.

Furthermore, the cross-appellant testified that at the Police Station, the DW1 and DW2 called him “thief”, “Criminal” and “Armed robber” etc; and that they told the station officer that he withdrew money with a forged cheque. The trial Court rightly held that the tort of slander was not proved since the station officer and others who heard the alleged defamatory statement were not called as witnesses. In a case of slander, as in this instance, it is necessary to call as a witness the person(s) to whom the defamatory words were published. This is, inter alia, to prove publication, without which the action fails. Again, a report or statement made to the Police cannot constitute defamation.

I therefore enter an affirmative answer to issue 1 of the cross-appeal and resolve it against the cross-appellant.

ISSUE 2
Whether having regard to the evidence and circumstances of this appeal, including the remorseless conduct of the cross-respondent, the sum of N300,000.00 as general damages for the false imprisonment of the cross-appellant at the instance of the appellant was not inadequate.

An appellate Court ought not to upset an award of damages merely because if it had tried the matter it would have awarded a higher or lesser amount. An appellate Court can however interfere with an award of damages when the award is manifestly too high or too low as to make it an erroneous estimate of the damages, or when the award is based on wrong principles of law or is not supported by evidence. See ZIK PRESS LTD v. ALVAN IKOKU (1951) 13 WACA 188, WILLIAMS v. DAILY TIMES OF NIG LTD (1990) 1 NWLR (PT. 124) 1 and ACB v. APUGO (2001) 1 MJSC 1.

The trial Court did not give any reason for the award of N300,000.00 damages for false imprisonment. It is not enough for a Court to simply award damages in a suit where damages are recoverable without giving any reason as to how it arrived at what amounted to reasonable damages – ADIM v. NIGERIAN BOTTLING COMPANY LTD (2010) 9 NWLR (PT. 1200) 543 565. This however will not automatically lead to the Court interfering with the award. The sum of N300,000.00 was awarded as damages for false imprisonment in the year 2010. I do not think that this was manifestly too low. I cannot use the standard of the current year (2021) to assess the award that was made in 2010. I therefore see no reason to interfere with the award by the trial Court.

I therefore enter a negative answer to issue 2 of the cross-appeal and resolve it against the cross-appellant.
On the whole, I find that the cross-appeal lacks merit and it therefore fails. I accordingly dismiss the same.
The parties to the cross-appeal shall bear their costs.

ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of reading in advance the draft copy of the judgment just rendered by my learned brother JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, JCA.

I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appellate Court will only interfere with a judgment and award of a lower Court where the finding/judgment is perverse or has occasioned a miscarriage of justice; TEC ENGINEERING CO. (NIG) LTD & ANOR v SALISU (2018) LPELR – 46654 (CA); EGBEBU v IZEJIOBI & ANOR (2017) LPELR – 42285 (CA); CBN & ORS v OKOJIE (2015) LPELR – 24740 (SC); UBN PLC v CHIMAEZE (2014) LPELR – 22699 (SC).

Consequently, the appeal(s) is (are) void of merit and accordingly dismissed.
The judgment of the High Court of Edo State per M. O. IGHODALO, J delivered on 29th January, 2010 is hereby affirmed.

I abide by all other consequential orders in the lead judgment(s).

BALKISU BELLO ALIYU,  J.C.A.: My learned brother, Joseph Eyo Ekanem, JCA has availed me with draft of the judgment just delivered. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion reached on the main appeal that it lacks merit and deserves a dismissal. I join him to dismiss the appeal and I abide by the order of cost made therein.

I also agree that the cross appeal lacks merit and I too dismiss it with no cost awarded.

Appearances:

Mrs. I. C. Okpara For Appellant(s)

O. I. Osarenkhoe, Esq. For Respondent(s)