YUSUF v. STATE
(2021)LCN/15916(CA)
In the Court of Appeal
(SOKOTO JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, December 16, 2021
CA/S/29C/2018
Before Our Lordships:
Saidu Tanko Hussaini Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
SIRAJO YUSUF (ALIAS BORANKO) APPELANT(S)
And
THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
THE PROCEDURE FOR TRIAL WITHIN TRIAL
In the procedure for trial within trial, it is the prosecution who must first lead evidence of witnesses so as to demonstrate the voluntariness of the statement ascribed to the accused person: Ebhomien & Ors. Vs. the Queen (1963) All NLR 371. This is so because the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the voluntariness of the statement, to prove it. The standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See R.V. Isaac Ajia (1960). WNLR 196, 198. Balogun vs. Attorney General of Federation (1994) 5 NWLR (pt. 345) 442, 458. Section 135 Evidence Act refers. SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A.
THE DEFINITION OF CONFESSION HAS DEFINED IN THE EVIDENCE ACT
The word or term “Confession” has been defined in the Evidence Act at Section 28 to mean:
“An admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime” see: A confession is relevant if proved or shown that the elements which constitute the offence in which the accused was charged were present and it identifies with that accused person, provided that the statement was not rendered inadmissible on account of some disqualifying elements or circumstances surrounding the making of that statement. Refer to Section 29 (2) (5) Evidence Act and the decision in Rabiu vs. State (supra). Amadi vs. Nwosu (1992) 5 NWLR (pt. 241) 273, Oforlete v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 681) 415, 436. The State vs. Oladele (1969), NWLR 210; Namsoh vs. The State (1993) 6 SCNJ 55. SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A.
THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
A confessional statement is proved to have been made voluntarily when at the point of tendering the confessional statement, there is no objection from the accused as to the voluntariness of the statement. See Gbenga Stephen vs. the State (2013) LPELR 20178 (SC). Similarly, where objection was taken at the time of tendering of the statement, the evidence of the prosecuting witness in the trial within trial that ensued on the voluntariness of the statement, was not challenged, discredited or controverted by the opposite party in his evidence under cross-examination, that statement would be taken as the confessional statement of the accused person. In that case, the statement is admissible as the voluntary confessional statement of the accused person. SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A.
THE METHODS A PROSECUTION IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS FUNCTION CAN PROVE HIS CASE
The prosecution in the discharge of his function can choose to prove his case by any of the three methods for establishing a crime or combination of two (2) more of them, namely:
(i) Proof by direct eye witness account of the event.
(ii) Proof by reliance on the confessional statement of the accused person.
(iii) Proof by circumstantial evidence. See: Akinsuwa vs. State (2019) LPELR–47621 (SC) pages 23-25. Agboola vs. State (2013) LPELR (20652) (SC). SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A.
THE ISSUE AND EFFECT OF A RETRACTED CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
Permit me to observe here and for the purpose of argument, whether strictly speaking, the issue of a retracted statement and the procedures that go along with it are any longer necessary and relevant where as in this case, only the voluntariness of the confessional statement was challenged.
Where a confessional statement was challenged on account of same not being the voluntary statement of the accused person, the accused person or the person taking the objection is merely speaking his mind that the statement was taken under duress notwithstanding that the accused appended his signature or mark to the statement. That signature or mark is inconsequential once the statement is proved to have been obtained under duress.
Where on the other hand an accused person retracted or resiled from the statement ascribed to him, the impression he gives by that conduct is that he (the accused) has nothing to do with that statement or better still that he is not the maker of the statement. It follows therefore in any view, that the two situations outlined above cannot go together in the same case, at the same time, in respect of the same accused person. I do not think that an accused person can have recourse to those defences (if I may say so) at the same time. Where as in this case, the bone of contention is the voluntariness or otherwise of the statement credited to the accused person, the finding by the Court at the end of the proceedings in trial within trial stating that the statement of the accused was the direct free and voluntary confessional statement of the accused person, should in my view foreclose any further duty on the part of the trial Court to consider and address issues of retracted statement on the part of the accused person. SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A.
SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death on three count charge of Conspiracy Abetment and Culpable Homicide punishable under Sections 97 (1) 85 and 22(b) of the Penal Code vide the judgment delivered at the High Court of Justice of Sokoto State on the 28th September, 2012. The appellant is one of the three accused persons who stood trial at that Court and at the end of proceedings, the three of them were found guilty, convicted and sentenced accordingly.
The salient facts leading to this case can be summarised as follows:-
The appellant and six other persons were alleged to have gone to the house of Mukhtar Garba of Shagon Goro to attack and kill him. It was alleged that the assailants split themselves into two groups comprising of the group who sneaked into the room where their victim was found and slaughtered him. The second group stood guard outside the building while operation was taking, place inside. The appellant belong to this second group. The arrest of the appellant was made much later and he was arraigned along with other accused persons.
At the end of the proceedings, the High Court of Sokoto State found the accused persons guilty of the offences charged.
The appellant has appealed to this Court vide the Notice of Appeal dated the 21st December, 2012. By leave of Court granted, the said Notice of Appeal was amended in terms of the Amended Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th February, 2021, in which is incorporated, five (5) grounds of appeal. Without stating the particulars, the grounds of appeal can be reproduced as below:
Ground One
The decision is altogether unreasonable, unwarranted in law having regards to the charge and evidence adduced at the trial.
Ground Two
The Court below erred in law when in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offences contrary to Section 97(1) 85 and 221 (b) of the Penal Code, it refused to consider the violation of the appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of his offence promptly and ground the conviction and sentence the appellant which has occasioned miscarriage of justice.
Ground Three
The Court below erred in law when in convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offences contrary to Section 97(1) of the Penal Code, where it refuses to expunge Exhibits A, A1, E, F, and G, as inadmissible document from its record, holding that there are other facts that corroborated the Exhibits and using same to ground the conviction and sentence the appellant and has occasion miscarriage of justice.
Ground Four
The Court below erred in law when in convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offences contrary to Section 97(1) 85 and 221 (b) of the Penal Code, where it refuses to resolve doubts in favour of the Appellant thereby ground the conviction and sentence the Appellant which has occasion miscarriage of justice.
Ground Five
The Court below erred in law when in convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offences contrary to Section 97 (1), 85 and 221 (b) of the Penal Code, where it refused to pronounce statutorily sentence to the hearing of the Appellant which ground the conviction and sentence the Appellant and has violated the law thereby occasioned Miscarriage of justice.
On the 19th February, 2018, the Record of Appeal was transmitted to this Court and same was deemed on 8th April, 2019. Subsequent to that, the appellant and the respondent respectively filed and exchanged their briefs of argument. appellant’s brief of argument filed on the 15th February, 2021 was deemed on the 7th July, 2021. The brief of argument for the respondent was filed on the 5th August, 2021.
The appellant in his brief of argument has identified two (2) issues for the determination of Court thus:-
(i) Whether from the totality of the evidence placed before the trial Court, the Respondent proves the voluntariness of the confessional statement of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt (Distilled from ground 3).
(ii) Whether or not the prosecution had discharged the burden placed on it by law in proving its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt (Distilled from grounds 1 and 4).
There are no issues formulated from grounds 2 and 5 of the grounds of appeal as contained in the Amended Notice of Appeal hence those grounds over which no issues were raised are deemed as abandoned.
Learned counsel for the respondent in their brief of argument has adopted the two (2) issues formulated in the appellant’s brief of argument but they both differ in their submission with regard to those issues.
I will now proceed to give the highlights of the submissions made by the learned counsel respectively with regard to those two (2) issues.
Issue No. 1
(i) Whether from the totality of the evidence placed before the trial Court, the respondent proves the voluntariness of the confessional statement of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt (Distilled from ground 3).
Counsel’s argument:
(a) Appellant’s Counsel’s submission
Learned appellant’s counsel has contended that Exhibits A-A1 ascribed to the appellant were not the voluntary statement of the appellant and yet the Court below admitted same in evidence whereas the prosecuting counsel had failed to prove the voluntariness of the statement in Exhibit A-A1 which he claimed was obtained by torture of the appellant. He relied on Section 29 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the decision in State vs. Ajayi (2007) 5 ALLR 164, 171. He argued that since the evidence of the appellant who testified as DW1 in the trial within trial was not controverted, it means that the respondent admitted that the statement in Exhibit A-A1 was obtained under duress hence the statement was inadmissible. He relied on the decision in Banjo vs. State (2012) All FWLR (pt. 609) 1175; State vs. Salawu (2012) All FWLR (pt. 614) 1 (SC); Amachree vs. Nigerian Army (2003) 3 NWLR (pt. 807) 256; Rabiu vs. State (2010) LPELR–4488, page 27-28. He argued finally that the procedure adopted by the Police in obtaining the statement of the appellant runs foul of the rule of practice and procedure as provided for under Section 29(2) (a) and (b) of the Evidence Act, 2011. We were urged to hold that the confessional statement ascribed to the appellant was inadmissible.
The learned counsel for the respondent argued per contra in their brief of argument stating that the trial Court was fully satisfied that Exhibit A-A1 were the voluntary confessional statements of the accused/appellant at the time the same were admitted in evidence. He claimed that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses especially PW1 were not discredited or controverted under cross-examination. He argued that there has not been any violation of the provision of Section 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act. In reference to the decision of the apex Court in Kim vs. The State (1992) 4 NWLR (pt. 233) 17, 25, Learned respondent’s Counsel stated the requirements of an extra-judicial statement to include:
(i) It must carry the usual form of caution.
(ii) The words of caution must be in the language understood by the maker.
(iii) It must be followed by the maker’s thumb print or signature as the case may be, and
(iv) It must be read over and interpreted to the maker in the language in which it was made.
It is submitted that exhibits A-A1 were duly recorded in compliance with the above stated requirements and Section 29 (2) (a) (b) of the Evidence Act hence exhibit A-A1 relied upon by the trial Court was admissible evidence. We were urged to resolve issue No. 1 in favour of the Respondent.
Resolution of Issue No. 1
I have given careful thought to the submission made by learned counsel on both sides. The question on hand arose from the proceedings of the trial Court in the trial within trial held or conducted between the 31st May, 2011 and 5th October, 2011. See pages 50-65 of the record of appeal. The proceedings of the trial within trial was necessitated by the objection taken by the appellant and his counsel on the admissibility of the documents ascribed to the appellant as his confessional statement.
In opposing the document being tendered the appellant through his counsel contended that the said confessional statement was obtained under duress. The trial Court expectedly, ordered for trial within trial so as to test the voluntariness of that statement.
In the procedure for trial within trial, it is the prosecution who must first lead evidence of witnesses so as to demonstrate the voluntariness of the statement ascribed to the accused person: Ebhomien & Ors. Vs. the Queen (1963) All NLR 371. This is so because the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the voluntariness of the statement, to prove it. The standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt. SeeR.V. Isaac Ajia (1960). WNLR 196, 198. Balogun vs. Attorney General of Federation (1994) 5 NWLR (pt. 345) 442, 458. Section 135 Evidence Act refers.
The prosecution in their bid to prove their case called evidence of two (2) witnesses including the Investigating Police Officer (IPO) who testified as PW1 in the trial within trial. His evidence is at pages 51-54 of the record. His evidence in summary is that the appellant volunteered a statement and proceeded to narrate his story relative to the incident after the words of caution had been administered to him (the appellant) in Hausa language. The appellant, he said appended his mark or signature after the prescribed cautionary words. In the like manner, the accused/appellant further affixed his signature to the statement which he recorded in Hausa Language. He translated the statement into English language. He did not stop at that; the witness took the accused to his superior police officer before whom the appellant confirmed the statement as his statement. PW2 was not directly involved in the recording of the statement (Exhibit A-A1) nonetheless he was called as a witness being the person in whose presence the statement was taken. Both PW1 and PW2 in the trial within trial, were cross-examined by counsel for the appellant.
At the close of evidence for the prosecution in the trial within trial, the defence opened their case. The appellant testified as DW1. He called one other witness, DW2. Both of them painted the gory story of how the statement of the appellant was obtained under duress, resulting from torture practiced on him, as to suggest that the statement ascribed to him in terms of Exhibits A-A1 were not his voluntary confessional statement.
The word or term “Confession” has been defined in the Evidence Act at Section 28 to mean:
“An admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime” see: A confession is relevant if proved or shown that the elements which constitute the offence in which the accused was charged were present and it identifies with that accused person, provided that the statement was not rendered inadmissible on account of some disqualifying elements or circumstances surrounding the making of that statement. Refer to Section 29 (2) (5) Evidence Act and the decision in Rabiu vs. State (supra). Amadi vs. Nwosu (1992) 5 NWLR (pt. 241) 273, Oforlete v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 681) 415, 436. The State vs. Oladele (1969), NWLR 210; Namsoh vs. The State (1993) 6 SCNJ 55.
A confessional statement is proved to have been made voluntarily when at the point of tendering the confessional statement, there is no objection from the accused as to the voluntariness of the statement. See Gbenga Stephen vs. the State (2013) LPELR 20178 (SC). Similarly, where objection was taken at the time of tendering of the statement, the evidence of the prosecuting witness in the trial within trial that ensued on the voluntariness of the statement, was not challenged, discredited or controverted by the opposite party in his evidence under cross-examination, that statement would be taken as the confessional statement of the accused person. In that case, the statement is admissible as the voluntary confessional statement of the accused person.
I have considered and examined the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in the trial within trial, particularly the evidence of PW1, the Investigating Police Officer who recorded Exhibits A-A1. In the statement ascribed to the appellant but I am unable to find as where the witness was found wanting in the course of taking or the recording of that statement marked as Exhibit A-A1 and ascribed to the appellant as his confessional statement. There is nothing on record to suggest to me that PW1 obtained Exhibit A-A1 from the appellant, as his confessional statement by reason of questions put to the accused by the police officer. To obtain a confessional statement is to induce the maker of the statement to make it. Such statement is not admissible. See Uluebeka v. State (2000) LPELR – 3554 (SC).
Again where the evidence of prosecution witness has been so materially discredited in the trial within trial as to the voluntariness of the statement, such statement cannot pass as admissible confessional statement. It is on this note that the case in hand is distinguishable from the case of Rabiu v. State (supra) cited and relied on by the appellant and his counsel. There is nothing on the record of evidence to establish the fact that Exhibits A-A1 was the result of questions put to the appellant and the answers given by him. Furthermore, the evidence of PW1 and indeed PW2 on the voluntariness of Exhibit A-A1 was never discredited under cross-examination as was the case in Rabiu vs. State (supra) hence the Court below rightly admitted the said statement in evidence as the confessional statement of the appellant. In effect, issue No. 1 is resolved against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
The next question I should address in this appeal is issue No. 2. The appellant in his brief of argument has couched issue No. 2 in the following manner:-
“Whether or not the prosecution had discharged the burden placed on it by law in proving its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.”
Appellant’s counsel has addressed this question in his brief of argument at pages 7-15 of the Appellant’s brief of argument. I have taken note of the submissions of counsel made thereto. As for the Respondent, the submissions made in response can be found at pages 11-21 of the Respondent’s Brief of argument. Again I have taken note of the submissions contained in the respondent’s brief of argument.
The charge(s) preferred against the appellant among others raise three offences, namely Criminal Conspiracy under Section 97 of the Penal Code, Abetment under Section 85 of the Penal Code, Culpable Homicide under Section 221(b) of the Penal Code.
In all these cases, for the prosecution to succeed he is required to prove each and every offence, by a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt as ordained by law, under Section 135 (1) Evidence Act, since the burden of proof rest with him. See also Section 131 of Evidence Act. To succeed, the prosecution must prove every element or ingredient that constitute any particular offence.
I will begin with the offence of Culpable Homicide under Section 221 of the Penal Code and the ingredients the prosecution was expected to establish to succeed are:
(i) The death of a human being has taken place.
(ii) The death was caused by the act of the accused.
(iii) That the accused knew or ought to know that death would be the result of his act.
See:Adava vs. State (2006) 9 NWLR (pt. 984) 152; Ali Muhammed vs. State (2014) LPELR-24623 (CA) Muazu Ali vs. the State (2015) LPELR–24711 (SC).
On the charge of Criminal Conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following ingredients of the offence, namely:
(i) There was agreement between two (2) or more persons to do or cause to be done some Illegal acts or some acts when are legal but in an illegal way.
(ii) That the agreement was done by one or more of the parties in furtherance of the agreement. See Yakubu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009) 14 NWLR (pt. 1160) 151, 154.
In relation to the charge of Abetment the prosecution has to prove:
(i) That the accused abetted the crime.
(ii) That the abetted offence was committed in consequence of the abatement. See: Kaza vs. State (2008).
I will take on each of those offences one after the other. Four witnesses in all testified for the prosecution in the substantive trial, among who are PW1 (Sgt. Joseph Adamu), PW2 (Sgt. Moh’d Bawa) PW3 (Cpl. Danjuma Giwa) and PW4 (Sirajo Malami). By reason of the evidence of PW1, PW3, PW4 and Exhibits E, F and G, that is the medical report with respect to the deceased, the post mortem report and the photographs respectively, the death of the deceased, Garba Mukhtar is a foregone conclusion and this meets with the first ingredient, in that the death of Garba Mukhtar has been established.
In relation to the second ingredient, the causative, or put differently, who it was who caused the death of Garba Mukhtar. It is clear that even though there was no direct evidence of the incident leading to the death of Garba Mukhtar, there is Exhibit A-A1 among other such similar documents.
Exhibit A-A1 is the statement ascribed to the appellant as his confessional statement written in Hausa and translated into English Language. I have earlier in this exercise addressed the voluntariness or otherwise of Exhibit A-A1 and I reached the conclusion that both documents, were the voluntary confessional statement of the appellant. Exhibits A-A1 are admissible documents.
The prosecution in the discharge of his function can choose to prove his case by any of the three methods for establishing a crime or combination of two (2) more of them, namely:
(i) Proof by direct eye witness account of the event.
(ii) Proof by reliance on the confessional statement of the accused person.
(iii) Proof by circumstantial evidence. See: Akinsuwa vs. State (2019) LPELR–47621 (SC) pages 23-25. Agboola vs. State (2013) LPELR (20652) (SC).
Exhibit A1 is the translated English version of Exhibit A. In it, the appellant is on record as stating among others thus:-
“They also told me that we should go to Sabon Titi at Gidan Kife to smoke indian hemp and after we smoked, we went to Runjin Rugga reaching one house five people entered the house (1) Usman Danzulu (2) Nura Dalatu (3) Mustapha Caca (4) Almu Bora (5) and Sirajo Kiki and three of us stayed at the gate, I and Aliyu Kiki, Mustapha and they jumped over the wall into the house and when they came out they told us that they have killed him… truly I am among the people that killed Mukhtar…”
Therefore, relative to the causative that is, on the question as to who caused the death of Garba Mukhtar Exhibits A-A1 has provided the answer. The appellant and his cohorts did the gruesome act.
Now talking about the mens rea with which they carried out the act, there is the need to revert to the evidence of PW4 who discovered the corpse of the deceased, Garba Mukhtar in his room and he described the situation thus:
“She saw Mukhtar her son lying down. I also saw him lying down. He was covered with mattress. I removed the mattress we say two knives on his chest he was stabbed we fell down myself and his mother and started crying. We saw blue rug around his neck and when opened we saw him slaughtered by his neck. Then I and his mother came out crying…”
Those words of PW2 described the manner by which the perpetrators sent the deceased to his untimely death.
Certainly to use a sharp object like knife to stab or pierce the body of the deceased through the heart and sliced his throat, the doer must have intended to kill the deceased knowing that the act would probably result in the death of the deceased. See Akinyede Olaiya vs. State (2018) 16 NCC 203, Akpan v. The State; (1994) 9 NWLR (pt. 368) 34.
The appellant was not alone when they carried out the dastardly act. Himself together with his cohorts named in his statement, conceived an evil plan and executed it. The conspirators killed Garba Mukhtar. Again, Exhibit A-A1 speak for itself in this regard. See Njovens vs. State (1973) 5 SC 17.
It might be argued that the appellant did not partake in the actual killing of the deceased since he did not enter the house or room where the deceased was attacked and killed. The fact however remains that he and others stood at the gate or the entry to the house where the deceased was murdered and by so doing gave cover to the rest of them who entered and killed the deceased. This is a clear case of abetment of the offence and in such a case, there is no difference in the role played by the individual so far as the culprits had a common purpose which was jointly executed by them, the division of labour between them as to who did what does not matter. See: Angustine Ike vs. the State (2018) 16 NCC 138. They are all guilty of the resultant act, as in the instant case of the killing of Garba Mukhtar.
One point which I want to address is the issue of retracted confessional statement ascribed to the appellant and the alleged failure by the trial lower Court to properly apply the principles enunciated in the English case of R. V. Sykes (1913) CAR 113 so as to ascertain the truth or otherwise of that confessional statement in Exhibit A-A1, should as argued, count in favour of the accused/appellant for an order of discharge and acquitted? That is the question.
Permit me to observe here and for the purpose of argument, whether strictly speaking, the issue of a retracted statement and the procedures that go along with it are any longer necessary and relevant where as in this case, only the voluntariness of the confessional statement was challenged.
Where a confessional statement was challenged on account of same not being the voluntary statement of the accused person, the accused person or the person taking the objection is merely speaking his mind that the statement was taken under duress notwithstanding that the accused appended his signature or mark to the statement. That signature or mark is inconsequential once the statement is proved to have been obtained under duress.
Where on the other hand an accused person retracted or resiled from the statement ascribed to him, the impression he gives by that conduct is that he (the accused) has nothing to do with that statement or better still that he is not the maker of the statement. It follows therefore in any view, that the two situations outlined above cannot go together in the same case, at the same time, in respect of the same accused person. I do not think that an accused person can have recourse to those defences (if I may say so) at the same time. Where as in this case, the bone of contention is the voluntariness or otherwise of the statement credited to the accused person, the finding by the Court at the end of the proceedings in trial within trial stating that the statement of the accused was the direct free and voluntary confessional statement of the accused person, should in my view foreclose any further duty on the part of the trial Court to consider and address issues of retracted statement on the part of the accused person.
Be that as it may and considering that the point having already been made that the Court below failed to apply the proper procedure in a case of retracted statement, I will again look at the record book to ascertain the veracity of that submission and having found at pages 191-192 of the record of appeal, I found no truth in that claim or submission of counsel for the appellant in this brief of argument.
I am of the opinion that the principles in R. vs. Sykes (1913) CAR 113 and applied in plethora of other cases including Shazali vs. State (1988) LPELR–3040 (SC) page 23-24 have been complied with.
Issue No. 2 is similarly resolved against the appellant and in favour of the Respondent. The appeal, in effect fails and same is dismissed. The judgment delivered at the High Court of Justice of Sokoto State on the 28th September, 2012 vide suit No. SS/3C/2011 is affirmed. <br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”></br<>
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, Saidu Tanko Hussain, JCA, just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add. I abide by all the orders made therein.
MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I have read in draft, the lead judgment prepared and delivered by my learned brother Saidu Tanko Hussaini JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion. This appeal is lacking in merit and fails; it is hereby dismissed. I abide by the consequential order in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
A. Y. Abubakar, Esq., with him, F. M. Mada, Esq. and M. B. Ngadda, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Zulai Bello (Mrs.), Esq., with him, Munira Ibrahim, Esq. For Respondent(s)