WEIKUN v. FRN
(2022)LCN/16610(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(SOKOTO JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, January 20, 2022
CA/S/87C/2021
Before Our Lordships:
Ali Abubakar Babandi Gumel Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal
Mohammed Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
MR. MENG WEIKUN APPELANT(S)
And
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
FACTOR TO DETERMINE THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS
In DONALD VS. SALEH (2015) 2 NWLR (PT. 1444) 529 AT 568 PARAS G–H, the Court held that:
“There is no hard and fast rule in determining the absence or presence of abuse of Court process in any action rather the Court is enjoined to examine each case predicated on its facts and circumstances, in order to ascertain if it exhibits an abuse of Court process.”
The Supreme Court in SARAKI VS. KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (PT. 264) PAGE 156, held that:
“The concept of abuse of judicial process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. Its one common feature is improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice. The employment of judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice.” PER IDRIS, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF LAW CAN SPECULARE ON A MATTER BEFORE IT
In the case of ORHUE VS. NEPA (1998) 7 NWLR (PT. 557) PAGE 187, it was held that “it is not part of the assignment of any Court to speculate. It must avoid it.”
In the recent case of IKEMEFUNA & ORS VS. ILONDIOR & ORS (2018) LPELR–44840, it was held that:
“The law is settled that a Court of law, including this Court, should not indulge in speculating on anything. Put simply, the Court has a duty not to speculate.”
See also the cases of IKENTA BEST (NIG.) LTD VS. A.G. RIVERS STATE (2008) 8 NWLR (PT. 1084) 612 and ANIMASHAUN VS. UCH (1996) 10 NWLR (PT. 476) PAGE 65. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT DIFFERENT OFFENCES CAN ARISE FROM A SINGLE PROOF OF EVIDENCE
Also, it is trite law that different offences can emanate from a single proof of evidence. When the prosecuting authority investigates an accused and gather evidence that form the proof of evidence, they have the unfettered right to institute as many charges against the accused as they deem fit based on that single proof of evidence. They can file the charges in a single suit before one Court or they can file several charges before several Courts. Thus, the prosecuting body has the right to pursue several charges against the same accused on the same set of facts or proof of evidence and this will not amount to an abuse of Court process. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON WHEN A PRIMA FACIE CASE CAN BE DISCLOSED
In the case of KALU VS. STATE (2014) 1 NWLR (PT. 1389) PAGE 531–532, it was held per Eko, JCA as follows:
“A prima facie case is disclosed when the facts are such that if uncontradicted and if believed, they are sufficient to prove the case against the accused person. The proof on its face must show that an offence has been committed and there must be evidence which could possibly ground conviction of the accused person. For this, there must be evidence or facts to meet all the essential elements of the offence charged. This is so in that, a citizen does not deserve to go through the rigours of a criminal trial if no prima facie case is established before he is called upon to bear that burden.
…Since a prima facie case only means that there is ground for proceeding and at this stage what the informative must disclose is certainly not the guilt of the accused person, but only a prima facie case for the accused to answer.”
A prima facie case does not in any way mean that the accused has been found guilty already or that the prosecution has escaped from the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Prima facie simply means that from a mere reading of the charge and the accompanying facts and proof of evidence, the accused has a case to answer.
In the case of IGWE VS. STATE (2019) 3 NWLR (PT. 1660) PAGE 417 AT PAGE 427 PARA D, the Supreme Court held that:
“A prima facie case will consist of facts that clearly reveal a crime and show that the accused person is linked with it; hence has something to explain at the trial.” PER IDRIS, J.C.A.
THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES
It is trite that in criminal proceedings the onus is always on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the prosecution should readily achieve this result by ensuring that all the necessary and vital ingredients of the charge or charges are proved by evidence. See the cases of YONGO VS. COP (1992) 4 SCNJ 113 and UCHE WILLIAMS VS. THE STATE (1992) 10 SCNJ 74.
In the case of IGWE VS. STATE (SUPRA), the Supreme Court held that:
“where an application is made to quash an indictment on an information, it is necessary for the trial Court to attend to such an application dispassionately and rule on it by reading all the depositions made by potential witnesses and accused person so as to find out if there is a prima facie case for the accused person to answer.” PER IDRIS, J.C.A.
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein, alongside one Mr. Xu Ku Ai were arraigned before the Sokoto Division of the Federal High Court on a three count charge dated the 5th day of October, 2020. The charge is reproduced hereunder as follows:
“That you MR WENG WEIKUN, Adult, Male and Mr. Xu Kuai, Adult, Male on or about the 11th day of May, 2020 in Sokoto within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court (Federal High Court) did conspired amongst yourselves to commit an offence to wit: making cash payment of the sum of N50,000,000 (Fifty Million Naira) which sum exceed the amount authorized by law without going through a financial institution and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 18(a) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 (as amended by Act No. 1 of 2012) and punishable under Section 16(2)(b) of the same Act.”
“That you MR. MENG WEIKUN, Adult, Male and MR. XU KUAI, Adult, Male on the 11th day of May, 2020 at about 22.00 hours at Kasarawa Area, Airport Road Sokoto, in Sokoto State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court (Federal High Court) without going through a financial institution made cash payment of the sum of N50,000,000 (Fifty Million Naira) to one Abdullahi Lawal the Zonal Head of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Sokoto State which exceeded N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) for the purpose of compromising an ongoing investigation involving the company China Zhonghao Nigeria Limited and you thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 1(a) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 (as amended by Act No.1 of 2012) and punishable under Section 16(2)(b) of the same Act.”
“That you MR MENG WEIKUN, Adult. Male and MR. XU KUAI, Adult, Male on the 11th day of May, 2020 at about 22.00 hours at Kasarawa Area, Airport Road, Sokoto, in Sokoto State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court (Federal High Court) directly took possession of the sum of the total sum of N50,000,000 (Fifty million naira) which sum you reasonably ought to have known forms part of the proceeds of unlawful act to wit: Bribery and you thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 15(2)(d) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 (as amended by Act No.1 of 2012) and punishable under Section 15(3) of the same Act.”
The Appellant filed a motion on notice seeking for an order to quash the three count charge as it amounted to an abuse of Court process since there was a case pending against him before the High Court of Sokoto State, thus affecting the jurisdiction of the Court and also, that the charge did not disclose a prima facie case against the Appellant. It was also submitted that the charge is overreaching and constitutes a breach of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing.
The Respondent filed a counter-affidavit, stating that the offences alleged against the Appellant before the High Court of Sokoto State was punishable under the Penal Code while the charge before the Federal High Court was punishable under the Money Laundering Act.
While delivering his ruling, the learned trial Judge held on the issue of abuse of Court process raised that the charge prima facie vests the Federal High Court with the requisite jurisdiction for money laundering offences and thus there was no abuse of Court process. It was also held that the argument of the Appellant that the charge did not disclose a prima facie case was misconceived because the Respondent had filed proof of evidence and other evidences to be relied on. That the Appellant can only raise this issue after the Prosecution has closed its case and the Appellant then elects to make a no case submission. In conclusion, the trial Court held that the Court had the jurisdiction to try the Appellant on the charge and it overruled their objection.
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the Court below, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal dated the 5th day of October, 2021, comprising of two grounds of appeal.
The Appellant on his part, filed his Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated the 18th of October, 2021, which was settled by Azeez Taiwo Hassan Esq. In the said brief of argument two issues for determination were distilled as follows:
(1) Whether the trial Court was right to have held that the Charge before it with Charge No. FHC/S/16C/2020 between Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mr. Meng Weikun and Mr. Xu Kuai dated the 5th day of October, 2020 and Exhibited as Exhibit EFCC 3 is not an abuse of Court process? (Distilled from Ground one of the Notice of Appeal)
(2) Whether the trial Federal High Court was right when it held that the Prosecution has made out an alleged case of making case transaction above the lawful threshold as well as the alleged offence of bribery and that the Proof of evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial of the Appellant. (Distilled from Ground two of the Notice of Appeal)
On issue one, the Appellant’s counsel has argued that he never said that the Federal High Court did not have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear matters bordering on money laundering. Counsel argued that the Appellant’s grouse at the trial Court was that the act of filing another charge by the Respondent while he is still facing trial for the offence of conspiracy to commit bribery on the same set of facts and proof of evidence is a flagrant abuse of Court processes. It was further argued that the charges are similar notwithstanding the nomenclatures or sections of the law under which they are brought and if allowed, the Appellant’s right to fair hearing will be overreached and a situation of fait accompli maybe foisted on the Appellant.
It was argued that the issue of abuse of Court process goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. Reference was made to the cases of LADOJA VS. AJIMOBI (2016) 10 NWLR (PT. 1519) PAGE 87 AT 128 PARA A–B and DINGYADI VS. INEC (2011) ALL FWLR (PT. 581) PAGE 1455–1456 PARAS G–C.
It was submitted that the count 2 of the charge before the trial Court brought under the Money Laundering Act which shows an alleged offence to compromise an ongoing investigation with the same N50,000,000 as proof of evidence. It was then submitted that if the High Court of Sokoto State finds the Appellant not guilty of the offence of bribery and the trial Court i.e. the Federal High Court, has found him guilty it will bring about a situation of conflicting decisions of the two Courts on the same set of facts.
On issue two, the Appellant’s counsel argued that the issue is whether there is a ground or reason at all for the Appellant to stand trial based on the proof of evidence attached to the charge with which the prosecution sought to prove its case. This Court was urged to take a look at the entire proof of evidence vis a vis the offences charged and to find whether the proof of evidence disclosed the vital ingredients or elements of the offences charged under Section 1(a) of the Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011 as found by the trial Court. The case of PRINCE BENEDICT BENJAMIN APUGO VS. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2017) LPELR–41643 (CA) was referred to.
It was submitted by counsel to the Appellant that the proof of evidence does not support the counts laid out in the charge as well as not disclosing or establishing any of the vital elements or ingredients of any of the counts laid down in the charge under Section 1(a) of the Money Laundering Prohibition Act, 2011.
It was argued that for the offence of money laundering, the proof of evidence must disclose the following:
(1) That the accused is a natural person or body corporate.
(2) Such natural person or corporate person must be in possession of funds.
(3) Such funds must be a proceed of an unlawful act.
It was argued that there is no evidence whatsoever either in the extra-judicial statement of the Abdullahi Lawal or in any other statement of the prosecution witnesses, showing or disclosing payment by the Defendants or acceptance by Abdullahi Lawal. It was also submitted that there is nothing on the face of the proof of evidence to show that the N50,000,000 is a proceed of crime.
Finally, it was submitted that the charge must be quashed as having not disclosed a prima facie case.
The Respondent on the other hand filed its brief of argument dated the 1st day of November, 2021, and settled by S.H. Sa’ad Esq. In the said brief of argument following two issues for determination were distilled thus:
(1) Whether the trial Court was right to hold that the charge before it with Charge No. FHC/S/16C/2020 between Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mr. Meng Weikun and Mr. Xu Kuai dated 5th day of October, 2020 and Exhibit EFCC 3 is not an abuse of Court process?
(2) Whether the trial Federal High Court was right when it held that the prosecution has made out an alleged case of making cash transaction above the lawful threshold as well as the alleged offence of bribery and that the proof of evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial of the Appellant.
On issue one, the Respondent’s counsel submitted that the Appellant’s brief of argument clearly shows that the Appellant has presented his issue one to bother on the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the Charge No. FHC/S/16C/2020 but yet went and conceded that the Federal High Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the charge against the Appellant before it.
It was submitted that the Respondent is statutorily empowered to investigate the offences for which the Appellant was being charged both at the High Court and the Federal High Court and that the latter has the exclusive jurisdiction to try all matters bordering on money laundering.
The Respondent’s counsel further submitted that the argument of the Appellant that the act of filing Charge No. FHC/S/16C/2020 at the Federal High Court whilst the Appellant is still facing trial for offences of conspiracy to commit bribery before the Sokoto State High Court constitutes an abuse of Court process is misconceived. Reference was made to the cases of ALIYU VS. FRN (2020) LCN/14228 and CHIMA IJIOFFOR VS. STATE (2001) NWLR (PT. 718) PAGE 371.
It was submitted that the respective charges were not premised on frivolity or recklessness but on cogent and credible facts and thus, that the prosecution of the Appellant cannot be said to amount to an abuse of Court process.
On issue two, the Respondent’s counsel argued that the Appellant was wrong to have said that the proof of evidence did not disclose a prima facie case against him. The counsel for the Respondent also argued that the appropriate time the Appellant can raise such an argument is by way of a no case submission after the Prosecution have closed its case. Reference was made to the case of STATE VS. NWACHINEKE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 398) PAGE 204 AT 320 PARAS C–D.
This Court was urged to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and to affirm the decision of the lower Court.
The Appellant then filed his reply brief dated the 5th day of November, 2021 in response.
The Appellant’s counsel has argued that an appeal is a continuation of the case at trial, a re-hearing of the case at trial and thus, a party must remain consistent in stating his case and will not be allowed to change his case. Reliance was placed on the case of ADELEKE VS. OYETOLA (2020) ALL FWLR (PT. 1047) PAGE 66 PARAS A-B.
It was submitted that the question as to whether it is the Federal High Court that has the exclusive jurisdiction to try money laundering cases never arose at the trial Court as the Appellant never questioned the jurisdiction of the Court in that regard. It was re-emphasized that the grouse of the Appellant is that the charge before the Federal High Court amounts to an abuse of Court process because a similar charge with the same proof of evidence is before the High Court of Sokoto State.
The Appellant’s counsel also argued that the filing of multiple actions on the same subject matter against the same opponents on the same issues or numerous actions on the same matter between the same parties even where there is in existence a right to commence the action is an abuse of Court process. It was further submitted that the fact that the Commission or the Respondent has the powers to initiate criminal proceedings is not and should never be interpreted to mean that they have the right to abuse Court process.
Finally, it was submitted that the Respondent has failed and neglected to respond to the Appellant’s submissions on his issue two as constituted on the Appellant’s brief of argument and thus, it is deemed conceded.
The Appellant’s counsel then urged this Court to allow the appeal.
RESOLUTION OF THE APPEAL
I have reviewed the arguments of counsel for the parties herein as contained in their respective brief of arguments. I shall adopt the issues for determination as formulated by the Appellant as those that have arisen for determination of this appeal. The said 2 (two) issues are again reproduced hereunder as follows:
1. Whether the trial Court was right to have held that the Charge before it with Charge No. FHC/S/16C/2020 between Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mr. Meng Weikun and Mr. Xu Kuai dated the 5th day of October, 2020 and Exhibited as Exhibit EFCC 3 is not an abuse of Court process?
2. Whether the trial Federal High Court was right when it held that the Prosecution has made out an alleged case of making case transaction above the lawful threshold as well as the alleged offence of bribery and that the Proof of evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial of the Appellant.
ISSUE ONE
Whether the trial Court was right to have held that the Charge before it with Charge No. FHC/S/16C/2020 between Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mr. Meng Weikun and Mr. Xu Kuai dated the 5th day of October, 2020 and Exhibited as Exhibit EFCC 3 is not an abuse of Court process?
The Appellant’s counsel has emphasized that the grouse of the Appellant was the act of filing a charge before the Federal High Court while the Appellant is still standing trial for the offence of conspiracy to commit bribery before the High Court of Sokoto State on the same set of facts and proof of evidence and thus it amounts to an abuse of Court process.
In DONALD VS. SALEH (2015) 2 NWLR (PT. 1444) 529 AT 568 PARAS G–H, the Court held that:
“There is no hard and fast rule in determining the absence or presence of abuse of Court process in any action rather the Court is enjoined to examine each case predicated on its facts and circumstances, in order to ascertain if it exhibits an abuse of Court process.”
The Supreme Court in SARAKI VS. KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (PT. 264) PAGE 156, held that:
“The concept of abuse of judicial process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. Its one common feature is improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice. The employment of judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice.”
Does it indeed amount to an abuse of Court process? In determining this, I shall carefully and thoroughly look at the processes filed. I have read the motion on notice and I can see that the grouse of the Appellant is contained in paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of the motion which is reproduced hereunder:
“That during our office weekly conference on the 2nd day of July, 2021 and after a painstaking perusal and examination of the later charge as in Exhibit EFCC3 and the accompanying proof of evidence, we discovered that the said three counts charge dated the 5th of October, 2020 are a verbatim reproduction, a regurgitation and or re-statement of the offence of offering bribe to a public servant which is currently pending before the High Court of Sokoto State in Charge No. SS/27C/2020 between Federal Republic of Nigeria v Meng Weikum and Mr. Xu Kuai as Defendants.
I know as a fact that the three Counts charge with Charge No. FHC/S/16C/2020 between Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mr. Meng Weikun and Mr. Xu Kuai dated the 5th day of October, 2020 are conclusive and show or portrayed the Defendants as if already found guilty of the offences of conspiracy to commit bribery at the High Court of Sokoto State in Charge No. SS/27C/2020 Between Federal of Nigeria v Meng Weikum and Mr. Xu Kuai.”
To my understanding, the grouse of the Appellant is that there is a pending charge before the High Court of Sokoto State between the same parties as the one before the Federal High Court and that the two charges are based on the same set of facts and proof of evidence, and that the charges are similar in nature and if the charge before the Federal High Court is allowed to go on, it will amount to overreaching the Appellant’s constitutional right to fair hearing/trial. Also, the Appellant has argued that if the High Court of Sokoto State acquits the Appellant on the charge of bribery and the Federal High Court convicts the Appellant for money laundering, it will lead to a situation of conflicting decisions of the two Courts on the same set of facts.
First and foremost, I am the firm view that this argument made by the Appellant is based on speculations. This is because the Prosecution has not even opened its case at all. All that the Appellant saw was the charge and the proof of evidence and he hastily filed a motion to quash same.
In the case of ORHUE VS. NEPA (1998) 7 NWLR (PT. 557) PAGE 187, it was held that “it is not part of the assignment of any Court to speculate. It must avoid it.”
In the recent case of IKEMEFUNA & ORS VS. ILONDIOR & ORS (2018) LPELR–44840, it was held that:
“The law is settled that a Court of law, including this Court, should not indulge in speculating on anything. Put simply, the Court has a duty not to speculate.”
See also the cases of IKENTA BEST (NIG.) LTD VS. A.G. RIVERS STATE (2008) 8 NWLR (PT. 1084) 612 and ANIMASHAUN VS. UCH (1996) 10 NWLR (PT. 476) PAGE 65.
Why is the Appellant’s counsel speculating and concluding that if the trial before the Federal High Court is allowed to go on, it will amount to overreaching the Appellant’s right to fair hearing? The Appellant’s counsel lazily refused to even furnish before this Court how the right to fair hearing of the Appellant will be infringed upon.
It is trite law that he who asserts must prove, prove the facts he asserts by solid and credible evidence. The Appellant has made no attempt to explain how the charge will harass and make life difficult for the Appellant.
Also, it is trite law that different offences can emanate from a single proof of evidence. When the prosecuting authority investigates an accused and gather evidence that form the proof of evidence, they have the unfettered right to institute as many charges against the accused as they deem fit based on that single proof of evidence. They can file the charges in a single suit before one Court or they can file several charges before several Courts. Thus, the prosecuting body has the right to pursue several charges against the same accused on the same set of facts or proof of evidence and this will not amount to an abuse of Court process.
The fact that the Appellant is standing trial on the charge of bribery before the High Court of Sokoto State does not prevent him for being tried for money laundering before the Federal High Court. I do not see how bribery and money laundering are similar as argued by the Appellant’s counsel. The two charges were filed under separate laws and before different Courts, and what is more the ingredients for proving bribery and money laundering are totally different. I therefore hold that the charge is not an abuse of Court process.
Issue one is therefore hereby resolved against the Appellant in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE TWO
Whether the trial Federal High Court was right when it held that the Prosecution has made out an alleged case of making case transaction above the lawful threshold as well as the alleged offence of bribery and that the proof of evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial of the Appellant.
The counsel for the Appellant has argued vehemently that there is no prima facie case against the Appellant to warrant him standing trial before the trial Court and that the trial Court was wrong when it held that the charge and the proof of evidence disclosed a prima facie case of the offences charged.
In the case of KALU VS. STATE (2014) 1 NWLR (PT. 1389) PAGE 531–532, it was held per Eko, JCA as follows:
“A prima facie case is disclosed when the facts are such that if uncontradicted and if believed, they are sufficient to prove the case against the accused person. The proof on its face must show that an offence has been committed and there must be evidence which could possibly ground conviction of the accused person. For this, there must be evidence or facts to meet all the essential elements of the offence charged. This is so in that, a citizen does not deserve to go through the rigours of a criminal trial if no prima facie case is established before he is called upon to bear that burden.
…Since a prima facie case only means that there is ground for proceeding and at this stage what the informative must disclose is certainly not the guilt of the accused person, but only a prima facie case for the accused to answer.”
A prima facie case does not in any way mean that the accused has been found guilty already or that the prosecution has escaped from the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Prima facie simply means that from a mere reading of the charge and the accompanying facts and proof of evidence, the accused has a case to answer.
In the case of IGWE VS. STATE (2019) 3 NWLR (PT. 1660) PAGE 417 AT PAGE 427 PARA D, the Supreme Court held that:
“A prima facie case will consist of facts that clearly reveal a crime and show that the accused person is linked with it; hence has something to explain at the trial.”
Let us not forget that a charge, proof of evidence and all documents attached thereto are not evidence until they are proved or established as legal evidence in the proceedings as held by the Supreme Court in the case of LAWALI VS. STATE (2019) 4 NWLR (PT. 1663) PAGE 468 PARA F. Proof of evidence is like a statement of claim in a civil proceedings as they consist of frontloaded depositions of witnesses and documents to be used as exhibits.
The rights of the Appellant is protected under Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which provides that:
“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty.”
The standard of proof in criminal trials is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The proof required is not to push a Court of trial into looking for proof beyond the shadow of doubt but rather proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Respondent should be allowed to prove the charge against the Appellant.
It is trite that in criminal proceedings the onus is always on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the prosecution should readily achieve this result by ensuring that all the necessary and vital ingredients of the charge or charges are proved by evidence. See the cases of YONGO VS. COP (1992) 4 SCNJ 113 and UCHE WILLIAMS VS. THE STATE (1992) 10 SCNJ 74.
In the case of IGWE VS. STATE (SUPRA), the Supreme Court held that:
“where an application is made to quash an indictment on an information, it is necessary for the trial Court to attend to such an application dispassionately and rule on it by reading all the depositions made by potential witnesses and accused person so as to find out if there is a prima facie case for the accused person to answer.”
I will now thoroughly evaluate the facts in the proof of evidence vis-a-vis the counts of the charge to see whether or not there is a prima facie case against the Appellant.
The Appellant has been charged for money laundering under Section 1(a), Section 18 (a) and Section 15(2) (d) of the Money Laundering Prohibition Act, 2011. The provisions of the said sections of the law are reproduced hereunder. Section 18(a) provides:
“A person who conspires with, aids, abets or counsels any other person to commit an offence commits an offence and is liable on conviction to the same punishment as is prescribed for that offence under this Act.”
And Section 1 provides as follows:
“No person or body corporate shall, except in a transaction through a financial institution, make or accept cash payment of a sum exceeding –
(a) N5,000,000 or its equivalent, in the case of an individual;
(b) N10,000,000 or its equivalent, in the case of a body corporate.”
While Section 15(2)(d) provides that:
“Any person or body corporate, in or outside Nigeria, who directly or indirectly-
(d) acquires, uses, retains or takes possession or control of any fund or property, knowingly or reasonably ought to have known that such fund or property is, or forms part of the proceeds of an unlawful act, commits an offence of money laundering under this Act.”
The Appellant has argued that there is no evidence showing or disclosing payment above the sum of N5,000,000 to Abdullahi Lawal and neither did any of the statements of the witnesses show same and thus the charge should be quashed.
I have read through the testimonies and statements of the Prosecution witnesses including that of Afanda Bashir Emmanuel and I can clearly see that the witness has deposed to the fact that upon the execution of a search warrant, the sum of N50,000,000 was recovered from and counted in the presence of the Appellant and the co-accused. Also, it was stated that smartphones and laptops were also recovered from the Appellant. The cheques and other documents detailing the withdrawal of the said sum of N50,000,000 were also included in the proof of evidence.
Prima facie, the facts support the allegation of money laundering under Section 1 and 18(a) of the Money Laundering Act. I do not agree with the Appellant’s counsel that there is no iota of evidence in the proof of evidence in support of the counts.
I firmly believe that the learned trial Judge was right when he held that a prima facie case had been disclosed by the proof of evidence to make the Appellant explain his own side of the story. The Appellant’s application to prematurely abort the charge against him is without merit.
With regard to whether the Respondent was able to show that the said sum of N50,000,000 is a proceed of crime, I do not think it would be reasonable to expect to have all the answers on the face of the proof of evidence when the law has given the Respondent the enormous duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in a trial. It would be unfair, unjust and unfounded to quickly make a joke out of the charge of the Respondent without giving them ample time and opportunity to prove the findings of their investigation and evidence garnered.
Prima facie does not mean the guilt of the accused should be clearly determined on the face of the evidence, rather it only means that there is a likelihood that the Appellant has a case to answer.
In response to this, I am of the view that the Respondent has successfully established a prima facie case against the Appellant and thus the application filed by the Appellant to quash the charge is without merit.
I affirm the judgment of the trial Court and dismiss this appeal in its entirety as it is baseless and frivolous. The application to quash the charge for not disclosing a prima facie case is clearly without merit and the learned trial Judge was right to have dismissed same.
On the whole, I see no merit in this appeal. In the circumstances, this appeal is therefore hereby dismissed and the decision of the trial Court is accordingly affirmed. No order is made as to cost.
ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now, the lead judgment prepared by my learned brother, Idris, JCA. I fully agree with all his reasonings and conclusions. For want of better words, I adopt them as mine to also dismiss this appeal for being devoid of any merits. I abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
MOHAMMED DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I have the privilege of reading in draft, the just delivered judgment by my learned brother M. B. Idris JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion in the lead judgment, that the appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed. I abide by the consequential order in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
A. T. Hassan, Esq., with him, J. Egedep, Esq. For Appellant(s)
S. H. Sa’ad, Esq. For Respondent(s)
