WALE ADISA v. THE STATE (2013)

WALE ADISA v. THE STATE

(2013)LCN/6212(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 17th day of May, 2013

CA/L/624/11

JUSTICES:

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

RATIO

EVIDENCE: WHETHER A TRIAL WITHIN TRIAL MUST ALWAYS BE CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE THE VOLUNTARINESS OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

It is well settled that where a confessional statement is tendered in evidence by the Prosecution and the question arises as to whether it was voluntarily made, the Court must there and then suspend the main trial and conduct a trial within a trial to determine its voluntariness. Where however it is a case of retraction of the confessional statement that is, where the accused denies making the statement, the statement is admitted when tendered by the prosecution notwithstanding the objection by the accused. The matter would then be taken up by the accused in his defence as a trial within a trial is usually not necessary. It is then for the trial Judge to decide the credibility of the retracted confession and what weight to attach to it. In the instant case, the Appellant had initially claimed that the confession was not voluntary. During the trial within a trial, it became obvious that it was a case of retraction rather than a challenge of the voluntariness of the confession. The law on the issue of confessions whether voluntarily made or retracted is quite settled.

As ably submitted by learned counsel for the Appellant, the general rule is that a court can sustain the conviction of an accused person on his confessional statement alone provided it is free, voluntary direct, positive and properly proved. See Obosi v The State (1965) NMLR 119; Dawa v. The State (1980) 8-11 SC. 236; Ojegele v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.71) 414; Monday v. Nwaeze (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.428) 1; Alarape v. State (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt.705); Uwagboe v. The State (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt.1031) 606; Oseni v. The State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 351.PER CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A.

Between

WALE ADISA – Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE – Respondent(s)

CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant was one of the two defendants charged with the offence of armed robbery contrary to Section 402 (2) (a) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap C.17, Vol.2, Laws of Lagos State 2003. They were arraigned before the High Court of Lagos State holding in Ikeja for robbing one Ibitoye Abiodun of his phone Nokia 2100 and N5000; and one Osotimehin Eniola while armed with guns on or about the 6th day of December 2005 at Mr. Biggs Headquarters, along Kudirat Abiola Road Oregun Ikeja in Ikeja Judicial Division.
The prosecution’s case is that on or about the 6th day of December, 2005 at about 9pm, the Appellant, the 1st Defendant and others now at large conspired to rob and did rob while armed with guns, one Osotimehin Eniola (PW1) and Ibitoye Abiodun (PW2). They got away but PW1 and PW2 reported the robbery at Alausa Police Station that night. Luck ran out on the robbers when their car was involved in an accident. The other robbers thinking that the 1st Defendant was dead abandoned him at the scene and ran away. Pedestrians around Oworonshoki took the 1st Defendant who was then unconscious to Ogudu police Station. PW2 whose mobile phone was taken by the robbers made a call to the phone and the call was answered by a Police officer at Ogudu Police station who then invited PW2 to the Police station. The police at Alausa were contacted and IPO Adekunle Babatola (PW3) went to Ogudu police Station where he was informed that the 1st Defendant, still then unconscious was found in possession of the phone and live cartridges. 1st Defendant was later taken to Alausa Police Station where he made a confessional statement. The case was then transferred to SCID Panti for detailed investigation. There, the 1st Defendant made another confessional statement in which he mentioned the name of the 2nd Defendant now Appellant as having taken part in the robbery. The 1st Defendant took the IPO Sgt Victor Omoregie (PW4) to the house of the 2nd Defendant (now Appellant) in a remote village at the border between Ogun and Lagos by the bank of a river where he was arrested. He also made a confessional statement to the Police.
The 2nd Defendant later retracted his confessional statement and now claimed he was in Bayelsa State with his boss (DW3) at the time of the robbery. He claimed he was arrested by the Police while on his way to buy food somewhere around Isheri. He denied making any confessional statement and claimed the statement was written by the Police who forced him to sign it.
At the trial, the prosecution called four witnesses. The confessional statements of the Defendants were admitted in evidence after a trial within a trial as well as the cartridges recovered from the 1st Defendant. The Defendants testified in their defences and the 2nd Defendant called one witness, his boss (DW3). At the end of the hearing and counsel addresses, the Defendants were found guilty of conspiracy and armed robbery and were accordingly sentenced to death.
Dissatisfied with the conviction, the 2nd Defendant filed a notice of appeal on 20/4/11 with three grounds of appeal. With the leave of this court, he filed an amended notice of appeal with five grounds of appeal out of which he formulated three issues. The issues are as follows:
I. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in upholding the Appellants retracted confessional statement and convicting him on same? (Grounds 3 and 5 of the amended Notice of Appeal)
II. Whether there was sufficient or any evidence of identification linking the Appellant to the crime? (Ground 1 of the amended Notice of Appeal)
III. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the defence of alibi raised by the Appellant and discountenancing the testimony of DW3? (Grounds 2 and 4 of the amended Notice of Appeal)
The Respondent in his brief adopted the three issues formulated by the Appellant.
ISSUE NO 1
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in upholding the Appellants retracted confession and convicting him on same
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS:
On issue I, learned counsel for the Appellant Olufunke Aboyade (Ms) after examining several authorities on retracted confessional statements submitted that the Appellant retracted his confessional statement when it was shown to him in the course of trial within trial proceedings to determine the voluntariness of the confessional statement. Counsel submitted that the appellant not only denied writing or signing the statement, he also stated that he was in Bayelsa State at the time the offence was alleged to have been committed and could not therefore have committed the offence. Relying on the cases of Omoju v F.R.N. (2008) All FWLR (Pt 415) 1656 @ 1673D & 1674C-H and Hassan v State (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt 735) learned counsel submitted that the Appellant consistently asserted that he did not and could not have made the statement tendered and admitted as Exhibit IDI (Sic exhibit P9) because the statement was not the one he was forced to sign at the State CID panti as the signature on Exhibit IDI (Sic Exhibit P9) was not his signature. Learned counsel submitted that in considering the weight to be attached to the Appellants retracted confessional statement, the court ought to have applied the test laid down in Nwaebonyi v The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.343) 138 and relied upon in Akinmoju v State (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt.662) and that if the Court had done so it would not have relied on the retracted confessional statement in convicting the Appellant.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:
On this issue, learned counsel for the Respondent, Lawal Pedro SAN, Solicitor-General Lagos State submitted that the admissibility of the retracted confessional statement of the Defendant is not in dispute. The learned senior counsel submitted that the issue to be considered by the court is the weight to be attached to a retracted confessional statement. Referring to the case of Akinmoju v State (supra), the senior counsel submitted that where a Defendant retracts his confessional statement at the trial, it is imperative for the trial Judge to measure the retracted confessional statement against independent material facts before placing reliance on such retracted statement. The independent facts sought in the form of corroborative evidence must be evidence which confirm in some material particular not only that the crime was committed but also that it was the accused who committed the crime. Onyegbu v State (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt 320) 328 @ 340. Senior counsel referred also to the case of Omoju v F.R.N. (supra) and submitted that there were independent material facts and evidence before the court which support the confession of the Appellant. Senior counsel submitted that even though the appellant was not identified by the two victims of the robbery his arrest was made possible by the 1st Defendant who had earlier been identified by the two victims. Furthermore, the content of the retracted confessional statement is consistent with other ascertained material facts already established.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NO I:
It is well settled that where a confessional statement is tendered in evidence by the Prosecution and the question arises as to whether it was voluntarily made, the Court must there and then suspend the main trial and conduct a trial within a trial to determine its voluntariness. Where however it is a case of retraction of the confessional statement that is, where the accused denies making the statement, the statement is admitted when tendered by the prosecution notwithstanding the objection by the accused. The matter would then be taken up by the accused in his defence as a trial within a trial is usually not necessary. It is then for the trial Judge to decide the credibility of the retracted confession and what weight to attach to it. In the instant case, the Appellant had initially claimed that the confession was not voluntary. During the trial within a trial, it became obvious that it was a case of retraction rather than a challenge of the voluntariness of the confession. The law on the issue of confessions whether voluntarily made or retracted is quite settled.

As also ably submitted by both learned counsel, the fact of retraction of a confessional statement does not preclude the court from acting on it to convict the accused person. But before so doing, the court must measure the retracted confessional statement against independent material fact in order to be sure that there are corroborative evidence confirming in some material particular not only that the crime was committed but that it was indeed the accused who committed the crime. See Akpan v State (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt.737); Onyegbu v. State (Supra); Nwachukwu v. State (2007) All FWLR (Pt.390) 1380 @ 1410 or (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt.1062) 31. In Nwaebonyi v. State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.343) 138, the Supreme Court set out the test to be applied in determining the weight to be attached to a retracted confession and indeed all confessions thus:
1. “Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true?
2. Is it corroborated?
3. Are the relevant statements of facts made in it true as far as they can be tested?
4. Was the prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the murder?
5. Is his confession possible?
6. Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved?”
Learned counsel for the Appellant had submitted that outside the retracted confessional statement, there is nothing linking the Appellant to the crime charged. I do not agree with learned counsel. One cannot close one’s eyes to the circumstances leading to the arrest of the Appellant. An armed robbery took place. In their quest to escape an accident occurred. The gang of robbers escaped leaving behind the 1st Defendant whom they assumed died in the accident. It turned out that he was merely unconscious. He was rescued by some good samaritans who took him to the police station. A mobile phone belonging to one of the victims had been stolen by the robbers. Even while the 1st Defendant was still unconscious, a call came through to the phone. The call was placed by one of the victims PW2. The police who had recovered the phone from the 1st Defendant answered the call. From that point facts began to unravel. The 1st Defendant regained consciousness and made a confessional statement in which he mentioned the Appellant as a member of his gang and one of those that took part in the robbery. It turned out that the Appellant was the only one amongst the gang whose address the 1st Defendant knew. The Appellant was arrested and also made a confessional statement in which he corroborated everything said by the 1st Defendant in his own confession. The Appellant subsequently denied making the statement or knowing anything about its contents. Yet the details in the statement are matters peculiarly within his knowledge and not within the knowledge of the IPO.
The learned trial Judge in his judgment at page 126 of the record said that the credible evidence of the eye witnesses to the robbery PW1 and PW2 which is corroborated by their extra judicial statements made when the incident was still very fresh exhibit P1 and P2 corroborate the statements of the 1st defendant.
His Lordship discountenanced all the evidence of torture as afterthought. His lordship held the confessions true and corroborated and gave weight to them. The fact that the 1st Defendant was physically identified by PW1 and PW2 as one out of the six men that robbed them and the same 1st defendant is the one who mentioned the 2nd defendant as a member of the gang of six and assisted in his arrest is corroborative of the Appellant’s confessional statement. While I agree with learned counsel for the appellant that the confessional statement of an accused is no evidence against a co-accused person who has not adopted the statement; (section 27 (2) of the Evidence Act) but where the co-accused makes his own confession, the fact in the two confessional statements can corroborate each other. After all corroboration is independent evidence outside the confessional statement confirming the truthfulness of the confession. If an accused person tells the story of how he and someone other person committed the crime and that other in his own statement confirms the story why should they not corroborate each other. The trial Judge did state at page 129 of the record that even though PW1 and PW2 did not identify the Appellant, their evidence as to what transpired at Mr. Biggs premises corroborate the facts in his confession. His statement also corroborate the statement of the 1st defendant in all material particular which confirmed that he was the wale the 1st defendant referred to in his statement. The learned Judge also pointed out that it was in the statement of the Appellant that what transpired after the robbery was revealed. The Appellant stated how they abandoned the 1st defendant at the scene of the accident thinking he was dead. The 1st defendant in his statement said he did not know how he got to Ogudu Police station after the accident. The evidence of PW1 that foreign currency was stolen from him corroborates the evidence of the Appellant that foreign currency was taken from their victims. All these corroborate the fact that the crime was committed. The fact that the 1st Defendant mentioned the Appellant as one of the robbers and assisted in getting him arrested corroborate the confessional statement of the Appellant. It is immaterial that at the hearing, the 1st defendant and the Appellant somersaulted and denied knowing each other. The Appellant even denied his signature on Exhibit D9. These are matters touching on the credibility of the witnesses. The learned trial Judge who listened to their evidence and watched their demeanour did not believe them. On matters of credibility the view of the trial Judge is supreme. Nasamu v The State (1979) All NLR 193.
All the arguments put forward by learned counsel for the Appellant at pages 11 – 13 of her brief of argument bordering on her view that conviction of the Appellant by the learned trial Judge was based on suspicion and not concrete evidence would have warranted consideration if there was no confessional statement. The Appellant confessed to participation in the crime and later retracted his confession. For all the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the learned trial Judge was absolutely right in upholding the Appellant’s retracted confessional statement and convicting him on same. Issue I is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.

ISSUE II:
Whether there was sufficient or any evidence of identification linking the Appellant to the crime? (Ground 1 of the amended Notice of Appeal)
APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS:
Ms Aboyade on this issue submitted that the two victims PW1 and PW2 were unable to identify the Appellant as one of those who robbed them. The 1st accused at the trial maintained his position that he did not know the appellant and had never seen him before. Counsel submitted that it could not be said conclusively that the Appellant herein is the same as the person who committed the crime. Counsel submitted that the Prosecution had failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. She urged the Court to discharge and acquit the Appellant.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
The learned senior counsel for the Respondent Mr. Pedro SAN conceded that there was no identification of the Appellant by the victims of the robbery but that guilt of an accused person can either be by direct or circumstantial evidence. He argued that there is no direct evidence that the Appellant was one of the armed robbers but that there was circumstantial evidence to prove conclusively that the Appellant was one of the robbers.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE II:
I am of the respectful view that the identification of the Appellant as one of the robbers was direct by the 1st Defendant. At the hearing, PW4 Sgt Victor Omoregie at page 61 of the record testified thus:
The next day 15/12/2005, the investigating team led by ASP Lawal went with the 1st Defendant and the complainant Abiodun Ibitoye to visit the scene of crime in front of Mr. Biggs Headquarters Office Kudirat Abiola Way Ikeja. When I was recording the statement of 1st Defendant he made mention of members of his gang. They were 8 in number out (sic of which) 6 carried out the robbery. He mentioned the name of the 2nd Defendant. On 24/12/2005, at about 1 am ASP Lawal went out with the 1st Defendant. He took us to the 2nd Defendant’s family compound at 3rd Wema Street Isheri. On getting there, we woke the occupants of the compound up. We told them of our mission. We met an elderly woman and some boys. They said they don’t know the whereabouts of Wale Adisa. As we were about leaving we met a young boy sleeping outside. We woke him up and told him our mission……….He then took us to a remote village between Lagos and Ogun State. It was there we arrested 2nd Defendant in a house at the back of the river. The 1st Defendant identified him as Wale Adisa….”
It is consequently wrong to say there was no identification of the Appellant. There was positive identification of the Appellant by the 1st Defendant, the leader of the gang of armed robbers who was himself positively identified by PW1. Under cross-examination, PW1 said:
“…..Apart from the 1st Accused, I did not see any of the others whether at Alausa Police Station or at Ogudu. I was able to identify him at the Police Station. There was an uncompleted building where suspects were kept. I was asked to identify the person who attacked me. I identified him amongst the accused persons there as the leader of the gang who attacked me ………Up till today, I have only been able to identify only the 1st Accused. I did not identify any other person at Panti. I did not say it was only the 1st Accused I saw when the gang came. One was at the steering and 5 came down with guns. 1st Accused was the one who approached me as their leader hence I can identify him.”
In his confessional statement at page 15 of the record, the 1st Defendant had said that they snatched a Mercedes Benz car from a driver at gun point at Ojota; that Ahmed pointed a gun at the driver and Wale dragged the driver down and took over the steering. They drove off to Oregun road Ikeja where they used the M/Benz to block Mr. Biggs Pick-Up van. This evidence corroborates the evidence of PW1 that one of the armed robbers remained at the steering while 5 came down. The armed robber at the steering was obviously Wale and that explains why PW1 was unable to identify him. The identification by the 1st Defendant was more than sufficient and leaves no doubt whatever that he participated in the robbery. Ms. Aboyade in arguing the point that the 1st Defendant at the trial maintained his position that he did not know the appellant and had never seen him before; ignored the damning confessional statement, the retraction of which the learned trial Judge did not accept. Looking at the contents of the confessional statements it is not arguable that the Appellant was very positively identified by the 1st Defendant as the driver of the Mercedes car used in the robbery. In the circumstances it is of no moment that PW1 and PW2 did not identify the appellant. As held by the learned trial Judge, identification parade was unnecessary in view of the positive identification of the Appellant by the 1st Defendant who knew him very well. See Eyisi v. State (2000) 12 SC (Pt.1) 24. Issue ii is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.

ISSUE NO. III:
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the defence of alibi raised by the Appellant and discountenancing the testimony of DW3? (Grounds 2 and 4 of the amended Notice of Appeal)
APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS:
It is the contention of Ms. Aboyade that the defence of alibi raised by the Appellant in the course of his evidence at the trial that he was in Bayelsa State with his boss ‘Oga Lati’ on the date of the alleged robbery ought to have been considered and upheld by the court. Counsel argued that the lower court ought not to have dismissed the defence on the ground that it was raised for the first time during trial thus denying the prosecution the right to investigate the alibi. Counsel further submitted relying on the case of Onyegbu v State (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt.320) 328 that there is no hard and fast rule attached to raising and relying on the defence of alibi; that although it is desirable that the defence should be raised timeously i.e. before trial, the mere fact that the accused person raised it during trial is not a basis for automatically disqualifying it especially if there is no credible evidence outside the defence of alibi linking the accused person to the crime. Counsel argued that the lower court ought to have given due consideration to the defence especially in view of the evidence of the Appellant’s boss who testified as DW3 in confirmation of the alibi.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
Mr. Pedro SAN in reply to the above submitted that the word ‘alibi’ means ‘elsewhere’ and that if a defendant claims to be some place other than where the Prosecution says he was at the material time, it is a matter peculiarly within his knowledge and the evidential burden is on him. Counsel submitted that as a general rule, the defence of alibi should be raised timeously, especially before trial and preferably in the accused person’s statement to the police. The accused must in addition give detailed particulars of his whereabouts on the crucial day such as the specific place, the people in whose company he was and what transpired at the time and place. The information must be given timeously to enable the Police carry out necessary investigation. Learned counsel submitted that neither the Appellant nor his boss who testified as DW3 gave particulars as to where they were in Bayelsa State, with whom, the duration of the type of mechanic work they went for. Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge rightly rejected the Appellants defence of alibi and urged the court to so hold.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NO III:
In the case of Esanabedo v The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.113) 57, Nnaemeka-Agu JSC observed:
“….by the defence of alibi the accused person seeks to raise a doubt to what might have been a foolproof case of the prosecution by saying that he was somewhere else at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed at the scene of crime. As where he was at the material time is a matter especially within his knowledge, the law requires that for his defence of alibi to succeed in raising the doubt in his favour he ought to do certain things. He ought to raise that defence at the earliest possible opportunity. In that defence he ought to give such details and particulars of his whereabouts that the police can investigate. This is the evidential burden on him in his defence of alibi.”
On the above authority and a host of others, the appellant ought to have disclosed his defence of alibi immediately on arrest by the Police and in his statements to the Police. See Ikemson v State, (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 455. While an accused has the right as guaranteed by the Constitution to remain silent when arrested and not to immediately disclose his alibi as suggested in Onyegbu v. State (supra) he does so at the risk of compromising his defence by the silence. At any rate the situation is different where the accused did not remain silent but made statements without disclosing his alibi from the very start. Further, in the instant case, it is not enough for the appellant to say during examination-in-chief for the first time that he and his boss went to Bayelsa to work. He did not give particulars of the specific place they were in Bayelsa, the nature of the mechanic work they went to do, the duration and for whom. He ought to have given these particulars to enable the Police investigate the alibi. Indeed he said absolutely nothing about the alibi until he was in the witness box. While this alone will not stop the court from considering the defence or the police from asking for an adjournment to carry out the necessary investigation, this will be done only where the story sounds credible. The delay will naturally raise doubt as to the truthfulness of the defence. Further the circumstances and the manner of raising the defence in the instant case leaves no doubt whatever that it was a mere after-thought lacking in credibility. A careful examination of the evidence of the appellant and that of DW3 will reveal that there is little truth in their claim that the Appellant was with DW3 in Bayelsa when the crime was committed. During cross-examination, the Appellant testified thus:
Q Tell the court the name of your boss when you were learning mechanic work?
A I call him Oga Lati. I cannot remember his surname.
Q When did you graduate and do your freedom?
A 2005
Q How many years did you train for?
A I signed for 4 years. I spent 5 years training.
The so called ‘boss’ in his evidence said the Appellant was once his boy, his apprentice mechanic and that he stayed two years with him as his apprentice mechanic before he took him to Bayelsa. His evidence contradicted that of the Appellant. If indeed the appellant was working with DW3 in Bayelsa, how come DW3 was not immediately informed that the Appellant was in police custody facing a criminal charge? DW3 testified in court on the 10th of June 2010 and the incident occurred on the 6th of December 2005. The Appellant claimed it was the same day he returned from Bayelsa and his ‘boss’ dropped him off that he was arrested. One would have expected that this ‘boss’ would be the first person the appellant would contact to let him know what happened to him after he was dropped off by him. Rather in his evidence, DW3 on 10/6/10 said: “Last two months when I had a breakdown of my car I was looking for someone to help me fix the car when I saw one of my former apprentices who informed me that Wale has this problem.” For five years, a ‘boss’ who was working with his apprentice in Bayelsa did not know that he was in police trouble especially when the trouble started the very same day he dropped him off on their return from Bayelsa. It is also strange that the Appellant did not know the surname of this his ‘boss’ with whom he trained for five years. The facts simply did not jell. One did not need to look far to conclude that the story of alibi was fabricated. These issues were well considered by the learned trial Judge and his lordship was absolutely right in discountenancing the testimony of DW3 as an afterthought and in rejecting the defence of alibi. This issue is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
I have no doubt whatever that there was sufficient evidence in this case to justify the conviction of the Appellant for conspiracy and armed robbery. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I affirm the judgment of Obadina J of the High court of Lagos State, Ikeja Judicial Division and the sentence of death passed on the Appellant.

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have read, before now, the judgment prepared and just delivered by the Honourable Justice C. E. Iyizoba, JCA. Having equally read the briefs of argument of the respective learned counsel vis-a-vis the records of appeal, as a whole, I cannot but concur with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the said judgment, to the effect that the appeal is lacking in merits. It’s my privilege to adopt the reasoning and conclusion in the judgment as mine. I accordingly hold that the appeal is lacking in merits, and it’s hereby dismissed by me. I abide by the consequential order affirming the vexed judgment of the High Court of Lagos State, delivered on January 25, 2011 by M. O. Obadina, J, in suit No.ID/105C/2007, and the sentence of death passed upon the Appellant.

JOSEPH SHAGBOOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: The appellant’s confession statement, Exhibit D9, identified him as one of the armed robbers which sufficed for the purpose of identification obviating the need to conduct an identification parade in the circumstance. See Archibong v. The State (2004) 1 NWLR (pt.855) 488.
For the reason stated above, and for the exhaustive reasons given in the lead judgment by my learned brother, Iyizoba, J.C.A., which I had the privilege of reading in advance, I too would dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant for armed robbery by the court below.

Appearances

Olufunke Aboyade (MS) with Abdulwasi Musa Esq. and Latifat Obitayo (Miss) For Appellant

AND

M. B. Olaniyi (Mrs.) Director Office of Public Prosecutions Ministry of Justice Lagos with A. O. Dawodu, Deputy Director. For Respondent