UZOKA & ORS v. ANOSA
(2021)LCN/15863(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(AWKA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, September 30, 2021
CA/AW/83/2010
Before Our Lordships:
Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme Justice of the Court of Appeal
Isaiah Olufemi Akeju Justice of the Court of Appeal
Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. NWANYIEKE UZOKA 2. SYLVESTER UZOKA 3. BENNETH UZOKA APPELANT(S)
And
AZUBIKE ANOSA (Substituted For Christopher Anosa (Deceased) By Order Of Court Made On 16-05-2018 RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT CASES IN CONTENTION ARE NORMALLY DECIDED ON ADDRESSES
The settled position of the law is that cases or issues in contention are not normally decided on addresses but on credible evidence: NIGER CONSTRUCTION LTD V OKUGBENI (1987) 4 NWLR, PT 67, 787; DONATUS NDU V THE STATE (2011) 12 NWLR, PT 1261, 401 and EZEANI V FRN (2019) LPELR–46800 (SC). I find nothing at page 15 of the records referred to by the Appellants or in any other part of the record which shows or establishes that “Umuagbu-na-Okeaji of the Plaintiffs are part and parcel of Umumbike who came from Ozubulu.” PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
WAYS IN WHICH TITLE CAN BE PUT IN ISSUE
It is clear from these facts between the contending parties that the title of the piece of land known as “Agbo-Okwu-Oye” was in issue between them. In other words, title is put in issue where a claimant alleges that the party in possession is a trespasser. My learned brother Sankey JCA, expressed this very succinctly and I quote her with approval when she held in the case of OGUNLEYE V SAFEJO (2009) 4 FWLR, PT 503, 10355 thus:
“There are two ways in which title can be put in issue. The first is by expressly basing the claim on title and the second, by claiming damages for trespass and injunction. See AGU V NNADI (2002) 12 SCNJ 238”.
See also GIWA & ANOR V AKINLABI & ORS (2012) LPELR–20426 (CA); IKHUMETSE V ERAGBE (2015) LPELR–25684 CA; EGWA V EGWA (2006) 4 FWLR, PT 339, 6594 AT 6617 and NWOKOROBIA V NWOGU & ORS (2009) 10 NWLR, PT 1150, 553. PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN GRANT AN ANCILLARY CLAIM FOR INJUNCTION WHERE DAMAGES ARE AWARDED FOR TRESPASS TO LAND
The settled position of law is that where damages are awarded for trespass to land and there is an ancillary claim for injunction, the Court will grant an injunction. However the claim for injunction is in no way dependent on declaration of title: OBANOR V OBANOR (1976) NMLR VOL. 1 39 AT 43. In the case of BALOGUN & ORS V AKANJI & ORS (2005) 10 NWLR PT 933, 394, the apex Court emphasized that the claim for trespass is not dependent on the success of a claim for declaration of title as both are separate and independent of each other. See also UDE V CHIMBO (1998) 12 NWLR, PT 577, 169 AT 187. It follows therefore that since the claim for trespass is separate and independent of the claim for declaration of title, counsel is misconceived to suggest that failure to grant the claim for damages for trespass and injunction meant that the plaintiff failed to prove his claim for declaration to title which ought to have been dismissed. This is especially so in the circumstances of this case where the trial Court explained why the defendants are not liable in trespass, “because no exhibit was shown to the Court about the harvesting of the Palm nuts, therefore the three hundred naira (N300.00) claim is unjustifiable and not upheld.” PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEAL CAN INTERFERE WITH THE CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT MADE IN THE TRIAL COURTS
The Court below and the trial Court have made concurrent findings of fact in respect of title to the land in dispute. The accepted position of law is that the concurrent findings of fact made in the two Courts below can only be interfered with in this Court where the Courts below have been shown to be in manifest error in their finding or the findings of fact as they are would lead to a miscarriage of justice: OKONKWO & ANOR V ADIGWU (1985) 1 NWLR, PT 4, 694. NNAMANI JSC puts it more lucidly in the case of OLUJINLE V ADEAGBO (1988) 2 NWLR, PT 75 238, when he concluded thus:
“…..Nor would this Court interfere with concurrent judgments of two Courts unless there are substantial errors in law or procedure leading to a miscarriage of justice”. See also SOGUNRO & ORS V YEKU & ORS (2017) LPELR–41905 (SC) and FRN V UMEH & ANOR (2019) LPELR–46801 (SC). PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This very old appeal arose from the decision of the Customary Court, Ozubulu, Anambra State. The Plaintiff/Respondent had on the 30th March, 1990 taken out an action against the Defendants/Appellants claiming damages for trespass and an order of injunction over a parcel of land known as “Agbo-Okwu-Oye”, situate at Irefi Orifite town. The matter went to trial. In his judgment delivered on the 4th December, 1991, the trial Judge found the Defendants/Appellants not liable in trespass and injunction as claimed by the Plaintiff/Respondent. The trial Judge also revoked the interim injunction it earlier granted over the land but turned round and declared the plaintiff/Respondent the owner of the land in dispute. The Defendants/Appellants in an apparent puzzle to the action of trial Court appealed to the High Court. The Defendants/Appellants contended that it was curious that the lower Court upheld the decision of the Customary Court, which granted a relief never claimed. It is against this judgment that the Defendant/Appellants by a Notice of Appeal dated the 28th May, 2007 and filed on the 4th of June, 2007, appealed to the High Court. This Notice of Appeal was filed pursuant to the leave of Court sought and obtained on the 14th May, 2007. The four grounds of appeal and their particulars are as follows:
GROUND ONE; ERROR-IN-LAW AND MISDIRECTION:
The learned Judge of the lower Court erred in law and misdirected herself in law by affirming the judgment of the trial Customary Court to the effect that exhibit B, the previous judgments of a competent Court involving the parties; do not operate as estoppels to bar the plaintiff’s/Respondent’s suit.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR AND MISDIRECTION
It is not disputed that the parties in this suit have been, through their predecessors-in-title, involved in previous suits namely: 56/38, 107, 155 and 84/38, which all ended in favour of the defendants/Appellants. The final decisions in those suit on review by P.C.HODGSON, ADC in March 30th 1939 was to the effect, inter alia, that the present plaintiff’s family were immigrants in Irefi Orifite. This decision has thus far created an issue estoppel as regards the status of the Plaintiff’s/Respondent’s family in Irefi Oraifite as there having been no reversal of that decision till date, same stands and the Plaintiff/Respondent cannot just wish the effect away by contending a contrary position in this suit.
GROUND TWO; MISDIRECTION-IN-LAW:
It is a misdirection in law and on the facts for the learned Judge of the lower Court to affirm the decision of the trial Customary Court which granted to the Plaintiff/Respondent relief which he did not claim and more so when the same trial Court had earlier rejected all the plaintiff’s claims before it.
PARTICULARS OF MISDIRECTION
The trial Court appeared to prevaricate, approbate and reprobate and the Court below totally abdicated its judicial functions to correct such injurious stand.
It is an impossible event for a plaintiff to completely lose his claims in Court and at the same time win the suit.
In any case, no Court of law is entitled to award a relief which neither of the parties claimed before it.
GROUND THREE; ERROR-IN-LAW AND MISDIRECTION
The Court below erred in law and misdirected itself in law by holding that the judgment of the trial customary Court accords with common sense, a perverse decision, when in fact this was not the case, and thereby came to a wrong decision occasioning miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
Where as in this case, it was established that the plaintiff’s/Respondent’s ancestors were the donees of the defendants/Appellants; then the issue of the title and boundary and/or even the extent of the land so donated cannot arise at all as between the done and the donor.
The trial Customary Court relied heavily on the customary law manual (Imo and Anambra States) and it was a grave error on the part of the Court below to affirm this when the said customary law manual is not a piece of legislation anywhere in Anambra State.
Throughout its judgment, the trial Customary Court did not reflect any logistical reasoning, the same failed woefully to accord any respect to the adversary system of adjudication in that the case put forward by the Defendants/Appellants werenever considered at all and/or given adequate consideration.
GROUND FOUR; WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE: –
The decision is against the weight of evidence.
In prosecuting the appeal, the Appellants filed their Brief of Argument on the 8th July, 2018. This brief was amended on the 31st May, 2018 and deemed properly filed and served on the 6th July, 2021. In arguing the appeal, MR. O. A. Ubachukwu of counsel for the Appellants adopted the brief as their legal arguments in support of the appeal. In it, the appellant distilled four issues for determination thus:
(i) Whether the Court below was right in holding the finding of the trial Customary Court Ozubulu to the effect that exhibit B, the 1939 judgment did not constitute issue estoppel between the family of the Defendants/Appellants and the family of the Respondent. (Ground one of the Grounds of Appeal).
(ii) Whether the lower Court was right, having regard to the reliefs claimed at the trial Court, to have upheld the award of reliefs not claimed by the Plaintiff at the Court of trial. (Ground two of the Ground of Appeal).
(iii) Whether the Court below properly applied the guidelines to be followed in reviewing the decision of a Customary Court (Ground three of the Grounds of Appeal).
(iv) Whether or not the decision is against the weight of evidence (omnibus Ground four of the Grounds of Apppeal).
On issue (1) counsel submitted that there was already a judgment in suit No. 84/38 which went on appeal by way of review by P. C. Hodgson A. D. C. on the 30th March, 1939 as evidenced by Exhibit B. That this decision is the final judgment of the Court and operated as estoppel per rem judicatam put up by the Defendants/Appellants as part of their defence. Counsel urged the Court to set aside the findings of the lower Court that Exhibit B did not establish issue estoppel capable of extinguishing the Plaintiff/Respondent’s suit. Counsel further urged the Court to hold that Exhibit B created issue estoppel to the effect that the plaintiff/Respondent’s family are tenants of the Defendants/Appellants family and cannot therefore re-litigate this suit.
On issue (2) counsel submitted that no Court has jurisdiction to award what a plaintiff never claimed before it. That a Court cannot go outside the claim as formulated by the parties to order a relief that the plaintiff never asked for. Counsel referred to the cases of OKONJI V NJOKANMA (1991) 5 LRCN, 1674 and AJA & ANOR V OKORO & ORS (1991) 5 LRCN, 1696. Counsel further submitted that the evidence of the Plaintiff/Respondent at the trial Customary Court was uncertain and could not sustain his claim. In other words, that the Plaintiff/Respondent failed to discharge the burden placed upon him by law. That this means that the Plaintiff having failed to discharge the burden placed upon him by law, the proper order to make is one for the dismissal of the claim. Counsel referred to the case of IBEME & ORS V OKPALA & ANOR (1986) 1 QLR, 172.
On issue (3) counsel referred to the case of OKOLIE V ONYEJULUWA (2000) 10 NWLR, PT 676, 450 AT 465 to submit that the decisions of Customary Courts shall accord with common sense, devoid of technicalities. That what this means is that it is not the logic but the truth of the case that matters in Customary Court proceedings. Counsel referred to the case of ODOFIN V ONI (2001) FWLR, PT 36, 807 AT 827 to contend that in matters relating to custom, the Judges of the Customary Court who have special knowledge of the custom are best suited to use their peculiar knowledge to decide such matters in preference to the evidence of parties. Counsel however argued that in the instant case, the Plaintiff’s claim was for damages for trespass and injunction simpliciter which does not require any special knowledge of custom. Counsel contended that the plaintiff’s claim presupposes that the plaintiff was in possession of the land in dispute; that by not finding the defendants liable in trespass, the presumption is that the Customary Court found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in dispute. Counsel submitted that going through the evidence of the plaintiff, his case was hinged on the grant of the land by his ancestors to the defendants’ ancestors and nothing more. That by virtue of Exhibit B the plaintiff could no longer be heard on this issue. Counsel also submitted that the Customary Court Judges visited the locus is quo and from the plaintiff’s answers under cross-examination by the Court, it is clear that the defendants were in effective possession of the land in dispute. That this must have informed the Court’s holding that the defendants were not liable in trespass. That it is therefore contrary to common sense and perverse for the said Court to in the face of this evidence declare the land in dispute as the bona fide property of the plaintiff. Counsel referred to the cases of KIMDEY V MILITARY GOVERNOR, GONGOLA STATE (1988) 5 NWLR, PT 77, 445 and KASHA DADI V NOMA (2000) 15 NWLR, PT 692, 801 AT 810 to submit that where the findings of the Court are in contradiction to the evidence led, the Appellate Court has the duty to interfere and set such findings aside.
Issue 4 is premised on the omnibus ground of appeal which challenges the whole decision of the Court. Counsel referred to SECTION 16 of the COURT OF APPEAL ACT, 1981 and the cases of FATUNDE V ONWUAMANAM (1990) BMLR, 199 and P.T.I V UWAMU (2001) 5 NWLR, PT 705, 112 AT 121–123 to submit that this Court has jurisdiction to make necessary findings of fact which the Court of first instance failed to make. Counsel further submitted that Exhibit B was part of the plea of the defendants at the trial Customary Court and is in conformity with PART III, SECTION 23 of the CUSTOMARY COURT RULES, 1983. That it was the failure of the members of the trial Customary Court to accord due regard to Exhibit B that made them make a somersault after finding that the defendants were lawfully in possession of the land in dispute. That apart from Exhibit B, there are other pieces of evidence showing that the defendants not only possessed the land in dispute but also all the surrounding parcels of land to the land in dispute. Counsel urged the Court to interfere and avoid a miscarriage of justice to the appellant by allowing this appeal and setting aside the decision of the Court below.
The respondent argued their appeal on their amended brief of argument filed on the 5th June, 2018 and deemed properly filed and served on the 6th July, 2021. In opposing the appeal DR. C. A. C. Uzoegwu of counsel for the respondent adopted the brief as their arguments in opposition to the appeal. In it, counsel also formulated four issues for determination by the Court as follows:
(1) Whether the Court below was right in upholding the finding of the trial Court that the document tendered as Exhibit B by the Appellants did not operate as Estoppel Per Rem Judicatam to bar the Respondent’s claim in this suit (Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal).
(2) Whether the Court below was right in upholding the declaration as to the ownership of the land in dispute made by the Trial Court (Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal).
(3) Whether the Court below was right in upholding that the Trial Customary Court properly evaluated the evidence led before it and that the decision reached thereby was not perverse (Ground 3 of the Grounds of Appeal).
(4) Whether or not the decision of the Trial Court is against the weight of evidence (Ground 4, Omnibus Ground).
On the first issue, counsel submitted that neither the doctrine of res judicatum nor Section 54 of the Evidence Act, 2011 is applicable to the instant case as the Plaintiff/Respondent was never a party to the proceedings in Exhibit B. Counsel referred to the cases of BALOGUN V ADEJOBI (1995) 1 SCNJ, 242 AT 245, RATIO 1 and ABISI & ORS V EKWEALOR & ANOR (1993) 7 (PART 1) SCNJ, 193 AT 196, RATIO 8 to argue that Exhibit B is ‘res inter alios’, the plaintiff not being a party to the suit of 1939. That Exhibit B is therefore not admissible against the Plaintiff/Respondent. Counsel also argued that the subject matter is not the same. Counsel also submitted that Exhibit B has not complied with Section 104 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and should be expunged from the records, having been wrongly admitted. Counsel referred to the cases of IGE V FAGBOHUN (2002) FWLR PT 127, 1140 AT 1147, RATIO 14 and OJENGBEDE V ESAN (2002) FWLR, PT 90, 406, AT 1414 & 1415, RATIOS 9 and 10.
On issue (2), Counsel referred to the case of CYPRIAN ONWUAMA V LOUIS EZEOKOLI (2002) FWLR, PT 100, 1213 AT 1215, RATIO, 1 to submit that because pleadings are unknown in Customary Courts, the Appellate Court must consider the substance of the proceedings liberally in order to do substantial justice to the parties as Customary Courts are not to be weighed down by technicalities. Counsel referred to the cases of AKULAKU V YONGO (2002) FWLR, PT 100, 1228 AT 1230, RATIO 3 and AGBEJE V AJIBOLA (2002) FWLR, PT 92, 1677 AT 1680, RATIO 1. Counsel argued that the judgment of the Customary Court was a declaratory judgment which did not contain any order to be enforced against the defendants. Counsel urged the Court to uphold the declaration as to the ownership of the land in dispute made by the trial Court.
On issue (3), counsel relied on the case of AGBEJE V AJIBOLA (SUPRA) AT 1681, RATIO 4 to submit that where a trial Court unquestionably evaluates and justifiably appraises the facts, what the Appellate Court ought to do is to find out if there is evidence on record from which the trial Court could have based its findings but should not interfere. Counsel referred to the cases of AWAOGBO & ORS V EZE (1995) 1 SCNJ, 157 AT 159, RATIO 1 and OLABANJI & ANOR V OMOKEWU & ORS (1992) 7 SCNJ, 266 AT 267, RATIO 3. Counsel referred to the case of SAMUEL ONWUJUBA & ORS V NATHANIEL OBIENU & ORS (1991) 5 SCNJ, 40 AT 41, RATIO 7 to concede that in appropriate cases findings of the Customary Court may be disturbed if there is some miscarriage of justice. Counsel however maintained that the instant case does not present such a scenario that calls for interference. Counsel submitted that the findings of fact made in this case are supported by evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom are appropriate. That the circumstances under which this Court can interfere with the said findings of fact have not been shown to exist. Counsel further submitted that the concurrent decisions of the trial Court and the Court below should not be disturbed by this Court in the absence of an established miscarriage of justice or violation of some legal principles of law or procedure.
In arguing issue (4), counsel submitted that the trial Court fully considered the totality of the evidence, ascribed probative value to it and found in favour of the Plaintiffs. Counsel argued that there was no evidence of compensation from NEPA as alleged by the appellant. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court.
The four issues raised by the Respondent are identical to the four issues raised by the Appellants. I will therefore determine this appeal on the four issues formulated by the appellants. The contention of the appellants in respect of issue (1) is that estoppel per rem judicatum by virtue of Exhibit B operates to oust the jurisdiction of the Court. I have considered the arguments of counsel, both salient on this issue. The contention of the Appellants is premised on the assertion that the Respondent is a privy to the Umumbike family. I have gone through the averments and evidence of the defendants/appellants painstakingly. There is no where the appellants led any evidence to establish the connection between the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Plaintiff in Exhibit B, i.e. Umumbike. The closest the appellants came to doing this is on page 4 of their brief:
“In his evidence at page 15 of the records, the Plaintiff described himself as coming from Agbu-na-Okaji and the Defendants from Umuezechem. At some point Plaintiff and/or his witnesses equally described himself as coming variously from Umuagbu-na-Okeaji and/or Umuagbu-na-Okeaji respectively. But there is evidence that Umuagbu-na-Okeaji of the Plaintiff’s are part and parcel of Umumbike who came from Ozubulu.” (Underlining provided).
It is clear from the underlined portion that the appellants are only making an assertion as to the availability of evidence in support of this fact but failed to provide such evidence. The appellants clearly provided the evidence on record to show that Umuezechem of the defendants are part and parcel of Nkalafis but failed to do same for the plaintiffs. The settled position of the law is that cases or issues in contention are not normally decided on addresses but on credible evidence: NIGER CONSTRUCTION LTD V OKUGBENI (1987) 4 NWLR, PT 67, 787; DONATUS NDU V THE STATE (2011) 12 NWLR, PT 1261, 401 and EZEANI V FRN (2019) LPELR–46800 (SC). I find nothing at page 15 of the records referred to by the Appellants or in any other part of the record which shows or establishes that “Umuagbu-na-Okeaji of the Plaintiffs are part and parcel of Umumbike who came from Ozubulu.” I do agree and uphold the submissions on behalf of the respondent that for the doctrine of res judicatum or SECTION 54 of the Evidence Act, 2011 to apply, the party relying on it has to among other things establish that the parties or their privies are the same and that the subject matter is the same. The contention of the Respondent in respect of the alleged 1938 or 1939 case is that the subject matter was the Iroko tree. This is confirmed from the judgment in respect thereof as contained at page 55 of the record; “Each party must remain on their own portion they had been living on before the advent of English.” Thus the subject matter is therefore not the same. In the circumstances, I find that his Lordship in the Court below was right when he upheld the finding of the trial Court that Exhibit B did not operate as Estoppel Per Rem Judicatum to bar the Respondent’s claim in this suit. I find no justification in disturbing this finding. Consequently, I resolve this issue against the Appellants.
The grouse of the appellants under issue (2) is that the trial Court who found the defendant not liable in trespass went ahead to declare the plaintiff the owner of the land in dispute except for the portion housing the Olie shrine, to be looked after by whoever is the priest in charge of the shrine. The complaint of the appellants under this issue as I understand it is twofold:
Firstly, that the Court granted to the plaintiff a relief not sought and secondly, that the plaintiff having failed to prove this case on the balance of evidence the trial Court ought to have dismissed same instead of finding in his favour as done.
I must say I agree with the appellants’ counsel that a Court not being a Father Christmas or a charitable institution has no jurisdiction to grant reliefs not sought by the plaintiff.
However, the law is also settled that since pleadings are not filed in Customary or Native Courts, the entire proceedings have to be carefully scrutinized to ascertain what the dispute is between the parties. I have meticulously gone through the record, particularly page 3 lines 13–16 which I quote for clarity:
“The Plaintiff is the original owner of a piece or parcel of the land known and called ‘Agbo-Okwu-Oye’ situated at Irefi Oraifite and this Agbo is regarded as a sacred place in accordance with native law and custom of Oraifite town.”
The averments of the defendants/appellants in their affidavit of facts contained at page 12 lines 25–29 are also quite instructive on this issue:
“That the plaintiff before making the above claims has not proved before this Court documentarily his OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND. THAT THE LAND ON WHICH THE PALM TREE STAND BELONG (sic) to us and my grandfather had been harvesting this palm tree before I inherited them”. (Emphasis provided).
It is clear from these facts between the contending parties that the title of the piece of land known as “Agbo-Okwu-Oye” was in issue between them. In other words, title is put in issue where a claimant alleges that the party in possession is a trespasser. My learned brother Sankey JCA, expressed this very succinctly and I quote her with approval when she held in the case of OGUNLEYE V SAFEJO (2009) 4 FWLR, PT 503, 10355 thus:
“There are two ways in which title can be put in issue. The first is by expressly basing the claim on title and the second, by claiming damages for trespass and injunction. See AGU V NNADI (2002) 12 SCNJ 238”.
See also GIWA & ANOR V AKINLABI & ORS (2012) LPELR–20426 (CA); IKHUMETSE V ERAGBE (2015) LPELR–25684 CA; EGWA V EGWA (2006) 4 FWLR, PT 339, 6594 AT 6617 and NWOKOROBIA V NWOGU & ORS (2009) 10 NWLR, PT 1150, 553.
In the instant case, the plaintiff claimed for declaration of title, damages and perpetual injunction. The defendants had asserted ownership of the land in dispute. In my view, these two situations doubly put title to the property in issue and the trial Court would be right to give title to who in its view proved a better title. Counsel is therefore misconceived in the circumstances to contend that the Court awarded title to the plaintiff/Respondent when same was never claimed.
Now to the second leg of the issue, i.e. whether the plaintiff failed to prove his case on the balance of evidence and the Court ought to have dismissed same. I have again painstakingly read the judgment of the Customary Court contained at pages 40-43 of the record. The rationale for the contention of the appellants stem from the fact that the Court did not find them liable for trespass and it therefore follows that the plaintiff/Respondent had not proved his case. This argument may appear plausible and logical but it does not represent the position of the law. The settled position of law is that where damages are awarded for trespass to land and there is an ancillary claim for injunction, the Court will grant an injunction. However the claim for injunction is in no way dependent on declaration of title: OBANOR V OBANOR (1976) NMLR VOL. 1 39 AT 43. In the case of BALOGUN & ORS V AKANJI & ORS (2005) 10 NWLR PT 933, 394, the apex Court emphasized that the claim for trespass is not dependent on the success of a claim for declaration of title as both are separate and independent of each other. See also UDE V CHIMBO (1998) 12 NWLR, PT 577, 169 AT 187. It follows therefore that since the claim for trespass is separate and independent of the claim for declaration of title, counsel is misconceived to suggest that failure to grant the claim for damages for trespass and injunction meant that the plaintiff failed to prove his claim for declaration to title which ought to have been dismissed. This is especially so in the circumstances of this case where the trial Court explained why the defendants are not liable in trespass, “because no exhibit was shown to the Court about the harvesting of the Palm nuts, therefore the three hundred naira (N300.00) claim is unjustifiable and not upheld.”
As found earlier in this judgment, one of the acceptable ways of putting title in issue is by claiming damages for trespass and injunction. This being the undeniable position in the instant case title was in issue. The trial Court therefore has an obligation to resolve title and rightly in my view did so. I do not therefore agree with the appellant that neither of them put title to the property in issue before the trial Court, that the Court resolving that issue in favour of the defendant/Respondent amounts to granting a relief not sought. The relief was implied in the claim. The trial Court acted within its powers by determining the issue of title and I so hold. As a result this issue is also resolved against the appellants.
In treating issues (3) and (4) together, I am satisfied from the decision of his Lordship in the Court below that he has effectively reviewed the judgment of the trial Court and satisfied himself that the trial Court properly evaluated the evidence before it and the decision is not perverse. I must say that the trial Court did an excellent job in that its findings of fact in the case are clearly supported by evidence on record and the inference drawn are quite proper, logical and accord with common sense. The appellants have failed to show in the Court below and in this Court any circumstances that should make either Court to interfere with findings and inferences reached by the trial Court. They have also failed to show how any finding of fact or inference made by the Court has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to them. It is firmly established that where a trial Court unquestionably evaluates the evidence and appraises the facts, it is not the business of the appellate Court to substitute its own views. The Court below satisfied herself that there was sufficient evidence on record from which the trial Court made its findings. She therefore rightly in my view refrained from disturbing the decision of the Court below. This posture is better appreciated when it is seen that the trial Court was a customary Court presided over by non-legal persons. The appellate Court is enjoined in such circumstances to focus on the substance and not the form. The lower Court approached the decision of the trial Court with the required latitude and objective posture required of an appellate Court.
The Court below and the trial Court have made concurrent findings of fact in respect of title to the land in dispute. The accepted position of law is that the concurrent findings of fact made in the two Courts below can only be interfered with in this Court where the Courts below have been shown to be in manifest error in their finding or the findings of fact as they are would lead to a miscarriage of justice: OKONKWO & ANOR V ADIGWU (1985) 1 NWLR, PT 4, 694. NNAMANI JSC puts it more lucidly in the case of OLUJINLE V ADEAGBO (1988) 2 NWLR, PT 75 238, when he concluded thus:
“…..Nor would this Court interfere with concurrent judgments of two Courts unless there are substantial errors in law or procedure leading to a miscarriage of justice”. See also SOGUNRO & ORS V YEKU & ORS (2017) LPELR–41905 (SC) and FRN V UMEH & ANOR (2019) LPELR–46801 (SC).
It has not been shown by the appellant that either the trial Court or the lower Court fell into any grave error in their deductive reasoning based on the admitted facts on record. I will therefore refrain from interfering in this appeal. Issues (3) & (4) are also resolved against the appellants. In the circumstances, this appeal fails. Same is accordingly dismissed.
I make no order as to costs in the circumstances of this case.
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A.: I agree.
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the judgment of my learned brother, PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, JCA before it was delivered.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein. I dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders.
Appearances:
MR. O.A. UBACHUKWU For Appellant(s)
DR. C.A.C. UZOEGWU For Respondent(s)