UNITRUST INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. AMBICO SENDIRIAN NIGERIA LTD. (2012)

UNITRUST INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. AMBICO SENDIRIAN NIGERIA LTD.

(2012)LCN/5626(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 22nd day of October, 2012

CA/L/967/08

RATIO

WORDS AND PHRASES: MEANING OF CONDITION PRECEDENT

The Term “Condition precedent” has been defined in the Blacks’ Law Dictionary 6th Edition – Page 312 as an act or event, other than a lapse of time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised arises. If the condition does not occur and is not excused, the promised performance need not be rendered. PER RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.

CONTRACT: MEANING AND NATURE OF AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT

In Vol. 8 of HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND 3RD EDITION PAGE 126, PARAGRAPH 218 it says

“A contract is illegal where the subject matter of the promise is illegal or where the consideration or any part of it is illegal”

Where a Contract is expressly forbidden by statute, its illegality is without question, and the Courts are forbidden to enforce it, or allow itself to be used to perpetuate illegality, or enforce same in all its ramifications.

It behoves on parties to bring to the notice of the Court any illegality, and if this is done, it overrides all questions of pleadings including any admission made thereon BELVOIR FINANCE CO. LTD. V HAROLD G. COLE & CO. LTD. 1969, WLR. 1877. PER RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.

CONTRACT: WHETHER A PARTY CAN BENEFIT ANY RIGHT FROM AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT

Where a contract is illegal ex- facie, neither party can desire any right or interest from it. It is void ab initio – PAN BISBILDER (NIG) LTD v. FBN LTD. 2000, 1 NWLR PT. 642 @ 684 … 697. Where a contract is on the face of it illegal or void, the court will take notice of that fact and refuse to enforce the contract even though the vitiating factor has not been pleaded, and even though the Defendant does not wish to raise the objection – ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE CORPN v. SJO FONS AKRINGS AKTIEBOLAGET VEGA (1902) 2KB 384. PER RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.

CONTRACT: WHETHER AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT CAN BE LEGALIZED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC POLICY

A contract, that has no root, cannot lean on the Principle of public Policy to take root. It is dead and dead it is. See HORWOOD v. MILLAR’S TIMBER & TRADING CO. LTD (1917) 1 KB, 305; KINE v. MICHAEL FARADAY & PARTNERS LTD. (1939) 2 KB 753 (1939) 2 ALL ER 498. In these cases, the contracts were void, not illegal.

The result is that there was nothing to enforce in the contract, the subject matter of this suit. This is because an illegal contract is void and cannot be the foundation of any legal right. PER RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

UNITRUST INSURANCE CO. LTD. – Appellant(s)

AND

AMBICO SENDIRIAN NIGERIA LTD. – Respondent(s)

RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A. (Delivering the leading judgment): The claim, the subject matter of the present appeal was instituted at the High Court of Lagos state, Lagos, by writ of summons dated the 24th of November 2005 but sealed on the 24th of October 2004, wherein the Claimant (now Appellant) claims against the Defendant (Now Respondent) as follows:

1. “The sum of N7,357,585.15 (Seven Million, three hundred and fifty seven thousand, five hundred and eighty-five naira, fifteen kobo only) due and payable by the Defendant.

2. Interest on the said sum at the rate of 21% per annum from the 13th day of April, 2005, until the Judgment and at the rate of 6% per annum thereafter until the judgment debt is satisfied.

3. The sum of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand naira only) being the costs of this action.” Pages 1-2 of the Record of Appeal.

In his 7 paragraphs Statement of Claim reflected at Pages 3-4 of the Record of Appeal, the claimant had claimed reliefs 1 & 2 only, as reflected as reliefs a & b on the Statement of Claim.

The Appeal is for an order to set aside the Ruling of the Hon. Justice R.I.B. Adebiyi given on the 26th of June 2006 in suit No. LD/2117/2005.

The Appellant’s Brief of argument is devoid of the facts of the case, but on the 18th of September, 2012, when he adopted his brief of Argument, learned counsel submitted that the Appellant had paid part of the premium and not the full payment. That there was a Preliminary Objection on failure to pay the full premium, but that the court held that the contract of Insurance was voidable and declined Jurisdiction.

It is however on record that, at the conclusion of filing of pleadings, the Respondent, filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 18th May 2006 challenging the enforceability and/or validity of the contract of Insurance, as well as the competence of the lower court to hear and determine the substantive suit. Pages 96-103 of the Record of Appeal.

The Grounds for the Preliminary Objection were that:

a) The Contract of Insurance, the subject matter of the present suit is incompetent and an abuse of the processes of this Honourable Court.

b) This Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the suit as presently constituted.

This is buttressed by the grounds that:

1) “By virtue of Section 50 of the Insurance Act, receipt of an insurance premium is a condition precedent to a valid contract /Insurance unless the premium is paid in advance.

2) The Court is duty bound to refuse to enforce a contract that is patently illegal and void”

After hearing the Preliminary Objection, the learned trial Judge in his Ruling of 26th June 2006, held that the Court lacked Jurisdiction, to entertain the action, the condition precedent to the creation of a valid Contact of Insurance, not having been met, pursuant to Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act cap 117 L.F.N. 2004, thereby upholding the Preliminary Objection and striking out the suit. Pages 119-121 of the Record of Appeal.

The Appellant, dissatisfied with the outcome of the Preliminary Objection, filed a Notice of Appeal on the 19th of May 2008, encapsulating two grounds of Appeal.

The Appellant had sought for, and obtained an order enlarging time within which he can compile and transmit the Record of Appeal on the 8th of February 2011. The Record of Appeal was therefore deemed compiled and transmitted to this Honourable Court on the 8th of February 2011.

The Appellant filed his brief of Argument on the 9th of February 2011, and a Reply Brief of Argument on the 14th of April 2011. He adopted both briefs on the 18th of September, 2012.

The Respondent filed his Brief of Argument on the 11th of March 2011, and adopted same on the 18th September, 2012, urging this Honourable Court to dismiss the Appeal.

The Appellant articulated and formulated two issues for determination as reflected at Page 2 of his Brief of Argument. They are:

a) “Was the claimants’ claim premature and void having regards to trade practice in the Insurance Industry and in view of public policy consideration?

b) In view of the trial court’s Ruling that the Appellants’ claim was founded on a voidable contract, was the trial court right in declining jurisdiction? ”

He submits that Issue No. 1 emanates from Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal while Issue No. 2 emanates from Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal.

Arguing Issue No. 1, which I find predicated on Ground No. 1, the Appellant submits that the learned trial Judge had only considered the statement of Claim in arriving at her conclusion, in considering the Preliminary Objection, with regard to the issue of jurisdiction. That she should have considered the Statement of Defence too. That the Suit at the High Court was in fact concerned with a series of Insurance Contracts and policies issued thereto to the Defendant by the Appellant.

He contends that the learned trial Judge failed to avail herself of the entire circumstances, as set out in Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim, – referring to a letter from the Defendant’s- broker to the Defendant, which letter forms part of the pleadings and evidence, as it was exhibited to the claimant’s witness Statement on oath. That the Pleadings and evidence disclosed a cause of action worthy of consideration by the trial Judge in a full blown trial.

The Respondent had proffered and articulated at pages 6 to 7 of his Brief of Argument, two issues for determination. They are:

a. “Whether the failure to pay Insurance premium as provided for by the provisions of Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act renders on Insurance contract invalid and inactionable as held by the lower Court?”

b. “Whether the lower Court was right to have declined jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant’s claim as indorsed upon the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim upon the reasoning that the Insurance Contract upon which it may be founded is voidable.”

He submits, referring to Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act, that that section can be interpreted to mean that there shall be no valid Insurance contract save where the premium relating thereto has been paid in full.

He also postulates that the import of the words “there shall be no cover, in respect of an insurance risk, unless the premium is paid in advance”, employed in Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act, is that the insurer is under no contractual obligation, to abide by the terms of an insurance policy if the premium is not paid. He argues that therefore, the insurer does not in such circumstance, provide any service to the supposed insured, in respect of which he can sue as done by the Appellant in the lower Court.

Learned Counsel has argued that the insurance premium is the consideration for an insurance contract/policy, and the payment of the requisite insurance premium in full, makes it impossible for the insurer to sue for the payment of insurance premium.

He submits that the provisions of the Insurance Act are enacted as a matter of Public Policy, because the contractual breach of the Respondent, as well as the actions of the Respondent not only makes a mockery of public policy, but makes it repugnant, and it behoves both Counsel and the Court to ask which is the paramount interest to safeguard.

Citing ONWUCHEKWA v. NDIC 2002, 2 S.C. PART (11), he argues that upon the strength of same, the overriding public interest is that parties should not be deprived of their entitlements. That indeed the Appellant should not be denied its constitutional right to seek redress in the Courts, to enforce the performance of contracts willingly entered into by both parties. He further argues that the manipulation of the insurance Act by the Respondent, to use it as a technicality to escape the performance of its obligation to the Appellant, should be discouraged as a matter of Public Policy. And that contractual obligations should be adhered.

He submits that a cause of action had been disclosed, and that it was premature on the High Court’s part to strike out a suit, the substance of which could only be appreciated through proceedings at trial.

The Appellant has argued that if a contract is voidable, measures can be taken to repair the defects therein, and render it valid. Therefore, he further argues, that the Court was wrong to have declined Jurisdiction to look into the Respondents’ breach. That it was wrong for the Court to allow the Respondent to use a technical ploy to escape it’s contractual duty to the Appellant.

He urges this Court to set aside the Ruling of the Honourable Justice R.I.B. Adebiyi delivered on the 26th day of June, 2006 in Suit No. LD/2117/2005, and to remit the matter to the High Court for trial.

The Respondent had, in adopting his Brief of Argument in Court argued that Issue No. 1 as shown in paragraph 3(a) at page 2 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated 8th February, 2011 does not arise from any of the Grounds of Appeal as contained in the Appellants’ Notice of Appeal dated 19th May, 2008. He further argues that the Appellant had no complaint in either of his two Grounds of Appeal, which alleges a complaint relating to the failure of the High Court of Lagos State to consider the trade practice in the Insurance Industry, and public policy in reaching its decision. He contends that the issue of Trade practice in the Insurance Industry, and Public policy relating thereto, was never canvassed by the parties before the lower Court.

He urges court to discountenance Issue No. 1 in the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, as being incompetent.

The Respondent had further argued that from the provisions of Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act, there shall be no valid insurance contract, save where the premium relating thereto has been paid in full. In other words, the Insurer shall be under no obligation to provide cover to the supposed insured, except the supposed insured has paid the requisite premium in full.

That the import of that section of the law is that the insurer is under no contractual obligation to abide by the terms contained in an insurance policy, if the premium relating thereto is not paid. Therefore, the insurer does not in such circumstance, provide any service to the supposed insured in respect of which he can sue, as done by the Appellant at the lower Court.

He contends that the payment of the requisite insurance premium by the insured is a “must” for the formation of an insurance contract. No contract of Insurance can exist and be sued upon, except the claimant is able to show, as a condition precedent, the fact that the requisite premium was paid over to him as provided for by the provisions of section 50(2) of the Insurance Act. He submits that the Insurance premium is the consideration for an insurance contract/policy, and the failure to make payment of the requisite Insurance premium in full, makes it impossible for the insurer to sue, for the payment of Insurance Premium.

He argues that an Insurance Contract, like every other contract, to be valid, the consideration which is an essential ingredient of a contract must exchange hands. Any failure to exchange consideration renders such contract unenforceable, citing YARO v. AREWA CONSTRUCTION LIMITED & ORS. (2007) 17 NWLR (PT. 1063) 333 AT 377 PARAGRAPH E. F.

He argues that a Court must decline jurisdiction to adjudicate on a matter, once a contract is ex facie illegal, whether or not, such illegality has been pleaded, citing EKWUNIFE v. WAYNE (WEST AFRICA) LIMITED (1985) 5 NWLR (PT. 122) 422 @ 436.

So much for submissions of learned counsel for the respective parties.

Maybe I should address the Respondent’s grouse concerning the issue of the Appellant’s first issue for determination.

He had argued, that the Appellant’s first issue for determination does not arise from his first Ground of Appeal or any of the Grounds of Appeal for that matter.

In considering this argument I deem it necessary to reproduce Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal and Issue No. 1 in the Appellant’s Brief of Argument:

GROUND NO. 1

“The learned trial Judge erred in law when she held that the parties having failed to meet the condition precedent to the creation of a valid contract of Insurance pursuant to the provisions of Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act, the Claimant’s claim is premature and void”

The Appellant’s Issue No. 1 as Gleaned from Page 2 of his Brief of Argument is

“Was the Claimant’s claim premature and void having regards to trade practice in the Insurance industry and in view of public policy consideration?

Now, a cursory look at these, shows that Ground One of the Appellants Grounds of Appeal and Issue No. 1 in his brief of Argument represent the same idea, and that is the idea as to whether the Claimant’s claim was premature and void, as decided by the learned trial Judge. This is the kernel of the matter inherent in Ground one, and the Appellants Issue No. 1, for determination.

Decidedly issues for determination should not be framed in the abstract, but in concrete terms, arising from and related to the Grounds of Appeal. OBED OKPALA & ANOR v. RICHARD IBEME & ORS. (1989) NWLR (PT. 102) 208.

Therefore any issue or argument advanced, but not on an Issue arising from the Ground of Appeal is incompetent OSINUPEBI v. SAIDU 1982, 7-SC. 104.

It is my view that the Appellants first issue for determination flows in essence from his Ground No. 1 of Appeal and the fact that the term “public policy” is inherent in that Issue for determination is of no moment. I find the argument a total misconception and same is hereby discountenanced.

In his Reply Brief filed on the 14th of April 2011, the Appellant had also alluded to the fact that the Respondent formulated two issues for determination outside the issues so formulated by the Appellant. I find this, also a total misconception, as the issues formulated by the respective parties coalesce and overlap and same address the same issues more or less.

Based on the cumulative Issues raised by the respective parties, I would safely say that the Issues for determination can be aptly put thus: viz

a. Whether the Contract of Insurance, the subject matter of this litigation is enforceable in law.

b. If the answer to (a) above is in the negative, does it rob the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the action?

The particular Contract here has to do with Insurance, a matter covered by the Insurance Act- Cap. 117 of 2004.

The learned trial Judge had struck out the suit on the threshold issue of Jurisdiction, because the condition precedent to the creation of a valid contract of Insurance was not met by the Respondent.

It seems to me, that the fulcrum of this Appeal is the decision of the learned trial Court who considered the Preliminary Objection filed on the 19th of May 2006, and upheld same on the Ground that the insured had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act 2004, for failure to pay premium.

This brings to the fore the interpretation of section 50(1) of the Insurance Act 2004.

In Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Statement of Claim (Page 3 of the Record of Appeal) it says:

Paragraph 3

“The Defendant entered into a series of Insurance contracts with the Claimant, however the defendant has failed to pay premium due on the said contracts”

Paragraph 4

“Since September 1998, the Defendant has neglected to honour its obligations to the Claimant; the Claimant shall rely on the schedule of outstanding indebtedness at the trial of this action”

Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act Cap 117, Laws of the Federation 2004 has this to say:

“The receipt of an insurance premium shall be a condition precedent to a valid contract of Insurance and there shall be no cover in respect of an insurance risk, unless the premium is paid in advance.”

In Section 50(2) it says:

“An insurance premium by an insurance broker in respect of an insurance business transacted through the insurance broker shall be deemed to be premium paid to the insurer involved in the transaction”

It is noteworthy that this section comes under the heading “PREMIUMS AND COMMISSIONS” in the Act.

The Statement of Claim has indicated that the Contract of Insurance is void ab-initio for failure of the Defendant to pay premium due on the Contracts.

Section 50(1) of the Act is explicit as to when the premium should be paid. It is to be paid in advance. What is the effect of failure to pay premium in advance, in respect of an Insurance coverage? It, in my view, makes the contract an illegal contract thereby rendering it void. The Act does not talk about part payment.

The Grounds of Preliminary Objection, being one that borders on the threshold issue of Jurisdiction, the learned trial Judge had a duty to take a cursory look at the claim of the Claimant, to see if he is vested with jurisdiction, to entertain the matter. The law is elementary, that it is the claim before Court that has to be looked at, or examined, to ascertain whether or not it comes within the Jurisdiction conferred on the Court.

ADEYEMI v. OPEYORI 1976 9-10 S.C 31; TUKUR v. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (NO. 2) 1989. 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 577; IBRAHIM v. ABDULHAMID (2006) 8 SCM.1 @ 73; 2006. 13 NMLR (PT. 996) 127.

It is the Statement of Claim that determines Jurisdiction – FEDERAL GOVT. OF NIGERIA v. OSHIOMOLE 2004. 3 NWLR-PT. 860 @ 305. A Court has inherent Jurisdiction, in the exercise of its discretionary power, to determine whether or not it has Jurisdiction to entertain a matter. And this can be achieved upon his examination of the claim before it, including whether such claim is premature and void ex-facie.

It follows that parties cannot by themselves or by consent confer Jurisdiction on the Court.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 & 6 of the Statement of Claim comes to focus. I shall reproduce same verbatim, as I deem it pertinent to do so.

Paragraph 3

“The Defendant entered into a series of insurance contract with the Claimant, however the Defendant has failed to pay premium due on the said contracts.”

Paragraph 4

“Since September, 1998, the Defendant has neglected to honour its obligation to the Claimant, the Claimant shall rely on the schedule of outstanding indebtedness at the trial of this action”

Paragraph 6.

“The Claimant’s brokers (Man-Mountain and Company) wrote a letter to the Defendants reminding them of their outstanding indebtedness to the Claimant. However despite this medium, the Defendant did not pay the premium due…”

These paragraphs suffice, to divest the Court of Jurisdiction to entertain the suit, moreso when a preliminary Objection was filed to challenge the Court’s Jurisdiction.

A fortiori, applying the above definition to the provisions of section 50 of the Insurance Act, it means that payment and receipt of Insurance premium, is an act that must exist before there can be a valid contract of Insurance. Non-payment renders the contract null and void. The fact that the learned trial Judge used the word “voidable” is of no moment. The suit is premature, as rightly pointed out by the learned trial Judge.

Now, let me look at the Appellant’s first issue for determination. I shall reproduce same.

“Was the claimant’s claim premature and void having regard to trade practice in the Insurance Industry and in view of public policy”

I had earlier on subsumed this issue into the one I formulated.

Section 1 of the Insurance Act says:

“This Act shall apply to all insurance brokers and business, other than insurance business carried on or by insurers of the following…”

It is my view that Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act, not only makes the payment of premium a condition precedent to a valid contract of Insurance, it goes further to say “there shall be no cover in respect of an insurance risk unless the premium is paid in advance” (as stipulated by the relevant Law).

The question here is not whether the Appellant had made some part payment, but whether the condition precedent to entering such a contract has been met. In other words, whether the Appellant had paid premium in advance (emphasis is mine)

In Vol. 8 of HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND 3RD EDITION PAGE 126, PARAGRAPH 218 it says

“A contract is illegal where the subject matter of the promise is illegal or where the consideration or any part of it is illegal”

By the express provisions of the relevant Law, (here Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act 2004) the payment of insurance premium is a condition precedent to a valid contract of Insurance. Therefore, non compliance with same renders the contract null and void.

In HOLMAN v. JOHNSON 1775 ICOMP. 341 @ 343 LORD MANSFIELD observed inter alia thus:

“If from the Plaintiffs claim own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise “ex turpei cause” or the transgression of a positive law of this Country, then the Court says he has no right to be assisted. To allow the Claimant to enforce the contract is to permit this Honourable Court to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of a contract on transaction which is illegal SCOTT v. BROWN 1892, 2 Q-B 724 per hindley C.J.”

In AJAOKUTA STEEL CO. LTD v. CORPORATE INSURANCE LTD. 2004, 16 NWLR (PT.899) 367 AT 397, Oguntade J.C.A . (as he then was) observed thus:

“Section 50(1) of the Insurance Act 1997 not only makes the payment of premium a condition precedent to a valid contract of insurance, it goes further to say “there shall be no cover in respect of an insurance risk unless the premium is paid in advance”

There is no doubt that statutorily, the premium must be prepaid and fully too.

Where the law is silent on whether the premium shall be paid fully or by instalment, the presumption is that it should be paid fully, and this, by virtue of Section 50(1) in ADVANCE.

It is obvious that the answer to the Issue of whether the contract, the subject matter of this appeal is enforceable in law, is necessarily in the negative and the Issue is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant. Ipso facto, Issue No.2 as framed by me must necessarily be in the affirmative and same is resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.

I shall quickly say here, that Judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law, than as expounders of Public Policy – RE MIRAMS (1891) 1QB 594 @ 595 PER CARE J.

The result is that there was nothing to enforce in the contract, the subject matter of this suit. This is because an illegal contract is void and cannot be the foundation of any legal right.

The learned trial judge was therefore, in my view right to have struck out the suit as he did, while upholding the preliminary Objection.

The Appeal consequently, is devoid of merit and same is hereby dismissed. Parties are to bear their own costs.

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.C.A.: I have read before now the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Pemu, J.C.A. and I agree with him that the appeal lacks merit.

He has addressed all the issues, and I have nothing useful to add except a few words on the objection raised by the Respondent to Issue 1 distilled by the Appellant from Ground 1 of its Grounds of Appeal. Yes, however meritorious a ground of appeal may be, it must be connected with the controversy between the parties; so also the issue arising from the ground – see MBN Plc. v. Nwobodo (2005) 7 S.C. (Pt. 111) 1.

Issues for determination are meant to be a guide to the arguments and submissions to be advanced in support of the Grounds of Appeal – see Ogbuayinya & Ors. v. Okudo & Ors. (No.2) (1990) 8 NWLR (pt. 146) 55 and Management Enterprises Ltd. ABC Merchant Bank (1996) 6 NWLR (pt. 453) 249 where Pats-Acholonu, J.C.A. (as he then was) said – “the three characteristics of Issues are precision, brevity and clarity”.

In this case, the Appellant’s complaint in Ground 1 of its Grounds of Appeal is that the lower Court erred when it held that the “claimant’s claim is premature and void” because parties failed to meet the condition precedent to the creation of a valid contract of insurance. Issue 1 simply questions whether the lower Court was right to hold that the claimant’s claim was premature and void, and the added reference to trade practice and “public policy considerations” does not take away or add anything. The Respondent’s objection is therefore misconceived, and lacks merit.

The bottom line is that I also dismiss the appeal, and I abide by the consequential orders in the lead Judgment, including that on costs.

ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.: I have been afforded an opportunity of reading in advance the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Pemu, J.C.A. I am in agreement fully, with the reasoning and the reasoned conclusion in the said judgment.

For the reasons adumbrated in the judgment, I also hold that the appeal is lacking in merit and I join my brother in dismissing same.

I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.

Appearances

Oranmiyan Biobaku Esq.For Appellant

AND

A. A. Adegbomire with him is O. Iyayi Esq., (Mrs.)For Respondent