UNICAL v. MENSAH
(2020)LCN/15736(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Tuesday, June 30, 2020
CA/E/436/2008
Before Our Lordships:
Ignatius Igwe Agube Justice of the Court of Appeal
Joseph Olubunmi Kayode Oyewole Justice of the Court of Appeal
Abubakar Sadiq Umar Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR APPELANT(S)
And
HENRY MANSON MENSAH RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
DETERMINATION OF THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT
Jurisdiction is the life elixir of adjudication. Any exercise of judicial power without the requisite jurisdiction renders the outcome of such exercise totally null and void and incapable of conferring any legal benefit. Jurisdiction of a Court is a statutory matter and with regards to the civil jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, recourse would be made to Section 251 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) hereinafter referred to as the Constitution.
To determine the jurisdiction of a Court in a specific matter, the Court would examine the originating processes of the Plaintiff or Claimant as the case may be. See ADEYEMI VS OPEYORI (1976) 9-10 SC 31, TUKUR VS GOVT OF TARABA STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (PART 510) 549, OKOROMA VS UBA (1999) 1 NWLR (PART 587) 359 and MIN. FOR WORKS VS TOMAS NIG. LTD (SUPRA) at 772 and 789. JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.
THE LIMITATION PERIOD AND THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE
Essentially, limitation legislations have the effect of extinguishing a cause of action once such has not been ventilated within the prescribed period. Where a limitation period is in existence, a litigant who is aggrieved and has a cause of action must approach the Court promptly within the stipulated time otherwise he loses the right to litigate on that issue and the Courts would be deprived of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain his claim. See OLAGUNJU & ANOR VS. PHCN PLC (2011) LPELR-2556(SC) and INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION VS OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC). JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.
THE DESCRIPTION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
For a determination of when the period of limitation sets in, the Court must determine the date of accrual of the cause of action. A cause of action has been described as a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain a remedy against another person. It is a fact or combination of facts which when proved would entitle aplaintiff to a remedy against a defendant. It consists of every fact, which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment of the Court. That is, the fact or combination of facts which gave rise to a right to sue. It is a cause for action in the Courts to determine disputed matters. See EGBE VS ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (PART 3) 549, THOMAS VS OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (PART 18) 689 and DANTATA VS MOHAMED (2000) 7 NWLR (PART 664) 176. JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Ebonyi State, Abakaliki Judicial Division, holden at Abakaliki delivered on the 13th May, 2008 by NJOKU, J.
The Appellant was 3rd defendant in an action for libel taken out by the Respondent at the trial Court wherein the Respondent sought the following reliefs:
The plaintiff claims against the Defendants jointly and severally as follows:-
1. A declaration that the letter written by the 2nd defendant, the principal officer and Chief Executive/Administrative Officer of the 1st Defendant for and on behalf of the 1st defendant and published to the Vice-Chancellor of Ebonyi State University. Reference VC/J-1/ vol. 11/48 and dated 27th day of April, 2007 is Libelous of the Plaintiff insofar as the character and content of the letter are concerned to wit:
University of Ado-Ekiti
Office of the Vice Chancellor
VC/J-1/Vol. II/48
The Vice Chancellor,
Ebonyi State University
P.M.B. 53
Abakaliki
Ebonyi State
My dear vice-chancellor,
Re: Dr. H.H. Mensah
I have be inreliably informed that one Dr. H.H. Mensah a Ghanaian is currently employed in your University as Professor of Law.
Dr. Mensah was a contract officer of this University before. He resigned his appointment in March, 2006 when we were about to determine his appointment on the receipt of a letter from the University of Calabar that his appointment was terminated in December, 2000 for alteration of examination grades in some Law courses.
Dr. Mensah is not fit to be lecturer in our University system in Nigeria.
A copy of the letter of the Registrar of University of Calabar is attached herewith.
Best wishes.
Professor I.O. Orbuloye
Vice Chancellor.
2. A declaration that the letter written by the 3rd defendant and published to the 1st defendant, reference UC/R. 113 and dated 14th February, 2006, which letter was further published by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the Vice Chancellor, Ebonyi State University on 27th April, 2007 as here below is defamatory of the plaintiff, to with.
“University of Calabar
P.M.B. 1115 Calabar, C.R.S., Nigeria
14th February, 2006”
UC/R.113
Registrar
University of Ado-Ekiti
Ekiti State.
Re: Information on Dr. H.H. Mensah
I wish to confirm that Dr. Mensah was a staff of this University. His appointment was however terminated with effect from December, 2000 for act of gross misconduct bordering on alteration of examination grades in some law courses in the Faculty of Law.
I hope the above information will serve your purpose.
Best personal wishes.
E.E. EFFIOM
Registrar
3. Damages, the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira only) against the defendants jointly and severally for the libelous publications against the plaintiff contained in the 1st and 2nd defendants letter dated 27th April, 2007 and published to Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki.
4. An apology made by the defendants to the plaintiff in writing and published in least two national daily newspapers, to wit the punch newspaper and the Sun Newspaper for the libelous publication caused to be published by them against the plaintiff.
5. An order compelling the defendants to issue a letter of retraction of the said libelous publication, written by the defendants to Ebonyi State University.
6. A perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from any further acts of libel against the plaintiff.
On being served, the Appellant entered conditional appearance which was accompanied by a preliminary objection to the said suit on the following grounds:
1. That a condition precedent to the issuance of the suit to wit, obtaining leave of Court before issuing the writ was not met contrary to Order 5 Rule 6 and 15 of the High Court Rules of Imo State as applicable to Ebonyi State.
2. That the suit as constituted is not before the appropriate Court by virtue of the fact that the 3rd defendant is a Federal Government Institution and ought to be sued at a Federal High Court.
3. That the Writ of Summons has three different dates making same void/invalid.
4. That processes filed in Court shall be relied upon at the hearing of this objection.
After taking arguments from the two sides, the learned trial Judge found no merit in the said preliminary objection and accordingly dismissed it.
Dissatisfied, the Appellant invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court via a Notice of Appeal filed on the 26th May, 2008, containing a lone ground.
The said Notice of Appeal was subjected to a number of amendments with the extant version being the Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed on the 12th October, 2018 containing three grounds.
At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Sani adopted the Amended Appellant’s brief filed on the 12th October, 2018 but deemed properly filed and served on the 16th October, 2018 as well as the Appellant’s Reply brief filed on the 20th September, 2018 but deemed properly filed and served on the 10th June, 2020 as the arguments of the Appellant in furtherance of the Appeal. Although notified of the hearing date, the Respondent was absent and unrepresented upon which his Respondent’s brief filed on the 3rd January, 2019 but deemed properly filed and served on the 10th June, 2020 was deemed adopted pursuant to Order 19, Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of this Court, 2016.
The Appellant distilled two issues for determination thus:
1. Whether the Appellant’s letter dated 14th February, 2006 written by its registrar in reply to the Registrar of University of Ado-Ekiti on the Respondent is not an administrative or executive act of the University of Calabar within the meaning of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. (Grounds 1 & 2).
2. Whether the Respondent suit is not caught by Section 2(A) of Public Officers Protection Act and thereby statute barred depriving the Court of jurisdiction (Ground 3).
Seemingly crying louder than the bereaved and not having filed a cross-appeal, the Respondent formulated three issues without tying them to the grounds of appeal, as follows:
1. Whether the trial Court was right in holding that it had jurisdiction to entertain the claim having regard to on the nature of plaintiff’s claim founded on the tort of libel.
2. Whether from the state of pleadings, facts and circumstance of this case, can the fresh issue of statute bar avail the appellant in this case.
3. Whether the Further Amended Notice and Grounds of Appeal are not incompetent.
In the circumstances, I shall adopt the issues for determination proposed by the Appellants and juxtapose them with the appropriate arguments of the Respondent.
The first issue therefore is:
Whether the Appellant’s letter dated 14th February, 2006 written by its registrar in reply to the Registrar of University of Ado-Ekiti on the Respondent is not an administrative or executive act of the University of Calabar within the meaning of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution.
Arguing the issue, it was submitted for the Appellant that an examination of the letter of 14th February, 2014 said to be libelous of the Respondent would disclose that it was a response to an enquiry by another University written within the administrative functions of the Appellant, and which brings it within the contemplation of Section 251 (1) (r) of the Constitution. Learned counsel referred to OLADELE FUNSHO OLADIPO VS NIGERIA CUSTOMS SERVICE BOARD 12 NWLR (PT 1156) 563, OLORUNTOBA-OJU VS DOPAMU (2008) 7 NWLR (PT 1085) 1 and OBIUWEUBI VS CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (PT. 1247) 465.
He urged the Court to hold that the action was wrongly commenced in the High Court of Ebonyi State.
For the Respondent on the other hand, their learned counsel submitted that the jurisdiction of a Court is derived from its enabling statute and that to determine whether a Court has jurisdiction to enter a particular cause or matter, the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in the writ of summons and statement of claim is considered. He referred to WEMA SECURITIES AND FINANCE PLC VS NIGERIAN AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (2015) LPELR 24833, ESSI VS NIGERIAN PORTS PLC (2018) 2 NWLR (PT. 1604) 361 and SOCIETY BIC S. A. VS CHARZIN INDUSTRIES LTD (2014) 4 NWLR (PT 1398) 497.
It was submitted further that by the reliefs sought in the writ of summons and facts disclosed in the statement of claim, the Respondent’s action was founded in the tort of libel which did not fall within the purview of the Federal High Court. He referred to ESSI VS NIGERIAN PORTS PLC (supra), JOHN SHOY INTERNATIONAL LTD VS FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (2016) 14 NWLR (PT. 1533) 427 and KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINE VS TOBA (2014) 2 NWLR (PT. 139) 137.
The learned counsel further submitted that where an agency of the Federal Government is sued as one of several defendants in a matter where the subject-matter is not in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, the action is maintainable at the State High Court. He referred to ALAMIEYESEIGHA VS IGONIWARI No. 2 (2007) 7 NWLR (PT 1034) 524.
Jurisdiction is the life elixir of adjudication. Any exercise ofjudicial power without the requisite jurisdiction renders the outcome of such exercise totally null and void and incapable of conferring any legal benefit. Jurisdiction of a Court is a statutory matter and with regards to the civil jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, recourse would be made to Section 251 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) hereinafter referred to as the Constitution.
To determine the jurisdiction of a Court in a specific matter, the Court would examine the originating processes of the Plaintiff or Claimant as the case may be. See ADEYEMI VS OPEYORI (1976) 9-10 SC 31, TUKUR VS GOVT OF TARABA STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (PART 510) 549, OKOROMA VS UBA (1999) 1 NWLR (PART 587) 359 and MIN. FOR WORKS VS TOMAS NIG. LTD (SUPRA) at 772 and 789.
A careful perusal of the reliefs sought by the Respondent herein and the pleadings contained in the statement of claim, puts it beyond contention that his claim is for the tort of libel. The Appellant seeks to bring this within the purview of Section 251 (1) (r) of the Constitution which provides thus:
I am not persuaded by the laborious arguments put forward by learned counsel for the Appellant on this point. That the letter said to constitute the alleged libel was supposedly written within the exercise of the administrative functions of the Appellant is a possible defence for them to put forward, however this point is not contained in the writ of summons or statement of claim of the Respondent. The Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on torts and this position has long been judicially settled. A community reading of Section 7 of the Federal High Court Act and Section 251 (1) of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is not simply assured by the mere fact that the defendant to the action is an agency of the Federal Government but coterminous to this is that the subject-matter must be within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. See RAHMAN BROTHERS LTD VS. NPA (2019) LPELR-46415 (SC), NNPC VS ORHIOWASELE (2013) 13 NWLR (PART 1371) 211, PORTS & CARGO HANDLING AND C.H.S.C LTD VS MIGFO NIG. LTD (2012) 18 NWLR (PART 1333) 555, GAFAR VS GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE (2007) 4 NWLR (PART 1024) 375 and SITA & ANOR V. MAEVIES LTD (2014) LPELR-24159 (CA).
I therefore resolve this issue against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.
The remaining issue is:
Whether the Respondent suit is not caught by Section 2(A) of Public Officers Protection Act and thereby statute barred depriving the Court of jurisdiction.
The learned counsel of the Appellant submitted that the allegedly libelous publication attributed to the Appellant took place on the 14th February, 2006 and that the alleged subsequent republication by another party constituted a fresh cause of action and not a continuation of the earlier one. Learned counsel therefore contended that the earlier publication attributed to the Appellant was statute barred at the time this action was commenced on the 26th July, 2007 pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. He referred to JOE ODE AGI VS FIRST CITY MONUMENT BANK PLC (2013) LPELR (CA) and OFFOBOCHE VS OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (PT. 739) 458.
Contrariwise, the Respondent argued that pursuant to paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 24 of the statement of claim publication took place on the 2nd May, 2007 which was less than three months to the commencement of the action.
The Respondent argued further that statute of limitation was a special defence which ought to have been specifically pleaded in the absence of which it could not be raised. Learned counsel referred to AGBAI VS UKPABI (2014) 16 NWLR (PT. 1434) 524.
It was further contended for the Respondent that the Public Officers Protection Act does not protect malicious or malafide acts amounting to abuse of office and that more importantly pursuant to Sections 42 and 44 of the Limitation Law of Ebonyi State, the 3 month limitation of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply in Ebonyi State. He referred to ONU AGHA UDUMA VS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF EBONYI STATE & ORS (2013) LPELR 21267.
In his Reply brief, the learned counsel for the Appellant pointed out that leave to raise and argue the fresh issue of statute of limitation was granted to the Appellant by this Court even though it was not raised before the trial Court, thereby validating it. He referred to FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA VS GOLD (2007) 11 NWLR (PT 1044).
He reiterated that by paragraph 11 of the statement of claim, publication of the alleged libel by the Appellant was said to have taken place on 14th February, 2006. He once more referred to JOE ODE AGI VS FIRST CITY MONUMENT BANK PLC (supra) and OFFOBOCHE VS OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (supra).
Essentially, limitation legislations have the effect of extinguishing a cause of action once such has not been ventilated within the prescribed period. Where a limitation period is in existence, a litigant who is aggrieved and has a cause of action must approach the Court promptly within the stipulated time otherwise he loses the right to litigate on that issue and the Courts would be deprived of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain his claim. See OLAGUNJU & ANOR VS. PHCN PLC (2011) LPELR-2556(SC) and INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION VS OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC).
For a determination of when the period of limitation sets in, the Court must determine the date of accrual of the cause of action. A cause of action has been described as a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain a remedy against another person. It is a fact or combination of facts which when proved would entitle a plaintiff to a remedy against a defendant. It consists of every fact, which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment of the Court. That is, the fact or combination of facts which gave rise to a right to sue. It is a cause for action in the Courts to determine disputed matters. See EGBE VS ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (PART 3) 549, THOMAS VS OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (PART 18) 689 and DANTATA VS MOHAMED (2000) 7 NWLR (PART 664) 176.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the legislation in issue here, the Public Officers Protection Act (supra). Section 2(a) of the said Act provides thus:
2. Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect-
(a) Limitation of Action the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof: Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison.
Not being an agency of the Ebonyi State Government, the Appellant does not come within the purview of the Limitation Law of Ebonyi State copiously referred to by the learned counsel for the Respondent and having been granted leave by this Court to raise and argue the issue of limitation, which goes to jurisdiction, the competence of this issue is reassured.
Basically, the cause of action in libel accrues when the alleged libel is published. See EZOMO VS. OYAKHIRE (1985) 1 NWLR (PT 2) 195, EGBUE VS. ARAKA (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 84) 598 and DAIRO VS. UNION BANK & ANOR (2007) LPELR-913 (SC).
However, what is crucial here is when the cause of action herein accrued within the context of the statement of claim of the Respondent. While the Appellant referred us to paragraph 11 of the said statement of claim, the Respondent made reference to paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 24 thereof. The said paragraphs are reproduced as follows:
11) Plaintiff avers that 3rd defendant university wrote and published a letter to 1st defendant containing libellous information against plaintiff which letter is dated 14th February 2006 with Reference No. UC/R.113, titled “RE: INFORMATION ON DR. H.H. MENSAH”. The said letter was re-published by 1st and 2nd defendants an annexure to their letter dated 27th April, 2007 and addressed to plaintiff’s employer i.e the Vice Chancellor Ebonyi State University. 3rd February, 2006 to be published by 1st and 2nd defendants to plaintiff’s employer. The libellous publication contained in 3rd defendant’s letter read thus:-
UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR
P.M.B. 1115, Calabar C.R.S. Nigeria
Vice Chancellor Prof, Bassey O. Asuquo Registrar & Secretary to Council B.Sc (Hon.) M. Phil. E.E. Effiom, B.Sc (Ibadan) Ph.D (UNN)
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR
UC/R. 113 14th February, 2006
Registrar University of Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State
RE: INFORMATION ON DR. H.H. MENSAH
I write with reference to your letter No. AD/OU.2/Vol. v=V.258 dated 18th June, 2004 which was received here on 30th January, 2006.
I wish to confirm that Dr. Mensah was a staff of this university. His appointment was however terminated with effect from December, 2000 for act of gross misconduct bordering on alteration of examination grades in some law course in Faculty of Law.
I hope the above information will serve your purpose.
Best personal wishes.
E.E. EFFIOM
Registrar
12) Plaintiff avers that the two libelous letters stated above were published jointly and severally by the 1st and 3rd defendants to the Vice Chancellor of Ebonyi State University Prof. Fidelis Ogah, the dean of Faculty of Law, Prof. M.C. Okany, sub-dean of Faculty of Law, Barr. Omaka C.A. and other officers of the University on the 2nd of May, 2007.
13) Plaintiff hereby for clarity of reference attaches copies of the said libelous letters dated 27th April, 2007 and 14th February, 2006 as annexure to this statement of claim.
14) Plaintiff avers that the content of the said libelous publication written by 3rd defendant dated14thFebruary, 2006 and published on the 2nd of May, 2007 to the Vice Chancellor Ebonyi State University refers to no other person but the plaintiff. The said letter was not only injuriously false but was maliciously written and calculated to disgrace, disparage/damage the plaintiff’s reputation/profession.
18. Consequent to paragraphs 16 and 17 above, plaintiff avers that there was no factual and legal basis for 3rd defendant university to write and publish the libelous publication contained in its letter addressedto 1st defendant university dated 14th February, 2006, which letter was further published to plaintiff’s current employer, Ebonyi State University on the 2nd May, 2007. The said letter was written maliciously, recklessly and without regard to the true state of facts.
24) Plaintiff avers that the said defamatory letters written by 1st – 3rd defendants and published to the vice chancellor Ebonyi State University, Prof. Fidelis Ogah on the 2nd of May, 2007 were circulated within the Ebonyi State University Community in line with administrative procedures to the relevant officers of the University, including the Registrar of the University, the Dean of Faculty of Law, Prof. M.C. Okany, the sub-dean of Faculty of Law, Barr. Omaka C.A. and other officers of the university. Plaintiff shall rely on the query and comment made on the defamatory letter by the Vice Chancellor, Ebonyi State University, the dean, faculty of law and other officers.
The totality of the submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant on this issue is that the allegation of libel against the Appellant is limited to the letter said to have been written on 14th February, 2006 and that the Appellant could not be held accountable for the subsequent republication thereof.
Faced with a similar scenario, SALAMI, JCA (as he then was) expounded the position of the law thus:
Generally, one who utters a slander or writes and publishes a libel is prima facie not liable for voluntary and unauthorised repetition or republication by a person to whom it was published by him. Weld-Blundell vs. Stephens (1920) AC 956 applied in Bradstreets vs. Mitchell (1933) Ch.190. The rationale behind that is that such repetition of publication is not the necessary natural or probable consequence of the original publication.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”></br<>
There is however no rule without exception. There is exception to this rule which makes the initial publisher liable in three circumstances defined in Speight vs. Gosnay (1891) 60 LJ QB 232. Although, the case was on repetition of slander, the same rule would apply to libel. See Mcrkaft vs. Pawluk (1931) 1 WWR 699 and Shore vs. Britski (No.2) (1942) 2 WWR 345. The three instances when the original publishers are made liable are-
“(a) Where he authorized or intended the person to whom he published the words to repeat or republish them to some third person;
(b) Where the repetition or republication of the third persons was the natural and probable result of the original publication.
(c) Where the person to whom the original publication was made was under a moral duty to repeat or republish the words to a third person.” See AFRICAN INT’L BANK LTD & ORS VS. ASAOLU (2005) LPELR-11340(CA)at 49-50.
I have no justifiable basis to depart from this clear exposition of the law. The allegation in the Respondent’s pleading was that the party to whom the alleged libel was earlier published, did republish it on 2nd May, 2007. That being thecase, I hold that the present cause of action arose on the 2nd May, 2007 when republication of the alleged libel took place.
I therefore resolve this second issue as well against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.
In totality, this appeal is devoid of merit and I therefore dismiss it.
Cost of N100,000.00 is awarded in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
The said Suit No. HAB/152M/2007 is remitted back to the High Court of Ebonyi State for continuation of hearing.
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: I have had a preview of the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, JCA. I agree with the reasons ably articulated therein to arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. For the said comprehensive reasons, admirably and brilliantly marshaled in the said lead judgment, I also accordingly dismiss the Appeal. I also abide by the order regarding costs made in the said lead judgment.
ABUBAKAR SADIQ UMAR, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity before now, of reading the judgment delivered by my learned brother, JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODEOYEWOLE, JCA. He has adequately considered and resolved all the issues raised in the appeal.
I agree entirely with his reasoning and conclusions. The appeal is unmeritorious and deserve to be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed by me.
I abide by the consequential orders therein including order to cost.
Appearances:
Mr. E. Sani. For Appellant(s)
No appearance for the Respondent. For Respondent(s)