UMU UDOEKE UMUEZE VILLAGE ISUOFIA & ANOR. v. UMUEZE VILLAGE UNION & 11 ORS.
(2010)LCN/4169(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 17th day of December, 2010
CA/E/176M/2008
RATIO
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES: CONSEQUENCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ORDER 1 RULE2(3) OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE) RULES 1979 ON A COURT’S JURISDICTION
In EZEADUKWA VS MADUKA (1997) 8 NWLR (PT 518) 527. This court held that non compliance with Order 2 Rule 1(2) of the Fundament Rights (Enforcement Procedure Rules 1979 renders the proceedings a nullity as the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear the motion on notice. In this instant case there was non compliance with Order 1 Rule 2(3) notwithstanding the operative word “must” used in the said subrule 3. This no doubt renders the application in the lower court void abinitio. See also OGWUCHE VS MBA (1994)4 NWLR (TP 336)75. I accordingly hold that the non compliance with Order 1 Rule 2(3) renders the proceedings and judgment of the trial court null and void. The said court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the motion on notice which was filed without a competent statement in support. It is impossible to put something on nothing and expect it to stand. If an act is void it is in law a nullity. See MACFOY VS UAC LTD. (1961) 3 AER 1169 or (2000)WRN 185. PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
WHETHER IT IS THE PRIMARY DUTY OF A TRIAL COURT TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT ON MATERIAL ISSUES
The primary duty of a court of trial is to make findings of fact on material issues, nay (SIC) on all issues placed before it. See OGOLO VS OGOLO (2004) All FWLR (PT.194) 517 at 549, MOGAJIVS ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC 91; CHIANSON VS IGBA (2004) All FWLR (PT 224) 1997. PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: WHETHER WHERE A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION SUCCEEDS., THE COURT STILL NEED TO GO INTO THE MERIT OF THE APPEAL
It is also settled law that where a court finds that a preliminary objection succeeds; there is no need to go into the merit of the appeal, See NEPAVS ANGO (2001) 15 NWLR (PT.737) 627; A.G, FEDERATION VS ANPP (2003) 18 NWLR (PT 851) 182. PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A.
MISNOMER: WHETHER NAMING A NON-JURISTIC PERSON AS A PARTY IS A MISNOMER AND WHETHER SAME CAN BE AMENDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUBSTITUTING THE NON-JURISTIC PERSON FOR A JURISTIC PERSON
A misnomer will arise where a party is sued in the wrong name, and the Courts will usually grant amendments to correct the mistake, even on appeal. However, naming a non-juristic person as a party is not misnomer and amending same to substitute a juristic person is out of it. This is because there cannot be a valid amendment of the title of the suit since there never was a legal person who was brought before the Court by the action – see Okechukwu & Sons v. Ndah (1967) NMLR 368. Thus, the only option open to the Court in such a situation would be to strike out the name of the non juristic person – see Agbomagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager G. B. Ollivant Ltd. & ors (1961) A.N.L.R 125. PER AMINA A. AUGIE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
UMU UDOEKE UMUEZE VILLAGE ISUOFIA & ANOR. Appellant(s)
AND
UMUEZE VILLAGE UNION & 11 ORS. Respondent(s)
SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of C. O. Amechi J. of the Aguata Division of the High court of Anambra State delivered on the 17th day
of December 2007, in Suit No. AG/MISC 6512007 (UMU UDOEKE UMUEZE VTLLAGE VS. UMUEZE VILLAGE UNION. Wherein the relief sought by the applicants for the enforcement of fundamental rights was granted.
The facts of the case is that the applicants (hereinafter refened to as the Respondents) filed a motion ex parte
for leave to apply for the enforcement of their fundamental rights on the 18/9/2007. Accompanying the said motion ex parte was a statement pursuant to Order 1 Rule 2(3) of the fundamental Rights (Enforcement
Procedure) Rules 1979 and a verifying affidavit to which is attached a document marked “Exhibit A”. There is also a written address in support of the motion ex parte.
The said application for leave was moved and granted on 2/10/2007 after the respondents withdrew paragraph 2
of the reliefs sought and the said paragraph 2 was struck out by the trial judge.
The reliefs granted by the learned trial judge read thus:-
It is hereby ordered:-
1. That leave is hereby granted to the applicants to apply for the enforcement of their fundamental rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as guaranteed by compulsory acquisition of property as guaranteed
by Section 38,40, and 44 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.
2. That an order of interim Injunction restraining the Respondents their agents or his officers from banning,
stopping and arresting applicants and or interfering in anyway with the activities of Udo Eke pending
determination of the substantive application. This application shall serve as a stay;
3. That return date for substantive motion as Notice shall be 15th day of October, 2007.
Subsequently, the Respondents (now the appellants) filed a counter affidavit on 17/10/2007. They also filed a
Notice of Preliminary Objection on the same day challenging the application for the enforcement of the
fundamental rights on the ground of non compliance with Order 1 Rules 2 and 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 and that the 1st Respondent was not a juristic person. The respondents
also filed a further affidavit on 25/10/2007. Written addresses were subsequently filed both on the motion on
notice and the Notice Preliminary Objection.
On the 12/10/2007 a motion for accelerated hearing and abridgment of time of the application for enforcement
of fundamental rights was also filed by the appellants and it was heard on 23/10/07. The court in its ruling
refused the prayer for abridgement of time but vacated the order of interim injunction made on 2/10/2007
wherein the parties duly adopted their written addresses.
In his judgment delivered on 17/12/2007 the learned trial judge overruled the preliminary objection and granted
the application for the enforcement of the Respondents’ Fundamental Rights.
The appellants being dissatisfied with the said judgment filed a notice of appeal containing five grounds on 29th January 2008. In accordance with the Rules of this Court, parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument which
they eventually adopted and relied on at the hearing of the appeal on 25/10/2010.
The Appellants’ Brief of argument was dated 15/7/2008 and filed on 21/7/008. For the Respondents, their brief of argument was dated 1/3/2010 and filed on 2/3/2010.
In the Appellants’ brief of argument 4 issues were formulated for determination:- To wit:-
(1) Whether the learned trial judge was right when she overruled the preliminary objection raised by the
Appellants and held that the Respondents’ application for enforcement of fundamental rights complied with the dictates of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979.
(2) Whether the learned trial judge was correct when she granted relief in favour of a non-juristic person.
(3) Whether the decision of the learned trial judge was justified given the deposed facts before her.
(4) Whether the learned trial judge was correct when she granted relief not asked for.
The Respondents in their own brief of argument settled by K.C. Ezeanyika (Esq) of counsel and filed on 2/3/2008, also raised four issues for determination as follows:-
(1) Whether the learned trial judge was right when she overruled the Preliminary Objection.
(2) Whether the trial judge was right to have upheld the right of the 2no Respondent (applicant) as an individual over and above the decision of the appellants of Isuanioma taken on 31st December, 2006 to ban Udo Eke
Shrine.
(3) Whether the decision of the trial court was justified considering the facts before the court as stated by the Respondents (Applicants)
(4) Whether the order of the learned trial Judge has same effect as the relief claimed by the Respondents (applicants).
The issues formulated for determination by both parties are not dissimilar and are capable of properly disposing of this appeal. However, I will consider this appeal on the basis of the issues as raised by the appellants. On issue 1.
It was the submission of DR. O. Ikpeazu (SAN) of counsel for the Appellants that the learned trial judge was
wrong in holding that the application of the Respondents contained the essential ingredients of a competent application for enforcement of fundamental rights under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979. He added that in the statement filed in support of the application for leave the name and description of the applicants with respect to the 1st Respondent was given as:-
“UMU UDO EKE of Umueze Village Isuofia town in Aguata L.G. Area of Anambra State.”
But in the substantive application the 1st Respondent was described on the motion on notice as “UMU UDO EKE WORSHIPPERS”
Umueze Village Isuofia.”
For learned Senior Counsel, the import of such anomaly is that the 1st Applicant in the motion for leave is not the same person in the motion on notice and this renders the application fundamentally defective with respect tot the reliefs sought by the applicants.
He added that the statement in support filed with the application does not embody the grounds on which the application is sought and therefore fundamentally defective. Also no facts were contained in the statement which
is akin to a statement of claim. He referred to Order 1 Rule 2 (3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 to show the requirements of an application for leave.
Learned Senior Counsel also referred to the verifying affidavit accompanying the application for leave to contend that it verified nothing as there was no fact in the statement in support for it to verify. He cited the case
OYEWOLE VS SHEHU (1995) 1 NWLR (PT 414)484 at 495 and TUKUR VS GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE
(1996)5 NWLR (PT 447) 186 at 196.
The learned Counsel for the Respondents in their own brief of argument submit on this issue that whilst the preliminary objection complained of noncompliance with order 1 Rule 2 and 4 of the Fundamental Right
(Enforcement Procedure) Rules, the argument of the appellants bothered on Order 1 Rule 2(3) and this makes
their argument to
be at variance with the preliminary objection an as such is not sustainable.
Learned counsel further submitted that contrary to the assertion of the appellants that Order 1 Rule 2(3) was not complied with by the Respondents because the statement does not embody the grounds on which the application
is sought and therefore fundamentally defective. The respondents did embody the grounds on which the reliefs
are sought in the application as shown in page 2 of the Record of Appeal, He added that the fact that the Respondents included the grounds upon which the reliefs are sought in the motion papers does not vitiate the application or amount to non-compliance with Order 1 Rules 2(3). Learned Counsel further contended that the learned trial judge was satisfied with the grounds upon which reliefs were sought hence she granted the application for leave as well as the reliefs prayed for in her judgment. Citing a number of authorities, he submitted that Justice can be done if the substance of the matter is examined and not rely on technicalities.
On the issue of different names used for the 1st Respondent in the motion ex parte and the motion on notice, learned counsel submitted that the inclusion of the word “worshippers in the motion on notice does not add or take away anything from “Umu Udo Eke” as written in the Motion ex parte. He urged the court to disregard it because
it is a distinction without a difference and only shows that Umu Udo Eke are worshippers of Umu-Udo Eke shrine.
Now Order 1 Rules 2(3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1999 provides that:-
“An Application for leave must be made ex parte to the appropriate court and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds in which it is sought and
by an affidavit verifying the facts relied on.”
What can be gleaned from the above provision is that an applicant seeking to apply to a court for leave to enforce his fundamental rights must do the following:-
(1) The application for leave must be ex parte.
(2) The application ex parte must be supported by a statement setting out:-
(a) the name and description of the applicant;
(b) the relief sought by the applicant and
(c) the grounds in which the relief is sought.
(3) There must be an affidavit verifying the facts relied on by the applicant.
In the instant case the applicants filed a motion ex parte for leave and in the said motion listed the grounds upon which the reliefs are sought. They also filed a statement in support which contain the names of the applicants and the reliefs sought by them, but there are no grounds in support of the said relief as provided for by Order 1 Rule
2(3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979, Meanwhile, in their 6 paragraph verifying affidavit, the 2na applicant deposed in paragraph 3 as following:-
“That I have read the motion, statement of facts accompanying it and confirm that they represent the applicants’ instructions to the counsel. I verify the facts as true and correct,”
The question to be answered now is, what fact are being verified as true and correct as the statement in support do not contain any fact to be verified as required by the rules. A statement in support of a motion ex parte for leave is akin to filing a Statement of Claim wherein a party who seeks certain reliefs from the court is expected to plead facts that will justify the grant of such reliefs. The absence of such pleaded facts definitely will render such statement of claim worthless. Thus in the case of a statement in support, failure by an applicant to state therein, the grounds for the relief sought renders such statement inchoate and also a breach of the provisions of Order 1 rule 2(3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement procedure) Rules 1979.
For purposes of clarity, I reproduce herein below the body of the statement in support of the application as filed by the applicants, thus:-
NAME AND DESCRIPTION OF THE APPLICANTS
1. Umu Udo eke of Umueze village Isuofia town in Aguata L.G. Area of Anambra State,
2ND APPLICANT
IFEANYI CHUKWU OGBUKAGU of Umueze Village Isuofia Town, Aguata L.G, Area of Anambra State is the Chief Priest of the 1st Applicant,
2. RELIEFS SOUGHT BY THE APPLICANTS
(1) Rights to freedom of thought, Conscience, Religion, association and against sections 38, 48 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and also as follows:-
A declaration that the stopping and/or banning of the Applicants from continuing to worship their Udo Eke, administering, organizing religious festival of Udo Eke, threat of arrest of anybody who attend Udo Eke festival of the Applicants constitutes a violation of the Applicants right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and Association as protected by section 38 and 40 of the constitution of Nigeria 1999.
3. That the compulsory taking of possession of Umu Udo Eke properties i.e. (1) Ofo Udo Eke (2)Okike Udo Eke (3) Urume Okuko (4) ljo na Nzu (5) Ha Merukwara Nso Udo eke is a violation of Applicants’ right as protected bS.44 of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria over their properties without their consent/compensation.
4. An order of court commanding the Respondents to return all the properties of Umu Udo eke carted away by them.
5. An Order of interim injunction restraining the Respondents by themselves or through their agents or it’s officers from banning, stopping or interfering with the Applicants’ Rights as guaranteed by section 38, 40 and 44 of the Nigerian 1999 constitution pending determination of the substantive Application on notice.
And for such Other Orders as the court may find fit in the circumstance
Dated this………..day of Sept, 2007
There is no doubt that the said statement as reproduced above did not satisfy the provisions of Order 1 Rule 2(3). It contains only the names and addresses of the applicant and the reliefs sought but devoid of the grounds upon which the reliefs are sought. This to my mind is a fundamental omission that cannot be glossed over, neither can it be condoned in the guise of not sacrificing merit on the alter of technicality.
The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Section 46(3) of the 1999 Constitution. It is a special procedure and not subject to the fluidity inherent in normal civil procedure Rules.
Therefore the need for strict compliance with the provisions of the Rules cannot be over-emphasised. It behoves an applicant who seeks to apply to a court for the enforcement of his fundamental Rights to observe and obey the relevant rules. See DIRECTOR SSS VS AGBAKOBA (1999) 67 LRGN 418; ANAEKWE VS C.O.P. (1995) 6 NWLR (PT 403) 564; OYEWOLE VS SHEHU (1995) I NWLR (PT 414) 484:
In MOHAMMED VS KAYODE (1997) 11 NWLR (PT 530) this Court per Salami JCA (As he then was) held at page 598 – 599 as follows:-
“The Orders and Rules are made under the provisions of the Constitution, they therefore have the force of law.
See Section 227 of the Constitution. Rules of court are made to be complied with or obeyed but not to be disobeyed or disregarded or neglected.”
Further in TUKUR VS GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1996) 5 NWLR (PT 447) 186 at 196. It was held per Oguntade JCA (As he then was) that-
“I am however not persuaded to accept the view that to Insist on compliance with rules of procedure under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is an over-adherence to technicalities. On the contrary it is safe and proper approach to do justice between the parties.”
This is a sound reasoning and I agree entirely with it. In this case, the respondents were found to have included only their names, description and relief sought in the statement in support and omitted to include the grounds upon which the reliefs were sought, This is glaringly contrary to Order 1 Rules 2 (3)which made it a ‘must’ that it should be included.
The learned trial Judge had in her judgment stated thus (see 70 – 71 of the Record):
“I have fully reviewed all the processes filed in the motion by the Applicants and the Respondents. On the preliminary objection as to whether or not the applicants complied with the fundamental right enforcement Procedure Rules 1979, I do not agree with the arguments in respect of the preliminary objection. The applicants prayed in their motion on notice to use all the processes filed in respect of the motion ex parte. A marriage of the processes in support of the motion ex parte and the motion on notice show that the application of the applicants continued (sic) all the requirements of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979. So I evenile (sic) the preliminary objection”.
With due respect to the learned trial judge, the above conclusion should not have been reached if she had properly examined the processes. The learned counsel for the respondents was aware of this when he argued in their brief as follows:-
“The Respondents’ motion ex parte and indeed motion on notice cannot be said not to contain or embody the grounds on which it is sought. To overlook the ten paragraphs of the grounds merely because counsel included it in the motion paper is to sacrifice justice on the alter of form”.
(underlining for emphasis).
It is indeed ironic that while the learned trial judge saw nothing wrong with the whole processes filed by the Respondents in the lower court in pursuit of their application for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. Their counsel readily admitted that there was an error but that the court should overlook it on grounds of substantial justice.
However, as earlier stated, the provisions of the Rules must be complied with moreso the word “must” was clearly used in Order 1 Rule 2(3).
The content of a statement accompanying an application for leave must be distinct and independent of the content of a motion ex parte. To seek to incorporate the grounds for reliefs sought as contained in a motion into the strict requirement of the Rules as to the content of a statement accompanying the said motion will amount to a naive indulgence. Hence Order 1 Rule 2(4) made the position clearer by providing that enough copies of the statement and affidavit must be lodged in the court at the time of filing an application for leave.
Now, what is the effect of non compliance with Order 1 Rule 2(3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979?
In EZEADUKWA VS MADUKA (1997) 8 NWLR (PT 518) 527. This court held that non compliance with Order 2 Rule 1(2) of the Fundament Rights (Enforcement Procedure Rules 1979 renders the proceedings a nullity as the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear the motion on notice. In this instant case there was non compliance with Order 1 Rule 2(3) notwithstanding the operative word “must” used in the said subrule 3. This no doubt renders the application in the lower court void abinitio. See also OGWUCHE VS MBA (1994)4 NWLR (TP 336)75. I accordingly hold that the non compliance with Order 1 Rule 2(3) renders the proceedings and judgment of the trial court null and void. The said court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the motion on notice which was filed without a competent statement in support. It is impossible to put something on nothing and expect it to stand. If an act is void it is in law a nullity. See MACFOY VS UAC LTD. (1961) 3 AER 1169 or (2000)WRN 185.
Consequently, I hold that the learned trial judge erred in overruling the preliminary objection. It ought to be upheld on this ground. Issue No.1 is therefore resolved in favour of the appellants.
On issue No.2, that this whether the learned trial judge was correct when she granted reliefs in favour of a non-juristic person. It is however amazing to note that this was one of the two grounds raised in the preliminary objection and both parties argued on it in their written addresses but the learned trial judge never even in one word touched on the issue.
The primary duty of a court of trial is to make findings of fact on material issues, nay (SIC) on all issues placed before it. See OGOLO VS OGOLO (2004) All FWLR (PT.194) 517 at 549, MOGAJI VS ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC 91; CHIANSON VS IGBA (2004) All FWLR (PT 224) 1997.
Now to the issue in contention. The learned Senior Counsel submitted in the appellants brief that the 1st Respondent as constituted was not shown to be registered in law and does not qualify as an artificial or legal person who can maintain an action.
Also citing IFEDAPO COMMUNITY BANK VS C.S. CHURCH (2001)7 NWLR (PT 712) 508 he submitted that the burden to establish legal personality lies on a plaintiff who is claiming status as a juristic person – as there are no rooms for assumptions and the only way out is the production of a certificate. He further cited ABU VS OGLI (1995) 8 NWLR (PT 413) 353 at 372; ATAGUBA VS GURU (2000) WRN 115 and BANK OF BARODA VS IYALABANI CO. TLD. (2002) 13 NWLR (PT.785) 551 at 588 – 589. He then concluded that the foundation on which the substantive application for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights was mounted was defective and as such affects the entire case.
For the Respondents, it was submitted by their counsel that the much the trial court should have done was to strike out the name of the 2nd Respondent and proceed with the hearing of the matter. He added that the preliminary objection did not vitiate the entire proceedings because the 2nd Respondent is a juristic person and can enforce his right and this sustains the application.
What I can glean from the respondents submission in their brief of argument is that they conceded to the fact that the 1st Respondent is not a juristic person and as such cannot sue or be sued but the application in the lower court could have still been saved by virtue of the legal status of the 2nd Respondent. In that regard it will be taken as an admission that the 1st respondent is not and ought not to present the application as it has no legal capacity to do so, Worse still is that all the respondents’ affidavits and further affidavit were deposed to by 2nd Respondent on the authority of 1st Respondent.
The proper approach in the circumstance was for the trial court to have struck out the name of the 1st Respondent before proceeding to hear the substantive application. But having gone ahead to hear the said application and delivered judgment based on a process that has no life in it, the whole proceeding leading to and including the judgment cannot stand, the application having not been properly brought before the Court. See ABU VS OGLI (1995) 8 NWLR (PT.413) 353. Issue
No.2 is hereby resolved against the Respondents.
Sequel to the view expressed in issues 1 and 2 above that the proceedings and judgment are null and void abinitio. I therefore deem it largely academic to embark on the consideration of issues 3 and 4 which no doubt is a follow up from the determination of issues 1 and 2. It is also settled law that where a court finds that a preliminary objection succeeds; there is no need to go into the merit of the appeal, See NEPAVS ANGO (2001) 15 NWLR (PT.737) 627; A.G, FEDERATION VS ANPP (2003) 18 NWLR (PT 851) 182.
In the result, the appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The judgment of the trial court granting all the reliefs sought in the action brought by the Respondent is hereby set aside.
In place of the judgment of the trial court there shall be entered a judgment striking out the Respondents’ motion on notice dated 5/10/2007 and filed on 10/10/2007 with no order as to cost.
AMINA A. AUGIE, J.C.A.: I have read the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Oseji, JCA, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusions.
He has addressed the issues raised in the appeal, and I only wish to add a few words on the issue of misnomer. It is not unusual for mistakes to be made in the names of parties, but there is a whole world of difference between a misnomer, which means – “a mistake in naming a person, place, or thing in a legal instrument” – see Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Ed: and the naming of a non-juristic person as a party.
A misnomer will arise where a party is sued in the wrong name, and the Courts will usually grant amendments to correct the mistake, even on appeal. However, naming a non-juristic person as a party is not misnomer and amending same to substitute a juristic person is out of it. This is because there cannot be a valid amendment of the title of the suit since there never was a legal person who was brought before the Court by the action – see Okechukwu & Sons v. Ndah (1967) NMLR 368. Thus, the only option open to the Court in such a situation would be to strike out the name of the non juristic person – see Agbomagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager G. B. Ollivant Ltd. & ors (1961) A.N.L.R 125.
In this case, the Appellants raised an objection on this ground but the lower Court totally ignored the objection, and proceeded to entertain the Application, and worse still, deliver Judgment thereon in favour of a non-juristic person. Obviously, the Judgment cannot stand, and I also do hereby allow the appeal, and set aside the Judgment of the lower Court.
I also make no order as to costs.
ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances
Ben Osaka with E. NzegwuFor Appellant
AND
K.C. EzeanyikaFor Respondent
