UMARU MOHAMMED (ALIAS ODIDI) v. THE STATE
(2018)LCN/11913(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Wednesday, the 11th day of July, 2018
CA/S/74C/2016
RATIO
CRIMINAL LAW: THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY
“The principles that guide a Court when considering a charge of conspiracy was succinctly put by Wiles J., in Makaby Vs R. (1986) 3 H.L., at page 315 thus:
”A conspiracy consists not merely in the intension of two or more but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, by unlawful means. So long as a design rests in intension only it is not indictable. When two agrees to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself and that of each of the actum, capable of being enforced if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means.”” PER PER FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
“The locus classicus on the subject is the case of R. vs. SYKES (1913) 8 C.A.R. 233, which has been applied in several Nigerian cases on the subject. What should perhaps, be noted with this case, is that it would have been unsatisfactory to have convicted on the evidence of identification alone had it not been assisted by the confessional statement and would also probably have been unsatisfactory if the conviction had rested solely on the confession without the circumstances which make it probable that the confessions were true. The tests therefore, as laid down in the case of R. vs. SYKES (Supra) to be applied to a man’s confession are; is there anything outside it to show that it is true? Is it corroborated? Are the statements made in it in fact, true as far as can be tested? Was the Appellant, one who had the opportunity of committing the crime? Is his conviction possible? Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and which have been as in this case proved? In any event, it is within the province of the trial Judge to determine the admissibility of a confession on proof by the prosecution that the statement was free and voluntary and having admitted the statements as in the instant case where the Court below had conducted a trial within trial in determining the veracity of the confessions made. The Court below having found the confessions made as a voluntary confession, the clear position of the law is that that confession is sufficient to ground a conviction and I find myself unable to disagree with the Court below that Exhibits F and F1 were not sufficiently corroborated.” PER FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HUSSEIN MUKHTAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
UMARU MOHAMMED (Alias ODIDI) Appellant(s)
AND
THE STATE Respondent(s)
FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This Appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Kebbi State, sitting at Birnin Kebbi Coram: IBRAHIM KANGIWA, J. in Case No. KB/HC/RFT/2/2013, delivered on the 23rd day of February, 2015 wherein the Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the offences of Conspiracy to commit Armed Robbery and Armed Robbery, contrary to Sections 5(b) and 1(2)(a) & (b) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, 1990.
Trial commenced at the Court below on the 3rd day of June, 2013 after all three (3) Accused persons, one of whom was the Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges read against them. See pages 41 to 41 of the Records of Appeal. The prosecution called three (3) witnesses who testified as the PW1, PW2 and PW3 and tendered Exhibits A, B, C, D, D1, E, E1, F, F1, F2 and F2a and thereafter closed its case. (See page 44 to 61 of the record of appeal). The Appellant as Accused person testified for himself and called no witnesses. At the close of hearing, written addresses of Counsel were duly adopted. On the 23rd day of February, 2015 the learned trial Court, delivering a well considered judgment, found the Appellant guilty for the offences of Conspiracy to Commit Armed Robbery and Armed Robbery contrary to Sections 5(b) and 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, 1990 (as amended) respectively and sentenced him to death. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court below, the Accused person has Appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal filed on the 14th day of May, 2015. There are three (3) Grounds of Appeal filed.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION;
There is nominated for the determination of this Appeal by the Appellant, a lone issue thus;
Whether from the evidence before the trial Court, the respondent proof the offence of conspiracy to commit armed robbery; armed robbery and aiding and abetting contrary to Section 5(a) (b) and 1 (2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special provisions) Act 1990 beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant. (Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4)
On the part of the Respondent, this sole issue was adopted and it was in respect of this issue that learned Counsel for the parties addressed Court in their briefs of Argument extensively citing a number authorities.
The Appellant’s brief of Argument filed on the 22-6-2017 settled by HUSSAINI ZAKARIYAU ESQ., while the Respondent’s brief of Argument was settled by BAGUDU U. ABUBAKAR ESQ. At the hearing of the Appeal on the 24-5-2018, learned Counsel adopted their briefs of Argument on behalf of their respective clients and urged the Court to decide the Appeal in their favour.
SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL
APPELLANT;
In arguing this issue, Counsel referred Court to the case of FATAI BUSARI vs. STATE (2015) 11 NCC 43 at 55 ratio 18 where the Supreme Court stated the ingredients of the offence of armed robbery and contended that the Respondent did not discharge the burden provided by the apex Court in the said case of FATAl BUSARI vs. STATE (Supra), which prescribes that the Respondent must proof all the three (3) ingredients conjunctively. The argument of Counsel is that the failure of the Respondent to proof any of the ingredients will render his case unproved and the Appellant will be discharged and acquitted as a result.
It is further argued by Counsel that in the instant case before the trial Court, there was no evidence that proved the complete ingredients and hence urged this Court to discharge and acquit the Appellant. According to Counsel, the testimonies of the PW1 and PW2 are pieces of evidence not linking the Appellant to the commission of the offence and that there was no any evidence of an eye witness linking the Appellant to the commission of the offence. He said that the PW2 who was the eye witness did not mention the Appellant as one of the robbers. (See page 44 to 54 of the record of appeal).
Counsel contended that the learned trial Judge in convicting the Appellant for the offences charged relied on the confessional statement of the first convict (EXHIBITS D and D1). To this he submitted that EXHIBITS D and D1 or any other co-accused person’s confessional statement cannot be lawfully used by the trial Court except when the confession was made before the Appellant or adopted by the Appellant. Counsel further argued that the co-accused person’s confessional statement used by the trial Judge in making a conviction for the Respondent was neither made in the presence of the Appellant nor was it adopted by the Appellant. For this reason he contended that the trial Court wrongly relied on a co-accused person?s confession in convicting the Appellant. Counsel urged this Court to so hold. He referred Court to Section 29 (4) of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) provides:
“Where more persons than one are charged jointly with an offence and a confession made by one of such persons in the presence of one or more of the other persons so charged is given in evidence, the Court shall not take such statement in to consideration as against any of such other persons in whose presence it was made unless he adopted the said statement by words or conduct”.
It was further contended by Counsel that the trial judge wrongly relied on the testimony of the PW2 and EXHIBITS F, F1, F2 and F2a in convicting the Appellant for the offences charged. According to Counsel, the evidence of the PW2 was to the effect that one Abdulrauf Bello (1st accused before the trial Court) together with some two other persons he did not know boarded his car and that in the process Abdul-Rauf-Bello brought out a Knife and threatened to kill him if he refused to give him the car. When Abdul-Rauf-Bello took possession of the vehicle he drove off while the other two people were at the back seat. Counsel argued that this piece of evidence never linked the Appellant to the commission of any offence. He urged this Court to so hold. (See page 49 to 52 of the record of appeal).
It was also contended that EXHIBITS F, F1, F2 and F2a are not confessional statements in relation to what the victim (PW2) told the trial Court. (See page 49 to 52 of the record of appeal). Counsel argued that these Exhibits sharply contradicted the testimony of PW2 in that it said another person threatened the PW2 and snatched his car while, Abdul-Rauf-Bello was just driving another car following the PW2’s (victim) car at the back. According to Counsel this is a serious contradiction in this evidence which cast doubt on the prosecution?s case and which doubt is to be resolved in favour of the Appellant. Counsel cited the case of GABRIEL vs. THE STATE (2011) 6 Nee 249 at 253:2.
In assuming but not conceding that EXHIBITS F, F1, F2 and F2a are confessional, Counsel submitted that they are qualified confessional statements, which are not contemplated by Section 27 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended).
He said that Exhibit merely referred to another crime, which is not as explained by the victim and the only eye witness to the commission of the alleged offence for which the Appellant was charged before the trial Court. He urged this Court to so hold. See UWAEKWEGHINYA vs. STATE 2005 ALL FWLR PT 259 1911 SC.
Counsel finally urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.
RESPONDENT;
The submission of Counsel under the lone issue for determination is that the Appellant did not consider the arguments of the Respondent; the evaluation of the evidence and findings by the trial Court in making the submissions it has made. According to Counsel, the Court below adequately considered and evaluated all the necessary issues in respect of the sole issue raised by the Appellant for the determination of this Appeal. Counsel urged this Court to so determine.
It was further submitted that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused person(s) is always on the prosecution and the onus of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel therefore urged this Court to hold that the prosecution had at the trial Court proved beyond reasonable doubt the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery contrary to Section 5(b) and 1 (2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act 1990 as amended. He said that the Respondent had through its witnesses and Exhibits tendered, placed before the trial Court direct, cogent, admissible, positive and compelling evidences, which the trial Court believed and convicted the Appellant herein. It was also submitted that the evidences placed by the Respondents at the trial Court had not been challenged or controverted by the Appellants at the trial Court. He urged this Court to so hold.
Counsel also contended that the evidence against the Appellant which the trial Court believed and relied upon in convicting the Appellant are Exhibits F, F1 F2 and F2a, which are the testimonies of the PW2 and PW3 through whom Exhibits F, F1 F2 and F2a were tendered and admitted in evidence after due consideration of trial within trial conducted upon the objection by the Appellant at the trial Court. Counsel argued that these pieces of evidences are direct and that the Court is bound to act on these as the Appellants failed woefully to discredit the evidences.
It was submitted by Counsel that in the instant case there was enough evidence at the trial Court, which proved all the ingredients of the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery against the Appellant. It was further submitted that the learned Appellant’s Counsel failed to appreciate the fact that the learned trial judge did not rely only on the confessional statement of the co-accused i.e. first convict in convicting and sentencing the Appellant herein but also on the confessional statement of the Appellant admitted in evidence after conducting trial within trial, where he stated thus-
”In respect of car snatched which I denied earlier, actually I could remember about eight months ago I came to Argungu from Yeldumy village to buy ?canbard? for welding I branched to one Ibrahim of Yar dole area Argungu. There he told me that there (sic) some boys he will join me with them because he heard that I once involve in a case of motor vehicle and their work is car theft. He called one Ummaru Bawa Maaji and joined me with him. He asked Ummaru Bawa Maaji whether he had partners they should joined with me because I knew how to drive. That moment Maaji was together with one AbdulRauf who he called on phone. They told me they want to go to Koko will get goods meaning vehicles to steal … we plan to go and steal vehicle. The four of us entered one vehicle a crecket belonging to Abdulrauf’s mother to Haliru Abdu Birnin Kebbi … on our way after Jega to B/Kebbi Maaji told the driver that we are thieves he should stop…, the driver flew the door open and run away. Maaji drove the vehicle together with myself to Gusau while Abdulrauf came back home.”
Against the backdrop of this position, the argument of Counsel for the Respondent is that apart from admitting the commission of the offence by the Appellant and contrary to the argument of the Appellant’s Counsel the above quoted statement adumbrated and strengthened the case of the Prosecution in many spheres. He said that in the first place the statement of the Appellant admitted in evidence as Exhibit F and F1 is in tandem with that of the first accused. Accordingly, the statements of the Appellant and that of the first Convict in Exhibits D and D1 having been of corroboratory material to each other left the trial Court with no option than to act on it in agreeing with the evidence presented by the prosecution.
In the alternative, Counsel further urged this Court to consider the following wordings of the Appellant; “about eight months ago I came to Argungu from Yeldu” and the charges against the Appellant. Counsel wondered that the accused cannot state a clear day or date that he joined the remaining convicts, but that the time he joined them and the time of the commission of the offence is the same thing. He drew attention to the charges against the Appellant, which reads ”on or about the 23rd day of December, 2008” and stated that the statement of the Appellant was volunteered on the 18th July, 2009 thus, clearly showing that it is the date contemplated by the charges, which is barely eight months as stated by the Appellant in his confessional statement.
Counsel therefore submitted that the provision of Section 29(4) of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) has not been violated as the Appellant point blank accepted and agreed with what the first convict informed the police about in his statement.
On account of this position, Counsel referred to the judgment of the Court below where the Court stated thus;
”In this case accused persons made confessional statement, the confessional statement of the 1st accused are Exhibits D and D1. In the Exhibit D the 1st accused person implicated the 2nd, 3rd and 4th accused persons in the conspiracy to commit armed robbery. When the confessional statements in Exhibits D and D1, E and E1, F and F1, F2 and F2A and the evidence of PW2 and PW3 are comparatively evaluated there is no doubt that the prosecution has proved that the accused persons conspired among themselves to rob PW2, one Ibrahim Abubakar of a vehicle”.
It was also submitted by Counsel that the conviction and sentencing of the Appellant was purely based on the direct, cogent, admissible and compelling evidence against the Appellant. According to Counsel, the confessional statement of the Appellant admitted in evidence as Exhibits F, F1, F2 and F2A are direct and pointed to only a direction of culpability of the Appellant. He urged this Court to hold that findings and conviction of the trial Court of the Appellant is in accordance with extant laws and procedure and most importantly uphold the conviction and sentence of the trial Court and dismiss the appeal by the Appellant.
On the question of the evaluation of the evidence and findings by the trial Court in convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offence of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery, Counsel said that this is solely based on the positive evidence placed by the Respondent at the trial Court and he urged this Court not to disturb the findings of the trial Court as they have been substantiated by credible pieces of evidence. It was argued that the Appellate Court cannot disturb the evaluation of evidence if performed satisfactorily. Counsel cited the cases of NKEBISI vs. STATE (2010) 5 NCC 84 at 90; ONWUBE vs. NDUBA (1972) 3 S.C. 106; EKE vs. THE STATE (2011) 6 NCC pg. 1 at pg. 4;
Based on the above arguments, Counsel urged this Court to hold that the Respondent had proved the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery punishable under Sections 5(b) and 1 (2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act 1990 as amended. He urged the Court to affirm the conviction and sentence of the trial Court.
RESOLUTION OF APPEAL
There does not seem to be any disputes as to the facts of this case which are as clear as day light. The Account of what transpired between the parties is that the PW2 herein was a commercial driver and an employee to the PW1 with a Saloon Car with Registration number AL 87 BRK. The complaint made by the PW2 against the Appellant along with three (3) other persons and which led to their trial, conviction and sentence was that at time material to the facts of this case, the said Appellant and his gang of four engaged his services in conveying them to Jega from Birnin Kebbi at about 8.00 pm. The substance of the complaint was that the Appellant and his gang members dispossessed him of his Saloon Car and other valuables.
Learned Appellant’s Counsel had contended that in the instant case there was no evidence that proved the complete ingredients of the offence for which the Appellant was convicted and hence urged this Court to discharge and acquit the Appellant. According to Counsel, the testimonies of the PW1 and PW2 are pieces of evidence not linking the Appellant to the commission of the offence and that there was no any evidence of an eye witness linking the Appellant to the commission of the offence. He said that the PW2 who was the eye witness did not mention the Appellant as one of the robbers. (See page 44 to 54 of the record of appeal).
What seemed to stand out clearly is that the Court below relied upon Exhibits F, F1, F2 and F2a, which are the testimonies of the PW2 and PW3 through whom Exhibits F, F1, F2 and F2a were tendered and admitted in evidence after due consideration of trial within trial conducted upon the objection by the Appellant at the trial Court. In examining these it is clear that these pieces of evidence are direct and that it would have amounted to a reversal of plausibility for the Court below to have done otherwise. Here was a situation in which the Appellant failed woefully to discredit the evidence of these witnesses. I am unable to see any reasons why the Court should not act on these pieces of evidence.
It is equally important to state that the learned trial judge did not rely only on the confessional statement of the co-accused i.e. the confessional statement of the first convict in convicting and sentencing the Appellant herein but on the confessional statement of the Appellant himself which was admitted in evidence after a trial within trial was conducted where he stated thus;
”In respect of car snatched which I denied earlier, actually I could remember about eight months ago I came to Argungu from Yeldu my village to buy ”canbard” for welding I branched to one Ibrahim of Yardole area Argungu. There he told me that there (sic) some boys he will join me with them because he heard that I once involve in a case of motor vehicle and their work is car theft. He called one Ummaru Bawa Maaji and joined me with him. He asked Ummaru Bawa Maaji whether he had partners they should joined with me because I knew how to drive. That moment Maaji was together with one Abdul Rauf who he called on phone. They told me they want to go to Koko will get goods meaning vehicles to steal … we plan to go and steal vehicle. The four of us entered one vehicle a crecket belonging to Abdul rauf’s mother to Haliru Abdu Birnin Kebbi … on our way after Jega to B/Kebbi Maaji told the driver that we are thieves he should stop…, the driver flew the door open and run away. Maaji drove the vehicle together with myself to Gusau while Abdulrauf came back home.”
The Court relied on the Appellant’s confessional statements in Exhibits F and F1. It is settled point of law that a confession alone is sufficient to support a conviction without corroboration so long as the Court is satisfied of the truth of the confession. See JAMES OBI ACHABUA vs. THE STATE (1976) 12 SC 63. The truth of the matters admitted in the statement should as a matter of importance, be established by some other evidence no matter how slight.
The locus classicus on the subject is the case of R. vs. SYKES (1913) 8 C.A.R. 233, which has been applied in several Nigerian cases on the subject. What should perhaps, be noted with this case, is that it would have been unsatisfactory to have convicted on the evidence of identification alone had it not been assisted by the confessional statement and would also probably have been unsatisfactory if the conviction had rested solely on the confession without the circumstances which make it probable that the confessions were true.
The tests therefore, as laid down in the case of R. vs. SYKES (Supra) to be applied to a man’s confession are; is there anything outside it to show that it is true? Is it corroborated? Are the statements made in it in fact, true as far as can be tested? Was the Appellant, one who had the opportunity of committing the crime? Is his conviction possible? Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and which have been as in this case proved?
In any event, it is within the province of the trial Judge to determine the admissibility of a confession on proof by the prosecution that the statement was free and voluntary and having admitted the statements as in the instant case where the Court below had conducted a trial within trial in determining the veracity of the confessions made. The Court below having found the confessions made as a voluntary confession, the clear position of the law is that that confession is sufficient to ground a conviction and I find myself unable to disagree with the Court below that Exhibits F and F1 were not sufficiently corroborated.
On the issue raised by the Appellant who happens to be of the view that the Prosecution did not succeed in establishing the offence of conspiracy against the Appellant, as it is important to note that the authorities are fairly well settled on the question of conspiracy as an offence in Nigeria. In defining the offence of conspiracy, the practice has been to draw guidance from the Common Law which defines it as an agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or act which is not illegal by illegal means. Usually, one of the many emphases is that there cannot be a conspiracy unless two or more persons are involved who have acted either by agreement or by concert. The most important thing is that the persons know of the existence and the intention or purpose of the conspiracy. That would suffice in law.
The purpose here is that the direct positive evidence of the plot between conspirators is hardly capable of proof. The reason for this is that crimes are mostly hatched in secrecy by desperate criminally minded individuals who would stop at nothing to conceal their tracks. It is precisely for this reason that the Courts are allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the overt acts of the conspirators so as to establish whether there was a conspiracy or not. See the cases of ODUNEYE vs. THE STATE (SUPRA); DABOH vs. THE STATE (1977) 5 SC 197 and a host of other decided cases on the subject. The question to therefore address at this stage is whether there were any overt acts of the Appellant and his co-convicts from which a reasonable degree of conspiracy can be inferred in this Appeal?
There were of course a number of overt acts recorded against the Appellant and his gang members. It would be recalled that the offences for which the Appellant and his co-convicts were held, tried and convicted were for conspiracy to commit armed robbery and armed robbery punishable under Section 5(b) of the Robbery and FireArms (Special Provisions) Act 1990 as Amended. The un-contradicted evidence of the PW2 at the Court below showed that the Appellant was not alone when he snatched the PW2?s Saloon Car. It is important to note that by the Appellant’s own showing in his confessional statement in Exhibit F1, the Appellant was recorded to have confessed thus;
”The four of us entered one vehicle a crecket belonging to Abdul rauf’s mother to Haliru Abdu Birnin Kebbi … on our way after Jega to B/Kebbi Maaji told the driver that we are thieves he should stop…, the driver flew the door open and run away. Maaji drove the vehicle together with myself to Gusau while Abdulrauf came back home.”
I therefore find myself unable to fault the lower Court’s finding that the Prosecution proved the offence of conspiracy against the Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the issue of contradiction, the simple reaction of this Court is that it is not every trifling inconsistency in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that is fatal to the case of the prosecution. It is only when such contradictions and inconsistencies are substantial and fundamental in the main issues in question, and thus necessarily create some doubt in the mind of the trial Court, that an accused is entitled to benefit thereon. It is important to note that the Appellant did not point to any contradictions, which were substantial and fundamental to the main issue of whether the Saloon Car of the PW2 was snatched by the Appellant and his gang members and whilst doing this, whether they were armed with offensive weapons or not. It is on record that this Court could not find any allegations of inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which was not sufficiently explained to the satisfaction of the Court below.
In the final analysis, this Appeal is moribund as it has failed and it is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the judgment of the learned trial Court delivered by I. KANGIWA, J of the High Court of Birnin Kebbi, Kebbi State on the 23-2-2015 is hereby affirmed.
HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A.: I have had the honour of previewing the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Frederick O. Oho, JCA. I agree, for the reasons ably advanced in the lead judgment, that the appeal is bereft of substance.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed by me. I adopt the consequential orders made in the judgment.
MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Frederick O. Oho, JCA. In that judgment, the issues canvassed have been duly analysed before the appeal was dismissed.
The crux of the appellant’s case is that the trial Court was wrong to have convicted him for the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery in spite of the apparent inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution.
The principles that guide a Court when considering a charge of conspiracy was succinctly put by Wiles J., in Makaby Vs R. (1986) 3 H.L., at page 315 thus:
”A conspiracy consists not merely in the intension of two or more but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, by unlawful means. So long as a design rests in intension only it is not indictable. When two agrees to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself and that of each of the actum, capable of being enforced if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means.”
In the instant case, both the evidence of PW2 and the appellant’s own confessional statement, Exhibit F, showed that the appellant was not alone when he snatched the saloon car. Therefore, the learned trial Judge quite properly recognized the principles noted above when he rightly in my view found that the prosecution has proved the offence of conspiracy against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
On the purported contradictions, it has long been laid down by a long chain of authorities that not every contradiction is fatal to the prosecution’s case save where such contradiction goes to the substance and materiality of a fact or facts in issue in the charge as to raise doubt in the mind of the Court. See Ibrahim Vs The State (1991) 4 NWLR (Prt 186) 399 at 415, Udo Vs State (1992) 2 NWLR (Prt 224) 471 at 479 and Oduneye Vs State (2001) 1 at 15.
In the instant case, there was no contradiction as to the snatching of PW 2’s saloon car by the appellant and his cohorts while armed with offensive weapons. The appeal is unmeritorious and is accordingly dismissed.
Appearances:
Hussaini Zakariyau, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Bagudu U. Abubakar, Esq. (DDPP, MOJ Kebbi State)For Respondent(s)
