UDO v. STATE
(2020)LCN/15658(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, March 30, 2020
CA/C/36C/2019
Before Our Lordships:
Mojeed Adekunle Owoade Justice of the Court of Appeal
YargataByenchitNimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal
Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
CPL ENOBONG UDO APPELANT(S)
And
THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
THE LEGAL INGREDIENTS OF OFFENCE OF MURDEE
see OKORO VS. THE STATE (2018) LPELR-44273(CA) where my learned brother Mbaba, JCA restated thus:
“The legal ingredients of offence of murder are well known; that to establish the offence of murder, there must be evidence of death (of the deceased); that the death of the deceased resulted from the act/omission of the accused person(s), and that the said act/omission of the accused person intended the death of the deceased, or to cause him grievous bodily harm; that is, the accused did the act/omission, intentionally, with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm would be its probable consequence. See OMOTOLA VS. THE STATE (2009) 7 NWLR (PT.1139) 148; (2009) LPELR – 2663 SC; NDUKWE VS. THE STATE (2009) 37 NSCQR 425 AT 459 – 460; NWACHUKWU VS THE STATE (2002) 3 FWLR (PT.123) 321; OBASI VS. THE STATE (2014) LPELR – 24013 (CA); SULE VS. STATE (2009) 19 NWLR (PT.1169) 33; AKPA VS. STATE (2008) 14 NWLR (PT.1106) 72; MUSA VS THE STATE (2014) 1 LPELR – 22912 (CA).” YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.
THE PRINCIPLE OF LAW ON THE NATURE OF CONSPIRACY
On the nature of conspiracy, the apex Court in the case of AWOSIKA VS. STATE (2018) LPELR-44351(SC) said:
“It is pertinent to say that the word “conspiracy” has been described in Mulcahy vs R (1968) 3 HC at 377 when Willes J of House of Lords stated thus:- “A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So being as a design rest in intention only it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus centraacins, capable of being enforced if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means. (emphasis supplied by me) See alsocases of Patrick Njovens&Ors vs The State (1973) 5 SC 17; Dabo&Ors vs The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.346) 535 YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.
THE WAYS THE OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY CAN BE PROVED
It is now settled law, that the offence of conspiracy can most of the time, be established through inferences of common design or agreement by two or more persons to do or not to do a criminal act. The offence of conspiracy is seldomly capable of being proved through direct evidence, but is largely established through inferences from the act or action of the parties thereto, which said act was focused towards realization or achieving a common or natural criminal purpose. See. Oduneye vs. The State (2001) 1 SC (Pt.1) 1 at 617. Godwin (Isienei) Chianugo vs. State (2001) FWLR (Pt.74) 242 at 251; Kenneth Clark & Anor vs The State (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.35) 381; Musa vs. The State (2005) FWLR (Pt.262) 343 at 353/354.” Per Sanusi, JSC. YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the Akwa Ibom High Court sitting in Uyo delivered on the 27th day of July, 2018, Coram: Hon. Justice Ifiok E. Ukana wherein the trial Court found the Appellant guilty and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment for the offence of Conspiracy to murder and death by hanging for the offence of murder. Dissatisfied with the said decision the Appellant filed a Notice of appeal on the 11th day of October, 2019 and thereafter with leave of Court filed an amended Notice of Appeal on the 7th day of June, 2019 setting out 5 grounds of appeal.
Facts leading to this appeal are amenable to brevity and I shall summarize it hereafter. The Appellant amongst 3 others were arraigned before the Akwa Ibom High Court on a two count charge of conspiracy and murder. They were alleged to have killed a commercial motorcyclist while on patrol along Abak Road. Three Police men from the “C” Division of the State Police command alighted from a tricycle on surveillance opposite the Federal Secretariat, seized 3 motorcycles belonging to some persons, amongst which was thedeceased. Almost immediately, a police car arrived the scene with the second accused on the wheels, he met the cyclists struggling with the Policemen who impounded their motorcycles and were beating them up. Two cyclists were able to wrestle their motorcycles from the policemen and escaped. The 2nd co-convict, the senior officer, was Inspector Akpaette Moses who sat at the front passenger seat with the door ajar. The motorcycle impounded belonged to the deceased and was held by the Appellant. It was in evidence that the 2nd accused/convict fired some shots to scare the crowd that had gathered and the third shot was aimed at the deceased who was hit on the thigh. He died on his way to the teaching hospital. The 3 other police men joined their colleague in the car and drove away from the scene of crime.
The Respondent called 5 witnesses and tendered 11 Exhibits while the defence called a total of 4 witnesses and tendered several Exhibits. The trial Court after hearing of witnesses and consideration of counsel closing addresses, found the Appellant guilty of the two offences charged; namely conspiracy and murder. He was accordingly sentenced to 14 years forconspiracy and death by hanging for murder. Dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, the Appellant appealed to this Court. His Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on 7th June, 2019.
The Appellant’s Brief settled by IFIOK UDOMAH ESQ filed on the 7th day of June, 2019 and was deemed on the 21st January, 2020. Therein, the Appellant distilled 3 issues for determination as follows:
i. Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced at the trial, the prosecution had proved the two count charge of the conspiracy to murder and murder beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant.
ii. Whether from the circumstance of the case, the incidence that led to death of the deceased was not justified in law in order to exculpate the appellant from conviction.
iii. Whether the learned trial Court was right in holding that there was a unity of purpose by the Appellant and three other accused persons in the killing of the deceased thereby convicting the accused.
The Respondent on its part filed its Respondent’s Brief settled by Friday J. Itim Esq on the 15th October, 2019 and it donated a lone issue for determination a follows:<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”></br<>
Whether from the totality of evidence adduced at the trial, the prosecution had proved the two count charge of conspiracy to murder and murder against the Appellant and others beyond reasonable doubt, and had clearly debunked the defence of self defence as contained in Force Order 237 relied upon by the Appellant.
After a careful consideration of the grounds of appeal, the record of appeal and the issues distilled by the parties, the Court shall adopt the issue for determination as donated by the Respondent while paying attention to the aspects highlighted by the Appellant and because the issues revolve around the question of evaluation of evidence and the burden of proof.
The Appellant in proffering submissions on issues one and two argued together reviewed the evidence against the Appellant and observed that PW1 and 4 were eye witnesses while the others were not and that the trial Court disbelieved the evidence of the Appellant and his co accused and accepted the eye witness account presented by PW1 and PW4. The grouse of the Appellant is that there were contradictions in the evidence of the PW1 and PW4 which goes to the root of the case and mustbe resolved in favour of the appellant, citing IBE VS. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 304) 185 at 195. Learned counsel to the Appellant reviewed the evidence of the eye witnesses and referred to the extra judicial statements of PW1 tendered as Exhibit A at pages 8-9 of the record of appeal where he said there was a wounded policeman at the scene of crime but was retracted during cross examination. Appellant argued that the trial judge justified the conviction by relying on the authority of AJERO & ANOR. VS. UGORJI & ORS. (1999) LPELR-295 (SC). Arguing further, the Appellant contended that the trial judge should not have relied on contradictory evidence to find the Appellant guilty. Appellant wondered why the trial judge believed that the Appellant shot the deceased when there were 4 police men and the finding that they were operating in concert was not supported by evidence and contrary to the evidence of PW5 (the investigating Police officer).
The Appellant further referred to the evidence of the investigating Police officer at pages 125-139 of the record of appeal and highlighted some aspects of the evidence where the witness told the Court that thesecond accused person was injured during the fracas and his evidence taken from a hospital bed and therefore he acted in line with Force Order 237 by shooting the deceased thereby giving rise to self defence as justification and a defence. The Appellant argued that the trial Court discountenanced the defence, ignored Exhibit “B” and expunged Exhibit “M”. Appellant contended that the evidence was duly tendered and the trial Court was bound to consider the exhibits along the defence disclosed in favour of the 2nd accused person, relied on DARIYE VS. FRN (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1467) 355. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that there was a justification for the shooting and the Appellant should have been discharged based on Exhibit “O” – The Force Order 237. Furthermore, that the fact of who shot the deceased is important because PW1 and PW4 said it was the Appellant while PW5 and DW2 said it was the DW2 that shot the deceased and 2nd accused gave justification for the killing.
On the third issue argued by the Appellant, he submitted that the trial Court held that it was immaterial that the 2nd accused fired thefatal shot; all the four accused persons were guilty, referred to page 271 of the record of appeal. Appellant submitted further that the Appellant and his co accused were not on illegal duty and therefore their being and leaving the scene of crime together cannot be taken to mean they had unity of purpose, and therefore the findings of the trial judge are perverse arising from contradictions in the evidence of PW1 and PW4. He referred the Court to the fact that the team was attacked by a hostile crowd. He referred to the evidence of the Investigating Police officer (PW 5) which justified the attack more so, the deceased was hit on the thigh. He cited the case of YAKUBU VS. STATE (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1408) 111 at 123- 124. And AFOLABI VS. STATE (2013) 6-7 SC (Pt.II) 1 at 33 on conspiracy and that the intention or purpose of the conspiracy must be established amongst all the accused. Appellant further submitted that conspiracy requires the consensus in the commission of the offence which he contended is lacking in this case, particularly so because the Appellant did not know a death occurred. He further argued that it is also contrary to the finding of the Courtthat all accused persons left the scene together because they had a common purpose. He observed that there was no evidence of an agreement to commit murder. He finally urged the Court to allow the appeal.
The Respondent in arguing its sole issue submitted that the investigating Police officer tried to save his colleagues in his answers to cross examination but failed to destroy the facts established by the eye witnesses. He also noted that it was a joint trial on two counts. Respondent’s counsel reviewed the cause of death which was attributed to the shooting of the deceased on his thigh by the Appellant and Appellant bled to death. The Appellant was the third accused person at the trial and the gun was given to him by 2nd co-accused person (Insp. Moses Akpaete). The deceased died on the 15th October, 2015 and shooting one with a gun is logically expected to cause grievous bodily harm and leaving such a man bleeding without help has the probable consequence of death. Learned counsel for the Respondent reviewed the evidence of the witnesses and particularly, the evidence of Pw1 who graphically told the trial Court that the Appellant in clear termstold the deceased that if he did not let go the motorcycle, he was going to shoot him, he said: “if you hold that motorcycle again, I will shoot and kill you”, referred to page 104 of the Record. Learned counsel relying on the evidence of PW1 submitted that though PW5 tried to exculpate his colleagues the evidence from other witnesses was strong and the tendering of Exhibit “O”, the Force Order 237- Rules for Guidance in the Use of Firearms could not be of help to the appellant. He admitted that the Force Order was akin to self defence in law. The Respondent directed the Court to the version of facts relevant to the offence as narrated by the Appellants, facts as presented by him and his co-convicts which were not believed by the trial judge and the rejection of Exhibit “B” was therefore right. Respondent referred to the evidence in cross examination of PW4 at page 115 of the record of appeal which supports the evidence of PW1 that no Police man was wounded as at the time they drove off after the shooting.
The Respondent’s Counsel highlighted what he considered the fallacies in the narrative given by the Appellantand his co-convicts. He challenged the assertion that they were attacked by over 40 persons who were armed which is more a fairy tale because the 2nd accused was in the car that followed the 3 policemen who alighted from the tricycle. They alleged that the 2nd co-convict was dragged out of the car and inflicted with machete cuts leaving him in a pool of blood. That they stood helplessly holding AK 47 fully loaded while watching the 2nd co-convict’s life in danger and until they saw that the second co-convict was almost dead, then they fired a shot and all the 40 persons dispersed. They took the injured officer to the station and handed him over to the station officer who later recalled the others to come and take him to the hospital. That the DW1 told the trial Court that he returned his gun to the armoury intact not having been fired. They also alleged that a locally made pistol was seen with a member of the mob but he was not arrested nor the gun recovered from him. That the allegation that the leader of the team was attacked and injured was denied by DW 2 (pages 173-178) the person alleged to have been attacked and could not show the injury to theCourt. DW2 also denied that he was shot at. He did not know where Exhibit B (photograph) was taken.
From the reviewed facts presented by the Respondent, the learned counsel directed his attention to the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy and relied on STATE VS. BABANGIDA (2014) 10 NCC 100; ABACHA V STATE (2003) 3 ACLR 344; AFOLABI VS. STATE (2013) 13 NWLR (PT. 1371) 331 to submit that their action supports the finding that they were acting in concert. On murder, he submitted that in AFOSI VS. STATE (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1371) 331, the apex Court held when a person is reckless on the consequences of his act upon a victim will consider as murder and the Appellant was reckless. On the defence through Force Order 237, the Respondent argued that the facts of this case cannot fit into the application of the order. On quality of evidence, Respondent submitted that PW1 and PW4 were eye witnesses and gave credible evidence. He also referred to the evidence at pages 282-289 of the record in which the team leader admitted that he shot the deceased and there is no justification for such an action in law. He finally urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirmthe conviction of the Appellant.
RESOLUTION
The Appellant in this appeal was the 3rd accused person at the trial Court wherein 4 of them, policemen were arraigned by the Respondent on 2 counts, namely: INSPECTOR IDOKO SAMPSON; INSPECTOR AKAETTE MOSES; CPL ENOBONG UDO and CPL GODWIN NNANA. The 2 counts are conspiracy and murder. The Respondent alleged that the appellant and his co-convicts unlawfully caused the death of one KENNETH FELIX AKPAN by shooting him on the thigh from where he bled to death. They were all found guilty and convicted. The Appellant contends in this appeal that the evidence presented by the Respondent was deficient and could not have been strong enough to ground his conviction. The Court relied principally on the evidence of PW1 and PW4 who were eye witnesses to the events that led to the death of the deceased. The evidence of how the deceased was shot differed between the Appellant, his co-convicts and the Respondent witnesses. Evaluating, the Court believed the version of the Respondents and gave reasons for doing so. The fact of death of Kenneth was established and admitted by the appellant and his co-convicts, in fact the 2ndaccused/co-convict admitted firing the shot that killed the deceased. (Exhibit E and F). It is the circumstances of the shooting that is stoutly contested by the two sides. The Appellant in this appeal did not fire a shot; his involvement was in respect of his being a member of the Police team that came to arrest the motorcyclist on the road opposite Federal Secretariat. The team also abandoned the deceased after the 2nd accused shot the deceased on the leg. The reason for the shooting was because the deceased refused to let go his motorcycle that the 3rd accused held and was trying to drag it away. The evidence before the Court was that he threatened to shot and kill the deceased if he did not let go the motorcycle. The narration of events by the Appellant and his co convicts were found to be a complete fabrication meant to pull the wool over the eyes of the Court. In one breathe, they contended that the 2nd accused who fired the shot was attacked. The person who alleged that he was inflicted with wounds could not substantiate or show scars and that line of defence collapsed like a pack of cards.
Looking at the role of the Appellant specifically, he didnot struggle with the motorcyclist and threaten him, he did not fire the shot. The act that caused the death of the deceased cannot logically be attributed to him. It was shown by evidence that he struggled with the motorcyclist. The trial judge dwelt so much on the collective actions of the Police team. The cause of death did not arise from a collective action but from a shot fired by one Policeman, the 2nd convict who admitted firing the shot. He is not the Appellant here so I will not go into whether he had a defence to the shooting in this appeal. The struggle for the motor cycle did not involve other members of the Police team but was between the deceased and the 3rd convict. The participation of the appellant was when he held no gun. The evidence of PW1 and PW4 was that he went to the car to collect a gun. However, it was the 2nd convict who shot. The Appellant could at best be an accessory after the fact. ABACHA VS. STATE (2002) LPELR-16(SC) Accessory after the fact was defined as follows:
“An accessory after the fact is defined in “The Criminal Law and Procedure of Lagos, Eastern Nigeria and Western Nigeria” by Brett and Mclean as follows:
“A person who receives or assists another who is, to his knowledge, guilty of an offence, in order to enable him to escape punishment, is said to become an accessory after the fact to the offence.”
The trial Court did not consider this aspect because the Appellant was found guilty of the principal offence. The offence of murder and elements the prosecution must, as a matter of duty must be established, see OKORO VS. THE STATE (2018) LPELR-44273(CA) where my learned brother Mbaba, JCA restated thus:
“The legal ingredients of offence of murder are well known; that to establish the offence of murder, there must be evidence of death (of the deceased); that the death of the deceased resulted from the act/omission of the accused person(s), and that the said act/omission of the accused person intended the death of the deceased, or to cause him grievous bodily harm; that is, the accused did the act/omission, intentionally, with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm would be its probable consequence. See OMOTOLA VS. THE STATE (2009) 7 NWLR (PT.1139) 148; (2009) LPELR – 2663 SC; NDUKWE VS. THE STATE (2009) 37 NSCQR 425 AT 459 – 460; NWACHUKWU VS THE STATE(2002) 3 FWLR (PT.123) 321; OBASI VS. THE STATE (2014) LPELR – 24013 (CA); SULE VS. STATE (2009) 19 NWLR (PT.1169) 33; AKPA VS. STATE (2008) 14 NWLR (PT.1106) 72; MUSA VS THE STATE (2014) 1 LPELR – 22912 (CA).” It is also the law, that offence of murder can be established by any one of the following 3 ways:
(1) By positive, direct evidence of an eye witness of the murder. See Chukwunyere Vs. The State (2014) LPELR – 23779 (CA); Galadima Vs. The State (2013) LPELR – 20402.
(2) By cogent circumstantial evidence which points, directly, unmistakably and conclusively at the Accused person, as the one from whom the guilt for the murder can be inferred. See Nasiru Vs. The State (1999) 2 NWLR (pt.589) 82; Chiokwe Vs. The State (2005) NWLR (pt.918) 424; Obasi Vs. The State (2014) LPELR – 24013 (CA); (3) By confessional statement of the accused person, must be adjudged voluntary, even when it is retracted, where the Court is satisfied that it accords with the other pieces of evidence before it. See Haruna Vs. A.G. of the Federation (2012) (2009) LRCN 70 at 96; (2012) 32 WRN 1; (2012) 9 NWLR (pt.1306) 419; Obasi Vs The State supra.Where any of the elements of the offence alleged is not established by evidence, the entire charge must fails. As observed earlier, the prosecution failed to specifically prove any of the actions of the Appellant which caused or contributed in causing the death of the deceased and also that such was intended. On this basis the charge of murder must fail and the appellant should have been discharged. The evidence of PW1 and PW4 gave indication that the Appellant went back to the car and picked a gun after threatening the deceased to let go the motorcycle or be shot and therefore, he was not the one who shot the deceased. If there were no evidence to the contrary, the question of who killed the deceased would have been doubtful; however, the team leader admitted that he shot the deceased in self defence. There is therefore no doubt as to who killed the deceased and there is no contradiction that can defeat the charge against the team leader (2nd accused). Obviously, the appellant did not shoot the deceased even after the threat.
There is no need to go into an academic exercise which will serve no useful purpose. The prosecution did not establish by evidence thatthe appellant caused the death of the deceased. The trial judge was wrong to use a paint brush to paint every member of the team with guilt without evaluating the evidence to ascertain who did what and the legal consequences of any such act. The act that caused death must be identified with certainty and in this case, it was a gunshot fired by the 2nd Convict not the appellant.
On the nature of conspiracy, the apex Court in the case of AWOSIKA VS. STATE (2018) LPELR-44351(SC) said:
“It is pertinent to say that the word “conspiracy” has been described in Mulcahy vs R (1968) 3 HC at 377 when Willes J of House of Lords stated thus:- “A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So being as a design rest in intention only it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus centraacins, capable of being enforced if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means. (emphasis supplied by me) See alsocases of Patrick Njovens&Ors vs The State (1973) 5 SC 17; Dabo&Ors vs The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.346) 535. It is now settled law, that the offence of conspiracy can most of the time, be established through inferences of common design or agreement by two or more persons to do or not to do a criminal act. The offence of conspiracy is seldomly capable of being proved through direct evidence, but is largely established through inferences from the act or action of the parties thereto, which said act was focused towards realization or achieving a common or natural criminal purpose. See. Oduneye vs. The State (2001) 1 SC (Pt.1) 1 at 617. Godwin (Isienei) Chianugo vs. State (2001) FWLR (Pt.74) 242 at 251; Kenneth Clark & Anor vs The State (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.35) 381; Musa vs. The State (2005) FWLR (Pt.262) 343 at 353/354.” Per Sanusi, JSC.
I must state that the proper approach to an indictment containing conspiracy charge and substantive charges is to deal with the later, that is, the substantive charges first and then proceed to see how far the conspiracy count has been made out in answer to the fate of the charge of conspiracy. Conspiracy beingan agreement between two or more persons is either to do a lawful act by unlawful means or to do an unlawful act. Failure to prove a substantive offence does not make conviction for conspiracy inappropriate, as it is a separate and distinct offence, independent of the actual offence conspired to commit. See: Segun Balogun vs. Attorney General Ogun State (2002) 2 SC (pt.11) 89, (2002) 4 SCM 23, (2002) 2 SCNJ 196.
The gist of the offence of conspiracy is the meeting of the mind of the conspirators. This is hardly capable of direct proof for the offence of conspiracy is complete by the agreement to do the act or make the omission complained about. Hence, conspiracy is a matter of inference from certain criminal acts of the parties concerned done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them and in proof of conspiracy the acts or omissions of any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common design may be and very often are given in evidence against any other or others of the conspirators. It is, therefore, the duty of the Court in every case of conspiracy to ascertain as best as it could the evidence of the complicity of any of thosecharged with that offence. See COKER J.S.C in NJOVENS VS. THE STATE (1973) LPELR- 2042(SC).
From the judgment appealed against, the finding that conspiracy was proved arose from the fact that after the shooting, all the Policemen, the convicts entered their car and drove away leaving the victim bleeding and without any help. The learned trial judge found at that point there was an agreement. The question to ask is whether the agreement was before or after the shooting? The agreement that can be inferred was to primarily arrest the motorcyclist for breaching public order which is not an unlawful act. The illegality came in when the leader of the team on his own volition shot twice into the air and then aimed at the deceased and shot him on the thigh. The act of shooting was purely that of the team leader and he was not the only person armed that day. Others did not fire their guns. The act of a person accused of causing death must be specific and identifiable to ground a conviction. At the trial it was the act of the team leader, 2nd Convict that caused the death and not the Appellant herein. There cannot be an agreement when the team leader on his ownshot the deceased. The agreement cannot arise after the fact. The inference to be drawn from the policemen was their escape from the scene and steps taken to shield the 2nd Convict which made them to come up with a different version of events and these came after the death occurred and certainly not to commit the offence of murder. It again raises the issue of the others being accessories after the fact. The fact here is the act of shooting the deceased was carried out with any agreement.
Having not established that the Appellant actually fired the shot, the case of the appellant was not made out beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, a doubt existed on the confession of the 2nd convict who admitted shooting the deceased. The benefit of the doubt must inure to the benefit of the Appellant.
The appeal is meritorious and I find for the Appellant. The judgment of the trial Court delivered on 27th July, 2018 is hereby set aside. The appeal is herein, discharged and acquitted.
Flowing from above, the appeal is meritorious; the judgment of the trial judge, Hon. Justice Ifiok E. Ukanna in charge HU/13C/2016 delivered on the 27th day of July, 2018 is herebyset aside. The Appellant is hereby discharged and acquitted.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I have had privilege of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother Yargata B. Nimpar, J.C.A. I totally agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the Appellant ought to discharged and acquitted
MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A.: I read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Yargata B. Nimpar, J.C.A. just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein which I hereby adopt in allowing the appeal.
I too allow the meritorious appeal and set aside the Judgment of the Court below in charge NO HW/13C/2016.
Appearances:
IFIOK UDOMAH ESQ.,For Appellant(s)
Friday J. Itim Esq.,For Respondent(s)