UCHE v. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE OF FCT & ANOR (2022)

UCHE v. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE OF FCT & ANOR

(2022)LCN/16563(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, February 25, 2022

CA/A/62/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal

Uchechukwu Onyemenam Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Mustapha Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

EZINNE BILIKISU UCHE APPELANT(S)

And

1. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 2. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE MEANING OF THE TERM “PERVERSE”

Perverse simply means persistence in error, different from what is reasonable or required, against weight of evidence.
The Supreme Court in RAMONU ATOLAGBE V. KOREDE OLAYEMI SHORUN (1985) LPELR-592 (SC) defined a perverse decision as “a decision where the trial Judge took into account matters which he ought not to have taken into account or where the Judge shuts his eyes to the obvious.”
The Supreme Court also in IBIBIAMA F. G. ODOM & ORS. V. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY & ORS. (2015) LPELR-24351 (SC) had this to say: “A finding of fact or decision is said to be perverse when it runs counter to pleadings and evidence on record or where the Court which findings or decision are/is being reviewed is shown to have taken into account irrelevant matters or shut its eyes to the obvious and by its very nature the finding or decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. A decision being reviewed may as well be found to be perverse on account of the trial Court’s wrongful application of the law to correctly ascertained facts.”
See also: YARO V. AREWA CONSTRUCTION LTD & ORS. (2007) 16 NWLR (PT. 1063) 333 AT 374 AND OLANIYAN & ORS. V. FATOKI (2013) LPELR-20936 (SC): PER. MUHAMMAD, JSC (P.39, PARAS A-C); ARCHITECT HUDU IBRAHIM MAMONU & ANOR V. JOSEPH D. MATO DIKAT & ORS (2019) LPELR-46560 (SC). PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE PRIMARY DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT

Evaluation of evidence which is in the province of the trial Court is the appraisal of both oral and documentary evidence and the ascription of probative value to the evidence resulting in the finding of facts. See: BUHARI V. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (PT. 1120) 246, ADAMU V. THE STATE (1991) 4 NWLR (PT. 187) 530, (1991) LPELR-73 (SC); ELVIS EZEANI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2019) LPELR-46800 (SC). PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS CAN DELVE INTO THE ERROR OF TECHNICALITIES RAISED BY PARTIES

The attitude of the Court has since changed against deciding cases on mere technicalities. The Supreme Court in HON. JUSTICE TITUS ADEWUYI OYEYEMI (RTD) & ORS v. HON. TIMOTHY OWOEYE & ANOR (2017) LPELR-41903 (SC) held as follows:
“Our duty as an Apex Court is to do substantial justice-stark justice, based on fairness which to all intent and purposes, seeks to not only ensure fairness in dispensing justice, but which is manifestly seen and duly acknowledged by all and sundry as justice both in content and context.
We are not judicial technicians in the workshop of technical Justice. The jurisprudence or logic of our reasoning is and as humanly possible, would be devoid of technicalities. The need to do substantial justice and avoid delving into the error of technicalities is well settled.”
In NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION (N.R.M.A.F.C) V. JOHNSON (2007 49 W.R.N. pages 169-170 where Peter Odili, JCA (as he then was) opined as follows:
“…The Courts have deliberately shifted away from narrow technical approach to justice which characterized some earlier decisions to non-pursue the course of substantial justice.”
See also: MAKERI SMELTING CO. LTD. V. ACCESS BANK (NIG.) PLC (2002) 7 NWLR (PT. 766) 411 at 476-417; AJAKAIYE V. IDEHIA (1991) 8 NWLR (PT. 364) 504, ARTRA IND. LTD. V. NBC (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 483) 574, DAKAT V. DASHE (1997) 12 NWLR (PT. 531) 46, BENSON V. NIGERIA AGIP CO. LTD (1982) 5 S.C.1. PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE WAY AND MANNER A JUDGE WRITES HIS JUDGEMENT

Let me state here that the way and manner a Judge writes his judgment is essentially a matter of style and has nothing to do with the substance of the case. There is no dogmatic style in writing judgments. Indeed, every Court is entitled to its own style of writing its judgment. Every Judge has his style of judgment writing according to his exposure, level and the quality of training and experience he has garnered over the years; and as a result, Judges differ in the procedure and style of writing their judgments. See: JEKPE V. ALOKWE (2001) 8 NWLR (PT. 715) 252 AT, 264, YALAJU-AMAYE V. AREC LTD. (1990) 4 NWLR (PT. 145) 422 AT 445; PASTOR IZE-IYAMU OSAGIE ANDREW & ANOR V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2017) LPELR-48518 (SC).
Judgment writing is an art and once the essential elements are present in the judgment, it will not matter what method was employed in writing the judgment. Therefore a judgment cannot be set aside for the style being inelegant so long as the decision reached is right. Also, whether the Appellant’s case or the Respondents’ case was considered first will not affect the trial Court’s resolution of the issues in contention between the parties. See: CHUKWUEMEKA EZEUKO (ALIAS DR. REV. KING) V. THE STATE (2016) LPELR-40046(SC). PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

DEFINITION OF THE TERM “FAIR HEARING”

On whether the trial Court failed to consider the issue of denial of fair hearing in the suit. Fair hearing was defined in the Supreme Court case of: R. ARIORI & ORS. V. MURAIMO ELEMO & ORS. (1983) 1 SCNLR 1; (1983) 1 SC 13 AT 24 OBASEKI, J.S.C. observed as follows:-
‘Fair hearing, therefore, must mean a trial conducted according to all the legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties to the cause.”
See also: CHIEF OSIGWE EGBO & ORS V. CHIEF TITUS AGBARA & ORS (1997) LPELR-1036(SC).
A fair hearing must, of course, be a hearing that does not contravene the principles of natural justice; a fair hearing must also involve a fair trial and a fair trial consists of the whole hearing. See: DR UMAR ARDO V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2017) LPELR-41919(SC). PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant initiated this appeal against the decision of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Abuja Division delivered on 25th September, 2018 by R. B. HAASTRUP J. in SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/353/2013.

The brief fact of the case is that the Appellant was an employee of the 1st Respondent who rose from the rank of Magistrate Grade 2 to Director of Litigation and Deputy Chief Registrar of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory. The Appellant was alleged to be involved in 2 petitions alongside the Chief Registrar of FCT High Court; the petitions were sent to National Judicial Council by one Mbanefo Michael A. N in respect of Suit No: FCT/HC/CV/486/10 between: NESTELLO GATEWAY GROUP V. ALHAJI ABDULAZIZ ABUBAKAR MARI and Suit No: FCT/HC/CV/312/07; Between: BPS CONSTRUCTION LTD V. FERMA by one Fredrick E. Elochukwu.

It was contended that in the first petition above, the Appellant connived with the Chief Registrar and the Chief Judge of the FCT to set aside a judgment that had already been executed. It was also contended in the second petition that the Appellant made improper use of Court power of execution and connived with the FCT High Court and the managing Director of BPS Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd to defraud the Federal Government to the sum of N460,000,000.00 (Four hundred and sixty million Naira).

The National Judicial Council upon receipt of the said petitions forwarded same to the 1st Respondent who set up a sub-committee and investigated the complaint against the Appellant. The Appellant was suspended pending the determination of the investigation and at the conclusion of the investigation the sub-committee found the Appellant guilty of the allegation and compulsorily retired her from service.

Aggrieved by the decision of the sub-committee, the Appellant approached the trial Court via a Complaint challenging the said decision. The learned trial Judge held in favour of the Respondents thus:
“I must first of all state that it is the law that the claimant as an employee cannot gag the defendants, particularly the 1st defendant, i.e. her employer from exerting disciplinary action against her. I have dealt extensively on this point in the course of this judgment. Furthermore, the position of the law is clear that it is the claimant in this case that the onus rests upon to prove that she is entitled to the claims, as set out in Sections 135, 136 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). The claimant in this case, must succeed on the strength of her own case by preponderance of evidence of probability and not the weakness of the defendants’ case. See: HEALTH CARE PRODUCTS (NIG.) LTD VS. BOZZA (2004) 3 NWLR (PT. 861) PG. 582/ PARA’S. H-O; NYONG EMMANUEL OBOT VS. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (1993) 8 NWLR (PT. 310) 140 @ 162.
In light of the foregoing, issue No. 3, is equally resolved in favour of the defendants, and the claimant having failed to prove her claims against the defendants in this suit, her claims are all liable to fail in its entirety, and are all accordingly dismissed.”

The Appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court and has approached this Court by a notice of appeal as seen at pages 1427 to 1439 of the records of appeal. Counsel on both sides filed relevant processes as required by the rules of the Court and the appeal was heard on 1st December, 2021.

UCHENNA UWAZURUONYE Esq., appeared for the Appellant. He adopted and relied on the Appellant’s brief of argument filed on 4th February, 2020; but deemed properly filed and served on 2nd June, 2020 and the Appellants’ reply brief of argument to the 1st Respondent’s brief filed on 6th October, 2020, in urging the Court to allow the appeal.

P.E. OSSAI ESQ., with MARTHA IBEKWE ESQ., B.Y EDOGBANYA ESQ., P.O AKOJI ESQ., FORTUNE W. ADAH ESQ., appeared for the 1st Respondent. They adopted and relied on the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument filed on 21st September, 2020; but deemed properly filed and served on 23rd September, 2020; in urging the Court to dismiss the Appeal.

Mr. Uwazuruonye Uchenna Ernest, applied to withdraw the appeal against the 2nd Respondent and for the appeal to be heard. The application was granted without objection from Mr. P.E. Ossai the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent.

In the Appellant’s brief of argument settled by Uwazuruonye Uchenna Ernest Esq., the Appellant formulated 3 issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the judgment wherein it is obvious that the trial Court lost grip of the case, failed to consider the evidence of key witnesses, failed to consider constitutional issues, etc, is not perverse and liable to be set aside by this hon. Court?
2. Whether the trial Court did not err when it failed to hold that the interference of the NJC in the discipline of the Appellant which led to the termination of the Appellant’s employment violated the provisions of Sections 304 and 158 of the Constitution?
3. Whether the trial Court did not err in law when it failed to consider the broad issue of denial of fair hearing contested in the suit and which led to a miscarriage of justice.

P. E. Ossai Esq., in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument adopted the 3 issues submitted by the Appellant for determination.

I shall therefore resolve issues 1 and 3 together and issue 2 as a separate issue.

SUBMISSIONS ON ISSUE 1
Whether the judgment wherein it is obvious that the trial Court lost grip of the case, failed to consider the evidence of key witnesses, failed to consider constitutional issues, etc, is not perverse and liable to be set aside by this hon. Court
Mr. Uwazuruonye in the Appellant’s brief of argument contended that the judgment of the trial Court was delivered outside the statutory period, when the Court had lost grip of the facts and other essential features of the case; he added that the learned trial Judge only summarized but failed to evaluate the evidence of parties before it. He elaborately demonstrated the evidence of the witnesses and submitted that the fact that the evidence of CW2, which relate to the cause of action, was ignored by the trial Court; this Court has a duty to set aside the judgment of the trial Court. He relied on: OYIBO IRIRI & OTHERS V. ESERORA YE ERHURHOBARA & ANOR (1991) 2 NWLR (PT. 173) 252. The learned counsel submitted that the inability of the Court to appreciate and resolve vital constitutional issues properly raised in the pleadings, evidence and address of the Appellant, renders the judgment perverse and liable to be set aside. He referred to the decision of the Court in: KALU V. STATE (1998) LPELR-1655; (1998) 13 NWLR (PT. 583) 531.

The learned counsel contended that the 1st Respondent investigated and found the Appellant “guilty of improper use of Court Powers of Execution and Connivance between the High Court of FCT and the Managing Director, BPS Engineering and Construction Co. Limited to Defraud the Federal Government to the tune of N460 Million only”. He submitted that by the authority of: UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN & ANOR VS. OLUWADARE (2002) LPELR 7179; FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE V. LAOYE (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 106) 652 & OR., any decision on the above subject, the 1st Respondent itself or through its sub-committee cannot investigate and/or punish a public servant on an allegation of crime unless the employee expressly admitted the commission of the crime or he has been found guilty by a Court of law.

The learned counsel also submitted that it is the duty of the trial Court to address the constitutional issues raised timeously and dispassionately and the failure to do so renders its judgment perverse. He cited the cases of: ALAMIEYESIGHA V. IGONIWARI (NO. 2) (2007) 7 NWLR (PT. 1034) 524 AT 583 PARAS. F- G; YUSUFU V. OBASANJO (2003) 16 NWLR (PT. 847) 532, ALHAJI RUFAI AGBAJE AND OTHERS V. MRS. W.A. ADELEKAN AND OTHERS (1990) 7 NWLR (PT. 164) 595 AT 614, ONYEMA AND OTHERS V. OPUTA AND OTHERS (1987) 3 NWLR (PT. 60) 259; (1987) 2 N.S.C.C. 900, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION AND OTHERS V. SODE AND OTHERS (1990) 1 NWLR (PT. 128) 500; (1990) 1 N.S.C.C.271, TUKUR V. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517 AT 545. He further submitted that the judgment giving rise to the instant appeal lacks the basic ingredients of a valid judgment.

Mrs. Ossai in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument submitted that although by the provisions of Section 294 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, 2011 (as amended), the Courts are enjoined to deliver judgment within ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and full addresses; he further submitted that the delivery of judgment in this case outside the statutory period of three (3) months as envisage by the constitution has not in any way occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the Appellant as the judgment was delayed for only an extra month after the statutory period of ninety (90) days after the adoption of the Final Written Addresses by the parties. He relied on Section 294 (5) and (6) of the Constitution (as amended).

The learned counsel contended that the trial Court did not lose grip of the case and had considered all Constitutional issues and evidence of key witnesses before it, therefore the trial Court was not perverse in its judgment. He submitted that the Appellant was given ample opportunity to defend herself and also to cross- examine witnesses; he referred to paragraph 20 of her statement on oath and page 27 of the minutes of meeting of the sub- committee.

The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent on the issue that the 1st Respondent relied on the directive of the National Judicial Council to sanction the Appellant, submitted that the 1st Respondent never acted under the directive or control of National judicial Council but acted independently as employer of the Appellant who has the power to sanction the Appellant for any act of misconduct as its employee. The 1st Respondent further submitted that the National Judicial Council merely transferred the petition to the appropriate authorities being the 1st Respondent and never gave any directives to them.

He further submitted that the 1st Respondent’s proceedings and recommendations of its sub-committee duly complied with the tenets of fair hearing by giving adequate notices to the Appellant to present her defence which the Appellant responded to by appearing before the sub-committee.

The 1st Respondent in response to paragraphs 4.24 (e) and (g) of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument submitted that it was on the complaint of misconduct arising from 2 petitions against the Appellant and other officers of the 1st Respondent that led to the investigation and subsequent sanction by the 1st Respondent contrary to the submission of the Appellant.

In response to sub-paragraph (g) 4.24 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, regarding the petitions from FERMA, the 1st Respondent submitted that the events which transpired in the minutes of meeting held on 9th September, 2013 indicates the fact that the 1st Respondent’s panel was not in any way interested in the criminal aspect of the petitions, but the administrative lapse on the part of the Appellant and the Chief Registrar of the High Court of FCT. He cited the case of: UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN & ANOR V. OLUWADARE (2002) LPELR 7179 and FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE V. LAOYE (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 106) 652.

The learned counsel in response to sub-paragraph (h) of 4.24 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, submitted that the Appellant’s presence at the 102 (extraordinary) meeting held on the 4th October, 2013 was not required as the Appellant was already granted fair hearing at the meeting of the sub-committee held on the 9th September, 2013 and what the sub-committee did was to give their recommendations based on the investigations and cross- examinations already carried out in their previous meetings.

SUBMISSIONS ON ISSUE 2
Whether the trial Court did not err when it failed to hold that the interference of the NJC in the discipline of the Appellant which led to the termination of the Appellant’s employment violated the provisions of Sections 304 and 158 of the Constitution.
The learned counsel for the Appellant on this issue contended that the 1st Respondent’s solemn responsibility of disciplining its employees must be exercised independently and without any form of influence by a third party. He relied on Section 158 (1) of the Constitution; MANUWA V. NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL (2013) 2 NWLR (1337) 1, 24. He added that the suspension and disengagement of the Appellant from service was initiated by the letter National Judicial Council wrote to the 1st Respondent, he went on to say that the NJCs role in the disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant amounted to unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of the 1st Respondent in violation of the Constitution and therefore unlawful. He cited: HON. JUSTICE RALIAT ELELU & NJC V. A.G OF THE FEDERATION & 2 ORS, (2012) NWLR (PT. 629) PAGE 1011.

The learned counsel submitted that the trial Court failed to make any findings on the conduct/involvement of the National Judicial Council in the disciplinary process of the Appellant; and failure of the trial Court to hold that the act of National Judicial Council was unlawful and breached the Appellant’s right to fair hearing led to miscarriage of justice. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

The 1st Respondent’s counsel on this issue submitted that the trial Court did not violate the provisions of Sections 158 and 304 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and did not err when it refused to hold that the interference of the National Judicial Council led to the termination of the Appellant, as there was no interference by the National Judicial Council. The learned counsel defined interference and extensively illustrated the role of the National Judicial Council in the disciplinary process of the Appellant contrary to the submission of the Appellant.

The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that from the events that transpired between the 1st Respondent and the Appellant; there was no interference whatsoever by the National Judicial Council (NJC) on the decision of the 1st Respondent by directing the petitions to the 1st Respondent to investigate and sanction.

SUBMISSIONS ON ISSUE 3
Whether the trial Court did not err in law when it failed to consider the broad issue of denial of fair hearing contested in the suit and which led to a miscarriage of justice
The learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the trial Court did not consider in its judgment, the broad issue of fair hearing concerning the 1st Respondents’ 101 meeting of 1st August, 2013. He added that in the judgment subject of this appeal, the trial Court did not in any way consider whether the conduct, proceedings and decisions of the 1st Respondent, which resulted to the suspension of the Appellant and setting up of the sub- committee, did not violate the Appellant’s right to fair hearing.

He also submitted that a hearing cannot be said to be fair if any of the parties is refused a hearing or is denied the opportunity to be heard or even after being heard, is denied a consideration of his case. He cited the case of: MIL. GOV. IMO STATE V. NWAUWA (1997) 2 NWLR (PT. 490) 679. 102. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that the trial Court considered the issue of fair hearing especially at pages 1424-1425 of the Record of Appeal and consequently there was no miscarriage of justice.

In response to paragraphs 4.76-4.79, particularly, paragraph 4.79 (i)-(iv) of the Appellant’s brief of argument, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that the Appellant’s presence at the 101 and 102 extraordinary meeting was not required as her presence may interfere with the investigation process of the petition against her. He added that the composition of the sub-committee of the 1st Respondent as well as their conduct during the proceedings was in line with the rules of fair hearing.

The learned counsel also in response to paragraph 4.82 of the Appellant’s brief of argument particularly paragraph 4.81 submitted that the trial Court addressed the issues of fair hearing raised by the Appellant in her claims at every stage of the proceedings of the 1st Respondent’s sub-committee.

The 1st Respondent also submitted that the trial Court considered and evaluated all material issues and evidence before reaching a valid conclusion that the Appellant had failed to prove her case. I have taken record of the Appellant’s reply brief to the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument; I shall refer to the said brief when necessary during the resolution of this appeal.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES 1 and 3
Perverse simply means persistence in error, different from what is reasonable or required, against weight of evidence.
The Supreme Court in RAMONU ATOLAGBE V. KOREDE OLAYEMI SHORUN (1985) LPELR-592 (SC) defined a perverse decision as “a decision where the trial Judge took into account matters which he ought not to have taken into account or where the Judge shuts his eyes to the obvious.”
The Supreme Court also in IBIBIAMA F. G. ODOM & ORS. V. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY & ORS. (2015) LPELR-24351 (SC) had this to say: “A finding of fact or decision is said to be perverse when it runs counter to pleadings and evidence on record or where the Court which findings or decision are/is being reviewed is shown to have taken into account irrelevant matters or shut its eyes to the obvious and by its very nature the finding or decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. A decision being reviewed may as well be found to be perverse on account of the trial Court’s wrongful application of the law to correctly ascertained facts.”
See also: YARO V. AREWA CONSTRUCTION LTD & ORS. (2007) 16 NWLR (PT. 1063) 333 AT 374 AND OLANIYAN & ORS. V. FATOKI (2013) LPELR-20936 (SC): PER. MUHAMMAD, JSC (P.39, PARAS A-C); ARCHITECT HUDU IBRAHIM MAMONU & ANOR V. JOSEPH D. MATO DIKAT & ORS (2019) LPELR-46560 (SC).

It is the argument of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the trial Court’s judgment subject of this appeal is perverse on the ground that it was delivered after 90 days and therefore lacked the essential ingredients of a valid judgment. On the effect of failure of a Court to deliver judgment within the 90 days provided by law; the Supreme Court pronounced on this issue in the case of: DENNIS AKOMA & ANOR V. OBI OSENWOKWU & ORS (2014) LPELR- 22885(SC) where it held thus:
“The question is, what is the consequence(s) of the failure of the lower Court, in the circumstances of the case, to deliver its decision within ninety days of the final addresses of counsel?
The answer is that the judgment/decision/order so delivered is valid except an Appellant can satisfy the Court that the non-delivery of the judgment within the stipulated time has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to him”.
Section 294 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides thus:
(1) Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof.
However Section 294 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides thus:
(5) The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Subsection (1) of this Section unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason thereof.

The Appellant on attempt to prove that the failure of the trial Court to deliver its judgment within 90 days occasioned a miscarriage of justice; contended that the trial Court failed to consider and evaluate the evidence of key witnesses. Evaluation of evidence which is in the province of the trial Court is the appraisal of both oral and documentary evidence and the ascription of probative value to the evidence resulting in the finding of facts. See: BUHARI V. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (PT. 1120) 246, ADAMU V. THE STATE (1991) 4 NWLR (PT. 187) 530, (1991) LPELR-73 (SC); ELVIS EZEANI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2019) LPELR-46800 (SC).

If a Court of law does not make use of evidence of witnesses, the evidence will be regarded as dead or moribund in the determination of the live issues in the matter. See: GENERAL MUHAMMADU BUHARI V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2008) LPELR-814 (SC).

I have painstakingly gone through the judgment of the trial Court and I observe that the trial Court in evaluating the evidence of parties before it stated at page 1421 of the records of appeal thus: “the claimant’s assertion as in paragraphs 19 of her witness statement on oath is in my view merely an assumption or speculation, and not tenable. The law is trite that a Court of law can only pronounce judgment in the light of evidence presented and proved before it, and is barred from basing its findings on claimant’s whimsical views, sentiments or feelings and/or speculations.
Pages 13-14 of Exhibit EBU 27 (investigation report of FCT- judicial service Committee) held 9/9/2013 on petitions against the Claimant, observed as follows …” (underlined emphasis is mine).

The learned trial Judge from pages 1418 to 1426 of the records of appeal, elaborately evaluated the evidence of the parties before him; the mere fact that the trial Court did not make reference to the specific oral testimonies of the Appellant’s witnesses to me does not mean that he did not properly evaluate or take the evidence into consideration in the course of writing its judgment. Also, the learned trial Judge in my view properly evaluated all the documentary evidence and the arguments contained in the Appellant’s witness deposition on oath.

Again, the mere fact that the trial Court in formulating its issue one used the term ‘dismissed’ instead of compulsory retirement from office again to me does not mean the trial Court lost grip of the facts of the case; he stated the fact in issue in his judgment and in his resolution he steadily maintained the fact that the Appellant was compulsorily retired and not dismissed.

The attitude of the Court has since changed against deciding cases on mere technicalities. The Supreme Court in HON. JUSTICE TITUS ADEWUYI OYEYEMI (RTD) & ORS v. HON. TIMOTHY OWOEYE & ANOR (2017) LPELR-41903 (SC) held as follows:
“Our duty as an Apex Court is to do substantial justice-stark justice, based on fairness which to all intent and purposes, seeks to not only ensure fairness in dispensing justice, but which is manifestly seen and duly acknowledged by all and sundry as justice both in content and context.
We are not judicial technicians in the workshop of technical Justice. The jurisprudence or logic of our reasoning is and as humanly possible, would be devoid of technicalities. The need to do substantial justice and avoid delving into the error of technicalities is well settled.”
In NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION (N.R.M.A.F.C) V. JOHNSON (2007 49 W.R.N. pages 169-170 where Peter Odili, JCA (as he then was) opined as follows:
“…The Courts have deliberately shifted away from narrow technical approach to justice which characterized some earlier decisions to non-pursue the course of substantial justice.”
See also: MAKERI SMELTING CO. LTD. V. ACCESS BANK (NIG.) PLC (2002) 7 NWLR (PT. 766) 411 at 476-417; AJAKAIYE V. IDEHIA (1991) 8 NWLR (PT. 364) 504, ARTRA IND. LTD. V. NBC (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 483) 574, DAKAT V. DASHE (1997) 12 NWLR (PT. 531) 46, BENSON V. NIGERIA AGIP CO. LTD (1982) 5 S.C.1.

It is equally the argument of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the trial Court failed to consider constitutional issues raised in the suit. I have read the entire judgment of the learned trial Judge and have equally studied the facts of the case subject of this appeal, the complaint of the Appellant in my view is mainly on the fact that the 1st Respondent allegedly acted on a letter from the National Judicial Council to compulsorily retire her from service.

The Appellant added that the National Judicial Council should not have interfered with the disciplinary process of the Appellant. The Appellant further contended that her right to fair hearing was breached as she was allegedly not allowed fair hearing in all the meetings of the committee.

The trial Court at page 1421 addressing the letter of the NJC to the 1st Respondent stated thus:
“My understanding of the above is that the Claimant should be subjected to disciplinary action, which the 1st Defendant has done by Exhibit EBU 16. The suspension of the Claimant is a disciplinary process to allow for investigation, particularly where the employer thinks keeping the employee in the office may interfere with the process of investigation.”

Again at page 1423 of the records of appeal, the trial Court addressed the issue of breach of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing. In my view, the learned trial Judge duly addressed the Constitutional issues in the suit and I so hold.

The learned counsel for the Appellant also contended that the trial Court failed to consider superior Court’s decisions on the subject matter. Let me state here that the way and manner a Judge writes his judgment is essentially a matter of style and has nothing to do with the substance of the case. There is no dogmatic style in writing judgments. Indeed, every Court is entitled to its own style of writing its judgment. Every Judge has his style of judgment writing according to his exposure, level and the quality of training and experience he has garnered over the years; and as a result, Judges differ in the procedure and style of writing their judgments. See: JEKPE V. ALOKWE (2001) 8 NWLR (PT. 715) 252 AT, 264, YALAJU-AMAYE V. AREC LTD. (1990) 4 NWLR (PT. 145) 422 AT 445; PASTOR IZE-IYAMU OSAGIE ANDREW & ANOR V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2017) LPELR-48518 (SC).
Judgment writing is an art and once the essential elements are present in the judgment, it will not matter what method was employed in writing the judgment. Therefore a judgment cannot be set aside for the style being inelegant so long as the decision reached is right. Also, whether the Appellant’s case or the Respondents’ case was considered first will not affect the trial Court’s resolution of the issues in contention between the parties. See: CHUKWUEMEKA EZEUKO (ALIAS DR. REV. KING) V. THE STATE (2016) LPELR-40046(SC).

On whether the trial Court failed to consider the issue of denial of fair hearing in the suit. Fair hearing was defined in the Supreme Court case of: R. ARIORI & ORS. V. MURAIMO ELEMO & ORS. (1983) 1 SCNLR 1; (1983) 1 SC 13 AT 24 OBASEKI, J.S.C. observed as follows:-
‘Fair hearing, therefore, must mean a trial conducted according to all the legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties to the cause.”
See also: CHIEF OSIGWE EGBO & ORS V. CHIEF TITUS AGBARA & ORS (1997) LPELR-1036(SC).
A fair hearing must, of course, be a hearing that does not contravene the principles of natural justice; a fair hearing must also involve a fair trial and a fair trial consists of the whole hearing. See: DR UMAR ARDO V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2017) LPELR-41919(SC).

The learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the trial Court did not consider the broad issue of fair hearing concerning the 1st Respondent’s 101 meeting of 1st August, 2013. I totally disagree with the contention of the Appellant on this issue, I have stated earlier in this judgment that the trial Court at page 1421 addressed the letter of the NJC to the 1st Respondent and I reproduced the view of the trial Court in respect of the said letter. The trial Court need not write an epistle on a particular issue before such issue is deemed to have been addressed. I have also noted earlier that Judges have different ways of writing, but as long as the Court properly evaluated the evidence of parties before it and addressed all vital issues raised for determination in the suit; its mode of writing cannot vitiate a proceeding well conducted.

I am of the opinion that the learned trial Judge in his judgment duly considered the broad issue of denial of fair hearing contested in the suit at pages 1423 to 1426 of the records of appeal and I so hold.

An appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of facts made by a trial Court on credibility of witnesses unless it is shown that such findings are perverse or are not the result of proper evaluation of the evidence. See: AYENI V. STATE (2016) LPELR- 4010 (SC); SANYAOLU V. STATE(1976) 5 SC 37, RABIU V. STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 130; ADELUMOLA V. STATE (1988) 1 NWLR 13 (PT. 73) 683; SUGH V STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (PT. 77) 475; STATE V NNOLIM (1994) 5 NWLR (PT. 345) 394.

In all, I fail to fault the decision of the trial Court on these issues. Consequently, I resolve issues 1 and 3 in favour of the 1st Respondent and against the Appellant.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 2
Section 304 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) established the 1st Respondent as follows:
“(1) There shall be for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the composition and functions of which shall be as provided in Part III of the Third Schedule to this Constitution.
(2) The provisions of Sections 154(1) and (3), 155, 156, 157(1) and (2), 158(1) and 159 to 161 of this Constitution shall apply with necessary modifications to the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”

Section 158 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides as follows:
“(1) In exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the National Judicial Council, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Federal Judicial Service Commission, the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission, the Federal Character Commission, and the Independent National Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person.
(2) The National Population Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person-
(a) In appointing, training or arranging for the training of enumerators or other staff of the Commission to assist it in the conduct of any population census;
(b) in deciding whether or not to accept or revise the return of any officer of the said Commission concerning the population census in any area or part of the Federation;
(c) in carrying out the operation of conducting the census; and
(d) in compiling its report of a national census for publication.”

The complaint of the Appellant on this issue is that the National Judicial Commission interfered in the disciplinary process of the 1st Respondent in its letter dated 25th July, 2013 which allegedly led to the suspension of the Appellant pending the investigation by the 1st Respondent’s panel and therefore breached the Appellant’s right to fair hearing.

The Appellant also contended that since the allegation against her bothers on fraud which is criminal in nature, it can only be determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

I have gone through the entire records of appeal before me; at page 562 is a letter dated 21st February, 2013 authored by National Judicial Council to the 1st Respondent, the said letter reads thus:
“I have been directed by the Honourable, Chief Justice of Nigeria and Chairman of the National Judicial Council, Hon. Justice A. M. Mukhtar, GCON to forward to Your Lordship a petition dated 12th February, 2013 by one Mr. A. N. Mbanefo Micheal on the above subject matter. The Judicial Service Committee of the FCT under your Chairmanship is to investigate the allegations against the Chief Registrar and Director of Litigation and forward the outcome of its investigation to His Registrar and Director of Litigation and forward the outcome of its investigation to His Lordships, please. “

It is not in dispute that the 1st Respondent is the Appellant’s employer and therefore has the statutory power to discipline the Appellant on any allegation bothering on the administration of her office. The main grouse of the Appellant is that the second letter from the National Judicial Council to the 1st Respondent interfered with the disciplinary process on the ground that the committee relied on the said letter to suspend the Appellant.

At pages 1041 to 1042 is also a letter dated 25th July, 2013 from the National Judicial Council to the 1st Respondent, and the said letter reads as follows:
1. “on receipt of a petition by Michael Mbanefo A. N & 1 Ors, counsel to Nestello Gateway Group Ltd against Hon. Justice Lawal Gummi, Hon. Justice Jude Okeke, the Chief Registrar/Deputy Sheriff and Director Litigation, High Court of FCT, Abuja, the National Judicial Council set up a ‘fact finding Committee’ comprising its members, under the Chairmanship of Hon. Justice P.O. Aderemi, CON, to investigate the various allegations leveled against the officers.
2. After investigation, the Committee submitted a Report to the National Judicial Council, which was deliberated upon during its meeting which was held on 17th and 18th July, 2013. In the Report, the Committee found that the Chief Registrar/Deputy Sheriff in the person of Mrs. Oluwatoyin Yahaha and the Director of Litigation, Madam Uche Ezinne Chinenye Bilikisu are not free from blame for the role they played in reversing administratively the execution already successfully carried out.
3. Consequently, Council decided that the two officers Mrs. Oluwatoyin Yahaha and the Director of Litigation, Madam Uche Ezinne Chinenye Bilikisu are not free from being referred to the FCT Judicial Service Committee under your Chairmanship for appropriate sanction.
4. You are to forward to my chamber the outcome of the action of the FCT Judicial Service Committee vide paragraph 3 above, please.”

I have noted the said 2nd letter from NJC as reproduced above. However, at pages 736 to 818 of the records of appeal contain the minutes of meeting of the Sub-Committee held on 9th September, 2013 wherein the Appellant was present and equally represented by a counsel. At page 745 the Chairman of the Committee stated as follows:
“This panel is to investigate the administrative lapses that indict the Chief Registrar and Director Litigation as contained in the letter signed by Hon. Chief Justice of Nigeria.” (Underlined is mine for emphasis).

Again at page 746 of the records of appeal, the Hon. Grand Kadi stated thus:
“What happened at NJC is not binding on us, we have to find out the administrative lapses. We are not relying on NJC report but it serves as a guide.”

From these committee’s excerpts, the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the committee set up by the 1st Respondent was constituted to investigate the administrative lapses of the Appellant and not any criminal complaint against her.

Part iii of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Executive Body (Established under Section 304) Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
“1. The Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall comprise the following members –
(a) the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja who shall be the Chairman;
(b) the Attorney-General of the Federation;
(c) the Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja;
(d) the President of the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja;
(e) one person who is a legal practitioner and who has been qualified to practice as a legal practitioner in Nigeria for a period of not less than twelve years; and
(f) one other person, not being a legal practitioner, who in the opinion of the President is of unquestionable, integrity.
2. The Committee shall have power –
(a) to recommend to the National Judicial Council suitable persons for nomination for, appointment to the office of
(i) the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
(ii) a Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja,
(iii) the Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja,
(iv) the President of the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja,
(v) a Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja,
(vi) a Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja;
(b) subject to the provisions of this Constitution, to recommend to the National Judicial Council the removal from office of the judicial officers specified in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph;
(c) to appoint, promote and exercise disciplinary control over the Chief Registrar and Deputy Chief Registrars of the High Court, the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, Magistrates, the Judges and members of the District and Area Courts of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, if any, and all other members of the staff of the judicial service of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja not otherwise specified in this Constitution and of the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.” (Underlined emphasis is mine).

From what I have just reproduced, I will be correct to say that it is the Constitutional duty of the 1st Respondent to appoint/discipline the Appellant. Also from the records of the committee as shown in the records of appeal; I hold that the letter of the National Judicial Council did not in any way influence the investigation and findings of the 1st Respondent’s Committee and that the Committee investigated the administrative involvement of the Appellant in relation to the petition against her contrary to the submission of the Appellant.

In all, I fail to fault the decision of the trial Court on this issue. The issue is resolved in favour of the 1st Respondent and against the Appellant.

Consequently, the appeal lacks merit and the same is dismissed. The decision of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Abuja Division delivered on 25th September, 2018 by R. B. HAASTRUP J. in SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/353/2013; is hereby upheld.
I make no order as to costs.

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.: I read in draft form, the leading judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Uchechukwu Onyemenam, JCA.
I agree that the appeal lacks merit and I also dismiss it.

I abide by all the orders made by my learned brother, including the order as to costs.

MOHAMMED MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in advance, the judgment of my learned brother, UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, JCA just delivered. I agree with his conclusions that the appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
No order as to costs.