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UBER TECHNOLOGIES SERVICES NIG. LTD v. AJAYI (2020)

UBER TECHNOLOGIES SERVICES NIG. LTD v. AJAYI

(2020)LCN/15647(CA)

In the Court of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, September 17, 2020

CA/L/541/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Joseph ShagbaorIkyeghJustice of the Court of Appeal

Obande Festus OgbuinyaJustice of the Court of Appeal

Balkisu Bello AliyuJustice of the Court of Appeal

Between

UBER TECHNOLOGIES SERVICES NIG. LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

JOSHUA AYODELE AJAYI RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO:

THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT                                            

It is settled law, that a Court is divested of the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate over academic disputes. This is so even if their determination will enrich the jurisprudential content of the law. Such academic questions are divorced from live issues which engage the adjudicative attention of the Courts, seeA.-G., Anambra State v. A.-G., Fed. (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) 572; Ugba v. Suswam (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 264; Salik v. Idris (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1429) 36; FRN v. Borishade (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1451) 155; Danladi v. T.S.H.A. (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442) 103; FRN v. Dairo (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1452) 141; Daniel v. INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463) 113; Odedo v. Oguebego (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1476) 229; Dickson v. Sylva (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1573) 299; Olowu v. Building Stock Ltd. (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1601) 343; Anyanwu v PDP (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710) 134. OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA

DEFINITION OF A JURISTIC PERSON AND WANT OF LEGAL PERSONALITY

By way of prefatory observations, a juristic person is an entity armed with the capacity to ventilate his/its complaints in judicio. Generally, it is only natural persons, id est, human beings and artificial persons, such as body corporate/corporation, an artificial being which is invisible, intangible and exist only in the contemplation of the law, that are imbued with the capacity to sue and be sued in law Court. The jural units, which the law has cloaked with the garment of legal personality, are: human beings, incorporated companies, corporate sole with perpetual succession, trade unions, partnerships and friendly societies. No action can be commenced by or against any party except a natural person(s) save such a party has been accorded by a statute, expressly or impliedly, or by common, either a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or right to sue or be sued by that name. Where either of the parties is not a legal person, capable of exercising legal rights and obligations in law, the action is plagued by incompetence and liable to be struck out on account of want of legalpersonality, see Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager G.B. Olivant Ltd. (1961) 2 SCNLR 317; Kate Ent. Ltd. v. Daewoo Nig. Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 116; Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.105) 558; Ataguba& Co. v. Gura (Nig) Ltd. (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429; A. –G., Anambra State v. A.–G., Fed (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4; Admin./Exec., Estate, Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; M.M.A. Inc. v N.M.A. (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 506; Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; BB. Apugo& Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Interdrill (Nig) Ltd v. U.B.A. Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1581) 52; Dairo v. Regd. Trustees, T. A. O.., Lagos (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 62; Bajehson v. Otiko (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1638) 138; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 313; Moses v. NBA (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 59; Persons, Name Unknown v. Sahris Int’l Ltd. (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 203. OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA

THE AMENDMENT OF COURT PROCESS IN THE EYES OF THE LAW
Amendment of Court process does not envisage amendment of non-existent/pseudo-party or process. The “Uber Nigeria”, which was not clothed with the toga of juristic personality, was/is not submissive to any amendment. A fortiori when it was made a party in an incompetent originating process that is allergic to amendment. The purported/phantom amendment, in the eyes of the law, amounted to an . Amendment of Court process does not envisage amendment of non-existent/pseudo-party or process. The “Uber Nigeria”, which was not clothed with the toga of juristic personality, was/is not submissive to any amendment. A fortiori when it was made a party in an incompetent originating process that is allergic to amendment. The purported/phantom amendment, in the eyes of the law, amounted to an exercise in futility in that it is a classic exemplification of placing something on nothing. It is a notorious principle of law that no one puts something on nothing and expects it to stand, see UAC v. Macfoy Co. Ltd. (1962) AC 152; CCB Plc. V. Ekperi (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 493; Alsthom v. Saraki (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 208; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 592. OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA

THE POSITION AND EXPECTATION OF THE LAW IN RELATION TO A NON JURISTIC ENTITY.

I have, in due loyalty to the expectation of the law, situated the amendment with the inelastic position of the law displayed above. The raison d’etre for the juxtaposition is obvious. It is to ascertain whether the amendment is obedient to the law or rebellious to it. To my mind, the amendment, substitution of “Uber Nigeria” with the appellant, is highly, offensive to the inflexible position of the law as catalogued above. The “Uber Nigeria” was/is ab initio a non-juristic entity. Put differently, in the sight of the law, there was never a defendant in the respondent’s suit instituted before the lower Court. OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA

THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE CONDITION PRECEDENT

 Indisputably, a Court is not invested with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a matter where a sole party, either a plaintiff or defendant, is not cloaked with a juristic personality, see Admin/Exec., Estate. Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (supra); Moses v. NBA (supra). It is worse when, as in the instant case, the appellant is “a sole defendant” as the action will, de jure, be rendered incompetent. It is incontestable, decipherable from the ingredients of jurisdiction chronicled earlier, that the non-juristic status of the “Uber Nigeria” is a glaring feature in the case which ought to prevent the lower Court from exercising jurisdiction over the respondent’s action. At once, it amply, demonstrates that the action was initiated without due process of law and satisfaction of the condition precedent for the lower Court to exercise its jurisdiction over it. In sum, the suit desecrated the second and third ingredients of jurisdiction. OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is an offshoot of the decision of the High Court of Lagos State, Lagos Division (hereinafter addressed as “the lower Court”), coramjudice: A.M. Lawal, J., in Suit No. LD/3207/GCMW/2017, delivered on 25th January, 2017 and 4th May, 2017. Before the lower Court, the appellant and the respondent were the defendant and the claimant respectively.

​The facts of the case, which transformed into the appeal, are amenable to brevity and simplicity. The appellant and the respondent are the occupants of a 5-bedroom semi detached duplex known as No. 32C and 32D Cameroon Road, Ikoyi, Lagos respectively. In November, 2016, the appellant was carrying out demolition and renovation exercise of its premises to convert it to commercial use. The respondent alleged that the demolition exercise was affecting his own property and his health, quiet and peaceful enjoyment of it. The respondent made reports to the appropriate government to stop the demolition and its effects on him, but to no avail. The respondent nursed the fear that unrestrained demolition by the appellant might cause thecollapse of his property and loss of lives. Sequel to that, the respondent beseeched the lower Court, via a writ of summons filed on 4th January, 2017, and tabled against the appellant the following reliefs:
(i) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, its servants, agents and or privies from further demolishing, interfering the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of the Claimant’s proprietary rights Nuisance to his property at No. 32D Cameron Road, Ikoyi, Lagos.
(ii) AN ORDER of this Honourable Court appointing a reputable Structural Engineering Consultants suitable to the Claimant, to conduct ‘Integrity Test’ on the Claimant’s property in order to ascertain the extent of damages caused to the Claimant’s property at No. 32D Cameron Road, Road, Ikoyi, Lagos, as a result of the illegal demolition by the Defendant.
(iii) A DECLARATION that the Conversion of the Certificate of Occupancy of the demolished property by the Defendant from RESIDENTIAL PURPOSE to COMMERCIAL USE is illegal.
(iv) DAMAGES in the sum of N250,000,000.00 (Two hundred and fifty million Naira).
(v) DAMAGES in the sum ofN20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) for interfering with Claimant’s peace, quiet enjoyment his Nuisance, Negligence, Health hazards and gross violation of the Claimants proprietary rights on his property.
(vi) Cost of this action.

Before the service of the originating processes, the lower Court, based on the respondent’s ex parte application, granted the respondent the leave to amend and reflect the true name of the appellant from Uber Nigeria to Uber Technologies Services Nigeria Limited. Then, the processes were served on the appellant.

In reaction, the appellant, on 10th February, 2017, entered a conditional appearance to the suit. On that same day, the appellant filed a notice of preliminary objection which prayed the lower Court to strike out/dismiss the suit. The parties joined issue on the preliminary objection by filing the relevant affidavits. The lower Court duly, heard the preliminary objection.

In a considered ruling, delivered on 4th May, 2017, found at pages 178-195 of the record, the lower Court dismissed the preliminary objection.

​The appellant were aggrieved by the two decisions (rulings). Hence, on13th April, 2018, the appellant lodged a 4-ground notice of appeal, copied at pages 196-202 of the record, wherein it prayed this Court for:
a) An Order setting the Rulings of the High Court of Lagos State, delivered per Honourable Justice A. M. Lawal, on January 25, 2017 and May 4, 2017 in Suit No: LD/3207/ GCMW/2017 – Mr. Joshua Ayodele Ajayi v. Uber Technologies Services Nigeria Limited.
b) An Order allowing the Appeal
c) Such further Order or Orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

Thereafter, the parties, through their counsel, filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument in line with the procedure governing the hearing of civil appeals in this Court. The appeal was heard on 13th July, 2020.

​During its hearing, learned appellant’s counsel, Mayor Njoku, Esq., adopted the appellant’s brief of argument, filed on 10th May, 2018 and the appellant’s reply brief filed on 12th September, 2018 but deemed properly filed on 13th July, as representing his arguments for the appeal. He urged the Court to allow it. Similarly, learned respondent’s counsel, K.K.Suleiman Esq., adopted the respondent’s brief of argument, filed on 29th June, 2018 but deemed filed on 13th July, 2020, as forming his submissions against the appeal. He urged the Court to dismiss it.

In the appellant’s brief of argument, learned counsel distilled four issue for determination to wit:
1. Whether the Lower Court erred in Law when, in arriving at its decision of May 4, 2017, it held that the Respondent had complied with the Pre Action Protocol of the High Court of Lagos State [Civil Procedure] Rules 2012?
2. Whether the Lower Court erred in law when in the Ruling of January 25, 2017, the Court granted the Respondent leave to substitute the name of the defendant on record, “Uber Nigeria” with “Uber Technologies Services Nigeria Limited’ and went on in the Ruling of May 4, 2017, to hold that the Court is functus officio on the matter?
3. Whether the Lower Court erred in law when it held in its Ruling of May 4, 2017, that the purported service of the Originating processes on the Appellant was not defective and incompetent?.
(a) Whether the Lower Court erred in law when the Court heldin the Ruling of May, 4, 2017, that the action of the Respondent does not constitute an abuse of Court process?

Admirably, the learned respondent’s counsel adopted the four issues crafted by the learned appellant’s counsel. However, for reasons that will unfold anon, I will kick off with the consideration of issue two.

Arguments on the issue two.
Learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the lower Court wrongly substituted Uber Nigeria with the appellant because both are non-juristic person. He stated that action would not be maintained against a non-juristic person. He relied on Abubakar v. Yar’adua (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1; Administrators/Executors of Estate of General Sani Abacha (Deceased) v. Eke-Spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; A-G., Fed. v. ANPP (2003) 12 SCM 1; Fawehinmi v. NBA (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558; Nigeria Nurses Association v. A-G., Fed. (1981) 11-12 SC (Reprint) 1; Ataguba&Co.v. Gura (2005) 2 SCM 47. He reasoned that a suit against a non-juristic person could not be amended. He cited Njemanze v. Shell BP PH (1966) 1 SCNLR 9; Obike Int’l Ltd. etc v. AyiTeletroncis Ltd. (2005) 15NWLR (Pt. 948) 362. He said the respondent had the onus to show that the appellant was a juristic person. He referred to Sections 131-134 and 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. He maintained that the lower Court had no jurisdiction because of a non-juristic sole defendant. He cited Lion of Africa Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Esan (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 19; Mankanu v. Salman (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 915) 270; Order 13 Rule 5 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2012 (the Rules).

For the respondent, learned counsel contended that the appellant had appealed against two rulings without choosing the one it wanted. He cited Bilante International Ltd. v. NDIC (2011) SCMY 540. He claimed that an action against a wrong defendant could be amended on the application of the claimant. He referred to Order 13 (5) of the Rules. He said that the lower Court raised the issue of competency of “Uber Nigeria”. He explained that the use of the word Services instead of “Systems” was printer error. He declared the case of Njemanze v. Shell BP PH (supra) as inapplicable. He took the view that the appellant had the burden to furnish its true name andidentity. He referred to Bank of Baroda v. Iyalabani Co. Ltd. (2002) 11 MJSC 102.

On points of law, learned appellant’s counsel posited that a single notice of appeal could be used to challenge two rulings provided the appellant was within time to appeal. He relied on Uchiv v. Sabo (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1538) 264. He asserted that the name of a non-juristic person could not be amended. He cited Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205.

Resolution of the issue.
An indepth study of the four issues discloses that each evinces jurisdictional issue. However, I will attend to issue two first. The reason is simple. It is foremost among the four jurisdictional questions in that it orbits around the propriety or otherwise of the nomenclature of the appellant as a party. The hub of the issue is plain. It centres on the jurisdiction of the lower Court to hear the suit which mothered this appeal. Issue of jurisdiction is numerouno in adjudication. The law compels the Courts to handle issue of jurisdiction first when raised in any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Co. Dev. Ltd.(2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193. I will obey this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.
Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Untltd. v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; A.-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017)1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175; Angadi v. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1; Nduul v. Wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548.
A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: “1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court fromexercising its jurisdiction; and 3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction”, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu(2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387; Nworika v. Ononeze-Madu (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672). The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction into a Court.

The issue, though appears seemingly knotty, is canalised within a narrow compass. It seeks to indict and puncture the juristic personality of the appellant to defend the respondent’s suit against it in the lower Court. For a dispassionate consideration, it is imperative to comb the authorities for thepurport and hallmarks of juristic personality.

​By way of prefatory observations, a juristic person is an entity armed with the capacity to ventilate his/its complaints in judicio. Generally, it is only natural persons, id est, human beings and artificial persons, such as body corporate/corporation, an artificial being which is invisible, intangible and exist only in the contemplation of the law, that are imbued with the capacity to sue and be sued in law Court. The jural units, which the law has cloaked with the garment of legal personality, are: human beings, incorporated companies, corporate sole with perpetual succession, trade unions, partnerships and friendly societies. No action can be commenced by or against any party except a natural person(s) save such a party has been accorded by a statute, expressly or impliedly, or by common, either a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or right to sue or be sued by that name. Where either of the parties is not a legal person, capable of exercising legal rights and obligations in law, the action is plagued by incompetence and liable to be struck out on account of want of legalpersonality, see Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager G.B. Olivant Ltd. (1961) 2 SCNLR 317; Kate Ent. Ltd. v. Daewoo Nig. Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 116; Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.105) 558; Ataguba& Co. v. Gura (Nig) Ltd. (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429; A. –G., Anambra State v. A.–G., Fed (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4; Admin./Exec., Estate, Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; M.M.A. Inc. v N.M.A. (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 506; Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; BB. Apugo& Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Interdrill (Nig) Ltd v. U.B.A. Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1581) 52; Dairo v. Regd. Trustees, T. A. O.., Lagos (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 62; Bajehson v. Otiko (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1638) 138; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 313; Moses v. NBA (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 59; Persons, Name Unknown v. Sahris Int’l Ltd. (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 203.

Now, the gravamen of the appellant’s chief grievance, indeed its trump card on the killer issue, is that the lower Courtdefiled the law when it substituted the appellant for the “Uber Nigeria” when both are non-juristic persons. In other words, the appellant quarrels with the amendment of the parties made by the lower Court on 25th January, 2017. Unarguably, the issue of amendment has become ubiquitous in adjudications in the Courts. It is invariably, precipitated by the accepted fallibility of man in the process of writing documents. Etymologically, amendment traces its lexical paternity to the Latin verb “emendo-emendere” meaning “to cure, to add to, to correct an error”. In its wide context, amendment is: “A formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specif., a change made by addition, deletion or correction, esp., an alteration in wording”, see Bryan A. Garner (ed.) et al, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th edition (USA, Thomson Reuters, 2014) 99. In the immaculate words of Oputa, JSC, in Awote v. Owodunni (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 941/(1986) 2 NSCC (vol. 17) 1359 at 1366, “amendment involves and implies an alteration, an addition to or subtractionfrom….” Even, substitution is held as an act of amendment, seeAgbabiaka v. Saibu (1998) 7 SCNJ 305/(1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 517) 534; SPDCN Ltd. v. Edamkue (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1.
It is settled law, beyond any peradventure of doubt, that a defective/void originating process or process cannot be revived/cured by an amendment, see Nwaigwe v. Okere (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt 1105) 445; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 592; Daniel v. INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463) 113; Okafor v. B.D.U., Jos Branch (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 385; Ani v. Effiok (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 281; SPDC (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agbara (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1668) 310; Yusuf v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710)1. In Omisore v. Aregbesola(2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205 at 256, the Oracular Nweze, JSC, insightfully and incisively, declared:
Different considerations would apply, however, if argument was that the second respondent is a non-juristic person. In such a case, there would have been no valid amendment of title of the suit since there was never a legal person before the Court Okechukwu& Sons v. Ndah (1967) NMLR 368. The only option open to the Court, insuch a situation, would be to strike out the name of the non-juristic person. Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v Genera’ Manager G.B. Ollivant Ltd. &Ors. (1961) ANLR (Reprint) 125. What is at play in this appeal, however, is not a mistake as to the identity of the second respondent. Maersk Line v. Addide Investment Ltd. (2002) 11 NWLR (pt. 778) 317, 377. In my view, this Court has the undoubted power to correct this slip in the name of the second respondent as this is a case of a misnomer. Njemanze v. Shell B. P. Port HarCourt (1966) Vol. 4 NSCC 6; (1966) 1 SCNLR 9) Maersk Line v. Addide Investment Ltd. (supra) 377-378; Olu of Warri &Ors. v. Esi& Anor. (1958) Vol. 1 NSCC (1958) SCNLR 384; Establishment Baudelot v. R.S. Graham & Co. Ltd. (1953) 1 All ER 149; Alexander Mountain & Co. v. Rumere Ltd. (1948) 2 All ER 482.
For sure, it is the law that where the description of a party on a process in a litigation (as happened here) is a mere misnomer, an amendment would suffice to put it right provided that the person mis-named is a juristic entity and is in existence, just like the second respondent. A.B. Manu & Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Costain (WA.) Ltd. (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 367) 1 112.
It is axiomatic that “Uber Nigeria”, the original defendant party to the respondent’s action, which parented this appeal, is a non-juristic entity. The respondent’s ex parte application, filed on 24th January, 2017, monopolises pages 37-40 of the record. Therein, it was averred that the lower Court raised, ex proprio motu, the competence of the defendant appellant as a party to the action. The lower Court granted the respondent the leave to amend the title of the appellant on 25th January, 2017 as manifest in pages 87-89 of the record. I have, in due loyalty to the expectation of the law, situated the amendment with the inelastic position of the law displayed above. The raison d’etre for the juxtaposition is obvious. It is to ascertain whether the amendment is obedient to the law or rebellious to it. To my mind, the amendment, substitution of “Uber Nigeria” with the appellant, is highly, offensive to the inflexible position of the law as catalogued above. The “Uber Nigeria” was/is ab initio a non-juristic entity. Put differently, in the sight of the law, therewas never a defendant in the respondent’s suit instituted before the lower Court. On that premise, there was no existing defendant to be amended either by substitution, alteration or correction. Amendment of Court process does not envisage amendment of non-existent/pseudo-party or process. The “Uber Nigeria”, which was not clothed with the toga of juristic personality, was/is not submissive to any amendment. A fortiori when it was made a party in an incompetent originating process that is allergic to amendment. The purported/phantom amendment, in the eyes of the law, amounted to an exercise in futility in that it is a classic exemplification of placing something on nothing. It is a notorious principle of law that no one puts something on nothing and expects it to stand, see UAC v. Macfoy Co. Ltd. (1962) AC 152; CCB Plc. V. Ekperi (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 493; Alsthom v. Saraki (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 208; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1150) 592. In the Latin days of the law, it was encapsulated in the maxim: Lex non cogitadimpossibila – the law does not command the impossible, see Lasun v. Awoyemi (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt.1168) 513. The foregoing exposition, with due reverence, exposes the poverty of the respondent’s salivating argument on the issue. It cannot fly.
​It admits of no argument, that the respondent’s amended writ of summons, which warehoused the appellant as a defendant, is an originating process. An originating process ignites an action before a Court. The writ of summons is one of the most utilised modes of commencement of actions in the lower Court. It is the spinal cord of every litigation where it is employed. It is atop of the pyramid of litigation process and, ipso facto, its validity is sine qua non for proper adjudication. Every other process derives its descent from the writ of summons as an originating process in a matter. Hence, any irremediable defect in it is costly. Such a dent will infest and contaminate the purity of every other process that owes its ancestry to it. Thus, the blot on the juristic personality of “Uber Nigeria” which was wrongly supplanted by the appellant, stained/tainted all the other processes, housing it, and snowballed into the proceedings of the lower Court. The lower Court fractured the law by theamendment. In effect all its proceedings, inclusive of the grant of the amendment, are marooned in the murky ocean of nullity, see Yusuf v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710)1.
Indisputably, a Court is not invested with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a matter where a sole party, either a plaintiff or defendant, is not cloaked with a juristic personality, see Admin/Exec., Estate. Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (supra); Moses v. NBA (supra). It is worse when, as in the instant case, the appellant is “a sole defendant” as the action will, de jure, be rendered incompetent. It is incontestable, decipherable from the ingredients of jurisdiction chronicled earlier, that the non-juristic status of the “Uber Nigeria” is a glaring feature in the case which ought to prevent the lower Court from exercising jurisdiction over the respondent’s action. At once, it amply, demonstrates that the action was initiated without due process of law and satisfaction of the condition precedent for the lower Court to exercise its jurisdiction over it. In sum, the suit desecrated the second and third ingredients of jurisdiction. Theseinfractions constitute the coup de grace in the respondent’s action which mothered the appeal. Where a Court is drained of the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the proceeding germinating from it, no matter the quantum of diligence, dexterity, artistry, sophistry, transparency and objectivity injected into it, will be trapped in the intractable web of nullity, see Elugbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; Garba v. Mohammed (supra); Isah v. INEC (supra). That is bane of the respondent’s action and the proceedings flowing from it.
In the light of this juridical survey, done in due fidelity to the law, the lower Court’s amendment of the non-juristic “Uber Nigeria” and assumption of jurisdiction over the respondent’s suit, with due deference, is hostile to the law. It will amount to an affront to the law and mockery of justice to allow the injudicious exercise to stand. In due obeisance to the law, I declare the suit as incompetent for want of juristic personality. In the end, I resolve the issue two in favour of the appellant and against the respondent.

Having dispensed with issue two, I proceed to treat issues one, three and four. I have given a clinical examination to the import of each of them. Issue one chastises the lower Court’s finding that the respondent satisfied the Pre-Action Protocol in the Rules. Issue three probes into the propriety or otherwise of the service of the originating process on the appellant. Issue four queries the lower Court’s proclamation that the suit was not an abuse of Court process. The aftermath of issue two, dissected above, wherein the suit was declared incompetent for lack of juristic defendant, renders the consideration of the trinity issues a footnote and otiose. It stems from the outcome of issue two, that the three issues fall within the constricted four walls of academic issues. In Plateau State v. A-G., Fed (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) 346 at 419, Tobi, JSC, incisively, explained the term, thus:
A suit is academic where it is merely theoretical, makes empty sound, and of no practical utilitarian value to the plaintiff even if judgment is given in his favour. A suit is academic if it is not related to practical situation of human nature and humanity.

It is settled law, that a Court is divested of the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate over academic disputes. This is so even if their determination will enrich the jurisprudential content of the law. Such academic questions are divorced from live issues which engage the adjudicative attention of the Courts, seeA.-G., Anambra State v. A.-G., Fed. (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) 572; Ugba v. Suswam (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 264; Salik v. Idris (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1429) 36; FRN v. Borishade (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1451) 155; Danladi v. T.S.H.A. (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442) 103; FRN v. Dairo (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1452) 141; Daniel v. INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463) 113; Odedo v. Oguebego (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1476) 229; Dickson v. Sylva (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1573) 299; Olowu v. Building Stock Ltd. (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1601) 343; Anyanwu v PDP (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710) 134.
Flowing from this immutable position of the law, the appellant’s issues one, three and four, to all intents and purposes, are rendered idle. Their resolution in favour of the appellant will not erode the strength of its case in the appeal. Nor will their resolution in favour of the respondent advance, an inch, hischances of success in the appeal. Put starkly, their consideration by this Court, even if found in favour of the appellant or the respondent, will be of no judicial utilitarian value to either of them premised on the result of issue two. It is trite that Courts are not equiped with the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over academic issues. In total allegiance to the law, I strike out the issues one, three and four for being incompetent academic issues.

On the whole, having resolved the live issue two in favour of the appellant, the destiny of the appeal is obvious. It is imbued with merit. Consequently, I allow the appeal. Accordingly, Suit No. LD/3207/GCMW/2017, filed by the respondent, is struck out for being incompetent. The parties shall bear the respective costs they incurred in the prosecution and defence of the fruitful appeal.

JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A.: I agree with the succinct judgment prepared by my learned brother, Obande Festus Ogbuinya, J.C.A., with nothing useful to add.

BALKISU BELLO ALIYU, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the very well articulated Judgment prepared by my learned brother OBANDE FESTUSOGBUINYA JCA.

​I agree with His Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion and I am privileged to adopt same as mine. I also find merit in the appeal and I allow it. The ruling of the trial Court is set aside and the suit is struck out.
I abide by the order of no cost.

Appearances:

Major Njoku, Esq.For Appellant(s)

K.K. Suleiman, Esq.For Respondent(s)

Appearances:

Major Njoku, Esq.For Appellant(s)

K.K. Suleiman, Esq.For Respondent(s)