THE STATE v. KASIMU IBRAHIM & ORS
(2014)LCN/7323(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 26th day of June, 2014
CA/K/166/C/2011
RATIO
COURT: DUTY OF COURTS; WHETHER THE COURT IS BOUND BY THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE PARTIES
It is firmly settled that the court as an institution guided by the case and evidence placed before it does not make a habit or practice of granting to a party the relief not claimed by that party. See OBA LAWAL FABIYI V. CHIEF SOLOMON ADENIYI & ORS. [2000] 5 SCNJ 1, [2000] 6 NWLR [Pt. 662] 532. In the case of a motion as in this case the court is bound by the relief sought in the motion paper and cannot grant more reliefs than the one sought by the applicant or grant prayers that differ from the one sought. See EKPEYONG V. NYANG [1975] 2 SC 71; JATAU V. MAILAFIYA [1998] 1 NWLR [Pt. 535] 682; ODUKWE V. OGUNBIYI [1998] 8 NWLR [Pt. 561] 339; ADEYE V. AGBATOGUN [2000] 2 SCNJ 79. per.ISAIAH O. AKEJU, J.C.A.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: BAIL; THE PURPOSE OF BAIL
The main purpose of bail is therefore to guarantee the presence of the accused person at the trial of the case. See DOKUBO – ASARI V. FRN [2007] 5-8 Sc. 150; SULEMAN V. C.O.P. PLATEAU STATE 33 N SCQR [PART 2] 735. The factors to be considered in granting or refusing an application for bail include the nature of the charge, the character of the evidence in the case and the probability of accused appearing for the trial. See EKWUENUGO V. FRN. [2001] 6 NWLR [Pt. 708] 171; BAMAIYI V. THE STATE [2001] 8 NWLR [Pt. 715] 291; ABACHA V. THE STATE [2002] FWLR [Pt. 98] 863. per.ISAIAH O. AKEJU, J.C.A.
COURT: DUTY OF COURTS; THE PRIMARY DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO EVALUATE EVIDENCE
A trial court has the duty to evaluate the evidence adduced in a case before coming to a conclusion thereon, and can not rely on his own perception. See OGUDO VS. STATE (2011) 202 LRCN 13. [Pt. 1] 222. per.ISAIAH O. AKEJU, J.C.A.
COURT: INTERFERENCE; WHETHER AN APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WHERE THE TRIAL HAS EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION JUDICIALLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
Where the trial court has properly exercised its discretion, the appellate court will not interfere with the way and manner such discretion has been exercised, but where it is shown that the discretion has been wrongly exercised and injustice has thereby been occasioned to one of the parties the appellate court will not be a helpless on looker but will interfere so as to correct the injustice. See ENEKEBE V. ENEKEBE [1964] 1 ALL NLR 102; UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS [AIGORO [1985] 1 SC 265. per. ISAIAH O. AKEJU, J.C.A.
COURT: COURT’S DISCRETION; WHETHER THE COURT MUST EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION JUDICIALLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
It is however trite that a court must exercise its discretion not only judicially but also judiciously. Judicial discretion must be exercised within the confine of the facts and circumstances of the case before the court guided by the applicable law and not whimsically or capriciously. See UNIVRSITY OF LAGOS V. OLANIYAN [1985] 1 SC 295; EBE V. C.O.P. [2008] 1 SC per. ISAIAH O. AKEJU, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ISAIAH O. AKEJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
O.A. ADEFOPE-OKOJIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
AMINA A. WAMBAI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
THE STATE Appellant(s)
AND
1. KASIMU IBRAHIM
2. HUSSAIN UMAR
3. ALHAJI AUWULU SULE KILA Respondent(s)
ISAIAH O. AKEJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the decision of the High Court of Jigawa State holden at Ringim contained in the Ruling delivered on 28th July, 2010 in charge No. JDU/04C/2010 – The State V. Abubakar Abdullahi & 3 Ors., wherein the three respondents in this appeal as the 2nd, 3rd and 4th accused persons were charged with one Abubakar Abdullahi for the following offences:
1. That you, Abubakar Abdullahi ‘M’, Kasimu Ibrahim ‘M’, Hussaini Umar ‘M’ and Alhaji Auwulu Sule Kila ‘M’ on or about the 24th day of October 2009 at Kila town, Gwaram Local Government Area within Jigawa Judicial Division agreed to commit an offence of culpable homicide to wit; causing the death of Zainab Tanimu 3 years old and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 97 of the Penal Code Cap. 107 Laws of Jigawa State 1998.
2. That you, Abubakar Abdullahi ‘M’ Kasimu Ibrahim ‘M’ Hussaini Umar ‘M’ on or about the 24rh day of October, 2009 at Kila town, Gwaram Local Government Area within the Jigawa Judicial Division committed culpable homicide punishable with death in that you caused the death of one Zainab Tanimu 3 years old by severing her head from her body and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 (a) of the Penal Code Cap 107 Laws of Jigawa State of Nigeria 1998.
3. That you, Alhaji Auwulu Sule Kila ‘M’ on or about the 17th day of October, 2009 at Kila town, Gwaram Local Government Area within the Jigawa Judicial Division instigated Abubakar Abdullahi, Kasimu Ibrahim and Hussaini Umar to commit culpable homicide by asking them to bring human head to you for a fee of three million Naira (N3,000,000.00) and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 85 of the Penal Code Cap 107 Laws of Jigawa State of Nigeria.
The prosecution had sought to establish the allegations in the charge by oral and documentary evidence of the 12 persons cited in the list of prosecution witnesses that accompanied the charge. At the proceedings of 9th February, 2010, the four accused persons were arraigned following the leave granted by court to prefer charge against them, and each of them pleaded not guilty to the respective counts against him. The prosecution adduced both oral and documentary evidence through the 11 eleven witnesses called in support of the charge. The evidence of these 11 witnesses who testified as PW1 – PW11 can be found on pages 4 – 67 of the record of appeal. Thereafter two witnesses testified as DW1 and DW2 for the defence on pages 68 – 75 of the record before the case was adjourned to 22/7/2010 at which proceedings the court was informed of a motion on Notice filed for an order directing that Applicants (the accused persons) be released on bail pending the hearing and final determination of the case. The motion was argued.
Delivering the Ruling on that application on 28/7/10, the learned judge of High Court of Jigawa State (Now called the trial court) held on pages 93 -94 as follows:
“Be that as it may, this court suo motu is of the candid view that the 2nd 3rd and 4th accused persons are entitled to enjoy their freedom in with the provisions of Section 191 (3) of the C.P.C. Sections 35 and 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For failure to show sufficient evidence against 2nd 3rd and 4th accused person by the prosecution they are hereby discharged under S. 191 (3) of the C.P.C. they should not be rearrested without the leave of this court in fact since charges are framed against them and the plea taken their case falls within the provision of S. 164 of the C.P.C. i.e. their discharge amount to an acquittal.
On the issue of bail, of the remaining accused applicant i.e. 1st accused person due to the nature and gravity of the offence as charged and the severity of the punishments to be imposed on conviction and the fear or likelihood he may not appear to face his trial. The 1st accused is here by refused bail he should be remanded.”
Against that ruling, the appellant commenced the instant appeal by filing Notice of Appeal, and in prosecution thereof the Appellant’s Brief of Argument prepared by Yakubu A.H. Ruba, Hon. Attorney-General of Jigawa State was filed on 17/5/2013.
The Respondents’ Brief of Argument settled by Murtala Musa Esq. was filed on 11/01/14 but deemed filed on 21/1/14.
The Appellant has raised two issues for determination which the respondents adopted. These issues are:
1. Whether the trial court was right to have discharged and acquitted the respondents at that stage of the trial.
2. Whether it is right for the trial court to have granted a relief suo motu without giving the appellant an opportunity to address the court.
On the 1st issue, the appellant submitted that the learned trial judge was wrong to have ordered the discharge and acquittal of the respondents whose application was for an interim or provisional order, citing the case of OGBAEGBE V. FBN PLC [2005] 18 NWLR [Pt. 967] 357. It was submitted that the learned trial judge failed to consider the relevant factors in an application for bail but relied on Section 191 Criminal Procedure Code Laws of Jigawa State to discharge and acquit the respondents.
It was contended that the trial Court called upon the respondents to rebut the evidence against them at the end of the prosecution’s case and did not discharge them (respondents) apparently because he felt satisfied that the respondents had a case to answer and for the meaning of Section 191 (3), the case of COTEENA INT. LTD, V. I.M.B. LTD. [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt.985) 275 was cited. It was submitted that once a judge has satisfied himself that the accused has a case to answer at the end of prosecution’s case, that satisfaction can only be rebutted by evidence from the defence.
The learned Attorney General submitted that a court must be cautious when deciding interlocutory matters in a case so as to avoid taking a decision on the substantive matter; PDP V. ABUBAKAR [2007] 3 NWLR [Pt.1022] 515; GROUP DANONE V. VOLTIC (NIG) LTD. [2008] 7 NWLR [Pt.1087].
On this issue the respondents contended that unlike Civil Proceedings, all doubts in Criminal cases are resolved in favour of the accused person and the court must consider all laws that are favourable to the accused notwithstanding that counsel did not refer to such laws. It was further contended that the learned trial judge reviewed the cases on bail but held “in his wisdom” that the prosecution failed to give credible evidence against the 2nd, 3rd and 4th accused persons under Section 191 (3) of CPC and discharged them pursuant to Sections 164, 191 (3) CPC and Section 35 and 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) after hearing all the prosecution witnesses though bail had earlier been refused to the accused persons. The learned counsel submitted that the relevant circumstances as stated in UMARU V. STATE VOL. 4 NCC 141 must be considered, and in the instant case a retrial will only give the appellant a second chance and create difficulty for the respondents. It was argued that the appellant relied on circumstantial evidence which did not meet the required conditions because as held in EBENECHI V. STATE [2000] ALL FWLR [Pt. 486] 1825, circumstantial evidence must be positive, unequivocal and conclusive that the accused person committed the offence. It was submitted with the authority of FAAN V. GREENSTONE LTD. [2009] ALL FWLR [Pt. 500] 741 that this court acting under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act possesses full jurisdiction over proceedings of the trial Court.
It was submitted that Section 191 (3) gives the court a discretion and unless there is arbitrariness or injustice is occasioned thereby an appellate court will not interfere with discretion exercised by a lower court judiciously and judicially, citing ONWULA V. ENONUJU [2009] ALL FWLR [Pt.487] 26.
The learned counsel contended that the learned trial judge evaluated the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and found no basis for proceeding further against the respondents whereby the learned judge being a man with conscience discharged the respondents who deserved sympathy from the court.
It thus becomes clear from the foregoing that the application of the respondents that produced the ruling of 28/7/10 which led to this appeal was for the bail of the respondents and not for their discharge and acquittal and from this premises the order of the trial court for discharge and acquittal of the respondents was made outside the content and con of the relief sought by the respondents, or putting it in another way it was a grant of a relief not sought by the respondents.
It is firmly settled that the court as an institution guided by the case and evidence placed before it does not make a habit or practice of granting to a party the relief not claimed by that party. See OBA LAWAL FABIYI V. CHIEF SOLOMON ADENIYI & ORS. [2000] 5 SCNJ 1, [2000] 6 NWLR [Pt. 662] 532. In the case of a motion as in this case the court is bound by the relief sought in the motion paper and cannot grant more reliefs than the one sought by the applicant or grant prayers that differ from the one sought. See EKPEYONG V. NYANG [1975] 2 SC 71; JATAU V. MAILAFIYA [1998] 1 NWLR [Pt. 535] 682; ODUKWE V. OGUNBIYI [1998] 8 NWLR [Pt. 561] 339; ADEYE V. AGBATOGUN [2000] 2 SCNJ 79.
Bail which is what the respondents sought means a security in the form of cash or bond required by a court for the release of a prisoner who is to appear in court at a future time. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, page 100.
The main purpose of bail is therefore to guarantee the presence of the accused person at the trial of the case. See DOKUBO – ASARI V. FRN [2007] 5-8 Sc. 150; SULEMAN V. C.O.P. PLATEAU STATE 33 N SCQR [PART 2] 735. The factors to be considered in granting or refusing an application for bail include the nature of the charge, the character of the evidence in the case and the probability of accused appearing for the trial. See EKWUENUGO V. FRN. [2001] 6 NWLR [Pt. 708] 171; BAMAIYI V. THE STATE [2001] 8 NWLR [Pt. 715] 291; ABACHA V. THE STATE [2002] FWLR [Pt. 98] 863.
It is true that by the use of the words “the court may” in Section 191 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap 39 Laws of Jigawa State 1998, the trial court is given a discretion to exercise while considering or applying the Section.
It is however trite that a court must exercise its discretion not only judicially but also judiciously. Judicial discretion must be exercised within the confine of the facts and circumstances of the case before the court guided by the applicable law and not whimsically or capriciously. See UNIVRSITY OF LAGOS V. OLANIYAN [1985] 1 SC 295; EBE V. C.O.P. [2008] 1 SC [Pt. 1] 222.
It is on this note that I consider the exercise of discretion by the lower court based on the “generosity” or “sympathetic disposition” of the learned trial judge as argued by the learned counsel for the respondent to be faulty and indeed improper.
Where the trial court has properly exercised its discretion, the appellate court will not interfere with the way and manner such discretion has been exercised, but where it is shown that the discretion has been wrongly exercised and injustice has thereby been occasioned to one of the parties the appellate court will not be a helpless on looker but will interfere so as to correct the injustice. See ENEKEBE V. ENEKEBE [1964] 1 ALL NLR 102; UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS [AIGORO [1985] 1 SC 265.
In the circumstances of this case where the appellant had closed its case with the oral and documentary evidence of 11 witnesses and the respondents opted to defend and had indeed called two witnesses before placing an application for bail before the trial court, I am of the view that it was not right for the learned trial judge to have gone outside that application to order the discharge and acquittal of the respondents at that stage of the proceedings.
Let me state further that although the learned trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution did not produce concrete evidence against the respondents, it is not shown how that decision came about as the learned trial judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence of all the 11 witnesses called by the appellant so as to come to conclusion on the evidence adduced.
A trial court has the duty to evaluate the evidence adduced in a case before coming to a conclusion thereon, and can not rely on his own perception. See OGUDO VS. STATE (2011) 202 LRCN 13.
I resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.
On the second issue, it was contended by the appellant that the learned trial judge was wrong to have suo motu ordered the discharge and acquittal of the respondents thereby granting a relief not sought by the party; ONYEKWELI V. INEC [2008] 14 NWLR [Pt. 1107] 317. It was argued that the respondents did not seek any relief under Section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Code which the learned trial judge granted suo motu. The learned counsel submitted that this court possesses the power to set aside the lower court’s decision; ATIVIE V. KABELMETAC NIG. LTD. [2008] 10 NWLR [Pt.1095] 399.
The respondents contended that the trial court was right in granting any relief suo motu that was permitted by law and Section 191 (3) of Criminal Procedure Code vests a discretion in the court to assess the evidence before it and pronounce on them one way or the other and in the instant case the trial curt was prompted by the submission of the learned state counsel who referred the court to the provisions of Section 191 (3) of the CPC.
It was further contended that by the provision of Section 36 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), an accused is presumed to be innocent and this has placed the burden of proof on the prosecution to proof the guilt of the accused. In this case the appellant relied on circumstantial evidence which must be positive and unequivocal before it can ground any conviction; EBENEHI V. STATE [2009] ALL FWLR [Pt. 486] 1825; AIGBADION V. STATE [2000] 4 SC [Pt.1] 1.
It was argued that apart from the prayer for bail, there was another prayer for any such further orders as the court would deem necessary in the circumstances which had urged the court to use discretionary powers in favour of the applicant.
The learned trial judge had in clear words in the portion of his ruling I had earlier quoted in this judgment said he suo motu applied Section 191 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and held that the respondents were entitled to take solace under that provision. It is now firmly settled that a court should not raise an issue suo motu and decide that issue, without affording the parties the opportunity of being heard. See KATTO V. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA [2001] FWLR [Pt. 52] 188; ARAKA V. EJEAGWU [2001] FWLR [Pt. 36] 830.
Issues are joined through the processes filed in court by the parties and not through the address of Counsel. In the instant case there was no issue joined by the parties on the discharge and acquittal of the respondents, and the court was not right to have suo motu taken the issue and decided it on the reliance on further and other orders without calling for address from the parties. This is a negation of the right of the parties to fair hearing.
I resolve this issue also in favour of the appellant.
In view of my resolution of the first and second issues I have come to the conclusion that the appeal has merit and it is accordingly allowed. The decision of the learned trial judge in the ruling delivered on 28/7/2010 in case No. JDU/040C/2010 is set aside with the order of the discharge and acquittal of the respondents.
The appellant has prayed for an order for a retrial of the case before another judge of the High Court of Jigawa State.
It is beyond per adventure that in appropriate circumstances this court has the power to order a retrial. This power as exercisable under and by virtue of S. 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004 is guided by the principles which, as stated in YESUFU ABODUNDU & ORS. V. THE QUEEN [1959] 4 FSC 70 at 73- 74 include;
a. That there has been an error in-law including the observance of the law of evidence or an irregularity in procedure of such a character that the appellate court is unable to say that there has been no miscarriage of justice.
b. That there are no circumstances which render it oppressive to put the appellant on trial a second time.
c. That the offence or offences upon which a previous trial has been based and their consequences of the conviction or acquittal are not merely trivial;
d. That to refuse to order for retrial would occasion a greater miscarriage of justice than to grant it.
See also the cases of OKAFOR V. THE STATE [1976] 5 SC 13; AKWA v. THE STATE [1969] 1 ALL NLR 133.
In the instant case, the appellants were charged with offences of conspiracy and culpable homicide punishable with death and the prosecution had adduced oral and documentary evidence through 11 witnesses before the trial was irregularly aborted by the trial judge who discharged and acquitted them upon a motion for bail pending the conclusion of trial at which they had opened their defence. Their trial started on 9/2/2010 and was terminated on 25/7/10 after which this appeal was commenced.
In my view the facts and circumstances of this case call for a retrial order and I hereby make that order accordingly.
Consequently case No. JDU/04C/2010 is returned to the Hon. Chief Judge of Jigawa State for fresh hearing by another judge within the Jurisdiction.
OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Isaiah O. Akeju, JCA. I am entirely in agreement with the reasoning of His Lordship and agree that a retrial be ordered in case No. JDU/04C/2010 but before another Judge of the High Court of Jigawa State.
AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Isaiah O. Akeju, JCA. His lordship has thoroughly and efficiently dealt with the issues placed before the court for determination. I entirely agree with the sound reasoning and conclusion reached by my brother, that the appeal is meritorious.
My learned brother Akeju JCA, in the lead judgment has adequately dealt with the facts giving rise to this appeal.
The respondents were standing trial for criminal conspiracy and culpable homicide punishable with death contrary to Section 97 and 221(a) of the Penal Code Laws of Jigawa State of Nigeria 1998. The prosecutor called 11 witnesses and closed its case. The defence had also called 2 witnesses and moved the court by a motion on notice for the bail of the respondents. The motion was argued. However, in its ruling of 28/7/10, the learned trial Judge instead of deciding on the bail application before him, proceeded vide Section 191(3) Criminal Procedure Code to discharge and acquit the appellants.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the learned trial Judge was right to have suo moto invoked the provisions of Section 191(3) of the Jigawa State Criminal Procedure Code while considering an application for bail made on behalf of the respondents.
It is important to recite the relevant provisions of the whole of Section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It provides:
“191(1) After the reading of the examination of the accused, in accordance with the provisions of Section 190 the accused may be examined as provided in Section 235 and he shall then be asked –
(a) Whether he wishes to give evidence on his own behalf as provided in Section 236; and
(b) Whether he means to all witnesses other than witnesses to character.
(2) If the accused says that he does not intend to call any witness other than witnesses to character, the prosecutor, if any, may sum up his case against the accused and the court shall then all upon the accused to enter upon the defence.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2), the court may, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution if it considers that the evidence against the accused or any of several accused is not sufficient to justify the continuation of the trial, record a finding of not guilty in respect of such accused without calling upon him or them to enter upon the defence and such accused shall thereupon be discharged and the court shall then call upon the remaining accused, if any, to enter upon the defence.”
There is no doubt that in addition to the power of the court under Section 159(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code to discharge an accused person if no prima facie case is made out against him, the court is also empowered by Section 191(3) of the same code, to discharge an accused at a later stage where it is satisfied that there are no sufficient reasons to justify the continuation of the trial.
However, by the intendment of Section 191(3), such a discharge is to be done before calling upon the accused to enter his defence.
More importantly, the key words in the sub-section which invest in the Judge the discretionary power to invoke its provisions are “if it considers that the evidence against the accused is not sufficient to justify the continuation of the trial.”
The ordinary meaning of the word “consider” is to think carefully about something, especially in order to make a decision, to reflect on.
In the con in which it is used, being a discretionary power, the careful thinking or reflection before so reaching the decision that there are no sufficient evidence to justify the continuation of the case, must be by a process of judicial and judicious prudent thinking guided by the facts and circumstances of the case and the applicable principles of law and always bearing in mind what in each circumstance is just and fair.
It is an established principle of law that the very essence of exercise of judicial discretion, such as the one provided in Section 191(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, is and must be deeply noted in the belief that it must be exercised in accordance with the well laid down rules of law, practice, reason, fairness and justice, and not in accordance with the whimsical opinion of the judicial officer exercising the discretion. See Eronini v. Ihueko (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt 101) 46.
In the instant case, the trial Judge did not disclose on the record how the discretion was judiciously and judicially exercised.
Furthermore it was patently wrong for the learned trial Judge to have suo moto invoked Section 191(3) Criminal Procedure Code to discharge the respondents who had opened their defence and without giving the parties, particularly, the appellant a hearing.
It is settled law that on no account should a court of law raise a point suo moto, no matter how clear it may appear to be and proceed to resolve the case between the parties thereon without inviting them or their counsel to address the court on the point. If it does, as the trial Judge in this case did, it would be in breach of the party’s right to fair hearing. See Egwunewu v. Ejeagwu (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 324) 1893 at 1906 – 1907 paras F – I.
Worse still, the learned trial Judge was in grave error to have invoked the said Section 191(3) Criminal Procedure Code when the application before the Court which was the live issue properly placed before the trial Judge was that of bail and not for the discharge of the respondents.
The law is that not only can the court not go outside the 4 walls of the case before it, Olayiwola vs. FRN (2000) All FWLR (Pt. 305) 667, 649 C – E the court is also not a father Christmas to grant to a party what he has not sought. Indeed even father Christmas is generous only on Christmas day, the date the said Ruling was delivered which was on 28/7/10 not being a Christmas day, the Judge ought not to have been so generous unsolicited. See Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney General of the Federation (2000) 16 NWLR (Pt.1005) 265.
In view of these and the fuller reasons given in the lead judgment, I find this appeal meritorious and deserves to be allowed.
I allow the appeal and abide by the order for retrial made in the lead judgment which I also agree, meets the Justice of this appeal.
Appearances
Y.A.H. Ruba (Hon. Attorney General Ministry of Justice Jigawa State) with Hussain Abdullahi, M.A. Lamin and Aliyu AbdullahFor Appellant
AND
Murtala MusaFor Respondent
