Argued: Decided: March 4, 1823
March 1st.
Mr. D. B. Ogden, for the appellant, argued, that the decree must be reversed, on account of the multiplied irregularities in the proceedings. It was, in the words of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. s. 9. ‘a civil cause of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ according to the allegation of the libel, which stated the seizure to be on water. But it afterwards assumed the shape of an Exchequer cause, and the trial was by jury, upon which the Court rendered, not a judgment, but a sentence of condemnation. The District Court is both a Court of Admiralty, and a Court of common law. In the former branch of its jurisdiction, it proceeds as an Instance Court, by a libel in rem, which is to be tried by the Court:a in the latter, it proceeds, in revenue causes, by an information in rem, which is to be tried by the jury. [21 U.S. 391, 393] The two jurisdictions, and the proceedings under each, are to be kept entirely distinct. One consequence of blending them together is apparent. Where the seizure is on water, the claimant has a right to further proof in this Court, under certain circumstances; which he will be entirely deprived of, if the proceedings are to be according to the course of the common law, as the facts could not be reviewed by writ of error.
The Attorney General, contra, insisted, that a libel and an information were convertible terms. This was a libel of information, on which, as the seizure was on land, the party had a right to a trial by jury. that right was secured by the constitution, in all cases at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars; and in such cases, the facts tried by a jury cannot be re-examined, otherwise than according to the course of the common law.b Here an attempt is made to re- examine them by an appeal, and the cause may be dismissed from this Court on that ground. Supposing the proceeding, however, to have been according to the course of the civil law, there is nothing to prevent the Instance Court of Admiralty from trying facts by a jury, in the same manner as the Court of Chancery directs an issue. The judices selecti, of ancient Rome, were a sort of jury, who acted under the superintendance of the praetor, as his assessors in the determination of questions of fact. [21 U.S. 391, 394] March 4th.
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows:
By the act constituting the judicial system of the United States, the District Courts are Courts both of common law and admiralty jurisdiction. In the trial of all cases of seizure, on land, the Court sits as a Court of common law. In cases of seizure made on waters navigable by vessels of ten tons burthen and upwards, the Court sits as a Court of Admiralty. In all cases at common law, the trial must be by jury. In cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it has been settled, in the cases of the Vengeance, (reported in 3 Dallas’ Rep. 297.) the Sally, (in 2 Cranch’s Rep. 406.) and the Betsy and Charlotte, (in 4 Cranch’s Rep. 443.) that the trial is to be by the Court.
Although the two jurisdictions are vested in the same tribunal, they are as distinct from each other as if they were vested in different tribunals, and can no more be blended, than a Court of Chancery with a Court of Common law.
The Court for the Louisiana District, was sitting as a Court of Admiralty; and when it was shown that the seizure was made on land, its jurisdiction ceased. The libel ought to have been dismissed, or amended, by charging that the seizure was made on land.
The direction of a jury, in a case where the libel charged a seizure on water, was irregular; and any proceeding of the Court, as a Court of Admiralty, after the fact that the seizure was made on land [21 U.S. 391, 395] appeared, would have been a proceeding without jurisdiction.
The Court felt some disposition to consider this empannelling of a jury, at the instance of the claimants, as amounting to a consent that the libel should stand amended; but, on reflection, that idea was rejected.
If this is considered as a case at common law, it would be necessary to dismiss this appeal, because the judgment could not be brought before this Court but by writ of error. If it be considered as a case of admiralty jurisdiction, the sentence ought to be reversed, because it could not be pronounced by a Court of Admiralty, on a seizure made on land.
As the libel charges a seizure on water, it is thought most advisable to reverse all the proceedings to the libel, and to remand the cause to the District Court, for farther proceedings, with directions to permit the libel to be amended.
DECREE. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the District Court of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is DECREED and ORDERED, that the sentence of the District Court for the District of Louisiana, condemning the said 422 casks of wine as forfeited to the United States, be, and the same hereby is reversed and annulled. And it is further DECREED and ORDERED, that the cause be remanded to the said District Court of Louisiana, with directions to allow the libel in this case to be amended, and to take such farther proceedings [21 U.S. 391, 396] in the said cause as law and justice may require.c
